

1950	WESTERN	WN 1051/1/G
	NETHERLANDS	

F.O. minute
 H. J. Russell
 Dated: 9.12.49
 Rec'd. 27.1.50

Memorandum on the history
 of Kijlandspiel for the
 information of Sir Gladwyn Jebb.

Last Paper
 (Z 8370/1051/299)
 1949

See within

(Minutes)

References
 Z 6493/1051/299
 1949

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 28/1

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(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)
 R.L. 50/1

(Index)
 W.H.

Next Paper

Return to COFR's Day



WN1051 / G

*has been reviewed
not a letter 11/21*

"THE ENGLANDSPIEL"

On September 30th Mr. Shuckburgh submitted for the information of Sir William Strang a memorandum [Z 6493.G] rehearsing the history of this sorry botch.

Sir William Strang directed that Sir Gladwyn Jebb should see the file on his return to the office. Since that date, however, the papers have been in constant active circulation: furthermore there have been certain developments of substance. The department has accordingly revised the memorandum and brought it up to date. It is now submitted, for the information of:

- Sir G. Jebb.
- Mr. Christopher Warner.
- Mr. Reilly.

John Russell

9. 12. 48

JOHN RUSSELL,
WESTERN DEPT.

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COIR

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Draft.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb

Memorandum

Visit of Dr. Donker to London
October 2nd - 11th

Dr. Donker, a Member of the Second Chamber of the Netherlands States General, is the Chairman of the Netherlands Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry into the conduct of the Netherlands Government and Armed Forces during the war.

2. One of the subjects which the Commission is investigating is the so-called "Englandspiel". Briefly this means the failure of certain clandestine operations in Holland which were carried out by S.O.E. and S.I.S. The Germans were able to capture some agents together with their wireless operators and "persuade" them to continue to send messages to the Headquarters in London. By this means they were able to capture agents who were landed subsequently and a ^{great} number of these were imprisoned and executed.

3. After the war several Dutch journalists and lawyers published books, pamphlets and articles about this episode. Their main theme was that there had been treachery in

London...

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London. How, they asked, could captured agents have continued to send wireless messages to London without the controlling authorities being aware of what was happening? They answered this question by saying that of course the controlling authorities were aware, but they continued to send agents knowing that they would be captured on landing, thus deliberately sacrificing them. This in its turn required explanation and several were offered, the most colourful being that Great Britain, having lost her influence in other parts of the world, wished after the war to establish hegemony over Western Europe. In order to do this she would have to eliminate Dutch nationalists and patriots and chose this method in collusion with the enemy. This was England's game: the "Englandspiel".

4. Although Lord Selborne conducted an enquiry into the first phase of these operations, no formal and open investigation of these matters has ever been held in this country.

5. Dr. Donker who has throughout taken a sane and sympathetic view of the whole affair, had been and still is in close touch with Sir Philip Nichols about the Englandspiel.

6. The report of his Commission will undoubtedly have an important influence on Dutch public opinion. Here it should be noted that...

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that the fantastic explanations mentioned above are believed by a large number of Dutchmen. There are also a large number who do not believe them but there are several aspects of the episode which have remained without explanation to this day, and even our best friends in Holland feel slightly uneasy and would like to see the whole affair cleared up once and for all. Since the Commission's report is likely to be accepted as the last word on the subject, it is in our interest to do what we can to ensure that by implication it exonerates H.M.G. of the charges of treachery which have appeared in the less responsible sections of the Dutch press. I should perhaps say that these charges have been entirely ignored by H.M.G., and that no statement whatever has been issued by us, ^{to the Press} Accordingly ^{But} a statement was prepared last year by Mr Reilly's friends and transmitted to the Commission through ^{the} ~~H.M.G.~~ Military Attaché ^{to H.M.G. Embassy at} at The Hague in December 1948.

7. By the middle of September Dr. Donker had completed his enquiries in the Netherlands. He wished however to ^{Secure} ~~fix~~ the last link in the chain, in the shape of the evidence of the British officers who had controlled the operations from London.

8. During a visit to London in July, when he interrogated Dutchmen living here, he had called at the Foreign Office and ^{had} asked whether he might be put in touch with these officers.

9. After careful consideration and consultation..

consultation with ^{Mr} Reilly's friends we reached the conclusion that unless we met this request Dr. Donker might suspect us of having something sinister to hide, and that the Commission's report might reflect such doubts.

10. Accordingly arrangements were made for Dr. Donker to come over, and ten of the officers who were connected with the operations were invited to meet him, first at a small reception, and subsequently either singly or in small groups for more detailed conversations.

9. When Dr. Donker arrived it was immediately plain that his attitude was friendly. He was at pains to explain that the Commission had entirely discarded the more sensational theories which had at one time been circulated in the Netherlands. He was grateful for the assistance already given by His Majesty's Government to the Commission, and in particular for the statement transmitted to the Commission through ~~His Majesty's~~ ^{the} Military Attaché at The Hague, and for the confidence in his discretion shown by His Majesty's Government in sending him a copy of the Selborne Report.

11. He was anxious however that His Majesty's Government should expand the statement of December 1948, and that it should be given official status.

10. It soon became apparent that Dr. Donker was concerned only to establish whether there had been any treachery on the part of agents of Dutch nationality, and the extent to which the Dutch authorities in London had been incompetent, negligent or treacherous.

12. He was not concerned to discover evidence of...

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of treachery on the part of British officers, nor even primarily to discover why the operations had failed.

11. ~~14.~~ Dr. Donker held lengthy conversations with the British officers who had been invited to meet him. It is doubtful whether he elicited any new facts from these talks, but he himself remarked that they had served to confirm the conclusions which the Commission had already reached. These may be summarized as

(1) that the highly coloured theories of a sinister British plot were entirely without foundation;

(11) that the operations had failed, not through treachery either on the part of the agents, or in London, but because the authorities controlling the agents had failed to realize that the Germans had succeeded in penetrating the organisation in the Netherlands.

Before leaving London, Dr. Donker had a meeting with Mr. Mayhew, at which he expressed his satisfaction with the conversations and handed him a letter in which he requested that a revised version of the 1948 Statement should be prepared and made available to the Commission.

15. This has now been done and has been cleared with Mr. Reilly's friends.

16. It will be sent to Sir Philip Nichols,
and...

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and subject to his views, will be transmitted to Dr. Donker. This statement will eventually be published in the Netherlands, and may be the subject of some comment in the press.

I think therefore that you should know something about it.

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WESTERN

WN 1051/b/G

1950

NETHERLANDS

F.O. minute
H. Shuckburgh
TOP SECRET
Dated: 28. 1. 50.
Rec'd: 30. 1. 50.

Amendment, requested by Dr. Darter,
to the memorandum transmitted
to The Hague for inclusion in
the report of the Netherlands
Committee of Inquiry into Englandspiel

Last Paper
WN 1051/1G.

(Minutes)

See within:-

References

Z 8103/1051/29G
1949.

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Next Paper

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W WN/OS/2

Sir Philip Nichols rang me up this morning to say that Dr. Donker, having translated into Dutch the memorandum about the Englandspiel which we sent to the Embassy under Mr. Mayhew's letter of October last (with the small addition asked for by Dr. Donker), has discovered that he does not like the very last sentence of the document. It refers apparently to some records of conversations with witnesses in the United Kingdom and he is afraid that, if the words go in as they stand, members of the public may ask to see these records. It is therefore proposed that, if we see no objection, the last sentence, or it may be sentences, should read as follows:

"There is no need here to recapitulate these conversations, of which the salient points are at the disposal of the Commission."

If this is acceptable, Sir Philip Nichols should be rung up this morning.

W.S.

22th January, 1950.

The memorandum referred to must be the one attached to Despatch 597 to The Hague, 14th December 1949. (Earlier pp are in circulation and could not be traced in time.)
whose organisation drafted the memorandum, told me that he considered Dr. Donker's amendment an improvement, and indeed it obviously tends to avert publicity.

Accordingly I telephoned to the Ambassador's private secretary at 12 noon and said that we accepted the amendment, the wording of which I repeated.

For convenience I give below the text of the original passage:

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IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

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"There is no need here to recapitulate these conversations, the salient points of which are now on record in the Commission's files. All the witnesses gave full answers to the questions put to them and volunteered information which, it is hoped, will be of service to the Commission."

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A.R.W.
A.R. Walpole
Western Dept
28th Jan. 1950

- 1) PUS Dept to see before entering.
- 2) Mr. Storer *1057/30.1*
- 3) C B *from pen*

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1950

NETHERLANDS

F.O. minutes

M. N. Bicknell

No 59/F.

Dated 17.1.50

Rec'd 1.2.50

Englandspiel

Comments of M. Keilly's friends
on points raised by Dr Donker

Last Paper

WN 1051/2G

(Minutes)

See minutes within.

References

Z 7674 / 1051/29G/1529
Z 7842
Z 7335
Z 7334
Z 7331

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Mr. Ramsden's minute of the 29th November, at 27674, asking for the comments of Mr. Reilly's friends about various Englandspiel points.

2. The list of points raised by Dr. Donker to which he wishes to refer in the report for his commission of enquiry, enumerated at 27342/G:

WN 1051/3. *G*

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A.(1) Mr. Reilly's friends see no objection to reference being made to the "finger-printing technique" in Dr. Donker's report. This technique was not sufficiently highly developed at the relevant time to play any significant part in detecting the fact that the agents concerned were under German control. This is obviously a point in our favour, and as the existence of the technique has been given wide publicity in the Netherlands and elsewhere, no security objection is apparent. (See page 4 of the record of conversations between Messrs. Senter and Miller with Dr. Donker on the 5th October, at 27335, and also page 3 of conversations between Messrs. Seymour and Bingham with Dr. Donker on the 5th October, at 27336).

A.(11) Mr. Reilly's friends see no security objection to Dr. Donker referring in his report to the fact that incoming messages from agents in the field were decoded at a central station and not by individual country or other sections of the appropriate organisation. (See page 3 of the record of conversations between Messrs. Senter and Miller with Dr. Donker on the 5th October, at 27335, and page 2 of the conversations between Messrs. Seymour and Bingham with Dr. Donker on the 5th October, at 27336).

A.(111) They see no reason to object to the inference drawn by Dr. Donker about the development of S.O.E. operations after the formation of S.H.A.E.F., although they personally feel it to be a non sequitur. It is true that after the formation of S.H.A.E.F., S.O.E. and other similar operations came under its overall command, but our friends doubt whether this fact in itself explains the improvement in operational methods after 1944. By this time the majority of liaison difficulties which were liable to arise between persons of different nationality working together, had been surmounted, and as a result operations had steadily improved. Furthermore, the organisation of S.O.E. had

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Minutes.

improved very much both in the operations and security fields, as a result of painful experience. (See page 4 of the record of conversations between General Gubbins and others with Dr. Donker on the 7th October, at 27338).

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B. (i) As far as the Netherlands operations were concerned, Mr. Reilly's friends think that it is correct to say that Col. Cordeaux's position in S.I.S. was analagous to that of Col. Brook in S.O.E. As Head of the Western European Region, Col. Brook was Mr. Bingham's immediate superior, and the relationship between Col. Cordeaux and Major Seymour was similar.

B. (ii) It is true that a British decoration was awarded to Thijs Taconis, although at the time that the citation was approved by Gen. Gubbins, Taconis was thought to be still alive and performing valuable resistance work. A copy of the citation, which was approved on the 16th June, 1943, is attached, and makes grim reading bearing in mind, as was later ascertained, that Taconis had been arrested in March, 1942, and that the operations described in the citation were all the product of the fertile imagination of Herr Giske of the Abwehrstelle and his comrades. According to a report submitted by Capt. de Graaf of the B.B.O., dated at Utrecht on the 18th June, 1945, a copy of which is attached, Taconis was probably shot by the Germans at Mauthausen. Taconis' military medal was not awarded solely for the supposed Kootwijk exploit, and it is probably that, when the insignia was presented to Taconis' next-of-kin in June, 1946, it had been decided that, as the award had been approved in 1943, it might be allowed to stand. There seems no reason to doubt that from November, 1941, to the time of his arrest in March, 1942, Taconis had done a respectable amount of work. This information should also answer the additional question at paragraph 3 (c) in Mr. Ramsden's minute of the 29th November at 27674/G.

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B. (iii) It is true that Ubbink and Dourlein, the two escaped agents who brought the news of the disaster out through Switzerland, were in fact detained in Brixton prison for a time. This resulted from a combination of circumstances not the least of which was that this unsatisfactory institution

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Minutes.

was used not only for the imprisonment of persons convicted of security offences, but also for the holding of doubtful cases pending a final clearance from the Security Services. This procedure raised the indignation of the Dutch at the time, particularly that of DeBruyne, who also impelled the Dutch War Minister, Jonkheer Van Lidth, to approach Lord Selborne, asking for his intervention. In this respect, I do not think I can do better than to attach copies of the correspondence which passed between Lord Selborne and various other Ministers, as they give a clear picture of the reasons leading to this enforced action.

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The edited version of the Selborne report was sent to Dr. Donker some months ago for his personal information. There appears to be no security objection to Dr. Donker referring to this report and its broad conclusions. It should not be

/published

(Signed) G. Mc.V. GUBBINS.

brigadier.

Minutes.

published in full or in part, because it is an uninhibited document with frequent mention of such organisations as S.I.S., which for security reasons should not be used publicly. (See my minute of the 7th December at Z7674/G). This is a security point which applies of course to all documents which Dr. Donker intends to publish, and Mr. Keilly's friends trust that we will ask him to bear this in mind if we have not already done so.

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3. There remains one supplementary question unanswered in Mr. Ramsden's minute of the 29th November, about Col. Six. We can find no record of Col. Six, but it can be inferred from the mention of Col. Six in the fourth page of the record of the conversations between Gen. Gubbins and others with Dr. Donker on the 4th October at Z7334, that he is a Dutch officer who was a member of the Dutch Underground Movement, the O.D. He does not appear to have been controlled by either S.I.S. or S.O.S. and appears to be one of the Dutch military officers who have been putting about the "Sacrifice" theory in the Netherlands in the past few months.

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Migel Bicknell
(Migel Bicknell)
17th January, 1950

See now WN 1051/4 G.

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(Signed) C. Mc.V. GUBBINS.

Brigadier.

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PRIVATE THijs TACONIS - DUTCH ARMY

Recommendation for the award of the Military Medal

Private Thijs TACONIS was landed in HOLLAND by parachute, with a wireless operator, early in November 1941 - since when he has done valuable and notable work both in performing the tasks for which he was originally despatched and in many other ways.

TACONIS has organized and trained 10 groups of saboteurs, each group consisting of an average of 8 men. These groups are situated in various parts of HOLLAND, and active but unobtrusive sabotage of transport and also arson has been and continues to be undertaken.

At our request TACONIS planned and organized in June 1942 an attack on the German radio station at KOOTWIJK. There is every reason to suppose that this attack would have been successful had the assault party not come upon land-mines - the presence of which was not suspected - and roused the guard, with resultant failure. TACONIS' organisation has neither been shaken nor endangered in any way by this incident - thus affording proof of the efficient way in which his work has been done.

With the aid of Reception Committees organized locally by TACONIS, 10 deliveries of stores comprising in all 52 containers have been made. The total net weight of these stores exceeds 5 tons and they have been distributed amongst the various sabotage groups and safely hidden.

These same Reception Committees, under the guidance of TACONIS, have at different times received and given safe accommodation to 6 officers and other ranks proceeding to the field, whose chances of safety and the ultimate success of whose work has depended to an important extent on the services thus rendered. In fact, it is due to the assistance in the initial stages of TACONIS and his men that plans for the organisation of resistance groups in HOLLAND have been completed so rapidly.

One of the officers whom TACONIS received was unfortunate enough to suffer severe concussion on landing. He was none the less safely housed, given medical attention and finally, when after a few days he died, buried clandestinely and therefore without danger to our Organisation.

Many other services have been rendered by TACONIS and his helpers in the way of receiving special equipment and messages and passing them through to other agents in the field, and even latterly in obtaining most valuable information in regard to the issue of identity and ration cards in HOLLAND.

Throughout all these months of active and intelligent planning and organisation, TACONIS has been in constant danger, the nature and extent of which can only be surmised, but which, by his high degree of courage, resourcefulness and devotion to duty, he has combatted successfully. His work commands the unreserved respect of all who have experience of such activities.

I strongly recommend that TACONIS be awarded the Military Medal.

(Signed) C.No.V. GUBBINS.

Brigadier.

copy

REPORTRe Taconis

Today, the 17th June 1945, I interrogated Mr. W.J. Hohman, chief assistant at the skin diseased clinic, Groningen, living at Verlengde Heerenweg 91, and Mrs. J. van Dijk, widow of Mr. Jaap van Dijk, Inspector at Unilever, Arnhem, died in German prison.

After Taconis was dropped he made contact with J. van Dijk, and also lived at his house. He was arrested in March 1942 in his safe-house, just when he was leaving the house to go to Patten to liberate a certain Johnnie, who was thought to be imprisoned there. This may have been Johnnie den Firoge, as the description practically agrees: slightly bald, strongly built, florid. Johnnie's description had previously appeared in the police paper. He went to Dijk's house once. He arrived in the evening, slept there, had breakfast the following morning and left afterwards.

Van Dijk and Taconis were then locked up in Scheveningen. From there they went to Amersfoort and after 8 months, approximately January, Van Dijk was sent to Vught.

It is not known whether Taconis has been there. Proceedings took place in March. The well-known Schimmelpenninck van der Oyen was also concerned in this. After the trial it appeared that 88 persons had been sequestered and approximately 24 had been sentenced to death. Before the trial the prisoners were at the Police barracks at Haaren for a short time, where they were treated well. In October they were taken to the Mutschweiler camp in Germany. From there they went to Dachau on the 2nd of September, from Dachau to Ottobruen on the 11th of September, then to Danzmirgen and eventually to Vailingen near Stuttgart. Mr. Van Dijk died there in March 1945. Apart from him, there were 14 other Dutchmen and it is confirmed that at least 12 of these are dead.

Taconis was probably shot. His wireless operator, a certain Huib, came from Manila, was short and slightly built, and was dropped at Ommen.

Most likely the penetration started via the person who looked after the agents at that time, and whose name and other details will follow shortly.

Utrecht, 18th June 1945.

The Reserve Captain S.B.O.

(Sgd.) K. DE GRAAF.

TOP SECRET

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F/1794/127

16th June, 1944.

My dear Morrison,

I enclose a copy of a letter of the 1st June from Jonkheer van Lidth de Jeude, Minister of War of the Netherlands, together with a copy of my reply of to-day.

This has obviously been a difficult case. I accept the decision arrived at by Sir John Moylan at his meeting on the 13th May to recommend the detention of these two Dutch agents during the special OVERLORD Security period. I also think that S.O.E. was right in asking that if these men were to be detained they should be detained apart from other detainees. I am writing to you because I think you may care to have the case brought to your personal notice as an example of the difficult questions that may arise in connection with the type of detention establishments for special cases. It seems to me unfortunate that men who are only segregated as a precaution should be sent to a prison. I cannot help thinking that it would have been better if they could have been kept in a private house as S.O.E. kept them so long as they were under our charge. I hope that the special reasons for the detention of these two Dutchmen may now be considered to have elapsed.

I am sending a copy of this correspondence to Eden as the Minister responsible for the Security Service. I am advising him that S.O.E. will raise this question immediately with the Security Service,

Yours sincerely,

The Rt. Hon. Herbert Morrison, M.P.,
Home Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

16th June, 1944.

My dear Minister,

I have considered with great sympathy your letter of the 1st June. I have made searching personal enquiries into the case of your fellow-countrymen, DOURLIN and UBBINK, and I hope that what I have established to my satisfaction may help to satisfy you as to the reasons for what has taken place.

I think it will assist in reaching an understanding of what has evidently been a difficult and unusual case, if I deal first with one or two points of detail in your letter. May I therefore - in no polemical spirit - draw to your attention some points in your letter?

It is not quite correct to say that these men were "interned here upon arrival", nor (as I shall explain below) is it correct to view their present detention as being either a continuation of their treatment since their arrival, or occasioned by the reasons adumbrated in your letter.

I am most anxious that these facts should be clear to you. DOURLIN and UBBINK were sent out as S.O.E.-sponsored agents and had the misfortune to be captured by the enemy. We established some considerable time ago a security system whereby any S.O.E. accredited agent, of whatever nationality (including British) who had escaped from enemy hands, should be segregated by us on arrival here until he has been interrogated by our own Special Section working in concert with the Security Service of this country (which alone can give a clearance). Any escape possibly arranged or connived at by the enemy is well known to be one of the classic methods of "penetration", and each such case therefore calls for special care. On the 29th November last, before these men had arrived in this country, our Directors of Security with the Deputy Director of the Division of the Security Service, called upon Colonel de Bruyne and explained this standard arrangement and the reasons for it, which he accepted as a sound security procedure, and as applicable to this case.

On their arrival they were accordingly housed at one of our country establishments in the care of one of our own officers, so that they should give a complete account of their adventures without the distraction of contacts with their compatriots or others. They were not interned. I desire to emphasise this point, since the procedure of segregation in our own care has been devised, in part to spare S.O.E. agents who have had the misfortune to be captured, the detention upon which the Security Service might naturally otherwise insist. They were first interrogated in February. The case was very complex, and a series of interrogations took place. The interrogations were unusually prolonged, partly on account of the complexity of the case, partly on account of the illness of UBBINK; and partly on account of the desire of the men to tender further evidence from time to time. On a point of accuracy, I must emphasise that throughout, this constituted an investigation - primarily in order to try and establish to what extent the enemy might have connived at this escape, and to establish the implications of that sinister possibility. It was not a "hearing" and this is important because their present detention does not result from a judgment which would have followed a "hearing" with an adverse verdict.

After many discussions the question came up as to their future.

As long ago as February last, the Security Service decided that in view of invasion plans, special security steps would have to be taken in respect of all cases where some residual doubt might remain. This involved an executive and not a judicial decision. It was an executive step considered necessary in any such case in the interests of the Allied cause as a whole, although the reason for it in some cases might be that insufficient positive evidence was available here

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to account for happenings that had taken place abroad.

In May, in that atmosphere, which you will remember and understand, the question arose as to the position of DOURLEIN and UBBINK. The decision, in the circumstances I have mentioned, lay with the Home Secretary advised by the Security Service. It was decided by them that there were unexplained features in the case and, applying the strict canons of security (which, as you know, were applied in other matters) it was decided that until the special security period had elapsed, they should be detained. That decision lay with the authorities responsible for national security. On that basis, their detention took place, under an order made by the Home Secretary on the 23rd May. We asked that they should not be put with other detainees detained for other reasons. I must therefore make it clear that their detention was not judicial in origin or penal in intent. I do, however, appreciate the considerations you have been kind enough to lay before me and in the altered circumstances I am accordingly now asking for a review of their detention. I hope that this may not be long of fulfilment.

I trust that the above explanation makes clear to you the point on which I have satisfied myself that the case has fallen into two phases and arises from two quite different sets of considerations. It must moreover be considered against the background of unwelcome and extensive German success against our joint efforts, which may result in apparent injustice to patriots, which would be the last wish of all of us.

Believe me, my dear Minister,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) SELBORNE.

Minister Jonkheer van Ldth de Jeude,
Royal Netherlands Government,
Arlington House,
Arlington Street, N.1.

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LONDON, June 1st, 1944.

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Dear Lord Selborne,

I should like to ask you personal attention for the fate of two of my country-men, named DOURLEIN and UBBINK, who were sent out in 1943 as secret agents to Holland by S.O.E., in concert with Colonel de Bruyne.

They were captured there, escaped from prison to Switzerland and arrived here again some time ago. They were interned upon arrival.

Meanwhile a hearing took place and although there is no evidence of any guilt, so far they have not been released. Apparently it is feared that they might commit indiscretions in their bitterness about their experiences. I do not share this fear, as they are both known as absolutely reliable and loyal.

It would be appreciated very much if a second hearing were to be held in the presence of one of the officers of our military intelligence service. Not only would this contribute to obtaining a much clearer picture of the occurrences, but also it would give both men the confidence that they are not left in the lurch by their Dutch chiefs.

I may enclose herewith a copy of a letter of UBBINK to Colonel de Bruyne - a similar letter in Dutch was written by DOURLEIN - from Brixton Prison, where they are detained.

I sincerely believe their detention is not deserved, after what they have gone through and I feel inclined to discontinue the enlisting of agents for this service, as I am afraid that this example will create serious ill-feeling.

You would do me a great favour indeed by reconsidering this case, for which I thank you in anticipation.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Jonkheer O.C.A. van Lidth
de Jeude.

COPY

Reg. No. 2286 Name: UBBINK, J.

TOP SECRET

BRIXTON PRISON.

To A.M. de Bruyne,
Colonel Royal Dutch Marines.

Sir,

For the last time I ask your attention in the matter in which Dourlein and I are concerned.

On 27 of May we are arrested and detained in Brixton Prison without any form of trial. I include the detention order which was given to us when we were arrested.

It is clear that we are not trusted. I want to explain that if the people who did this to us got information out of Occupied Country, the information given was given by the Gestapo.

We have nothing done that was not our duty and the people who think that the Germans helped us to come in England, what I suppose they think, then they are mistaken.

I swear by the Mighty God, in whom I believe, that I am not guilty.

This, Sir, you can regard as my oath.

I want you to come in touch with H.M. the Queen and with the highest officers of the Intelligence Service. If this cannot help you I ask you kindly to complain in the House of Lords.

I should like it very much to have an interview with you personal; if this is not possible, I ask you to use your influence to bring us in contact with Intelligence Officers and if this cannot be done, I want you to bring this matter before Court, where I can defend myself.

If the people, who ordered our arrest, think that it is better to separate us from the outside world, then there are places enough outside a prison where I am between walls and bars and I consider it as hurting my feelings of honour to be in the same prison as deserters and criminals.

I ask you, Sir, respectfully but with the utmost pressure to do everything you can do to help us, as Dourlein and I are unable to

/do

do anything at all. I feel that I cannot live longer in these
circumstances and I fear to lose my mind very soon.

In the hope that you get cleared the matter quickly, I sign

Respectfully yours,

(Sgd.) J.B. Ubbink.

Lt. ter Zee III S.D.

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