

had any objections to the publication of the statement. Mr. Lambert took the pp. and enquired of Mr. Street.

On 1<sup>st</sup> March Mr. Street called with a copy of the statement, ~~I agreed~~ with ~~him~~ which, he said, Mr. Bayler's friends had no objection to publishing. I agreed with him that it was unsuitable for publication as it stood, as it was written in a somewhat turgid style and contained words and expressions of a technical nature which would be confusing without explanation, and references to events which ~~were not~~ ~~mentioned~~ implied knowledge of the background of the case. We agreed that we should invite Mr. Lambert to prepare a précis of the document which would be suitable for publication.

Later in the day Sir Philip Nichols called and asked that he might be consulted before <sup>any official</sup> statement was issued to the press.

After he had gone Mr. Lambert and Mr. Street showed me a copy of the précis which Mr. Lambert had prepared (copy attached) and asked whether there were any objections to

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it's being passed to Mr. Scott of the  
"Manchester Guardian". In view of  
Sir Philip Nichols' wishes in the matter  
I said that we would not wish it to  
be published until it had been referred  
to The Hague.

Mr. Lambert pointed out that Mr.  
Scott had ~~already~~ shown considerable  
forbearance in withholding a story which  
~~had~~ was already current in the Nether-  
lands press, and that, in fairness to Mr.  
Scott, we could not very well ask him  
to hold back any longer. It was preferable  
that his story should be reflect the  
true background, even if it were not  
possible to issue <sup>official</sup> statement, than that it  
should be based on rumour. Mr. Scott  
was convinced that the charges of treachery  
were baseless, and wished for some official  
information to back up a story along these  
lines.

We therefore agreed that Mr. Scott should  
be shown Mr. Lambert's précis but asked  
not to quote it as the source of his infor-  
mation. In the meantime Mr. Street under-  
took to transmit the text of the précis to  
The Hague, Sir P. Nichols having already  
returned there.

On 2<sup>nd</sup> March I met Mr. Scott in the  
News Dept. and explained to him why  
/ we

*Allen*  
*did not wish the statement or the*  
*press to be published.*

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Room

[ Dear ]

Draft. Letter to  
Sir Philip Nichols  
from  
Mr. Sauerbrugh.

Seen by Mr. Hambert  
News Dep't.

You will remember our conversation of 1<sup>st</sup> March about the whether we should issue to the Press the statement which ~~was~~ you passed to the President Mr. Danker about the penetration of the S.O.E. organization in The Netherlands by the German intelligence service. Kayfer's friends had said that they had no objections to its being published but we considered that it was not, in its present form, suitable for publication and that we would prepare a more readable and less turgid piece. You asked us to let you have ~~the~~ <sup>an</sup> opportunity to comment on it before issuing it to the ~~press~~ press.

I did not realize when I spoke to you that Mr. Scott, the Diplomatic Correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian," was already in possession of most of the facts ~~and~~, through a correspondent in the Netherlands who had taken part in S.O.E. operations during the War, and ~~was~~ ~~had~~ ~~approached~~ ~~us~~ ~~for~~ was about to publish an article describing and refuting the allegations of treachery on  
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the part of British officers which had  
appeared in "Het Englandspeel".  
Mr. Scott

As ~~we~~ had consulted us first and  
is, in any case, a journalist <sup>in</sup> whom  
we have every confidence, ~~the~~  
The News Desk ~~is~~, we felt  
that in fairness to him, we could not  
ask him to withhold publication of  
his article any longer. We decided  
therefore, to show him the précis of the  
Statement passed to Mr. Jaurez, ~~and~~  
to authorize him to use it as background for his article,  
but to ask him not to <sup>quote it as</sup> disclose the source  
of this information.

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I enclose a copy of his article which  
appeared in today's issue of the "Manchester  
Guardian." ~~We~~ do not think that  
Mr. Scott has in any way abused our  
confidence although we would, perhaps,  
have been better pleased if he had  
omitted the sentence about a Foreign  
Office statement.

I enclose also a copy of the précis,  
which we propose, subject to your views,  
to clear for publication.

~~As requested~~

[ Yours ]

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*Outline*

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

4th March, 1949

**TOP SECRET**  
Z. 2737/1051/29C

You will remember our conversation of 1st March about whether we should issue to the Press the statement which you passed to Mr. Denker about the penetration of the S.O.E. organisation in the Netherlands by the German Intelligence Service. Hayter's friends had said that they had no objection to its being published but we considered that it was not, in its present form, suitable for publication and that we would prepare a more readable and less turgid précis. You asked us to let you have an opportunity to comment on it before issuing it to the press.

I did not realise when I spoke to you that Mr. Scott, the Diplomatic Correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian", was already in possession of most of the facts, through a correspondent in the Netherlands who had taken part in S.O.E. operations during the war, and was about to publish an article describing and refuting the allegations of treachery on the part of British officers which had appeared in "Het Englandspiel".

As Mr. Scott had consulted us first and is, in any case a Journalist in whom the News Department has every confidence, we felt that in fairness to him, we could not ask him to withhold publication of his article any longer. We decided therefore, to show him the précis of the statement passed to Mr. Denker, to authorise him to use it as background for his article, but to ask him not to quote it nor disclose the source of his information.

I enclose a copy of his article which appeared in today's issue of the "Manchester Guardian". I do not think that Mr. Scott has in any way abused our confidence, although we would, perhaps,

Sir Philip Nichols, K.C.M.G., M.C.,  
H.M. Embassy,  
The Hague

have been... at Mr. Mayhew may

[tag E]

Z. 2737/G - Summary of Van de Starp's book "The Englandspiel", and the letter to Sir Philip Nichols stating our reasons for wishing to avoid issuing a statement.

[tag G]

Z. 2739/G - Letters from Admiral Godfrey and Sir Hartley Shawcross, and draft reply.

[tag H]

Z. 3156/G - Letter to Sir Philip Nichols authorising him to make a statement denying the Englandspiel allegations.

*C. H. [Signature]*

7th May, 1949

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the letter, I agreed to do a

statement for me which would be more correct.

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[7 Aug 5] - Z. 2739/G -  
[7 Aug 6] - Z. 3156/G -



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I enclose also a copy of the précis, which we propose, subject to your views, to release for publication.

~~No requests~~

[ Yours ]

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[File E] - Z. 2737/G

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I have made a slight amendment to the end of Mr. Street's draft letter to Sir Hartley Shawcross, which I now submit for approval: at the same time, Mr. Mayhew may like to see Mr. Street's reply to his remarks of 19th April.

I agree with Mr. Halford in thinking that Mr. Mayhew would be well advised to avoid making a speech on this subject. If he had to answer questions, I fear there would be great difficulties.

In order to follow developments of the Englandspiel case in recent months, Mr. Mayhew should, I think, read the following papers:-

- [7 May 1] - Z. 59/G - Request from Sir Philip Nichols that a copy of Lord Selborne's report be made available to Mr. Denker, the Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry.
- [7 May 2] - Z. 1783/G - Letter from Sir Philip Nichols recommending that H.M. Government should issue a statement on the Englandspiel; also letter to Sir Philip Nichols forwarding two copies of Lord Selborne's report. (Copy of Lord Selborne's report herewith, but as this is a long and intricate document Mr. Mayhew may not think it necessary to read it.)
- [7 May 3] - Z. 2082/G - The Manchester Guardian article on the Englandspiel, and minutes regarding the guidance given to Mr. Scott of the Manchester Guardian.
- [7 May 4] - Z. 2737/G - Summary of Van de Storp's book "The Englandspiel", and the letter to Sir Philip Nichols stating our reasons for wishing to avoid issuing a statement.
- [7 May 5] - Z. 2739/G - Letters from Admiral Godfrey and Sir Hartley Shawcross, and draft reply.
- [7 May 6] - Z. 3156/G - Letter to Sir Philip Nichols authorising him to make a statement denying the Englandspiel allegations.

*C. J. Shuckling*

7th May, 1949

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the full extent of  
the disaster. After reading  
the letter, I gave 100% a  
speech for no cause ~~known~~ ~~to~~ ~~very~~ ~~unlike~~. ~~Comm~~  
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Act'd. 12/3  
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for draft.

6.3.49.

THE SUSSEX, ALFRISTON 313

1949

ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE,  
LONDON.

22739

11th March, 1949.



My dear Hector:

I enclose a letter and newspaper article which I have received from Admiral J.H. Godfrey, who was the head of N.I.D., and who is anxious that some statement should be made correcting erroneous allegations contained in the newspaper article. You will see he says that Passant knows about the matters in question. I do not know whether you can give me any information which would enable me to send him a suitable reply.

*John  
Hector McNeil*

The Rt. Hon. Hector McNeil, M.P.,  
Foreign Office,  
Downing Street, S.W.1.

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since the war. The lack of any official statement has helped to convince honest and patriotic Dutchmen that their suspicions are justified. In default of further information the Dutch can hardly be blamed for their suspicions, which are the more insidious because they affect Governments rather than individuals and can easily do lasting harm to the relations between two peoples who have rendered each other valuable service in peace and war and whose traditional friendship has hitherto been free of this ugly kind of suspicion.

#### WAR-TIME SUFFERINGS

Such suspicion undoubtedly exists at the moment in the hearts of many Dutchmen, and has perhaps the more

members were at first able to operate with some success. But as their activities expanded they came into

of sums in terms of factories. The needs of this generation are for tens of thousands of new factories—especially for the great mass-production plants of the next generation.

"Here is an opportunity and a challenge to the architects of our own age. Public opinion has been educated to the need for diverting a large proportion of our resources into re-housing projects. It is clearly more important that we should give priority in our resources to rebuilding many of our factories. There is a vital need for co-operation between engineer and architect. In the ultimate phase there should be no conflict between beauty and utility—the logical line is a beautiful line."

Lord Curzon, chairman of the British Electricity Authority, told the delegates that there was a growing recognition in industry, and on the part of those responsible for the direction of large units of industry, that if the best results were to be achieved the architect should be brought in at the earliest stages to take his place with the draughtsmen and engineers. It was now recognised that durability and ugliness were not essential characteristics of efficient production, and that beauty and good dition, and that beauty and good

Later he gave himself up to the police but then became scared and ran away. Stopped breathing he tried to revive it. It crying. When he found the child had not stop crying. So I put it round the baby's neck. I only put it round to stop it on my own neck, but the baby would wake up and started to cry. I took my evidence he said that the baby woke up and started to cry. I took my evidence he said that the baby was sentenced to five years' penal servitude. He had pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.

In evidence he said that the baby was sentenced to five years' penal servitude. He had pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.

old son but guilty of manslaughter. He was sentenced to five years' penal servitude. He had pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.

Nottingham Assizes yesterday was found guilty of murdering his nine-week-old son but guilty of manslaughter. He was sentenced to five years' penal servitude. He had pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.

Kenneth Roy Haslam (29), of Common Road, Huthwaite, near Mansfield, at Nottingham Assizes yesterday was found guilty of murdering his nine-week-old son but guilty of manslaughter. He was sentenced to five years' penal servitude. He had pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.

#### PUT THE ROUND CHILDS NECK

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6.3.49

J. H. GODFREY, WHITE STACKS, WILMINGTON, NEAR POLEGATE, SUSSEX, ALFRISTON 313.

1949

Dear Shawcross.

Here is the article I mentioned. It is  
 bad reading & may well be believed especially  
 after publication in such a respectable paper as  
 M.M.G. I believe that neither X, or Y are  
 true & the real explanation is one which can  
 hardly be published - nevertheless something  
 should be said. The article, when countered in  
 some way is *Frankfurt* to people like myself,  
 who have Dutch friends who were ardent  
 resisters, & good friends of Britain.  
 There is always an element of oblique  
 collusion (not cooperation) between belligerents  
 who indulge in double agent work especially

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had no reason to suspect the loyalty of their predecessor and who therefore trusted him and co-operated with him until they were captured themselves. (It is believed that a few of them also agreed to work with the Germans.)

At length two of them escaped from German captivity and made their way to London, where they reported on the desperate situation in Holland.

It was then decided to drop all agents "blind" in future, without informing anyone in Holland when or where they would arrive. By this method Allied Intelligence was able to build up a new organisation whose members were at first able to operate with some success. But as their activities expanded they came into

since the war. The lack of any official statement has helped to convince honest and patriotic Dutchmen that their suspicions are justified. In default of further information the Dutch can hardly be blamed for their suspicions, which are the more insidious because they affect Governments rather than individuals and can easily do lasting harm to the relations between two peoples who have rendered each other valuable service in peace and war and whose traditional friendship has hitherto been free of this ugly kind of suspicion.

WAR-TIME SUFFERINGS

Such suspicion undoubtedly exists at the moment in the hearts of many Dutchmen, and has perhaps the more

merit, it is the authority's intention that the design of all new station buildings shall be entrusted to a competent architect and every effort will be made to ensure that the buildings shall be as attractive as possible.

**PUT THE ROUND CHILDS' NECK**

Kenneth Roy Haslam (20), of Common Road, Huthwaite, near Mansfield, at Nottingham Assizes yesterday was found not guilty of murdering his nine-week-old son but guilty of manslaughter. He was sentenced to five years' penal servitude. He had pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder.

In evidence he said that the baby woke up and started to cry. "I took my tie from the range, I intended to put it on my own neck, but the baby would not stop crying. So I put it round the baby's neck. I only put it round to stop it crying." When he found the child had stopped breathing he tried to revive it, but then became scared and ran away. Later he gave himself up to the police.

of sums in terms of factories. The needs of this generation are for tens of thousands of new factories—especially for the great mass-production plants of the next generation.

"Here is an opportunity and a challenge to the architects of our own age. Public opinion has been educated to the need for diverting a large proportion of our resources into re-housing projects. It is clearly more important that we should give priority in our resources to rebuilding many of our factories. There is a vital need for co-operation between engineer and architect. In the ultimate issue there should be no conflict between beauty and utility—the logical line is a beautiful line.

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if both sides know that he is double crossing one of them. And yet its use of such a man, a direct pipe line into the <sup>stupid</sup> enemy's most secret counsels can be of incalculable value so long as his original employer does not reveal his knowledge of the d. a.'s duplicity. In our after knowledge of Tanaris' activities these activities acquire an added significance.

I am completely without any official knowledge after mid 1942 when I went to USA & India. but my first guess was that this had been one of S.D.E.'s sabotage people employed by M.E.W. - but I don't know.

I much enjoyed our talk last night. Please remember me to Christopher.

No doubt the appropriate department will deal with this matter, but for your personal information Ewan Montagu. - Jim Pasant <sup>is a</sup> <sup>much</sup> <sup>more</sup> <sup>in</sup> <sup>far</sup> <sup>better</sup> <sup>than</sup> <sup>any</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>others</sup> <sup>you</sup> <sup>know</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>group</sup>

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# A WAR-TIME TRAGEDY IN THE NETHERLANDS

## How Allied Agents Were Captured

From a Special Correspondent

It is now possible for the first time to tell the story of a tragic misfortune of war which cost the lives of many members of the Dutch Resistance movement and which has been wrongly understood by some Dutch patriots as a deliberate and inexplicable act of treachery on the part of the British Intelligence Service.

From information available in London the facts appear to have been as follows.

The first agent dropped into Holland by parachute in the summer of 1942 was soon captured by the Germans, who induced him to work for them against the Allies. This was not discovered in London until the end of 1943. In the meanwhile several agents had been dropped who had no reason to suspect the loyalty of their predecessor and who therefore trusted him and co-operated with him until they were captured themselves. (It is believed that a few of them also agreed to work with the Germans.)

At length two of them escaped from German captivity and made their way to London, where they reported on the desperate situation in Holland.

It was then decided to drop all agents "blind" in future, without informing anyone in Holland when or where they would arrive. By this method Allied Intelligence was able to build up a new organisation whose members were at first able to operate with some success. But as their activities expanded they came into contact with members of the previous "tainted" organisation.

Further denunciations followed, and the Germans were eventually able to capture most of the members of this second organisation as well. It seems, therefore, as if the treachery of the first agent, skilfully and thoroughly exploited by the Germans, led to the capture of many more.

This information confirms some aspects at least of the many stories about the same episode which have been current in the Netherlands for many months. On the other hand, it belies the conclusion that these unhappy consequences were due to deliberate treachery by the Intelligence Service in London, a conclusion which many Dutchmen have drawn from the facts available to them and in default of any official explanation.

### A NETHERLANDS VERSION

A young Dutch lawyer, Mr. J. E. v. d. Starp, has just written a pamphlet ("The English Plot," Uitgave Schefferdrukkerij, Dordrecht) which is probably a comprehensive account of the facts as they appear to many of his countrymen. He asserts that, following the capture and with the co-operation of the first agent already mentioned (who appears from his account to have been a Dutchman), the head of the German counter-intelligence service in Holland, a man named Schreieder, was in constant communication with London until the spring of 1944, using no fewer than eighteen separate radio circuits.

From his knowledge of the agents' radio operating procedures and of the identification signals they had to make, Mr. v. d. Starp argues that it must have been obvious in London that the first agent was co-operating with the Germans. In view of what

but says that they were imprisoned when they reached London lest they reveal the damning facts about the Intelligence Service's co-operation with the Germans.

It is clear that the melancholy history of the second organisation, set up in 1943 as the result of these two agents' report, would inevitably lend colour to this last assertion for the news that the two men brought to London did not, in the long run, prevent the subsequent capture of many of their comrades.

A comparison of these two accounts shows that in Holland, at any rate, the information available on the matter is incomplete and therefore misleading. If an inquiry has been held, it has been held in secret, and the public has not been reassured by what it has heard both during and since the war. The lack of any official statement has helped to convince honest and patriotic Dutchmen that their suspicions are justified. In default of further information the Dutch can hardly be blamed for their suspicions, which are the more insidious because they affect Governments rather than individuals and can easily do lasting harm to the relations between two peoples who have rendered each other valuable service in peace and war and whose traditional friendship has hitherto been free of this ugly kind of suspicion.

### WAR-TIME SUFFERINGS

Such suspicion undoubtedly exists at the moment in the hearts of many Dutchmen, and has perhaps the more easily gained credence because in the last months of the war the Dutch people were called upon to suffer greater hardships in the common cause than the people of any other liberated country in Western Europe. When the Allied armies were thought to have captured Breda on September 4, 1944, the Dutch people's enthusiastic preparations for their welcome (tragically premature, as events were to show) were brutally punished by the Germans. Their hopes were raised again when the airborne landings were made at Arnhem. On September 18 the Dutch railwaymen, responding to their Government's appeal, heroically and voluntarily incurred the Germans' wrath by declaring and maintaining a transport strike which was of incalculable military value to the Allies. In order to capture Walcheren the Allies had to breach the dikes and flood the land. Finally, in the spring of 1945, the Allied advance brought starvation to the invaded areas of the Netherlands.

This heroic record of enterprise and sacrifice has seldom been equalled. Since the war the people of Britain and of Holland have paid tribute, at Arnhem, to those who established that record and to those who helped them to do it. It would be tragic as well as unjust to allow anything to obscure the recognition by the Dutch and British peoples of each other's contributions to the common cause.

The charges put forward in Mr. v. d. Starp's book would, if generally accepted, clearly stand in the way of such recognition. But the information now available in London points strongly to the conclusion that the capture of the agents was due not to treachery but to a grave mistake made by the Intelligence Service in London. The terrible accusation of treachery must be rejected for the ugly and unhar-

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wrongly understood by some Dutch patriots as a deliberate and inexplicable act of treachery on the part of the British Intelligence Service.

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Further denunciations followed, and the Germans were eventually able to capture most of the members of this second organisation as well. It seems, therefore, as if the treachery of the first agent, skilfully and thoroughly exploited by the Germans, led to the capture of many more.

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From his knowledge of the agents' radio operating procedures and of the identification signals they had to make, Mr. v. d. Starp argues that it must have been obvious in London that the first agent was co-operating with the Germans. In view of what he claims to know about the strict precautions which were taken to identify the originator of any message, he refuses to believe that an honest mistake or genuine error of judgment could have been made and draws the conclusion that the radio traffic with the Germans was deliberately prolonged in order to betray to the enemy as many Dutch patriots as possible.

He admits that two agents did escape from German captivity in 1943

history of the second agent's capture up in 1943 as the result of an agents' report, would inevitably lend colour to this last assertion for the new; that the two men brought to London did not, in the long run, prevent the subsequent capture of many of their comrades.

A comparison of these two accounts shows that in Holland, at any rate, the information available on the matter is incomplete and therefore misleading. If an inquiry has been held, it has been held in secret, and the public has not been reassured by what it has heard both during and since the war. The lack of any official statement has helped to engender honest and patriotic Dutchmen that their suspicions are justified. In default of further information the Dutch can hardly be blamed for their suspicions, which are the more insidious because they affect Governments rather than individuals and can easily do lasting harm to the relations between two peoples who have rendered each other valuable service in peace and war and whose traditional friendship has hitherto been free of this ugly kind of suspicion.

#### WAR-TIME SUFFERINGS

Such suspicion undoubtedly exists at the moment in the hearts of many Dutchmen, and has perhaps the more easily gained credence because in the last months of the war the Dutch people were called upon to suffer greater hardships in the common cause than the people of any other liberated country in Western Europe. When the Allied armies were thought to have captured Breda on September 4, 1944, the Dutch people's enthusiastic preparations for their welcome (tragically premature, as events were to show) were brutally punished by the Germans. Their hopes were raised again when the airborne landings were made at Arnhem. On September 18 the Dutch railwaymen, responding to their Government's appeal, heroically and voluntarily incurred the Germans' wrath by declaring and maintaining a transport strike which was of incalculable military value to the Allies. In order to capture Walcheren the Allies had to breach the dikes and flood the land. Finally, in the spring of 1945, the Allied advance brought starvation to the inverted areas of the Netherlands.

This heroic record of enterprise and sacrifice has seldom been equalled. Since the war the people of Britain and of Holland have paid tribute, at Arnhem, to those who established that record and to those who helped them to do it. It would be tragic as well as unjust to allow anything to obscure the recognition by the Dutch and British peoples of each other's contributions to the common cause.

The charges put forward in Mr. v. d. Starp's book would, if generally accepted, clearly stand in the way of such recognition. But the information now available in London points strongly to the conclusion that the capture of the agents was due not to treachery but to a grave mistake made by the Intelligence Service in London. The terrible accusation of treachery must be rejected for the ugly and unhappy rumour that it is. An authoritative statement might well now be made by the British Foreign Office. Suspicion thrives on secrecy, and if the tragic fate of so many courageous Dutchmen is allowed to poison the relations between their country and ours it would indeed be an ironic triumph for Dr. Goebbels and a tragedy for two of the nations which fought against him.

13/5

*outfile*

21st March, 1949.

22739/1057/296

Just a word to let you know that we are working on your note of March 11th, with which you sent me a letter and newspaper article you had received from Admiral Godfrey. As you can well imagine, the background to this episode is most secret and complicated, so I am afraid it may be some little while yet before we can get any final decision in the matter. I am probably leaving for the Assembly on Friday next and Chris Mayhew will deal with it after I am gone and will let you have a proper answer as soon as possible.

(SGD) HECTOR McNEIL

cc. Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P.,  
Royal Courts of Justice,  
London.

13/5
16/5

200041 W116200147 71.000 6187 A.B.E.W.L.A. Gp.445

Normal security checks did not indicate to the

... imprisoned, their wireless sets and codes being taken over by the enemy. The result was that the majority of the agents dropped later <sup>also</sup> fell into enemy hands. So cleverly, however, did the Germans control the situation that the Allied H.Q. in London ~~that this was the case. Things had gone wrong.~~

3. In August/

*1 word*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

13/5

Registry  
No. Z2739/1051/296.

file

May 16

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

*Draft.*

Sir H. Shawcross  
from

~~Minister of State.~~

*Paul Under Secy*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

We have now looked more fully into the affair which was the subject ~~both~~ of Admiral Godfrey's letter to you of March 6th and of the article in the Manchester Guardian of March 4th. You will understand that for security reasons it is still not possible to go into great detail and this is the primary reason why we have not issued an official statement.

2. The operations to which Admiral Godfrey refers were carried out by S.O.E. (a department of the Ministry of Economic Warfare) between ~~June 1942~~ <sup>November 1941</sup> and the beginning of 1944. Their object was to drop agents into Holland to organise sabotage of the German war machine. The first agents dropped were to form reception committees to receive instructors and organisers of sabotage. Unfortunately, as has become clear since we have had the opportunity of studying the German archives on the subject, some of the very first agents dropped into Holland were captured by the Germans and were either induced to change their allegiance or were imprisoned, their wireless sets and codes being taken over by the enemy. The result was that the majority of the agents dropped later <sup>also</sup> fell into enemy hands. So cleverly, however, did the Germans control the situation that the Allied H.Q. in London ~~was~~ that this was the case. *Reigs had gone wrong.*

*Mr Reddaway*

*CSJ.*  
*8/5*

RECEIVED IN DIVISION.	
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normal security checks did not indicate to the

3. In August/

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BRISBANE WILLIAMSON 147 75-000 6-47 A.B.E.W.L.L.G. Gp-685



secret agents/

ed London. It was a strict rule that, whenever the two agents were imprisoned when they reach-

5. Finally, there is the allegation that hands.

the whole secret organization was in enemy escape of the two agents mentioned above, that it would not have been certain, until the authorities played their cards so ~~carefully~~ <sup>well</sup> that

Even so, the German counter-espionage enabled the correct conclusion to be drawn, which, if related to one another, should have pointers which meant little in isolation but there were, however, a number of technical which gave the position away to the enemy.

Guardian, there was no single 'grave mistake', contrary to the statement in the Manchester known to the enemy are not simple ones.

not previously aware that their operations were 4. The reasons why the London H.Q. were were known to and under the control of the enemy.

and that therefore the operations in Holland the information sent by the two men was reliable The report of this enquiry seemed to show that 1944 <sup>late</sup> in the meantime an enquiry was held.

two men did not reach London until February control of the S.O.B. groups in Holland. The London indicating that the Germans were in Switzerland, from there they sent messages to had been confined and eventually reached escaped from the concentration camp where they

3. In August 1943 two allied agents

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Registry  
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Top Secret.  
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Draft.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

secret agents had been captured and had escaped and returned to London, they should be kept apart from their fellows until their story was confirmed. Unfortunately, by the time that ~~this~~ stage had been reached in this case, preparations for D-day were well advanced and a fresh instruction ~~was~~ <sup>had been</sup> issued barring any contact between agents who were to take part in the invasion plans and those who had recently returned from the Continent. The result was that the two agents were not finally allowed to mix with their fellows until May 1944, when their <sup>good faith</sup> ~~intention~~ was finally established: <sup>by this time</sup> ~~and~~ the ~~own~~ secret organisation in Holland had been wound up.

6. This, very briefly, is the sad story of S.O.E.'s attempt to establish a sabotage organisation in Holland. Although there has not been much interest displayed ~~in this matter~~ by the English press, there has been a great deal in Holland, and we considered at one time whether we should not issue an official statement very much on the lines of this letter. We <sup>however,</sup> ~~have~~ decided ~~against~~ doing so because such a statement does not answer the detailed charges which have been made in Holland ~~and~~ principally in the book "English Plot" to which the Manchester Guardian refers. Some of the accusations in this book are ridiculous, and the rest are either untrue or have been twisted to serve the writer's purpose. Unfortunately, although we could answer many of the detailed charges we could not, for reasons of past and future security, answer all of them: ~~and~~

To answer some questions and then ~~refuse~~ <sup>refuse</sup> to answer others would, we feel, ~~be~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~would~~

~~proceed in this way would be ~~more~~ likely to  
give the impression that we had something to  
conceal, than if we avoided making any statement  
at all, which is what we intend. # However,  
I do not think that the main charge of  
treachery is really believed by more than a  
small proportion of the Dutch people.~~

7. I enclose a copy of this letter,  
which you may wish to send to Admiral Godfrey  
for his confidential information.

(Sgd.) C. P. MAYHEW.

# We are therefore confining  
ourselves to authorising Peter Frebony  
at La Hague, if hard pressed,  
to put out a bold statement  
on the following lines:

"

The attraction ....

[Not attached]

Cum

6/s.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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(Z 2739/1051/299)

SECRET

OUTFILE.

16th May, 1949.

We have now looked more fully into the affair which was the subject of Admiral Godfrey's letter to you of the 6th March and of the article in the Manchester Guardian of the 4th March. You will understand that for security reasons it is still not possible to go into great detail and this is the primary reason why we have not issued an official statement.

2. The operations to which Admiral Godfrey refers were carried out by S.O.E. (a department of the Ministry of Economic Warfare) between November 1941 and the beginning of 1944. Their object was to drop agents into the Netherlands to organise sabotage of the German war machine. The first agents dropped were to form reception committees to receive instructors and organisers of sabotage. Unfortunately, as has become clear since we have had the opportunity of studying the German archives on the subject, some of the very first agents dropped into the Netherlands were captured by the Germans and were either induced to change their allegiance or were imprisoned, their wireless sets and codes being taken over by the enemy. The result was that the majority of the agents dropped later also fell into enemy hands. So cleverly, however, did the Germans control the situation that the normal security checks did not indicate to the Allied Headquarters in London that things had gone wrong.

3. /

The Right Honourable  
Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., M.P.

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/ word

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

3. In August 1943 two allied agents escaped from the concentration camp where they had been confined and eventually reached Switzerland. From there they sent messages to London indicating that the Germans were in control of the S.O.R. groups in Holland. The two men did not reach London until February 1944 but in the meantime an enquiry was held. The report of this enquiry seemed to show that the information sent by the two men was reliable and that therefore the operations in Holland were known to and under the control of the enemy.

4. The reasons why the London Headquarters were not previously aware that their operations were known to the enemy are not simple ones. Contrary to the statement in the Manchester Guardian, there was no single 'grave mistake' which gave the position away to the enemy. There were, however, a number of technical pointers which meant little in isolation but which, if related to one another, should have enabled the correct conclusion to be drawn. Even so, the German counter-espionage authorities played their cards so well that it would not have been certain, until the escape of the two agents mentioned above, that the whole secret organisation was in enemy hands.

5. Finally, there is the allegation that the two agents were imprisoned when they reached London. It was a strict rule that, whenever secret agents had been

/captured

had escaped and returned to London, they should be kept apart from their fellows until their story was confirmed. Unfortunately, by the time that stage had been reached in this case, preparations for D-day were well advanced and a fresh instruction had been issued barring any contact between agents who were to take part in the invasion plans and those who had recently returned from the Continent. The result was that the two agents were not finally allowed to mix with their fellows until May 1944, when their good faith was finally established: by this time the secret organisation in Holland had been wound up.

6. This, very briefly, is the sad story of S.O.E.'s attempt to establish a sabotage organisation in Holland. Although there has not been much interest displayed by the English press, there has been a great deal in Holland, and we considered at one time whether we should not issue an official statement very much on the lines of this letter. We decided, however, against doing so because such a statement does not answer the detailed charges which have been made in Holland - principally in the book "English Plot" to which the Manchester Guardian refers. Some of the accusations in this book are ridiculous, and the rest are either untrue or have been twisted to serve the writer's purpose. Unfortunately, although we could answer many of the detailed charges we could not, for reasons of past and future security, answer all of them: to answer some questions and then refuse to answer others would, we feel, be likely to give the impression that we had something to conceal. We are therefore confining ourselves to authorising the Embassy at The Hague, if hard pressed, to put out a bald statement on the following lines:

/"The

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/ word

"The attention of His Majesty's Government has been drawn to allegations which have appeared in certain sections of the Netherlands Press, and more recently in pamphlet form, concerning the operations of the Netherlands Resistance Movement.

After close examination of all the available information His Majesty's Government wish to state categorically that there are no grounds whatsoever to support the suggestion that there was any treachery on the part of British officers. Further, the allegation that His Majesty's Government deliberately sacrificed the lives of Dutchmen in order to gain advantage elsewhere is totally devoid of foundation.

7. I enclose a copy of this letter, which you may wish to send to Admiral Godfrey for his confidential information.

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7th April, 1949

DRAFT STATEMENT

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P. 312

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not mailed

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WFT STATIST

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20 April, 1949

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Netherlands Press, and more recently in  
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Government.

For close examination of all the available  
His Majesty's Government wish to state cate-  
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agents. Further, the allegation that His  
Government deliberately sacrificed the lives of  
in order to gain advantage elsewhere is totally  
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13 May ? 23735 G

Further denunciations followed, and the Germans were eventually able to capture Breda on September 4, 1944, the Dutch people's enthusiastic preparations for their welcome as events were

...after he gave himself up to the police but then became relaxed and ran away. It was now recognized that draughtsmen and engineers were not take his place with the draughtsmen to be brought in at the earliest stages to be achieved the architect should be units of industry, that if the best results responsible for the direction of large in industry, and on the part of those that there was a growing recognition. Electricity Authority, told the delegates Lord Cirthne, chairman of the British firm is a beautiful line—the logical issue between beauty and utility—no conflict between beauty and utility. In the ultimate as a vital need for co-operation between rebuilding many of our factories. There should give priority in our resources to It is clearly more important that we of our resources into re-housing projects. Public opinion has been educated to the need for diverting a large proportion of the architects of our own age. Here is an opportunity and a challenge to the architects of our own age.

P.T. THE ROUND CHILDS  
NECK

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