

2.3156/6 IRAFT STATISTICS 20 7th April, 1949

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The attention of His Hajosty's Government has been drawn to allegations which have appeared in certain peoplet form, concerning the operations of the Notherlands Registance Movement.

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
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
Further dedunciations followed, last months of the war the Dutch people were called upon to suffer terms, therefore a last month of the war the Dutch people were called upon to suffer terms, therefore a last month of the war the Dutch people were called upon to suffer terms. seems, therefore, as if the treachery of the first agent, skilfully and thoroughly exploited by the Germans, led to the capture of many more.

This information confirms some

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Mr. Street should see Sir P. Nichols' letter as soon as possible.

If we authorised the Ambassador to issue a statement along the lines that he suggests, we should consider, and if possible decide now, how far we shall be prepared to amplify it if it provokes an outcry in Holland.

We should, I think, avoid the impression that we are reluctant to say anything about the "Englandspiel", but will do so if pressed sufficiently strongly. Sir P. Nichols' suggested statement the "high moral line" suggested in Mr. Shuckburgh's letter of March 28th. It refutes the two main allegations contained in "Het Englandspiel":

- (a) That there was treachery on the British side.
- (b) That there was a diabolical plot to exterminate Dutch patriots.

However, In view of the complications of the case, a statement such as this, although true, is not convincing. Van der Waals is clearly in a position to give evidence, which the Dutch would find very difficult to reconcile with such a statement. We should then be faced with the problem of whether or not to amplify it. As we should not be able to do so without disclosing details which we wish to conceal, we should, I think, be prepared to ride out any storms that might develop, and withstand any pressure to give detailed explanations. We should be on record as having denied the allegations, and we should be able to rely on our performance during the war, and on the good sense of the Dutch to prevent the baldness of the statement from prejudicing Dutch sentiment against us.

On balance, therefore, I think we should authorise Sir. P. Nichols to issue a statement along the lines which he suggests. It would, I think, be a mistake to use the German expression "Englandspiel" in a British statement. It might be thought to confer a validity to the whole story, which we do not of course recognise. I would suggest, therefore, that the words "so-called" should be inserted before each reference to the "Englandspiel" in Sir P. Nichols' draft. Otherwise, it seems adequate.

Mr. Street will no doubt say whether it will be possible to give Mr. Baker any further information from S.O.E. records. He will also, I am sure, wish to consider what reply should be returned to the Dutch, should they ask for Major Bingham to appear before the enquiry.


/M. Shuckburgh

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
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Minutes. Mr. Shuck burgh thinks that it would be preparable to avoid using the word "England-Spiel "and suggesto wistead "The operations of the Netherlands Rosistance Movement? 9/April 1 M. Joy.



"Englandspiel" in spite of Mr. Street's explanation. "The operation against England" is cularily not the happiest description of the operations of the Netherlands Resistance Movement. I now submit a draft cepty to Si P. Nicholo. 13/April . JOHN RUSSELL WESTERN DEFT. M. Bickull



In drain Minutes, Please see draft to Si. 18 32" JOHN RUSSELL, WESTERN DEPT. be Written be Nothing to THIS IS A COPY
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THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 9(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 not think that it would be pression "Englandspiel" although we realise that it signifies the game played against England and not by England. The use of the expression, rather Than a game played ho us mould / might

In diam 23156 BRITISH EMBASSY. THE HACUE. 7th April, 1949. TOP SECRET (150/25/49) My Dear Erelyn. With reference to my Top Secret letter 150/21/49 of 30th March, I have now discussed the question of the "Englandspiel" I still feel that, granted all the objections to a detailed statement that are outlined in your letter of the 28th March, a time is likely to come when we cannot pass over in silence accusations of treachery or the deliberate sacrifice of Dutch lives for purposes of our own. Such an occasion is likely to arise when the appeal of van der Waals against the death penalty is heard towards the end of this month. To meet such a situation I should like authority to issue a very short and emphatic but uninformative statement on the lines of the enclosed draft. We should of course refuse to be drawn into any further discussion of the matter. 2. Mr. Danker has now returned the Selborne Report, with the following comments which were conveyed to us orally by Colonel Fock:-(1) "He is extremely grateful for the loan of this document. (2) The Report is a fair review of the position as known at the time and it corresponds to the facts available to him. There are a few slight inaccuracies in it; these are due mainly to lack of later material gathered from much wider sources. (4) It hardly serves to help Mr. Danker at the present time since the Report is a factual review of evidence rather than an analysis of the reasons behind the tragedy. J.A.E. Shuckburgh, Esq., Western Department. Mr. Danker / THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 9(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958 not think that it would be pression "Englandspiel" although we realise that it signifies the game played against England rather Than a and not by England. The use of this expression Colo les told / might Mr. Danker was hoping to be able to glean enough evidence from it in order to make a decision about one of the various theories concerning the causes of the misfortune. He would have been happy to have found in it for example a statement that the fault lay in an accumulation of mistakes or poor communications methods, rather than indications of treachery on either side.

(5) Without in any way wishing to give the impression that he is asking for further information, and emphasising that he is in fact only commenting on the document in question as you requested, he has added that perhaps a document of a later date going more deeply into the reasons behind the whole business, would have been of more assistance to him at the present time."

3. Colonel Fock also tells me that we may shortly receive an official request from Mr. Danker for Major Bingham to appear before the enquiry. I will write again when I have received it.

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sense of the Dutch to prevent the balaness of
the statement from prejudicing Dutch sentiment
against us.

3. Reverting to your draft statement, we do
not think that it would be wise to use the expression "Englandepiel" although we realise that
it signifies the game played against England
and not by England. The use of the expression

## SUGGESTED STATEMENT.

The attention of His Majesty's Government has been drawn to allegations which have appeared in certain sections of the Netherlands Press, and more recently in pamphlet form, concerning the inglandantal operations of the Netherland Resislance Manuscht.


available information His Majesty's Government wish to state categorically that there are no grounds whatsoever to support the suggestion that the Englandepiel was aided in any way by the treachery of British Officers. Further, the allegation that His Majesty's Government deliberately sacrificed the lives of Dutchmen in order to gain advantage elsewhere is totally devoid of foundation.

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As regards an official request from Danker for Major Bingham to appear before the Inquiry, Hayter's friends say that this would notbe //a any and desirable. as he did not join the controlling staff of S.O.E. in London until 1st April, 1943, by which time the German penetration had been achieved. Accusations against him personally are therefore baseless.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGI

Sir Phili

(2 3156/1051/29 G)

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1. 20th April, 1949.

my dear Phil.

Thank you for your letter 150/25/49 of 7th April with which you enclosed the draft of a statement which you would like to issue about the "Englandspiel".

- The draft seems adequate as it denies the two main allegations contained in Van der Starp's pamphlet; namely that there was treachery on the British side, and a plot to exterminate Dutch patriots. We agree that you should issue it when a suitable opportunity presents itself and I enclose for this purpose a slightly amended version of your draft.
- 5. There is one point about the wording. We do not think that it would be wise to use the expression "Englandspiel" although we realise that it signifies a We do game played against England rather than a game played by England. But the use of the expression by us might be taken to imply some sort of admission, and whilst we realise that the Germans outwitted us, there is no need to rub salt into the wound. We have therefore substituted appropriate phrases for "Englandspiel" where it appeared in your draft.
- 4. I think you will agree that the statement, though true, is in virtue of its bald and unsupported character, not very convincing. It is more than likely that doubts will be cast on the veracity of the statement and that we shall be pressed to amplify it. As we should not be able to do this without disclosing details which we wish to conceal, we should be prepared to "ride the high horse", refuse any further explanation and rely on our performance. refuse any further explanation and rely on our performance during the war and the good sense of the Dutch to prevent the baldness of the statement from prejudicing Dutch sentiment against us.
- 5. Hayter's friends think that they can probably meet Danker's request for further information about the reasons why it was not appreciated in London that the S.O.E. organisation in Holland had come under enemy control. They hope to produce a draft statement soon.
- 6. As regards an official request from Danker for Major Bingham to appear before the Inquiry, Hayter's friends say that this would not be desirable. In any case he did not join the controlling staff of S.O.E. in London until 1st April, 1943, by which time the German penetration had been achieved. Accusations against him personally are therefore baseless.

Your wer, tuelyn Shuckburgh. (C.A.B. Shuckburgh)

Sir Philip Nichols, K.C.M.G., M.C., The Hague.

## DRAFT STATEMENT

The attention of His Majesty's Government has been drawn to allegations which have appeared in certain sections of the Metherlands Press, and more recently in pamphlet form, concerning the operations of the Metherlands Resistance Movement.

After close examination of all the available information His Majesty's Government wish to state categorically that there are no grounds whatsoever to support the suggestion that there was any treachery on the part of British officers. Further, the allegation that His Majesty's Government deliberately secrificed the lives of Dutchmen in order to gain advantage elsewhere is totally devoid of foundation.

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
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(b) The "hand-writing" test. This refers to the fact that an experienced wireless operator can sometimes get to know the personal characteristics of the transmitting operator at the other end of the link. It was thus possible that, if an agent were captured and replaced, this fact would be noted at the receiving end.

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
For final initial place. the request by ould be made far as possible the I don't know what has rters controlling ere not aware of ban Robbing it up. by the Germans. can be divided left we Pay 76 sages Signed by Richard June 15th g sent to Holland checks called "bluff" got bock tour fun & R. ectively. These of which the include in all + adicrous! tions were that 1616 ogated he was to the "bluff" check, continue to be however, on no account to reveal the existence of the "true" check, which he was to omit from all messages sent after his capture. (b) The "hand-writing" test. This refers to the fact that an experienced wireless operator can sometimes get to know the personal characteristics of the ECEIVED IN DEVISION transmitting operator at the other end **8 JUN 1949** of the link. It was thus possible that, if an agent were captured and replaced, this fact would be noted at the receiving end. S . So/



So far as checks are concerned, there were three reasons why the correct conclusion was no drawn. First, many of the messages received from Holland were considerably mutilated and it was frequently impossible to tell whether checks had been omitted or not. Second, it was by no means an easy task to ensure that the agents really understood the purpose of these checks and in many cases the agents forgot to comit them from their messages. Third, the inclusion or ommission of checks had been considerable to be inconclusive as a test of the agent's reliability.

there are three points to make. First, in many cases the agents themselves continued to transmit under German control. Second, in cases where they were replaced it needed a most expert receiving operator to notice the difference. Third, an electrical machine was devised during the war to measure the physical characteristics of a transmitting operator but this was not developed in time to be of use while the Dutch operation was going on.

Another point which contributed to the insecurity of the operations was the system, always preferred by agents, whereby they were not dropped "blind", but to reception committees already established in Holland. This system was extensively used in other theatres by S.O.E. Since most of the Dutch reception committees were known to the Germans at an early stage, it followed that



FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

8th June, 1949.

(% 3156/1051/29 G) TOP SECRET

OUTFILE.

my deal Phil,

As promised in paragraph 5 of my letter Z 3156/1051/6 of the 20th April, we have again looked into the request by Mr. Danker that a statement should be made available to him explaining as far as possible the reasons why the London headquarters controlling S.O.E. operations in the Metherlands were not aware of the penetration of their groups by the Germans. I am sorry that there has been so much delay.

2. The technical indications can be divided into the following categories:

## (a) Checks in wireless messages

Each agent before being sent to the Netherlands was given two separate checks called "bluff" and "true" checks respectively. These were cypher groups one of which the agent was supposed to include in all messages. His instructions were that if captured and interrogated he was to give the Germans the "bluff" check, which would thus continue to be included in all messages; but he was, on no account to reveal the existence of the "true" check, which he was to omit from all messages sent after his capture.

## (b) The "hand-writing" test

This refers to the fact that an experienced wireless operator can sometimes get to know the personal characteristics of the transmitting operator at the other end of the link. It was thus possible that, if an agent were captured and replaced, the change in technique would be noticed at the receiving end.

5. So far as the checks are concerned, there were three reasons why the correct conclusion was not drawn. First, many of the messages received from the Netherlands were considerably mutilated and it was frequently impossible to tell whether checks had been omitted or not. Secondly, it was by no means an easy task to ensure that the agents really understood the purpose of the checks and in many cases the captured agents forgot to carry out the drill. Thirdly, the inclusion or omission of checks, as was shown in other theatres of S.O.E. operations, was inconclusive as a test of the agent's reliability.

4. So far as the "hand-writing" is concerned, there are three points to make. First, in many cases the agents themselves continued to transmit under German control. Secondly, in cases where they were replaced it needed a most expert receiving operator to notice the difference. Thirdly although an electrical machine was devised during the war to measure the physical characteristics of a transmitting operator, it was not developed in time to be of use while the metherlands operation was going on.

5. Another point which contributed to the insecurity of the operations was the system, always preferred by agents, whereby they were not dropped "blind", but to reception committees already established in the Netherlands. This system was extensively used in other theatres by S.O.E. Since most of the Netherlands reception committees were known to the Germans at an early stage, it followed that the agents dropped to them fell into enemy hands at once. 6. Pinally, it must be admitted that staffs controlling clandestine operations abroad have a psychological resistance to being persuaded that their agents are under enemy control, and there have been cases in which such staffs have gone on believing in the security of their agents when all the evidence pointed the other way. 7. You can pass all of this on to Monsieur Danker if you wish. Yours well, (God. (C.A.E. Shuckburgh)

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IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1968 Commission contemplates issuing a Naturent, and intimate to him that