

no compunction.

Jonker in his letter of March 5th to the Embassy fastens on two aspects of the case, firstly that Van der Waals believed Schreieder to be a British agent and secondly that Van der Waals himself was employed by us after the liberation of Holland. I will try to deal with these two points in order.

The first of ~~these three~~ is largely based upon the second, the argument being that if Van der Waals was employed by us immediately after the liberation of Holland, it is to be assumed that he had already been working for us before. By extension it can then be argued that all his war-time activities under Schreieder were undertaken either ^{at} by our orders or at any rate in the belief that Schreieder was a British agent. Van der Waals would thus appear as an innocent Dutch patriot, and the ^{perhaps even as a} last victim of the "Englandspiel". In fact Van der Waals was never employed by us before the liberation of Holland: our people knew all about him; ~~namely, that~~ he was Schreieder's right-hand man and one of his most active agents in the penetration of the S.O.E. operation in Holland. The argument which I have just outlined therefore falls down. Van der Waals worked for Schreieder in the simple and single capacity of a thorough-going Dutch traitor serving the German intelligence.

Now as to the second of Jonker's points. Van der Waals was picked up after the liberation ^{and} of Holland/was employed by us in Germany. This was done with full knowledge of his identity and record and with at least the passive consent of the Dutch intelligence. The circumstances are as described in the attached letter to Jonker.
The/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No.

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft.

The story does not look wise or pretty now:
but in the stress of that time, when the German
Army was still in action, military expediency
over-rode all other considerations and some pretty
lurid things had to be done. In practice this
particular gambit failed: Van der Waals not
only produced no results in Germany but in fact
~~disappeared~~: ^{at once} when we again caught up with him
~~went underground with his Nazi friends~~ he was
therefore re-arrested and eventually handed over to
the Dutch.

So much for the facts: we now come up against
the question of how much we are prepared to say. As
I told you in my letter of April 20th, we feel
that, at any rate so far as statements to the
press are concerned, we should ride the high horse
and refuse to be drawn into detailed refutation
of the accusations launched against us. Jonker's
approach, however, confronts us with a rather
different problem and we have agreed with
Halford's friends the reply which we now send you,
on the following grounds.

In the first place most of the facts are al-
ready known and it would be useless to deny for
instance that we used Van der Waals in Germany
after the liberation of Holland. The two arti-
cles which appeared in the "Haagsch Dagblad" of
May 21st and May 22nd last year gave a very full
and largely accurate account of what happened when
Van der Waals was first picked up. The tone of
these two articles encourages us moreover to hope
that the Dutch public may accept the story as ^{the}
~~being~~ a true account of an operation which, however
distasteful, was dictated by the military necessi-
ties of the time. Secondly we feel that we must
send an answer of some sort to Jonker and it is
really impossible to reply in any less detail
than/

than is used in our enclosed letter: after all,
a reputable lawyer
he is *trying* to save his client's neck and, if
if only out of respect for the Courts of an
allied country, we owe some answer. Thirdly,
it does not seem likely that Jonker will use
the material with which we provide him, *since* it
would not be in his client's interest to do so:
there is therefore reason to hope that our letter
will not become public.

Finally *just* There is one *point* which I should
perhaps make. Schreieder's evidence after the
war showed quite clearly that Van der Waals had
been responsible for betraying to the German
counter-espionage service a large number of allied
and particularly Dutch agents. We do not feel
that we can include this *evidence* ~~information~~ in the reply
to Jonker, partly because it might lead to further
questions, but mainly because it might give the
impression that we were hoping to make Van der
Waals our scapegoat, get him hanged and bury with
him the whole unpleasant story.

We have arrived at this line of action after
a great deal of thought and discussion here:
I hope that it will seem acceptable to you. If
we do not hear from you on Tuesday we shall assume
that you have sent the letter on to Jonker.

[Yours ever,]

*Copy
6/5.*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry No. 22738/1051/29 G

Y^h May, 1949.

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
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OUTFILE + 3c 2pk

Sir,

I am..... to inform you, in reply to your letter of March 5th to H.M.Embassy at The Hague that enquiries have been made into the ^{statement} ~~allegati-~~on by your client Antonius Van der Waals that he was sent to Germany by the British authorities after the German capitulation in 1945. The facts are as follows:

Draft Letter

To
 Mr.G.Jonker,
 Van Eggenstraat,
 102,
 Amsterdam.

For enclosure in
 letter to
 Sir P. Nichols,
 The Hague.

+ 2 copy^{ies} for
 Sir P.Nichols.

Copy for
 Mr.Street,
 S.L.Dept.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

John 5/5
Agp/14
See & agreed by N's best.

RECEIVED IN DIVISION
 6 MAY 1949
 SENT TO THE 6/5
 BY 9/5

2. Van der Waals surrendered himself under a false name to the Canadian Field Security at Groningen shortly after the liberation of Holland in May, 1945. He was interrogated by two intelligence officers one British, Captain Pidcock, and one Dutch, Captain Siedenburg. Under interrogation Van der Waals' true identity soon came to light.

3. You are doubtless aware that at the time in question it was feared that the Germans ^{would} be able to establish a secret ~~Nazi~~ resistance organisation, devoted to the underground maintenance of the Nazi ideal and to harassing the Allied Occupation Forces. It was with this danger in mind that Captain Pidcock recommended to the British authorities that Van der Waals should be sent to Germany to make contact with any such clandestine Nazi organisation and report on its activities. Whilst his reputation as a successful German agent would make him persona grata with any such organisation which might exist, there seemed little security risk since, if he failed to carry out his instructions, he could at any time be re-arrested and handed over to the Dutch authorities, who were seeking him as a war criminal./

BR413 WLM:R:R:R 50,000 1247 A.S.E.W.L.L. Cp-453
 BR716 WLS:R:R:R 100,000 548

criminal.

4. After discussions in London, it was agreed that this operation should be carried out: the decision was communicated confidentially to the B.N.V., the Dutch Security Service, and Van der Waals was sent to Germany in the summer of 1945. The operation however was a failure since Van der Waals very soon disappeared from Bonn, where he had been established, and was not found again until the end of 1945, when he ~~reappeared~~ ^{was re-arrested} in Berlin. ~~As he was manifestly unusable from the Allied point of view, he was then re-arrested~~ ^{He was} confined in a prisoner-of-war camp in the British Zone and finally handed over to the Netherlands Government in the summer of 1946 to stand his trial.

5. Van der Waals has stated that he was convinced that Schreieder, who was the head of the S.D. in Holland and was responsible for the conduct of ~~the~~ operations against the Allied clandestine groups there, was working for the British Intelligence Service. This story is of course totally untrue nor, in view of the facts which became known when Schreieder was interrogated after the war, does it seem likely that Van der Waals ever believed it. Schreieder testified that Van der Waals worked for him as an agent against the Allied Resistance Movements from the beginning of 1941 until the middle of 1943 and showed clearly that he considered Van der Waals one of his most valuable agents.

CGJ
115

I do not believe this phrase.
Can we not say "As he was manifestly unusable from the Allied point of view, he was then re-arrested" which had been done...?"
CGJ
115

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

nothing to be written in this margin. *his phrase. he he*

Translation from the daily paper "HAAGSCH DAGBLAD" ed. 21.5.48.

A SLY FACE, BUT WE MAY BE ABLE TO USE HIM.

A British and a Dutch Officer have Plans with Van der Waals.

The Intelligence has a separate morale.

"My name is Van der Meer!", says Anton van der Waals to captains Pidcock and Sydenburg. "What can I do for the gentlemen?"

The traitor has ~~no~~ complete control of himself, although he must realize that the next few moments mean life or death. But at the same moment he notices the Dutch stars on the uniform of Capt. Sydenburg and he says decidedly: "I only wish to talk to high allied officers, for my information is so important that I cannot give it to everybody."

Pidcock looks amazed when Sydenburg ~~interprets~~ interprets these somewhat unusual words spoken by a prisoner. But Capt. Pidcock has got used to meeting queer people and he asks Sydenburg to tell him the following:

"We'll give you one chance. Tell everything now, immediately, or else into the cell and Court. If you fall into Dutch hands, you will be killed. You can choose."

At that moment Capt. Pidcock has not the faintest idea who the pale man is who is sitting opposite him. But his theory is right: this man is afraid of justice and he will talk from fear.

Van der Waals's story is 90% lies. He talks easily. And what he tells is so wildly fantastic that both officers listen intently - in spite of ~~the~~ the reservedness which their strange career has taught them. "Van der Meer" is getting more and more mysterious

and more and more important. He could be of great importance to the allies. He could do excellent work. He has been in Sweden during the war on special duties.

"In Sweden?" Pidcock asks suddenly.

"Yes", says Van der Waals. And at the same moment he realizes with horror that he has given himself away.....

Quietly Pidcock says: "So you are Van der Waals".

"Yes", murmurs the traitor. "Yes, I am Van der Waals".

"That's not so good for you", says captain Sydenburg. "We know a lot about you! But tell your story again, and this time without lies."

And again the soft, educated voice of the Rotterdam electro-technician sounds through the interrogation-room of camp O-5-0 in Okerhof. And again Van der Waals puts in lies. But what truth he tells is so horrible, so intensely mean, so completely a-moral, it makes that/both hardened intelligence-officers shiver.

"So Schreieder has been your chief?", Pidcock asks finally.

"Schreieder has given me all instructions", confirms the traitor. He does not say a word about "Emsel Verhagen", the British agent, about whom he told such strange stories two years later, to save his head. No word about the information Schreieder would have given him about his work as British penetration-agent. It is April 1945. At that moment Van der Waals has not yet thought up those mysterious stories. And even if he had thought of them, he would not have been able to relate them to this British officer of the Secret Service. For an investigation would disclose his lies.....

"All right", says Pidcock, "that's enough for now. Thanks for your information. You will hear more about it. You will remain in the camp for the time being. You will get paper and a pencil; we want you to write down your whole life-history."

The cell-door closes behind Van der Waals.

Captain Pidcock has a serious discussion with the camp-commandant. The prisoner Van der Meer must be given a special guard. Nobody must be admitted to him, nobody is allowed to talk to him.

He is "frozen"; a frozen-in prisoner. Reserved for the intelligence.

"That fellow has a mean face", says Pidcock to Sydenburg when they get into their car. "But he is interesting. And possibly useful."

Possibly useful.....

One day in May Sydenburg and Pidcock are sitting opposite a trembling Kriminal-Direktor in a cell of the Rotterdam prison. Little Joseph Schreieder was found in the Sperrgebiet in Scheveningen after the liberation and promptly arrested, together with all his S.D.-comrades who were with him. The group who arrested him has not been soft with him; the cunning Bavarian is still ~~completely~~ subdued.

Does he know Van der Weals? Certainly, gentlemen. Jawohl, that was his most useful man, gentlemen. A big man. A man who might be very useful to the British Intelligence.

Pidcock and Sydenburg look at each other; the German must have read their minds.

But after all, Schreieder is also an espionage-leader. The one wins the war, the other loses. But we are collegues after all. And espionage has its ^{set of} own morals. Morals which the man-in-the-street would call dirty. But what of it? In a profession in which man-hunting is called a "game"..... Morals? There is only one thing: to win the war. If necessary with the aid of individuals like Antonius van der Weals!

Translation from the daily paper "HAAGSCH DAGBLAD" of 22.5.48.

In O-3-0 in Oerhof ANTON VAN DER WAALS writes his biography for Captains Pidcock and Sydenburg. It becomes a long story; the memoirs of a traitor. Of course the pale fantast lies so much in this story that the paper is blushing. On the first few pages he memorizes numerous fine traits from his high-school days. Traits ~~fraxxxdink~~ showing his precocious intelligence. Anton was a clever boy indeed at the high-school. However, the truth is that he has never visited a high-school. But why shouldn't he lie when there is a possibility? Pidcock's and Sydenburg's work is not so nice either.

At the same time Captain Pidcock is writing a report to the War Office in London. He has found Van der Waals, the biggest scoundrel in Holland - and he would like to use him in the struggle against evil. He has found Van der Waals who was instrumental to the death of hundreds and hundreds of people and had more than a thousand people captured by the S.D. - and he requests the British commanders' permission to incorporate this hundredfold murderer in the struggle for Right. He has found Van der Waals who sent a considerable part of the illegality to mass-graves and concentration-camps, who turned hundreds of wives into widows and hundreds of children into semi-orphans. - and he feels very much inclined to withdraw this criminal from Dutch justice and to use him for the tracing of German saboteurs. Scoundrels catch scoundrels and war is war.

And the War Office agrees. Pidcock soon receives a document from London with many stamps stating that the contents is most secret and most important. Top secret-case and hush-hush. Antonius Van der Waals, prisoner in O-3-0, Dutch criminal in Dutch territory will be withdrawn from justice and will be allowed to use his devilish talents in the service of the conquering armies of the allies. May his work bear rich fruits!

With this message Pidcock and Sydenburg go to Anton, in the days that Holland is celebrating her liberation. One can see that the traitor is very relieved. He knows that at that moment hundreds of people are looking for him in all towns and villages of Holland. They will look in vain Van der Waals is protected! His path does not lead to the court of justice, but to freedom; to the work he loves, to new swindle, new lies, new treason.

"You will be attached to the work of the British Intelligence in Germany", says Pidcock. "We know that you have caused considerable blows to the Dutch resistance. If you fall into the hands of the Dutch, you are lost. But we'll give you a chance. Do as much as you can for the allied cause. See to it that you get as many good deeds to your credit as possible. That is your only chance to be saved."

Van der Waals is submissive, polite, obliging and of good will.

"I shall be able to do splendid work against the Russians", he says enthusiastically.

"Put that idea aside", warns Pidcock. "The Russians are our allies with whom we have just won the war against the Nazis. Your work will have to be directed against German underground movement. Do you know any people in Germany to collaborate with?"

The traitor has an idea. There is a Miss Geigerseder in Munchen, Schreieder's secretary, with whom he has had an affair. He will renew the friendship. That will be all right, it will be a good start.

Messrs. Pidcock and Sydenburg have no objections. Victory begins at Miss Geigerseder. Connections is all that matters in life

In those joyous days of 1945 there are so many different Dutch security services at work that they ^{give the} British and Canadians a head-ache. Holland has become so terribly security-minded that there is a camouflaged Paul ^(= Temple) (Vlaanderen in every street. And it is impossible to count the many heads of service and assistant-heads of service, and deputy assistant-heads of service who sit thinking behind impressive desks. There is an amazing number of important people who, dressed in brand-new uniforms, are driving beflagged motor-cars, at high speed. But their bustle also drives the allied authorities silly. When they seek contact with the Dutch security service, they have the choice of ten different ones and are sent from pillar to post. Who on earth has ever seen anything like it - more than ten security services, spying on each other and on the whole population, and creating a problem, compared to which the Gordian knot is a simple trick.

The Government takes action. At the end of May a Bureau Nationale Veiligheid (B.N.V.) is established. The leader is the Rotterdam ex-~~police~~ superintendent of police mr (= lawyer) L. Einthoven who in the beginning of the occupation was part of the triumvirate of the Nederlandsche Unie. And captain Sydenburg, Pidcock's colleague, is incorporated in this new B.N.V. For there must be specialists in that one central bureau which must guard over national security.

One of the first days of June captain Pidcock and Mr. Sydenburg have a serious discussion with Mr. Einthoven. "Look", says Pidcock, "we have the traitor Anton van der Waals for whom all Holland is looking. Your bureau too of course

But that man will not be arrested. For, with London's permission, we want to use him as a spy in our service. A big man. Has

tricked many Dutchmen into their death. He's going to do the same to the Germans. Of course, we're very sorry he's escaping Dutch justice and sorry for the hundreds who are looking for him in vain, but silence is gold."

Mr. Einthoven thinks it is a gruesome operation. But all right, silence is the highest virtue for the chief of a security service. And Mr. Einthoven can keep silent.

Therefore the Dutch detective-force in all its branches will look for Van der Waals for more than a year without finding him. There will be commotion and discord between various instances. The illegality will ask crossly: Why don't they catch the mass-murderer Van der Waals? What has happened to Van der Waals? Where has Van der Waals gone to?

And during all that time the chief of the Bureau Nationale Veiligheid will know that ^{every effort} ~~every effort~~ of justice and police, of B.N.V. and P.O.D. is doomed to fail. He knows that Van der Waals is working for the British.

But he keeps silent

And let the detectives run along!

8

WESTERN

22739 /G

1949

NETHERLANDS

22739 | 1051 | 29G

Sir Hartley
Shawcross (Attorney
General) to
Mr. McNeil

Dated 11
Recd 29 } March 1949

Accusations against the British
in connection with the "Englandspiel"
allegations in "Manchester
Guardian" article of March 4th

(Encloses letter from Admiral GODFREY, March 6)

Last Paper

22738

References

22082

22737 | 1051 | 29G

22738

(Print)

(How disposed of)

PTM Sir H. Shawcross
from Mr. McNeil
March 21st

off.) Sir H. Shawcross
from Mr. Maylew
✓ 16th May

(Action completed)

J. K. H.

(Index)

W. M. H.

Next Paper

See within: -

(Minutes)

Minute by Mr. Russell of March 16

Minute by Mr. Street no 148/F of March 18

Minute by Mr. Street no. 196/F of 12th April.

Minute by Mr. Street no. 211/F of 22nd April.

Minutes

-22739
Enter soon

SECRET.

The "Englandspiel."

I have just been confronted for the first time with this murky affair, which so far as we are concerned seems to boil down at the present stage to the following components.

(i) Statement.

We must now produce a statement to be published in the Press (preferably to be released in the first instance by our Embassy at The Hague) setting forth the true facts (so far as they can bear the light of day) and refuting to the best of our ability the various charges levelled against us, particularly set forth at (a) (b) and (c) in the Ambassador's letter of March 10th. to N. Shuckburgh.

We have had one shot at this, but the draft statement which we sent under cover of Mr. Shuckburgh's letter of March 4th (Z 2082) has been rejected by the Ambassador as inadequate: public interest has been further excited by the "Manchester Guardian" article of March 4th and Sir P. Nichols calls for something more precise and comprehensive than what we offered him (a paper originally drafted by the friends and slightly amended here).

We have no choice but to return to the charge with the friends and ask them to produce something better. The F.O. is not in possession of the relevant information nor in a position to decide how much of it is publishable. The best line of approach would seem to be for Mr. Street (S.L. Department) to tackle the friends on this.

(ii) When this point has been decided, we should send an interim reply to Sir P. Nichols (who as shown by his telephone conversation of March 11th with Mr. Shuckburgh) is getting restive, telling him what is happening.

(iii) Jonker.

The Embassy have for the moment fobbed off Mr. Jonker, the new Defence Counsel for Van der Waals, by telling him that they are consulting London and I think that any further communication with him can await the upshot of the action suggested above for producing a statement: we should so inform the Embassy.

(iv) Admiral Godfrey.

We must now answer Sir Hartley Shawcross' letter of March 11th to the Minister of State, under cover of which he enclosed a letter addressed to himself by Admiral Godfrey, formerly D.N.I. I think this reply should be quite non-committal for the moment and I submit a draft letter merely saying that we are going into the matter.

Admiral/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Page A Note / 22737G

Page B 22082G

Page C within

Page D 22737G

Page E 22738G

Page F within

M. g. r. s.

Admiral Godfrey's letter contains various disturbing phrases. In the first place he says that "the real explanation is one which can hardly be published:" Further on he speaks of "an element of oblique collusion . . . between belligerents who indulge in double agent work:" and again he says "in our after knowledge of Canaris' activities, these activities acquire added significance."

I do not find this very re-assuring as it suggests ~~to me~~ that there was in fact something pretty ~~quaint~~ on our side in all this. Would it be possible perhaps to check further with Admiral Godfrey? Mr. Passant, to whom Admiral Godfrey refers at the end of his letter, may be able to cast some further light.

Conclusion
I know no more of this episode than is shown in the few papers attached; but it seems to me that it is going to be difficult for us to get out of it easily. If the friends are unable to produce any convincing story, supported by technical details, I think our only line is to ride the high horse and concentrate on an indignant denial of the sinister political motives imputed to us: these are in any case of a wildly improbable nature. The "Manchester Guardian" article incidentally offers a good let-out but I do not know whether the friends will be prepared to admit that S.O.E. was able to make such major blunders.

John Russell

(J.W. Russell)
16th March, 1949.

1. Mr. Street.
2. Mr. Halford.
3. Mr. Hayter. *sup. minutes.*
4. Mr. F. Warner ✓ (for approval of draft from Minister of State to Sir Hartley Shawcross).
5. Mr. Passant.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Minutes

The Minister of State has minuted as follows:-

"This is a bewildering and distressing story which I suppose may yet have unpleasant political implications for us.

Of course I do not understand the details, but here are some questions.

(1) I presume that we at no time dropped people knowing they were being caught: or even to have them used as double double agents.

(2) When was the "handwriting" device employed? 1943? Did none of our captured men refuse to send: and if even one did why did we not spot it?

(3) What (although this has nothing to do with our pleasant embarrassment) did we get out of it or expect to get out of it?

On the reports here it seems as hare-brained as a Hollywood thriller and as pointless."

H. McN.
March 22nd.

*Now see letter to Sir P. Nichols
suggesting that we avoid issuing a
Statement. (Z 2737/6)*

*There remain the questions of
Jonker's letter on Z 2738, and
Admiral Godfrey's letter to Sir
Hartley Shawcross therein.*

*R. Mason
27/3/44.*

We ought perhaps to deal with the question of Jonker's letter separately from the general question of how we are to answer the public accusations which are being levelled against us.

The point in the case of Jonker's letter seems to be whether it can be said that his client, Van der Weals, was sent to Holland in the belief that Schreider was in fact working for the British. In view of the reference by Admiral Godfrey to "oblique collusion between belligerents" it seems to me that this may be rather a nasty question and as the man's life may depend upon it we must be very careful.

As regards.....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Minutes.

As regards the general question, I confess to being still very much in the dark and I should be very grateful if Mr. Street could come over and explain various points to me. In particular we must answer the Minister of State's question above and I should like to know, if I may, whether any full inquiry, similar to Lord Selbourne's report, has been made since the war or is being made now. It is clear that this is likely to become a very tricky question between us and the Dutch and we must be prepared for the most likely event of Sir Philip Nichols being dissatisfied with the contents of my letter of 28th March.

CSJ

31st March, 1949

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. Halford.

Mr. Russell's minute of March 18th about the "Englandspiel", which I have kept for the present.

I return herewith the draft reply to Sir Hartley Shawcross, which there is no reason to delay. When it has gone off I should like to have back the letters from Sir Hartley Shawcross and Admiral Godfrey so that the papers may be kept together. Copies of the Selborne report, for which Mr. Bunker has asked, are almost ready, and I will send them across as soon as they are available. The delay has been due to the necessity to edit into a concise report of about 50 pages the information contained in the S.O.E. files.

I am going ahead at once with the preparation of the revised statement for which Sir Philip Nichols has asked. It is, of course, a task of some difficulty because of the technical nature of the enquiry and the extraordinary complications of the case.

Finally, there is the letter from Mr. Jonker, now Counsel for Van der Weale. It is going to be even more troublesome, since Mr. Jonker has raised the question of Van der Weale's activities after the German capitulation. These involve not only S.O.E., but also your friends, who appear to have used Van der Weale as an agent (perhaps I should say a 'double double agent') at a time when he was being sought by the Netherlands authorities as a traitor.

John Street

J.R.D. Street.

18th March 1949.

Mr PA. Waver. If the M/S agree to write a suggested way then have the file back? May 1949

14th April, 1949.

Mr Aspden.

In the absence of the M/S you might like to suggest that the PA's sign this letter.

May 12/4

Mr Mayhew

I was formally mixed up in it

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

Minutes. Z

Z2739
No. 196/P.
P/W - 2/G

Mr. Joy.

Reference Z 2739/1051/293.

I now attach a draft reply from the Minister of State to Sir Hartley Shawcross. Western Department have already seen it, except for the last two paragraphs, which I have inserted at Mr. Shuckburgh's request. C. has approved the draft, subject to any amendments which Mr. Shuckburgh or the Minister of State may wish to make.

The answers to the questions posed by the Minister of State in his minute of March 22nd are as follows:

1. At no time did S.O.E. drop agents knowing that they would fall into enemy hands, nor did they use any of them as double or treble agents.
2. The term "handwriting" refers to the personal characteristics of a wireless operator transmitting Morse signals. These characteristics can only be spotted by a very experienced operator at the receiving end, and they are by no means infallible as a guide.
3. The disaster suffered by the S.O.E. operations in Holland must be judged against the broader background of similar operations in other countries, which were either almost entirely or mainly successful. It just happened that in the case of Holland S.O.E. were defeated by superior counter-espionage technique.

J.E.D. Street
J.E.D. Street.

12th April, 1949.

Mr Aspden.

In the absence of the M/S
You might like to suggest that
the Park M/S sign this letter.

Murray 12/4

Mr Mayhew

I was formerly mixed up in

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

good deal of this day to say.
Mr. Street's part 2 miss, I think,
to indicate that I had in devised an
electrical machine to measure "handwriting".
It was quite unlike, I believe it was
devised as a result of Jule's experience.

I remember we used a double
agent on the BLA front for a time.
He did a lot of things before being
discovered or arrested.

I would like to see the full
history before signs to draft.

Perhaps I could make a speech
on this sometime, having infiltrated a
'double' Jule's agent myself.

Chm
19/4

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Nothing to be written in this margin.

Minutes

211/7

Z2739

Mr. Halford.

Reference Mr. Mayhew's minute about the "Englandspiel".

Your friends tell us that although, as Mr. Mayhew says, there was an electrical device to measure "handwriting", it was not sufficiently developed to be of use in time to give information about the operators in Holland.

I rather think that the double agent referred to by Mr. Mayhew may be Anton Van der Waals, whose case I am now dealing with on other papers. Although responsible to a considerable degree for the break-up of the S.O.E. groups in Holland, this man was not used as an agent until after the war and then by your friends and not by S.O.E. It is the case that S.O.E. did not knowingly employ double agents at any time during their operations in Holland.

John's Street

J.B.D. Street.

22nd April, 1949.

Even today, though we can record peculiarities of transmission, we cannot automatically classify them. We have to rely on gentlemen with second-sight or some such occult gift.

Western Dept. can perhaps

Holland were to be used by... every case these "reception committees" were German controlled.

The name of Major Bingham has been repeatedly mentioned in Holland in connexion with this affair and charges of treachery have been levelled against him. In fact he did not take charge of the British side of the London headquarters until March 1943, and by this time the Germans had already intercepted the first agents and were firmly in control of the situation. When he took charge, Major Bingham insisted on abolishing the system of "reception committees" and agents were dropped "blind".

This story should perhaps be read against the wider background of the war in which the question of... 1st March, 1949.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

select those pp. which Mr. Mayhew
sh^d see to get the whole story. I
don't suppose we need trouble him
with all this correspondence.

I don't whether it w^d
be a good thing if Mr. Mayhew
were to make a speech. For the
reasons given in the lft. letter we
shall never be able to make a
full statement in reply to
accusations - so the sooner the
whole business lapses into oblivion
the better. I fear that a speech
by a Minister might only fan
the flame.

W. Mayhew
22/10/49.

Western Dept. first.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

A. J. H. L. L.

Ames

Sub a. David

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

1.

Shown to R Scott
Manchester Guardian
Lambert New York 2/3/49

Enclosure

2/6

Operations by S.O.E. in Holland during the war were in large part ineffective, since the organisation was penetrated by the Germans at a very early stage and thereafter most efficiently controlled. Statements have been made recently in Holland suggesting that the disasters which S.O.E. agents in Holland suffered were due not to errors, but to British treachery. The latest weapon in this campaign is a pamphlet "Het Englandspiel" which is full of the most libellous and untrue statements, as the Dutch authorities agree.

The facts are that the first agent sent to Holland by S.O.E. in the summer of 1942 was caught by the Germans shortly after his arrival, induced to tell what he knew and persuaded to work for the Germans. Subsequent S.O.E. missions, acting on the assumption that the first agent was still free, walked into the same trap and were themselves turned against the headquarters in London.

A drill had been arranged with the agent to ensure that, if he were captured, this fact would be known to the London headquarters.

It had been arranged, before the despatch of the first agent, that if he were caught by the Germans and they tried to persuade him to work for them, he would omit from any wireless messages which he might send a certain code word. This drill was in fact carried out by the first agent after his capture; since, however, it was thought in London that there might have been other reasons other than the obvious one for the omission of the code word, the matter was discussed by the Anglo-Dutch headquarters and, taking into consideration what was known of the personality and character of the agent, and with the knowledge that the code word had been proved in other areas to be inconclusive as a test, it was decided that the agent was still free.

At the end of 1943 two S.O.E. agents, who had been captured by the Germans and had escaped, arrived in England and reported to their headquarters the serious state of affairs in Holland. As a result a most thorough investigation took place in the early part of 1944. The investigation showed that the organisation in Holland had in fact been penetrated and thoroughly controlled by the Germans since at least the early part of 1943. Efforts were then made to establish a completely new organisation, having no connexions with the old one. Inevitably, however, as the new organisation grew, it came into touch with the remnants of the old one and was thus drawn into the German web. In any case, the stories now circulating in Holland relate solely to the penetration of the first organisation.

Lined

One of the factors which contributed to the German success was the system under which the agents dropped into Holland were to be met by agents already installed. In almost every case these "reception committees" were German controlled.

The name of Major Bingham has been repeatedly mentioned in Holland in connexion with this affair and charges of treachery have been levelled against him. In fact he did not take charge of the British side of the London headquarters until March 1943, and by this time the Germans had already intercepted the first agents and were firmly in control of the situation. When he took charge, Major Bingham insisted on abolishing the system of "reception committees" and agents were dropped "blind".

This story should perhaps be read against the wider background of the S.O.E. question in all countries in which these operations were conducted. This was the only case in which these operations were conducted on 1st March, 1949.

4

WESTERN

Z 2082 /G

1949

NETHERLANDS

Z 2082/1057/29 G

F.O. Minute
Mr Mason

d. 3. March.

v. 7. March.

Report on Allegations of Treachery against
British Officers Operating during the War
under S.O.E. in the Netherlands

Last Paper

Z 1783

References

(Minutes)

We must now await Sir P.
Nichols' observations on the statement
prepared for publication.

Rose

12/Mar.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

2 ft / Sir P. Nichols (The Hague)
from Sir Sturges
14 March

(Action completed)

K147

(Index)

K147

Next Paper

Z 2083

26500

Registry
No.

22082

MINUTE 2

1051/29

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Allegations of Treachery Against
British Officers Operating under
S.O.E. in The Netherlands.

Draft.

Record of talk

M: Nasar
News Dept

M: Lambert
News Dept

M: Skitt
S.L. Dept.

On 28th February Mr. Lambert
of the News Dep^t ~~was~~ asked me whether
I was aware that a book "Het Engeland-
Spil" had recently ~~been~~ appeared in
The Netherlands, containing charges
of treachery against certain British
officers operating with S.O.E. in The
Netherlands during the War, and that
a Major Bingham had been called
upon to give evidence before a Dutch
Commission of Enquiry. He said that
the Diplomatic Correspondent of the
"Manchester Guardian" was aware,
from a correspondent in The Netherlands,
that the British Ambassador at The
Hague had passed a statement
refuting ~~these~~ ^{of treachery} allegations to the President
of the Commission of Enquiry, and was
requesting permission to publish a
copy of the statement.

I showed Mr. Lambert the
papers and suggested that Mr. Hayler's
friends should be asked whether they
/ had

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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