

~~SECRET~~

ENGLANDSPIEL - TALKING POINTS

- (a) Try to avoid discussing the "Englandspiel".
- (b) If forced to discuss it, avoid disclosing any more information than has been already disclosed officially by us: e.g. Sir Philip Nichols's statement if it has already appeared. (However, if Sir Philip Nichols's statement has still not been issued, we should not mention that he has been authorised to make a statement. The same, of course, would apply to our letter to Jonker.)
(Statement has not yet been issued)
- (c) Avoid getting involved in discussion of the details, e.g. the Bingham family; the reason why the cell sign was not recognised; the "hand-writing" device; use of double agents, etc.
- (d) Take every opportunity to pour scorn on the idea that we plotted to exterminate Dutch patriots.
- (e) Support the suggestion that "Secret Services" are by nature disinclined to publicise their activities and methods - but only if this point is raised by the visitors.
- (f) Avoid discussing Van der Weels, but if forced to do so, take the line that Van der Weels and the Englandspiel are not connected, at any rate as far as we are concerned.
- (g) If asked why we will not issue a detailed statement, say that no responsible Dutchman believes this nonsense and that it is beneath our dignity to enter into the arena.

16th May, 1949

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1949

WESTERN

Z 3814 / G

12.

NETHERLANDS

Z 3814/1051/29G

Mr. G. Jonker
Amsterdam.

J/B no. 473.

Dated 16th May.
Rec'd 20th May.

Request for further information
regarding the case of Anton van
der WAALS, Dutch collaborator.

Last Paper

Z 3738.

(Minutes)

References

Z 2738/1051/29G

Mr. Jonker is the Dutch lawyer who was briefed to defend Antonius van der Waals in his appeal against the death sentence. He wrote to the Embassy at The Hague (see 'x') and asked for information which could be used to support a plea of mitigation on van der Waals' behalf. We replied (see 'x'):

- (a) that van der Waals had been employed by us as a double agent after the liberation of Holland,
- (b) that we did not believe that van der Waals thought that Schreieder, the Head of the German S.S. in Holland, had ever been a British agent.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

2. Mr. Jonker has now replied that he is convinced that van der Waals was a dupe, that Schreieder was in fact a British agent and that he intends to fight the case to the bitter end.

3. It is fairly clear that Jonker sees himself in the somewhat romantic role of fearless and high-minded advocate, determined to see justice done, come what may. He is prepared to fight against the obscurantism of the Dutch Government and the wiles of the "British Secret Service" and he will not shrink from tearing the veil from the most sacred mysteries. He is self-consciously Dutch and obstinate. Although he sees his client as a weak-minded man who was seduced by the dubious fascination of the "Secret Service" he has nevertheless swallowed a large dose of it himself. He has an eye for the drama and tragedy of war and believes that incidents such as the Dieppe Raid, involving the deliberate sacrifice of lives for the sake of an unspecified advantage elsewhere, are, if not commonplace, at least fairly frequent and certainly justifiable.

(Action completed)

(Index)

Kul7

De J.

Next Paper

4. Jonker does not say how he intends to carry out his plans to establish the purity of van der Waals' intentions. He does not seem to be concerned with the fact that his client's acts were those of a traitor.

Van/

Van der Waal's appeal has been heard and the death sentence has been upheld; the final decision will be announced on June 8th. It does not seem, therefore, that Jonker will have another chance of defending him in an open court. It is possible, therefore, that he may join the ranks of the pamphleteers such as van der Starp and van der Graaf (Noel de Gaulle).

5. Jonker does not adhere to van der Starp's theory that the Englandspiel was a plot to eliminate Dutch patriots. However, he finds it necessary to have a comprehensive theory of some sort and the only hypothesis with which the facts, as he knows them, can be reconciled is that Schreieder was a double agent who was working for us. Schreieder's potentialities could not have been realised unless the Germans had good reason to trust him. In order, therefore, to establish his reputation with the Germans we perpetrated the Englandspiel betrayals. Jonker is not apparently moved to moral indignation by this - which reflects his Kiplingesque conception of the ethics of an Intelligence Service in war. He is merely concerned, in the interests of abstract justice, to see the truth revealed.

6. We have, of course, denied that Schreieder was working for the British Intelligence Service. Jonker does not believe this, although his evidence for believing the contrary is very slender, and seems to hinge on the following points:-

- (a) Schreieder had the semi-privileged position of a barber in a prisoner-of-war camp and once spent an inordinate amount of time cutting van der Waals' hair. The suggestion is that Schreieder had been imprisoned merely to hoodwink the Dutch, and that we encouraged his contact with van der Waals even at that late date.
- (b) Van der Waals was put in touch with Schreieder by Verhagen, apparently a British agent. (Who is Verhagen? Is it possible that Jonker suspects that he is one of the Bingham's? Who is Mr. Bess?)
- (c) Schreieder, who is really responsible for the betrayals, was released from custody and evidence which could have convicted him was wilfully suppressed. The suggestion is that Schreieder was released at the behest of the British Government because he was in fact a British agent, and that van der Waals has been made the scapegoat, firstly in order to silence him and secondly to satisfy the Dutch demand for vengeance.

7. It seems likely that Jonker will pursue his enquiries along these lines and that if he starts a publicity campaign his main aim will be to develop the argument that Schreieder had been a British agent. If there is no truth in the suggestion that Schreieder was a double agent working for us, then whatever fresh "facts" Jonker might produce cannot affect us very profoundly. However, there remains the "element of oblique collusion" which Admiral Godfrey mentioned in his letter to Sir Hartley Shawcross (see Z 2739/G). The object of using double agents, as described by Admiral Godfrey, is similar to that described by Jonker, namely to obtain access to the secret councils of the enemy. If Admiral Godfrey was referring to

Schreieder/

Schreieder, and if Jonker contrives to unearth evidence to support this hypothesis we might find ourselves in an awkward position.

8. It might be as well to mention here that we have given Mr. Danker, the Chairman of the Dutch Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry, a précis of Lord Selborne's report on the penetration of S.O.E. operations in the Netherlands, and that Mr. Danker is strongly inclined to the view that the Englandspiel allegations are groundless. A recent Dutch press report (see Z 3711) stated that the Commission had found independent evidence which exonerates H.M.G. From the point of view of Dutch public opinion it is most important that the Commission should retain an attitude favourable to us. If, as a result of their investigations, the Commission found that there was any basis for the allegations of treachery on our part, our prestige in the Netherlands would suffer a severe setback, as it is most unlikely that the majority of Dutchmen would share Jonker's philo-sophic detachment. We have, up to the present, made a point of taking the Commission into our confidence and, as a result, our confidence has been reciprocated in the most gratifying manner. If Jonker were now to produce convincing evidence that Schreieder had wittingly or unwittingly worked for us, that basis of mutual confidence would be destroyed, with results which might even adversely affect Western Union defence plans. While, therefore, I have no positive reason for thinking that there may be aspects of Schreieder's activities which have not yet been disclosed, I think it is essential to make absolutely certain, as soon as possible whether or not Admiral Godfrey's remarks apply to Schreieder. If this is indeed the case, then we should consider telling the Commission.

9. To return to Jonker's letter; he has stated the points which are not clear to him, he has shown us the way in which his mind is working and he has given us notice that he intends to get to the bottom of the story. He has not asked us any specific questions and I do not think, therefore, that we need address a reply to him. His activities may cause us embarrassment, but there is nothing we can do to restrain him.

10. We should send a copy of Jonker's letter to Sir Philip Nichols, together with an indication of the line which we intend to take.

R. H. Mason

(R.H.Mason)
25th May, 1949.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.



Minutes.

Mr. Mason's minute is admirably lucid.

What we want now be told, if only for our own information is

- was Schreiber at any time, directly or indirectly, working for us?

Mr. Joy.

John Kessel

25.5

JOHN KESSEL
WESTERN DEPT.

I agree. This extremely complicated and unpleasant subject shows signs of leading to dangerous results, and I am beginning to wonder whether it will not be necessary to urge the Prime Minister to order a confidential investigation into the whole matter. It is really impossible for the F.O. (or at least a Critical Dept) to get to the bottom of the facts, especially since many of them are, & must perhaps remain, shrouded in conscious mystery & and we have hitherto

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

hitherto depended on the Friends for advice on the action we should take. But as serious political implications are involved we must be sure of the ground on which we stand.

Would it be possible to write ~~that~~ for a meeting with "C", or whoever is the most senior & responsible person with a knowledge of these facts, in order to consider the next step?

W. Sturges
20/11

Mr. Hallett should see this paper as soon as it comes back from Mr. Sturges.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. Street.

Your friends welcome the proposal that they should discuss this case with members of the Western Department at an early date in order to decide upon the future action necessary. They feel, however, that any formal enquiry is unlikely to justify the considerable practical difficulties of securing an exhaustive examination of this very complicated affair by producing any facts significantly at variance with those already communicated to the Foreign Office.

In the meantime your friends are able to give an unqualified assurance that Schneider was not at any time either directly or indirectly working for us.

J. P. Bell

(For Nigel Bicknell).
14th June 1949.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

*Western Dept
(Mr Mason)*

The proposal for a meeting seems to me to ignore the fact that there is no one now working for Mr Hayler's friends who was closely concerned with the details of the S.O.E. operations in Holland. All the information so far produced has
(had to

*That is precisely why the problem is so unsatisfactory in the present terms
JMB*

had to be extracted from the S.O.E. files by people only generally familiar with the story. However, a meeting might do much to clear the air and I will make the necessary arrangements if you will suggest a date. Mr Shuckburgh's suggestion of a ministerial inquiry might be discussed at the meeting.

Sd/- John E.D. Street.
20.6.49

These papers returned to Western Department on June 21st. The Friends are not very forthcoming. In fact a certain evasiveness appears in their


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reaction to our request for information. Nor do I think that the lack of continuity in their organization is really a good reason for their professed inability to help us over the past history of this ill-fated operation. There is no one now in Western Department who was there before 1947. - but we don't refuse requests for information about events previous to that date.

However... I think the best thing to do is to go ahead with the proposed meeting and see what we can get out of it. A day at the beginning of next week would probably suit best.

Mr Mallet might like to see these papers and perhaps preside the meeting.


(J. Russell).
22 June, 1949.

I have looked through these papers and I am not convinced that any useful purpose would be served by any further enquiry into the matter at present.

It seems to me that the four most probable explanations of the affair are

(1) that there was treachery in this country. I see no evidence to support this supposition.

(2) that there was a deliberate policy aimed at securing the elimination of agents and contacts in Holland. This seems to me to be too far fetched to be believed unless it were in connexion with

(3) a plan whereby certain agents were sacrificed in order to establish the reputation with the German authorities of the man Schreieder, whom we wished to employ as a double agent.

(4) that through stupidity, sloth ~~and~~ or carelessness S.O.E. failed to make use of various indications which were available of the fact that their agents were falling into the hands of the Germans.

Of all these suppositions the last seems to me to be the least unlikely. But however this may be, the position now is that we have received a letter from a lawyer who is defending Waals in Holland, and that a Dutch Commission is investigating the affair. The letter seems to me to call for no answer: in fact if we were to attempt to answer it we might be led on into a very embarrassing discussion. As for the Dutch/

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Minutes

Dutch enquiry, it seems to me that we can await its result. If its effect is to exonerate our Services then there is nothing more to be done: if on the other hand it attributes blame to our Services, we have then some grounds for making a further enquiry.

Mallet.

27th June 1949

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

SECRET

Sir G. Jebb

I attach a file about certain operations of S.O.E. during the war which have become known by the name of the Englandspeil, of which you may possibly have heard.

The story briefly is that an agent dropped by S.O.E. in Holland fell into the hands of the Germans, and as a result a number of other agents subsequently fell into their hands, and a large number of Dutch resisters were discovered and executed by the Germans. Some stories have been circulating in Holland to the effect that this tragedy was caused either by treachery in the British Services or by carelessness there or as a deliberate attempt to build up a double agent who was employed by the Germans.

As you will see from my minute on the top paper, I do not think that we should, or need, take any action in the matter at present, but I wondered whether you could add anything to the story from recollections of your days with S.O.E.

Walter

27th June 1949


I only heard about this story after the end of the war, but the incident is, I think, quite impartially summarised in Dr. Mackenzie's "History of S.O.E.," extracts of which were shown to me about a couple of years ago since my name occasionally figured in the earlier part of it. I have no copy of this History with me, but I have no doubt that Mr. Hayter or Mr. Joy could produce one and it might be useful to turn it up.

Actually I do not think that I myself can throw much light on the affair since the Agent whose arrest started the business was only arrested a couple of months after I had myself returned to the Foreign Office (mid-April, 1942). Whether the ensuing calamity would have been allowed to go so far if Mr. Dalton and I had continued in Berkeley Square House, is a matter on which it is scarcely for me to pronounce! But I should say that while I was there I saw every incoming and outgoing signal from every Agent and whenever I thought that anything looked at all fishy, demanded a meeting of those concerned. Sometimes this meeting was held by the Minister.

/ The

Minutes.

The Germans certainly seem to have behaved pretty cleverly over the whole affair just as they did when they successfully fooled C's organisation during the winter of 1939-40 into believing that "the Generals" were ~~at~~ on the point of staging a revolt against Hitler. This particular comedy, you may remember, ended with the arrest of two of C's more important officials at Venloo.



27th June, 1949.

W. Deft

You might have a look at Dr Mackenzie's book. It is obvious we wouldn't have any (him) it which gave away awkward secrets.

/m+r

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Mr. G. Jo
Post on Pr
it / B

MR. G. JONKER
Advocaat en Procureur
A/B No. 473

Z
AMSTERDAM Z. May 16th 1949
Van Eeghenstraat 102 Telefoon 25287

Z3814

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,

L O N D O N . S.W.1.

Sir,

I thank you for your extensive letter of May 7th (No. Z 2738/1051/29 G) which, however, does not elucidate the more intricate questions involved. I do not think that His Majesty's Government is in the least obliged to solve problems for a Dutch barrister but, since your kind letter was meant to clarify, I think I may just as well state the points which remain obscure.

- 1) Surrendering himself under a false name does not explain why he surrendered at all.
- 2) It is rather hard to believe that a man whose alleged ties with the Germans consisted solely of having belonged to their most despised helpers, could be considered as a likely man to make his way to the bosom of the most ideological resistance movement. Although I am no judge of the tactics of the B.I.S. you will agree with me that such an assumption would have been rather optimistic.
- 3) It is still unexplained what Schreieder was doing as a barber in a prisoner-of-war camp and why it took him many hours to give van der Waals a hair-cut.
- 4) It is not quite clear how the sending of van der Waals' to Germany could have been communicated confidentially to the B.N.V., in view of the fact that the B.N.V. started the hunt for van der Waals in the summer of 1945 and continued it throughout the time until the summer of 1946, going even to the extent of digging up the graves of unknown victims of German mass-slaughters.
- 5) Whether van der Waals believed that Schreieder worked with the B.I.S. is a question only second in importance. The paramount question is indeed whether Schreieder did or did not work with the B.I.S.

Van der Waals claims to have made the acquaintance through a certain Mr. Verhagen. Having found a man who strikingly answers the description given by van der Waals of Verhagen and who during the war undoubtedly carried on the kind of work ascribed by van der Waals to Verhagen, I now stumble over the visit of Mr. Bass' to the Netherlands. I do not for one moment want to express any doubt of the veracity of any statement made

MR. G. JONKER
Advocaat en Procureur

AMSTERDAM Z. May 16th 1949.
Van Eeghenstraat 102 Telefoon 25287

The Under-Secretary of State, LONDON S.W.1.

Page 2.

made by you or by the Foreign Minister, but I should like to point out that the words "working for the British Intelligence Service" may meet with different interpretations in different countries. I do not think that Schreieder performed his many objectionable duties as a head of the S.D. on behalf of the B.I.S. However, many explanations have been given about the so called "England Spiel", which are all but one highly unsatisfactory. For instance:

I. The England-Spiel was possible because of the transcendental stupidity of the B.I.S. which at the beginning of the war had lost its capable men to the fighting forces and was staffed by mere amateurs. This was told to me by the director of a State Institute for War Documentation.

I have too great a respect for the British efficiency to believe this.

II. The England-Spiel was possible through the treason of one high British officer in the S.O.E. (preferably, I think, Major Bingham). It seems to me that this gentleman must have had a rather strenuous job.

III. The England-Spiel was founded on the treason of the dropped agents. I think this is not only libellous with regards to the men who did their duty, but also hardly feasible and absolutely irreconcilable with the warnings of Dessing, Dourlein, Lebbink and others.

IV. The England-Spiel has been staged by the B.I.S. to eliminate the pick of the Western European intelligentsia. It was this amusing slander which caused the Manchester Guardian to ask for an official statement.

V. The England-Spiel was wilfully staged by the Allies in order to avert German attention from the future scene of war, France. Apart from the fact that history seems not to bear this out, the version might explain the droppings, but not the capture.

VI. Schreieder was the only approachable man in the Reichs Sicherheits Hauptamt but could only have any value as a spy if by sufficient successes he were enabled to make a quick career. Thus sacrificing a limited number of men the Allies obtained a key-man in the German camp which palpably served the Allied war aims.

As

MR. G. JONKER
Advocaat en Procureur

AMSTERDAM Z. May 16th 1949
Van Eeghenstraat 102 Telefoon 25287

The Under-Secretary of State, LONDON S.W.1.

Page 3

As far as I can see only explanation VI covers most of the ground. I do not see how any blame could be thrown on the Allied High Command thereby, any more than by the Dieppe raid or any other action in which a party is sacrificed to save the lives of thousands or more.

Incase surmise VI were true, I do not think an official acknowledgement of the state of affairs would be desirable. Although I am neither a soldier nor a spy nor a politician I can quite see that the inner works of war-fare should be discussed as little as possible. But in this case my hand is being forced. I was appointed by Court to defend van der Weals. I am to defend him as well as I can and I am not appointed to repeat any official point of view on the mere grounds of its being an official view. I have to test the elements of the case on their probability.

For the moment I can only see that my client, who claims - and even during the war has claimed to his relatives and his German girl-friend - that he worked for the Allies, is going to be shot while his master, whose acts are far from dissimilar to those, which brought many Germans to the gallows or in prison, is being led out of the country. A German girl who brought in an accusation against that master, grave enough to hang him, was ordered out of the country within 48 hours.

For the moment I see rhyme nor reason in all this, except if I see it as the deliberate sacrifice of a stupid man who though himself elected to the (in my eyes rather dubious) fascination of the Game, but without any MAHBUB ALI to get him out of trouble, no HURRER BAHU and his red umbrella, only many CREIGHTON SAINES to let him down.

And I am going to fight this. Apart from everything else my reputation is at stake. I did not ask for this case, but having got it I have to bring it off. I am going to fight it on the beaches and the open plains, in and out of the woods and in any back-yard where any laundry is left unlaundered. I am going to fight it even if they kill my client first. Because, I sincerely think, may know him not to be guilty.

I have a very great love for your country and a very profound respect for its inhabitants. More than I can say I hate dragging Great Britain into a fight which is neither of your nor of my seeking and which we all only owe to an irresponsible yielding to the popular

craving

Mr. G. JONKER
Advocaat en Procureur

AMSTERDAM Z. May 16th 1949.
Van Eeghenstraat 102 Telefoon 25287

The Under-Secretary of State, LONDON S.W.1.

Page 4.

craving for blood on the part of my government and their public prosecutors.

This is the main reason why I address myself in such length to you.


I want to state that I have no ulterior object. If I had not been the lawyer of van der Waals' I should never have bothered. If the unlikely would happen and my client is sent away with a verdict deserved by a man of such credulity, the case is closed. But if the man is sacrificed to the needs of secrecy I shall have to batter my way to justice.

As this battering might easily be misinterpreted as an unfriendly attitude towards your country I want to stress my deep devotion to the country I am forced to annoy.

With the expression of my humblest respect to His Excellency and to you

I am,

yours sincerely



Minutes.

9 Div h/w
or? 2 Div

Z 3814

Print. Embassy The Hague Dutch Press Review 9/6/49.

Van Der Waals Again Sentenced to Death

Wartime collaborator A. van der Waals was again sentenced to death by the Court of Appeal yesterday. This news is found frontpaged in all evening papers. During the summing up, the Judge told the accused that the Court attached little value to his statement that he had acted on the instigation of an agent of the British Intelligence Service, while they were frankly incredulous as regards his belief in Schreieder's role as a 'British Agent'. Nevertheless, the Court wished to stress the fact that the verdict would not have been different if the accused had worked for the Allies, since his record was black enough to warrant the highest punishment.

An appeal is to be lodged with the authorities for clemency.

(NO SOURCE)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN

Minutes.

Z Diepke

Z 3814/1051/290

17 JUN 1949

Dutch Press Review (British Embassy) 14/6/49

The Englandspiel: Yet Another Brochure

The series of brochures on the Englandspiel has been enriched with yet another publication, written by A. van der Waals, the wartime collaborator who was recently sentenced to death. After giving his vision on the E-spiel, van der Waals describes his own activities during the war. He explains that he entered the resistance movement on the instruction of Schreider, after this Movement had already been tracked down by the Germans. Schreider and van der Waals, however, succeeded in saving the lives of many of the underground workers. Both he and Schreider were in the service of the Allies, van der Waals writes.

The Catholic Progressive paper DE TIJD, which frontpages a short review of this new brochure, observes that the brochure is revealing in one respect: van der Waals' story about his meeting with Schreider in Germany, where the latter worked as hair-dresser. Schreider told the writer that he would be killed if he told anyone about his (Schreider's) activities as an Allied agent.

The brochure contains a postscript by the writer's Council for the Defence, Mr. G. Jonker who gives his own vision on the Englandspiel.

No

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

2 Div
b/w

23814 G

Schreieder's Release Confirmed

The Schreieder case has now been formally closed, after the Special Court of Appeal rejected the appeal of the Leuwarden Prosecutor for reopening the case, various papers report. There is no comment.

NIEUWE COURANT learns that the Council for the Defense of the wartime collaborator van der Weals has appealed for a revision of sentence.

Nothing to be Written in this M

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

1949

WESTERN

Z 3873 / G

13.

NETHERLANDS

Z 3873 / 1051 / 29G

Int. M. A. Robb
(Information Secretary)
The Hague

Int. Matthews
MAR/HW

Dated 11th May.
Rec'd 23rd May.

Request for further information
concerning the "Englandspiel"
case.

Last Paper

Z 3814

References

PW 468/4/429

(Print)

(How disposed of)

Int. Mr. Robb (THE HAGUE)
from Mr. Mason July 14

(Action completed)

J. B. P.

(Index)

M. H.

Next Paper

(Minutes)

There is no trace of any letter
from Mr. Brooks (who is he by
the way?) in Z. Div. - either
green or white. I gather, however,
that there are papers entered P.W.

We are anxious to keep publicity to
a minimum: this is a very dangerous
subject, on which it is very easy to
go wrong. We have given the
ambassadors a carefully worked out brief
about what not to say and it is
essential that nobody else, e.g. the Press
offices, should get out of line.

W. F. I. D

John Keene

28.6

The letter to Mr. Brown

Mr. Mason,
Western Department.

*Ente 6
(E-spiel)*

SSY

Z 3873

voices
IAGUE

This refers to a letter which I passed on to you. Perhaps the two had better be married.

11th May, 1949.

Peter Matthews

Peter Matthews.

18th May, 1949

a copy of your letter
he "Englandspiel".
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Yours truly,

Richard L. ...

ry.

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REVENUE WELSH/132 150,000 1948

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from "Truth".

We certainly do not propose to pursue the matter any further, and our line is that the legs said about this unhappy affair the better. The Ambassador is, of course, fully aware of our attitude, on this subject.

Yours Sincerely,

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13.7

(R.H. Mason)

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Mr. Mason,
Western Department.

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Z 23873

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BAGUE

This refers to a letter which I passed on to you. Perhaps the two had better be married.

11th May, 1949.

Peter Matthews

Peter Matthews.

18th May, 1949

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Yours Sincerely,

(R.H. Mason)

*Mark
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Z3873

149

No. 182645.

BRITISH EMBASSY
Press and Information Services
29, LANGE VOORHOUT, THE HAGUE

Our Ref. MAR/NW.

Restricted

11th May, 1949.

Dear Matthews,

Thank you for having sent to me a copy of your letter
PW 468/4/929 of May 4th to Brooks about the "Englandspiel".
I would however be very grateful if you would let me have also a
copy of the letter received from Brooks, with any background
to the request that there may be. As you can imagine, this
is a topic which causes very considerable concern here.

PW not entered green

Yours ever,

Michael Robb

M. A. Robb.
Information Secretary.

Peter Matthews Esq.,
News Department,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
LONDON S.W.1.

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*Our decision
of any reference
to Bulgaria
was of course
deliberate and*

from "Truth".

We certainly do not propose to pursue
the matter any further, and our line is that
The legs said about this unhappy affair
the better. The Ambassador is, of course,
fully aware of our attitude on this subject.

Yours Sincerely,

RM
13.7

(R.H. Mason)

Registry
No. Z3873/1051/29G

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

Draft *2.3873*

Mr. M.A. Robb,
Information Secy.,
The Hague.

From:-

Mr. R.H. Mason



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Our omission of any reference to Bingham was of course deliberate and

to please

14th July, 1949

147

Dear Robb,

Your letter of the 11th May to Peter Mathews of the News Department, reference ^{to} MAR/NW about ^{to} "Englandspiel", has been ^{actually} passed to me. I apologise for the long delay in replying. The letter which Mr. Brooks wrote ^{to Mathews} passed on a copy of a letter which had been addressed to the Public Relations Officer at the War Office, asking for information about the "Englandspiel". The War Office had referred the writer to us and you have a copy of our reply. Mr. Brooks' letter had been inspired by a letter from a reader of "Truth" in Holland.

In reply to our letter Mr. Brooks said that "Truth" was glad to have such an explicit denial of the allegation of treachery ^{but} and pointed out that our reply made no reference to Major Bingham, to whom his original letter had referred. There has been no further request for information from "Truth".

We certainly do not propose to pursue the matter any further, ~~and our line is that~~ The legs ~~said~~ said about this unhappy affair the better. The Ambassador is, of course, fully aware of our attitude, ~~on this subject.~~

Yours Sincerely,

(R.H. Mason)

RHM
13.7

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

(Z 3873/1051/29 G)

14th July, 1949.

SECRET

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN ON THIS PAGE

Dear Robb,

Your letter of the 11th May to Peter Matthews of the News Department, reference MAR/NW about the "Englandspiel", has been eventually passed to me. I apologise for the long delay in replying. The letter which Mr. Brooks wrote to Matthews passed on a copy of a letter which had been addressed to the Public Relations Officer at the War Office, asking for information about the "Englandspiel". The War Office had referred the writer to us and you have a copy of our reply. Mr. Brooks' letter had been inspired by a letter from a reader of "Truth" in Holland.

In reply to our letter Mr. Brooks said that "Truth" was glad to have such an explicit denial of the allegation of treachery but pointed out that our reply made no reference to Major Bingham, to whom his original letter had referred. There has been no further request for information from "Truth".

Our omission of any reference to Bingham was of course deliberate and we certainly do not propose to pursue the matter any further. The less said about this unhappy affair the better. The Ambassador is, of course, fully aware of our attitude.

Yours sincerely,

Heath Mason

(R.H. Mason)

M.A. Robb, Esq.,
The Hague.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.