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S.O.E. HISTORY

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Vol.

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SOE HISTORY 110	HOLLAND
VOLUME	HISTORY OF DUTCH SECTION
FROM 1945	PART I
TO	General
	Produced by Captain W E Mills (period Dec 1940 - Dec 1943) Lt Colonel R I Dobson (Period January 1944 - July 1945)

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DUTCH SECTION HISTORY.

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DECEMBER 1940 - DECEMBER 1941.

PREAMBLE.

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF SECTION.

The Section became an independent entity on Dec 20th, 1940, when Mr. R.V. LAMING was placed in charge.

II. SITUATION AT THAT TIME VIS-A-VIS THE NETHERLANDS AUTHORITIES.

Grave difficulties immediately confronted the Section, due mainly to the opposition of the chief of the Dutch Secret Service, Mr. VAN'T SANT, whose influence was extremely great, and whose obstructive attitude made it impossible to obtain the services of Dutchmen of military age, whilst, at the same time, it closed valuable sources of general information. As a result of this attitude the prevailing outlook of Dutch officials was one of non-co-operation based partly on fear of VAN'T SANT, and partly on considerations set forth in the following paragraph.

III. NATURE OF DUTCH OFFICIAL CIRCLES.

All authority naturally derived from Queen WILHELMINA. The appointment of ministers had to be approved by her. The circle from which they could be recruited was of necessity limited to the relatively few possible candidates already in the U.K., most of whom were politicians of the old parties. The influence of VAN'T SANT on the Queen was quite uncanny and permeated many spheres in which he was not directly interested.

GERBRANDY, the Prime Minister, was sincere but weak. Thus many ministers and functionaries were imbued with the necessity for confining their activities to the strict limits of their official duties, fearing that any extraneous commitments might involve displeasure and possible dismissal. Obviously their underlings followed the same line. The result was complete apathy so far as such schemes as ours were concerned.

This state of affairs rendered it necessary for the Section to decide to go forward with the preliminary work without consulting the Dutch. It is, however, highly probable that such activities as were initiated were known to VAN'T SANT, whose system of espionage was notoriously thorough.

IV. RECRUITING.

The situation as above outlined made it essential to confine efforts at recruitment to people not connected with the Netherlands Government, thus reducing the available field to an unhealthily small circle.

V. PRELIMINARY RECONNOITRING.

Consideration was given to the possibility of landing agents by sea, and the support of the R.A.F. was enlisted for reconnaissance flights over the northern islands of HOLLAND. This plan was fraught with difficulties of all kinds. It was a hazardous undertaking at the best, and preparations for it were complicated by the lack of local knowledge.

In March 1941, the question of dropping agents by parachute was discussed. This proposal had previously been rejected as the opinion was that the topography and population density of HOLLAND were unfavourable. Another reason was that it was extremely difficult to secure the right type of man for this highly specialised type of infiltration.

(Reason) As landing by sea turned out impracticable when attempted in July 1941, parachuting was decided upon and training arrangements instituted.

VI. PERSONNEL.

During the period Dec 1940 - Dec 1941 the staff of the Dutch Section at H.Q. consisted of :-

Mr. R.V. LAMING. (Chief)	
Lt. R. LAMING.	
Maj. LOEWE.	
Maj. PINNOCK.	
Lt. DAWSON.	} Conducting Officers
Lt. KAY.	
Mr. BINGHAM.	
Lt. RUPERT.	

AGENTS SENT.

SEPTEMBER 1941.

On the night of Sep 7th two agents were dropped, viz. HENNING and STEEN, constituting Operation GLASSHOUSE A.

MISSION:

Apart from sundry possible contacts for securing general intelligence, they were to contact one JAN BOTTEMA, who was to be advised of this organisation's existence and general intentions. They were also to sound BOTTEMA about sea communications.

FIELD HISTORY:

Nothing was heard from either of the agents, or about them, until on Jan 4th 1942 a W/T operator sent out with a subsequent operation (CATARRH) reported that one of them had set out for the U.K. The other was said to have been caught in early October, escaped and gone into hiding. It subsequently transpired that STEEN left by boat on Nov 13th. No more was ever heard of him and he was presumed lost. HENNING was successfully exfiltrated on a trawler and landed in the U.K. on Feb 20th 1942, bringing with him two more Dutchmen who were put into training as agents.

HENNING brought back certain general information about internal conditions, but it was impossible to send him back again as he was too well-known to escape detection.

OCTOBER 1941. No despatches.

NOVEMBER 1941.

This is the next month in which agents were sent. The operation was known as "CATARRH" and consisted of :-

TIMMER - Organiser.  
LOOMAN - W/T Operator.

They left on 8th November 1941.

MISSION:

- Their mission was divided into two parts :-
- (a) To contact the two GLASSHOUSE couriers sent in September and to assist them to return.
  - (b) Thereafter to proceed with the organisation of sabotage groups in the West of HOLLAND.

FIELD HISTORY:

Nothing was heard from these two agents until Jan 4th 1942 when the message about GLASSHOUSE arrived. Traffic proceeded in a reasonably satisfactory manner and CATARRH reported good progress with the proposed sea-route to be arranged via BOTTEMA (then known as BRANDY).

By January 1942, the Germans were aware that attempts were being made to build up sabotage organisations under guidance from LONDON. Their prime source of information was a Dutchman named RIDDERHOF who acted for them in penetrating an existing organisation near NIJMEGEN. As a result they found out about a projected dropping of containers from LONDON scheduled for the end of February.

Two containers were dropped on the 27th, and were handed over to RIDDERHOF by Capt. van den BERG, chief of the reception committee "for safe keeping". This seems to have been done unwittingly by van den BERG. This incident convinced the German counter-espionage, led by Oberstleutnant GISKES and Sonderführer HUNTEMANN that somebody was in direct communication by W/T with the U.K. Priority was accordingly given to locating the operator. By the beginning of March, the street in the HAGUE where LOOMAN was transmitting was discovered. The district was raided and on the 6th March LOOMAN was arrested.

According to two reports made since the capitulation by GISKES and HUNTEMANN (as well as one by a certain KUP, who will be referred to in another section of this history), LOOMAN was soon persuaded to turn and operate under German control. On the 18th March, he sent message No.17 calling for more supplies and stating that a previously agreed dropping point was too dangerous. Thenceforward all his traffic was German controlled. The implications of this are apparent but will be referred to in more detail in the subsequent comments on the general situation in the field during 1942-3.

In fairness to LOOMAN, it must be added that he endeavoured to attract the attention of London H.Q. to the fact that he was controlled, by omitting to give identity checks when sending his telegrams.

LOOMAN was moved from HOLLAND to GERMANY in the summer of 1944. He was in RATHENOW when the Russians arrived and was liberated on April 25th, 1945, arriving in ENGLAND on May 21st.

TIMMER, after working successfully with LOOMAN, had the misfortune to get into touch with an agent provocateur known as JOHNNY, who caused him to be shadowed. On the 18th March 1942, TIMMER made an attempt to rescue one of his group from German captivity; he was arrested during the attempt. The Germans did not, at the time, appreciate the importance of their capture. TIMMER refused to talk at first, but later on, being convinced that the whole organisation was blown, he gave details of his mission. His soldierly behaviour was described by GISKES as exemplary.

Details of his subsequent movements are not clearly established, but he was eventually sent to MAUTHAUSEN Concentration Camp, where he was shot on September 6th 1944.

DECEMBER 1941. No despatches.

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DUTCH SECTION - GENERAL.I. PERSONNEL OF H.Q. SECTION.January - February, 1942 :-

Mr. R.V. LAMING. (Chief)  
 Major PINNOCK.  
 Major LOEWE.  
 Lt. DAWSON.  
 Lt. KAY. x  
 Capt. BINGHAM. x  
 Lt. KNIGHT. x

March - December, 1942 :-

Major BLIZARD. (Chief)  
 Capt. BINGHAM. x  
 Lt. KNIGHT. x  
 Sub. BOND. (A.T.S.)  
 Lt. SNEWING.  
 Lt. MILLS.  
 Lt. KAY. x } Conducting  
 Lt. PARR. } Officers.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE DUTCH AUTHORITIES.

The situation at the end of 1941 could not be described as satisfactory. It seemed apparent that until we could get our affairs segregated from the mass of high level intrigue and allocated to a specific chief with a suitable and adequate department in close contact with our section, little progress could be made. Our efforts were, accordingly, directed to that end. In February 1942, with the advent of the new section chief of S.O.E. H.Q., Major BLIZARD, efforts were intensified to reach an understanding with the Dutch.

Eventually Colonel de BRUYNE, of the Netherlands Marines, was placed in charge of the M.I.D. (Militaire Inlichtings-Dienst = Military Intelligence Service), assisted by Capt. LIEFTINCK, also of the Netherlands Marines, and Lt. SCHILP of the Netherlands Navy.

Co-operation between the M.I.D. and H.Q. Dutch Section was cordial and close, but for some time de BRUYNE's position was insecure and unhappy, due to intrigues against him on high levels. In these intrigues the hand of VAN 'T SANT was again evident. He resented the encroachment on his previously unchallenged supremacy in "secret" affairs, and also disliked de BRUYNE personally. There was also the fact that military circles viewed with disfavour the assumption by a naval man of power in a sphere which, considered theoretically, could not be called connected with the Navy.

In May the intrigues had reached such a pitch that de BRUYNE, in spite of his anxiety to co-operate with us, was fast finding his position untenable. He was an honest, open kind of man who was unable to cope with the "palace intrigue" in which he became entangled. His desire was to get on with the job and he suffered from an undermining of his authority and position by powerful self-seeking people

/ of limited vision

of limited vision and mediocre minds. Negotiations on a high level took place aiming at a clarification of the position, culminating in the intervention of Prince BERNHARD. The result was, eventually, that de BRUYNE's position was strengthened, with a consequent revival of his enthusiasm. More energetic steps were taken to provide us with suitable recruits, and the standard of the men sent to us for training was, on the average, high.

In April a plan was worked out known as the "Plan for HOLLAND", (to be the subject of an appendix to this section of the history). It was elaborated in collaboration with the Dutch and Col. de BRUYNE spent much time in discussing it with us, so that co-operation between S.O.E. Dutch Section and his office was very close. It continued so during the whole year in spite of vicissitudes in de BRUYNE's career.

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OUTLINE OF PLANNING FOR  
THE FIELD IN 1942.

During the first three months of the year, as is evidenced by the details of the agents' missions, efforts were directed towards establishing in HOLLAND a nucleus of men who could undertake preparatory work for future operations on a large scale, to follow a concerted plan. This preparatory work may be analysed as follows:-

- (a) The establishment of satisfactory arrangements for the reception of personnel and stores.
- (b) The establishment of efficient lines of communication between the U.K. and the Field.
- (c) The recruiting of helpers prepared to participate in more extensive action later.
- (d) The commission of undetectable acts of sabotage along specific lines.
- (e) The instruction and training of men in sabotage and subversive work generally.

All this programme was designed gradually to lead up to the introduction of much more ambitious and far-reaching schemes to be eventually worked out in conjunction with the plans of the Allied High Command.

In April the first draft of the "Plan for HOLLAND" was drawn up and submitted to Col. de BRUYNE's office for consideration and discussion. It was eventually completed in its final form and the agent commissioned to initiate it in the field was JURGENS (operation MARROW). The salient points of the Plan were as follows :-

1. It has as its object the creation of a "Secret Army".
2. The activities of the Secret Army are divided into two phases, viz:

PHASE A.

- (a) The disruption of enemy communications on or soon after D-Day, according to the strategic plan and the tactical situation.
- (b) The prevention, by this disruption, of the removal to GERMANY of Dutch locomotives and rolling-stock.

PHASE B.

- (a) After D-Day, the provision of direct support, behind the enemy's lines, to forces in the field.
- (b) The prevention of demolitions by the enemy ;
  - (i) of objectives (bridges, power-stations, dock facilities etc.) which the advancing Allied armies will wish to use.
  - (ii) of other objectives constituting scorched-earth policy.



The plan was supported by a wealth of military and industrial intelligence, classified in appendices to the final form, and, commencing with agent JURGENS, (Operation MARROW) organisers and instructors were given all facilities for a detailed study of its objects and implications.

Apart from this Plan, a directive was issued by General GUBBINS covering the general policy to be followed during the last quarter of the year. This was :-

1. To extend contact and communication with the Orde Dienst so as to cover as many districts as possible, endeavouring at the same time to deliver arms and stores to them.
2. To continue to build up the sabotage organisations and to deliver arms and stores to them as far as possible without endangering their security.
3. To undertake undetectable sabotage of all forms of transport and of establishments working for the enemy, although railway lines should not be attacked until further orders.

Special note re operation PARSLEY.

This agent was given a special mission at the request of the Dutch authorities. Under the details of his mission are given the main headings of his tasks, which were designed to provide the Dutch and us with up-to-date and complete details of all aspects of German measures in Occupied Holland - defences, communications, troop concentrations, movements, petrol stores, living conditions, Luftwaffe dispositions, Naval situations, war industries &c. The value of such information for general purposes, as well as in relation to the development of the "Plan for HOLLAND", is apparent.

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ACTUAL POSITION IN THE FIELD DURING 1942  
AS REVEALED BY LATER DEVELOPMENTS.

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The lines along which it was supposed and intended that activity in the field should develop are seen from the agents' missions, which were based on the plans formulated, details of which are found in the "Outline of Planning" attached to this history.

In reality, as is evident from the fate of the agents despatched during 1942, the position was that the German so-called "Ast-Niederlande", under the direction of one, Oberstleutnant GISEKES, had control over the whole of our organisation. Through that control, they were aware of our plans, and were able to carry out large numbers of arrests throughout the country, thereby stifling the development of resistance in general.

They concentrated on forcing or persuading W/T operators to work for them, and appear to have been largely successful. At the same time, by threats and cajolery they extracted as much information as possible about our organisation in ENGLAND, and our plans for subversive action in HOLLAND.

The original penetration was on the occasion of the capture of LOOMAN (operation CATARRH q.v.). From the "turning" of that agent dates the gradual assumption by the Germans of control over our activities, and this control continued undetected the whole of the year. Having all the cards in their hands, the Germans played them cleverly. They maintained heavy traffic on all circuits and described the "successful" completion of sabotage projects which, of course, had never been carried out. In the case of operation "PARSLEY" they realised that the fictitious collection of intelligence and its transmission to LONDON would involve an enormous amount of laborious work and a waste of W/T traffic to little or no purpose. They accordingly decided to eliminate him and his mission in a convenient way by advising us of his death as a consequence of an accident on landing. Actually, of course, he was in prison.

This is typical of the many ruses to which they resorted and with which they managed to support the facade which they had built. It follows that our plans were rendered nugatory and that during the year under review, we were under a completely false impression.

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AGENTS SENT.

JANUARY. No despatches.

FEBRUARY.

Operation - CARROT.  
Agent - DESSING.  
Date of departure - 27.2.42.

MISSION:

1. Reconnoitring of southern sea-route possibilities.
2. Arranging for the escape of some important Dutchmen such as Dr. COLLJN or Minister van DIJK.
3. Contacting Mr. L.J. van LOOY, a prominent social-democrat and Trade Unionist.
4. Organising sabotage cells in the ROTTERDAM DORDRECHT area, especially in shipbuilding and shipping circles.

FIELD HISTORY:

DESSING contacted van LOOY, who was running an Underground paper called "VERZET". He assisted van LOOY in the preparation and distribution of this paper. He also looked for suitable landing grounds and did a certain amount of intelligence work. In general, he did what he could to further the cause but he never found a suitable W/T Operator, so that he did not get into touch with LONDON. (He was to have communicated through the W/T operator of operation TURNIP, despatched shortly after him, but who was killed on landing). He felt isolated and lost heart, eventually arranging his own escape via SWITZERLAND whence he was exfiltrated via GIBRALTAR to the U.K. His interrogation revealed that he did contact the TURNIP organiser, ANDRINGA, but as the latter was accompanied by a Gestapo agent and indicated so to DESSING, CARROT dropped the attempt and never saw ANDRINGA again. He was thus without W/T communication and without contact with those agents from LONDON with whom he expected to work.

He found himself continually short of money, this in itself cramping his activities. As he was in no position to supply any sabotage organisation with material, he thought it futile to undertake the building-up of groups.

His investigation of possible sea-routes in the South convinced him that movement restrictions and defence measures precluded such a scheme being successful. To attempt the exfiltration of important people was also a task beyond his capacity.

The mission must be considered a failure due partly to bad luck and partly to DESSING's losing heart and consequently adopting a passive rather than an active attitude. He arrived back in the U.K. on 2nd September 42, and has since been employed in the Netherlands Ministry of Finance.

MARCH.

Operation - TURNIP.  
Agents - ANDRINGA (Organiser)  
          MOLENAAR (W/T)  
Date of departure - 28.3.42.

MISSION:

1. To investigate the possible opening of a new sea-route for in- and ex-filtration.
2. To reconnoitre specified targets in BRABANT and to recruit men willing to sabotage them.

FIELD HISTORY:

MOLENAAR was killed on landing. ANDRINGA was arrested by the SIFO in early April 1942, on information supplied by a woman in UTRECHT. Details are not known. ANDRINGA had recruited a local W/T operator known as SWEDE, and it is thought that the Germans, by discovering the TURNIP signal plan on MOLENAAR's body, were able to track down SWEDE whom they operated.

ANDRINGA was first sent to HAAREN Concentration Camp, then to RAWICZ, SILESIA and finally to MAUTHAUSEN, where he was executed in Sep 1944.

Operation - WATERGRESS.  
Agent - BAATSEN.  
Date of departure - 27.3.42.

MISSION:

1. To reconnoitre the telephone exchange near VOORBURG (suburb of the HAGUE).
2. To deal with the Hotel AURORA, H.Q. of the German Nachrichtendienst, containing an important telephone exchange.
3. To destroy or damage a large store of provisions and clothing for German Naval personnel at RIJNSBURG, near LEIDEN.
4. To damage as much as possible the petrol dock serving the aerodrome at YPENBURG, near the HAGUE.

After completion of these tasks to return to the U.K. by a route to be arranged by us.

FIELD HISTORY:

The impending departure of WATERGRESS was signalled to CATARRH on March 19th in telegram No.21. He dropped on March 27th to a Dutch reception committee under S.D. control. CATARRH advised LONDON of his "safe" arrival in his telegram of 28th March 42, ref.CXG24.

He is alleged by the Germans to have offered voluntarily to work for them, and to have been used by the SIFO for spying on his fellow prisoners at HAREN Concentration Camp. This may be true but nevertheless, we have been advised that he was shot at MAUTHAUSEN in Sep 1944.

MARCH

Operation - LETTUCE.  
Agents - RAS (Organiser)  
          JORDAAN (W/T) : TRUMMET  
Date of departure - 28.3.42.

MISSION:

Organisation of sabotage groups and selection of dropping grounds.

FIELD HISTORY:

RAS. Arrested early May 1942 due to information given to the SIPO by a Dutch traitor, Dr. STEMKEL, of UTRECHT. He was not heard of again until reported shot at MAUTHAUSEN in Sep 1944.

JORDAAN. Arrested at the same time as RAS, and also as a result of denunciation by Dr. STEMKEL. First sent to HAAREN and subsequently transferred to various camps in GERMANY. He was ultimately traced in May 45 to one of the MAUTHAUSEN camps, and was still alive then. He was alleged to have been transferred to an American hospital, but it has so far proved impossible to locate him and he must be regarded as "missing".

APRIL.

Operation - LEEK.  
Agents - KLOOS (Organiser)  
          SALBERG (Assistant Organiser  
                  and instructor.)  
Date of departure - 5.4.42.

MISSION:

Both men were to work in OVERLIJSSEL and to carry out :-

- (a) immediate acts of sabotage to hinder the enemy war effort.
- (b) acts which would hamper and hinder the Germans in the event of their invading ENGLAND from HOLLAND or of our invading the Continent via HOLLAND.

FIELD HISTORY:

KLOOS and SALBERG were arrested soon after arrival. Both were first sent to HAAREN Concentration Camp, and executed at MAUTHAUSEN in Sep 1944.

Operation - POTATO.  
Agent - DE HAAS.  
Date of departure - 19.4.42.

MISSION:

1. Organisation of ferry service between ENGLAND and HOLLAND.
2. Arranging of suitable accommodation addresses where agents could leave messages asking to be brought back to U.K.

FIELD HISTORY:

Due to the arrest of JORDAAN in April, the Germans were able to decipher messages sent on the "TRUMPET" circuit. It is known that POTATO contacted TRUMPET and it is thought that it was through this contact that POTATO was arrested on April 28th.

He was held at DEN HAAG for some time before being sent to HAAREN Concentration Camp. From there, he probably went to RAWICZ, but this is not certain. He was eventually transferred to MAUTHAUSEN Camp, where he was executed in Sept. 1944.

MAY.

Operation - BEETROOT.  
Agents - PARLEVLIET } Sub-  
          VAN STEEN } Organisers.  
Date of departure - 29.5.42.

MISSION:

1. General. To investigate the possibilities of opening a new sea-route for in- and ex-filtration, and to assist TURNIP.
2. To prepare plans and collect stores for the interruption of railway traffic when instructed by LONDON.
3. To carry out sabotage acts in general.

FIELD HISTORY:

The two agents dropped to a German reception committee, so were arrested on arrival. PARLEVLIET was imprisoned at HAAREN, but we do not know his ultimate fate, and he is still considered "missing".

VAN STEEN was seen at RAWICZ Concentration Camp, in SILESIA, in July 1944, but we have no subsequent news, so that he also is posted as "missing".

JUNE.

Operation - SPINACH.  
Agent - BUIZER (W/T)  
Date of departure - 22.6.42.

MISSION:

1. To act as W/T operator to PARSNIP, as well as to assist him generally.
2. To act, if necessary, as W/T operator to POTATO.

FIELD HISTORY:

Dropped at the same time as PARSNIP and arrested with him. Subsequently reported executed at MAUTHAUSEN Concentration Camp in Sep 1944.

Operation - PARSNIP.  
Agent - Van RIETSCHOTEN.  
Date of departure - 22.6.42.

MISSION:

- (a) Organising and instructing groups of men for sabotage in the province of ZUID HOLLAND.
- (b) Arranging reception transport and storage of arms and material.

- (c) Acts of opportunistic sabotage.
- (d) Maintaining touch with **POTATO** and **SPINACH** (see under **SPINACH**).

FIELD HISTORY:

From LONDON's telegram of 15th June 1942 No. 28 to **TRUMPET**, the Germans learned of the impending arrival of **PARSNIP**. He was arrested on arrival as the reception committee was German. He was imprisoned in **HAAREN** Concentration Camp, whence he escaped on Nov 22nd 1943. He apparently left there with van der **GIESSEN** of operation **CABBAGE**. A German source states that he was arrested with **CABBAGE** whilst travelling in the train from **ROTTERDAM** to **ZEELEND**, and that he was subsequently executed. No confirmation of this exists and he is listed as "missing".

Operation - **MARROW**.  
Agents - **JAMBROES** (Organiser)  
          **BUKKENS** (W/T)  
Date of departure - 26.6.42.

MISSION:

To contact leaders of the "Orde Dienst" and to explain to them the "Plan for **HOLLAND**" which had been compiled in LONDON and agreed between the British and Dutch authorities. Thereafter, to organise the recruiting of suitable bodies of men to implement the plan. Details of this Plan are given under the heading "Outline of Planning". Thirdly, to organise reception committees.

FIELD HISTORY:

LONDON advised **CATARRH** on June 15th, in telegram No.61, of the proposed despatch of these two agents as from June 24th. They were both arrested on arrival, their "safe" landing being advised to us by **CATARRH** on June 27th.

**JAMBROES** was transferred from **HAAREN** Concentration Camp to **RAWICZ**, in **SILESIA**, where he was seen in June-July 1944. He was subsequently reported to have been executed at MAUTHAUSEN in Sept. 1944.

**BUKKENS** was also transferred to **RAWICZ** and shot at MAUTHAUSEN in Sept. 1944.

JULY.

Operation - **LEEK A**.  
Agent - Van **HEMERT**.  
Date of departure - 23.7.42.

MISSION:

To amplify the instructions given to **KLOOS** (operation **LEEK**) before departure, and to have a report made out as to his progress, such report to be enciphered and collected by us.

FIELD HISTORY:

Arrested on landing, July 24th 1942. No further news of him until May 1945, when he was reported executed at MAUTHAUSEN in Sept. 1944.

AUGUST. No despatches.

SEPTEMBER.

Operation - KALE.  
Agent - BEUKEMA-THOE-WATER.  
Date of departure - 24.9.42.

MISSION:

Having studied exhaustively the "Plan for HOLLAND" given to MARROW, KALE was to be prepared to relieve MARROW of his duties and to take over from him as soon as possible, continuing his work. MARROW was to be exfiltrated but this was not KALE's task but that of MANGOLD (see operation MANGOLD).

FIELD HISTORY:

Dropped to a German-controlled reception committee and arrested on 25th Sept 1942. He was seen at RAWICZ Concentration Camp in July 1944, but in May 1945 he was reported executed at MAUT-HAUSEN in Sept 1944.

Operation - MANGOLD.  
Agent - DROOGLEVER-FORTUYN.  
Date of departure - 24.9.42.

MISSION:

Based on the "Plan for HOLLAND". To work in with KALE and CAULIFLOWER (see notes re CAULIFLOWER operation). Specific tasks were :-

- (a) To organise without delay two reception committees for stores and men.
- (b) To arrange for transport of such stores to suitable places in the region.
- (c) To tell MARROW by what means he can arrange to be exfiltrated.
- (d) To tell MARROW of the impending arrival of his successor and of organiser-instructors for the operation of the "Plan for HOLLAND".
- (e) To assist MARROW in all possible ways.

FIELD HISTORY:

Dropped to German-controlled reception committee and arrested at once (25.9.42). After being held for a time in HOLLAND, he was transferred to RAWICZ, SILESIA, and is known to have been there in June 1944. He was ultimately sent to MAUT-HAUSEN where he was executed in Sept 1944.

Operation - PARSLEY.  
Agent - JONGELIE.  
Date of departure - 24.9.42.

MISSION:

This man, an older type than usual and extremely reliable, was

/ sent at



sent at the request of the Dutch authorities. His tasks were :-

(a) To contact the leaders of the Inlichtingadienst ("I.D"), the Secret Intelligence Organisation in HOLLAND. To explain to them that he was to act as Liaison officer of the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, and as such to be the channel for instructions from LONDON to the "I.D". This organisation to be told at once to give all possible assistance to JONGELIE by providing reports, information, agents and any other help necessary for him in the execution of his duties as the Dutch Government's official envoy.

Details of the headings under which intelligence was to be collected and forwarded, will be found in the "General" summary for 1942.

FIELD HISTORY:

Dropped to German-controlled reception committee and arrested 25th Sept 1942. The Germans, finding JONGELIE's mission too involved for them to pretend in their traffic back to ENGLAND that it was being carried out, decided to report that he was killed on landing.

Our latest information is to the effect that he was eventually shot at MAUTHAUSEN Concentration Camp on 6th Sept 1944.

Operation - CAULIFLOWER.  
Agent - MOOY.  
Date of departure - 24.9.42.

MISSION:

1. To assume the duties of Regional Commander for OVERIJSEL or GELDERLAND in connection with the "Plan for HOLLAND". The decision as to the region allotted to be made by MARROW. In this capacity to give guidance and instruction to the personnel already recruited.
2. To organise the reception of personnel and stores.
3. To do the ground work necessary for the eventual exfiltration of MARROW by Lysander.

FIELD HISTORY:

Dropped to German-controlled Reception Committee. Arrested at once and imprisoned at HAAREN Camp. Nothing further is known of him and he is considered "missing".

OCTOBER.

Operation - CABBAGE.  
Agent - Van der GIESSEN.  
Date of departure - 1.10.42.

MISSION:

1. To join PARSNIP and to assist him in organising sabotage in the province of ZUID HOLLAND, concentrating on transport in all forms.
2. Reconnoitring possible reception grounds in the area.

FIELD HISTORY:

Van der GIESSEN was arrested on arrival, the Reception Committee being German-controlled. He was imprisoned in HAAREN Concentration Camp, but escaped on the night of Nov.22/23, 1943. Since that time reports of his whereabouts have been circumstantial and varied. It is confirmed that he did escape and that he made his way to the ROTTERDAM area. He endeavoured there to help underground activities. According to one German interrogation, he became involved with an organisation dealing in the manufacture of false documents.

He was proceeding by train from ROTTERDAM towards South BEVELAND, accompanied by one WEGENER (Operation LACROSSE, to be referred to under that operation), when he was arrested. The same source stated that he was shot later on, but we have no proof and still regard him as "missing".

Operation - CELEBY.  
Agents - STEEKSMa (Instructor).  
          KOOLSTRA ( - do - ).  
          MACARE (W/T).  
Date of departure - 21 and 24.10.42.

MISSION:

The two instructors' duties were :-

- (a) Reconnoitring of targets.
- (b) Instruction of sabotage groups in handling of weapons, explosives and incendiaries.
- (c) General steps to raise efficiency.

FIELD HISTORY:

Dropped to German-controlled committees and arrested at once. All three agents were reported by a returned French agent to have been seen at RAWICZ Concentration Camp, in SILESIA, in July 1944. STEEKSMa and KOOLSTRA were subsequently shot at MAUTHAUSEN Concentration Camp in Sept 1944. Nothing is known of MACARE, who is still "missing".

Operation - PUMPKIN.  
Agent - PAIS.  
Date of departure - 21.10.42.

MISSION:

Regional organiser for any area in the South of HOLLAND to be decided by the leader of the "Secret army", in connection with the "Plan for HOLLAND" already mentioned.

FIELD HISTORY:

Arrested on arrival by German-controlled committee. Sent to HAAREN Concentration Camp. Seen in July 1944 at RAWICZ Concentration Camp. Reported shot at MAUTHAUSEN Camp in Sep 1944.

Operation - TOMATO.  
 Agents - HOPSTEDE { Instructor  
           KAMPHORST { - do -  
           POUWELS { (W/T)  
 Date of departure - HOPSTEDE }  
                           POUWELS } 24.10.42.  
                           KAMPHORST } 21.10.42.

MISSION:

- (a) To assist leaders in reconnoitring targets and considering best methods of attacking them.
- (b) To instruct sabotage groups in the handling of weapons, explosives and incendiaries.
- (c) Generally to help to bring all aspects into an efficient state. All these points in the light of the "Plan for HOLLAND".

FIELD HISTORY:

Arrested on arrival. HOPSTEDE was sent to HAAREN, whence he was moved to RAWICZ, SILESIA, where he was seen by an escaped French agent. He was executed at MAUTHAUSEN Camp in Sept 1944. KAMPHORST was also at HAAREN and RAWICZ, and eventually suffered the same fate as HOPSTEDE, being executed at MAUTHAUSEN in Sept 1944.

POUWELS was imprisoned at HAAREN and then supposedly moved to RAWICZ, but this is not certain. His fate is unknown.

Operation - CUCUMBER.  
 Agents - BAKKER. { (W/T)  
           DANE. { (Organiser)  
 Date of departure - 27.10.42.

MISSION:

In connection with the "Plan for HOLLAND",

- (a) To take charge, as Regional Organiser, of the Provinces of FRIESLAND, GRONINGEN and DRENTHE.
- (b) In this capacity to organise, train and instruct bodies of suitable men and to perfect the organisation according to instructions from the leader as well as in the light of his own discretion.
- (c) To organise the reception of the necessary stores.

FIELD HISTORY:

Both dropped to a German-controlled reception committee and were arrested on 28.10.42.

BAKKER disappeared thereafter so far as any news was concerned, but we have recently heard from Dutch sources that he died in VIENNA from tuberculosis, shortly after the liberation of that city.

DANE - Advice has been received that he was executed at MAUTHAUSEN Concentration Camp in September 1944.

Operation - BROCCOLI.  
Agent - RUSELER.  
Date of departure - 28.11.42.

MISSION:

In connection with the "Plan for HOLLAND", to act as W/T operator for the leader under whom he was placed, and to obey his orders.

FIELD HISTORY:

Dropped to a German-controlled reception committee and arrested on 29th November 1942. Sent to HAAREN and thence to RAWICZ, SILESIA. Subsequently executed at MAUTHAUSEN in Sept 1944.

NOVEMBER.

Operation - MUSTARD.  
Agent - De KRUYFF.  
Date of departure - 28.11.42.

MISSION:

On the basis of the "Plan for HOLLAND",

- (a) To reconnoitre targets and consider how best to attack them.
- (b) To instruct groups of saboteurs and trainees in the use of weapons and explosives.
- (c) To act with initiative under the orders of a designated leader.

FIELD HISTORY:

Arrested immediately on arrival, 29th Nov 1942, by a German-controlled reception committee. No news since until June 1945 when we ascertained that he was executed at MAUTHAUSEN in Sep 44.

Operation - CHIVE.  
Agent - UBBINK (W/T Operator)  
Date of departure - 29.11.42.

MISSION:

To work as W/T operator for the secret military organisation envisaged under the "Plan for HOLLAND".

FIELD HISTORY:

Arrested at once by a German reception committee. He was taken to HAAREN and subjected to intensive interrogation, thereafter being placed in a cell and kept there until August 29th 1943, when he escaped with DOURLEIN, of operation SPROUT, (referred to under that operation). He made his way to SWITZERLAND where he arrived on the 19th November, reaching ENGLAND on 1st Feb. 44.

His interrogation, with DOURLEIN, was very thorough and prolonged and revealed a mass of information which made it clear that the Germans were in control of our organisation. The implications are obvious, and will be referred to in detail

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under the "General" paragraph relative to the time of the interrogation.

The agent was under a cloud for a long time, and eventually transferred to the Dutch West Indies in some position connected with the Netherlands Merchant Marine.

DECEMBER.

No despatches.

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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OPERATIONS - 1942

(a) Total "successful" sorties:	57
(b) Aircraft lost:	3
(c) Total Containers:	282
(d) <u>Stores delivered:</u>	
H.E.:	6,968 lbs.
Stens:	460
T.SMG:	19
Grenades:	3,170
Pistols:	1,305
Incendiaries:	45 cells.
Clams:	495
Limpets:	68

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1943  
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GENERAL.

I. PERSONNEL OF DUTCH SECTION.

January - February, 1943 :-

Major BLIZARD. (Chief)  
Major BINGHAM.  
Capt. KNIGHT.  
Capt. MILLS.  
Mr. OLINK.  
Lieut. SNEWING.  
Lieut. PARR.  
Jnr.Cdr. BOND. A.T.S.

March - December, 1943 :-

Major BINGHAM. (Chief)  
Capt. KNIGHT.  
Capt. MILLS.  
Mr. OLINK.  
Lieut. SNEWING.  
Lieut. PARR.  
Jnr.Cdr. BOND. A.T.S.  
Lieut. MORTLOCK. (U.S.A.)

II. RELATIONS WITH THE DUTCH AUTHORITIES.

These continued good throughout the year. Col. de BRUYNE and Capt. LIEFTINCK co-operated closely with us, but the former was never free from the cramping influence of "back-stage" intrigues against him. Eventually he relinquished his duties as Chief of the M.I.D. (towards the end of 1943) and Capt. LIEFTINCK, assisted by Lt. SCHILP, carried on. As will be seen from the attached summary of the real position in the field, towards the end of the year certain facts came to light which eventually showed that our organisation was hopelessly penetrated. In addition, losses in aircraft were heavy, and for a period of about three months air operations were suspended on this account.

Thus, whilst our relations with the Dutch personnel continued good, the amount of operational contact with them was not great, due to the paucity of despatches, this in turn being a result of the causes above mentioned.

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DUTCH SECTION FINANCIAL REPORT OF OPER-  
ATIONAL CURRENCIES ISSUED DURING PERIOD  
DECEMBER 40 / DECEMBER 43.

<u>OPERATION.</u>	<u>GUILDERS.</u>
GLASSHOUSE.	3,000.
CATARRH.	12,000.
CARROT.	3,000.
TURNIP.	5,000.
WATERCRESS.	6,000.
LETTUCE.	17,000.
LEEK.	12,000.
BEETROOT.	12,000.
SPINACH.	5,000.
MARROW.	100,000.
PARSNIP.	5,000.
LEEK A.	3,000.
KALE.	6,000.
MANGOLD.	4,000.
PARSLEY.	10,000.
PARSLEY A.	2,500.
CAULIFLOWER.	4,000.
CABBAGE.	5,000.
CELERY.	7,500.
PUMPKIN.	4,000.
TOMATO.	7,500.
CUCUMBER.	6,500.
BROCCOLI.	2,500.
MUSTARD.	2,500.
GRESS.	2,500.
CHIVE.	4,000.
ENDIVE.	10,000.
RADISH.	2,500.
HOCKEY.	5,000.
TENNIS.	2,500.
GOLF.	3,000.
BROADBEAN.	7,500.
LACROSSE.	4,000.
KOHLRABI.	4,000.
SEAKALE.	2,500.
SPROUT.	2,500.
GHERKIN.	4,000.
NETBALL.	2,500.
CROQUET.	4,000.
SQUASH.	4,000.
POLO.	4,000.
SOCCER.	31,000.
BADMINTON.	1,000.
RUGGER.	10,000.
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Gross Total	355,500.
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Less amount recovered from Dutch Authorities:	128,750.
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Net Total:	226,750.
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JANUARY & FEBRUARY 1944.

GENERAL SITUATION AND RELATIONS WITH THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT.

The year 1944 opened up with a complete " impasse ", no prospects of improving the situation and complete dissatisfaction in both the Dutch and S.O.E., camps.

It is obvious that if Colonel De Bruyne had had the complete confidence of his opposite numbers in the Dutch B.I., they would have been able to supply him & S.O.E., with reliable contacts on which to build up again. However, through the lack of cooperation between the Dutch B.I., and Colonel' de Bruyne's office on the one hand, and the S.I.S., Dutch Section and S.O.E., on the other hand, a complete deadlock had been reached.

Colonel de Bruyne was in disfavour and he resigned his post early in February 1944. Major Bingham had an interview with Colonel KRULS, head of the Dutch AMGOT and for whom the Dutch Minister of War had the highest regard. This meeting took place on the 9th. February & during which Colonel KRULS emphasised the importance of being well informed as to the mentality of the Dutch population in general. He also stated that circuits with which the Dutch Information Service ( B.I. ) was in contact, could not be charged with giving a true picture of the wishes of the larger mass of the population. They apparently consisted, according to him, of a small group of politicians who wanted to revive the old game of 52 parliamentary parties, and who were already jockeying for positions in order to be in power after the liberation. He claimed that as a result, the Dutch Cabinet were in a completely false picture on which to base its attitude and that in his opinion, it was necessary to have a man with a wide view at the head of all departments maintaining contact with the people in occupied Holland. He was extremely bitter about Major SOMER, head of the B.I., and considered him to be at the root of all the trouble in Dutch Government circles.

It is therefore evident that, in a sense, the Dutch Government themselves were dissatisfied at the state of things and would have welcomed a strong S.O.E., had this been possible. On the other hand S.I.S., who were fully aware of the S.O.E. state of affairs in Holland, can hardly be blamed for not cooperating more fully at that time. Their circuits would have obviously been penetrated.

In view of Colonel DE BRUYNE's resignation and the general situation, S.O.E., decided also to make changes. LORD SELBOENE had a meeting middle February with the Netherlands Minister for War, His Excellency JHR. O.A.C. LIDTHE DE JEUDE, to discuss the general situation and Major General C. Mc. V. GUBBINS, in his letter to LIDTHE DE JEUDE of 23 February, stressed the urgency of building up an effective organisation in the Netherlands to implement the directives of the SUPREME COMMANDER for D-Day action and that Commander JOHNS, regional director for BELGIUM, would henceforth be responsible for all policy matters in regard to S.O.E., operations in HOLLAND.

On the 13th. March, the Netherlands Minister for War was informed that Lt.Col. R.I. DOBSON., who had had three years experience in the BELGIAN Section, vice MAJOR BINGHAM, had been nominated to take charge of the Dutch Section and that S.O.E., welcomed the nomination of Major General J.W. van OORSCHOT as replacement for Colonel de BRUYNE.

Major General VAN OORSCHOT took up his appointment on the 15th. March, renamed his office the B.B.O. ( BUREAU BLZCNDERE OPDRACHTEN ) and Lt.Col. R.I. DOBSON took over from MAJOR BINGHAM on 26th. February 1944.

STUDENTS IN TRAINING. : 20.

AGENTS IN THE FIELD. : NIL.

MAY - JUNE - JULY 1945.

GENERAL SITUATION.

HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCES.

On Thursday, May 3, the situation was that GENERAL REICHELIT had ~~formed~~ informed GENERAL FOULKES that the German troops would surrender at once if they got an assurance that they would not be sent to RUSSIA as prisoners of war. GENERAL FOULKES passed this matter on the 21st. ARMY GROUP, but before the answer to this question arrived, General MONTGOMERY received, and signed, the official capitulation of all German forces in Northern Europe, excluding NORWAY, but including HOLLAND. This, naturally ended all the direct arrangements between GENERAL FOULKES and GENERAL REICHELIT of surrender of the German forces in Holland as the conditions laid down by GENERAL MONTGOMERY were now valid for these forces also.

One of these conditions was that the German forces should be concentrated in certain areas to be designated by GENERAL FOULKES, and to proceed to these areas after Allied troops had occupied Western Holland, and especially that they were allowed to retain their arms until this had taken place. This immediately put a stop to the possibility of the German forces surrendering to the Forces of the Interior, whose task now became even more limited.

On Saturday, MAY 5, at 1000 Hours, a meeting to which PRINCE BERNHARD was invited, took place between GENERAL FOULKES and GENERAL REICHELIT to discuss the capitulation and the necessary measures to be taken.

This was followed by a meeting in the afternoon of MAY 5 with GENERAL BLASKOWITZ. General BLASKOWITZ was told that the Forces of the Interior had to be recognized and they would, as from now, appear armed in public. He was further informed that the 49th. Division would march into Western Holland on Sunday MAY 6, and that he would be held responsible for any incidents or any disorders which might interfere with the smooth settlement of everything. General BLASKOWITZ pointed out that German communications were extremely bad and that in order to give the necessary orders to all his troops he asked GENERAL FOULKES whether he could possibly consider postponing the entry of the 49th. Division by 24 hours, as otherwise it would be practically impossible for him to prevent incidents and he thought that this was rather unfair. GENERAL FOULKES agreed that, if German communications were so bad, he would postpone the entry of the 49th. Division by 24 hours. GENERAL BLASKOWITZ then pointed out that if the INTERIOR FORCES appeared armed in the streets while his troops had not been informed of the true state of affairs, and in view of the very high feeling of the Dutch population against the Germans, this would certainly lead to incidents, as his troops would have to protect themselves by making use of their arms. He again inquired whether GENERAL FOULKES & PRINCE BERNHARD would consider ordering the Resistance Groups not to carry arms until such time as First Corps had taken full charge and German troops were disarmed as, if he was to be held responsible for any incidents, this would be an almost impossible task for him.

GENERAL FOULKES & PRINCE BERNHARD agreed that this situation might lead to great disturbances, which had to be avoided at

at all costs & PRINCE BERNHARD agreed to order all Resistance Forces not to carry arms in public until further notice.

On Sunday, MAY 6, PRINCE BERNHARD telephoned to MAJOR GENERAL KOOT and asked him about the effect of this order. PRINCE BERNHARD was informed that the troops of the RESISTANCE FORCES would be bitterly disappointed not to be able to be of any service & the fact that they would not be allowed to carry arms would be a blow to their morale. It was decided to issue an order of the day, pointing out the necessity to obey this order strictly. In effect this order was issued on Monday, MAY 7.

On Sunday afternoon, MAY 6, GENERAL FOULKES had another conference with GENERAL BLASKOWITZ, to which PRINCE BERNHARD was invited, to sign the official capitulation. Several small incidents had occurred which were discussed between the interested parties, and it was agreed that they should be settled on the spot between GENERAL REICHELT and MAJOR GENERAL KOOT. It was also agreed that it was almost impossible to decide who had started these incidents, and the least said about it the better. (Casualties were small and about even on both sides).

The Corps Commander, GENERAL FOULKES, then promised PRINCE BERNHARD to allow the Interior Forces to carry arms at the earliest possible moment. On Monday morning, MAY 7, GENERAL KOOT informed PRINCE BERNHARD by telephone that in several places in Western Holland the German Commanders had asked Resistance troops to carry arms & help them to ensure law & order. GENERAL KOOT was informed that the decision already arrived at should not be interfered with as the German Commanders still carried full responsibility but that if they took it upon themselves to ask Resistance troops to go out armed, it would be up to them to make sure that nothing happened. This arrangement was put into practice in several places during the following week and caused no trouble anywhere.

On the same day, however, Brigadier General SPALDING, of 1st. Corps, drove through AMSTERDAM under German safe custody, with one German car in front and two German cars behind, and was fired upon. Several people in his car were wounded, and the bullets found were from British Sten Guns.

GENERAL FOULKES informed PRINCE BERNHARD of this in the evening of Monday, MAY 7, and said that he did not want to lose the life of one single more Canadian soldier and, if Resistance troops were undisciplined, he would have to proclaim martial law; in the meantime he would issue an order to shoot on sight at any civilian carrying arms.

PRINCE BERNHARD pointed out to the General that a great many German Gestapo personnel, and even German Army personnel, were armed with British Sten Guns which they carried even in public, and that moreover certain Extremist groups had been armed with British material by the Germans after September 1944. PRINCE BERNHARD also pointed out to GENERAL FOULKES that he had foreseen this and that, to avoid such instances by either German provocateurs of Extremist groups he had, several months ago, issued orders that all Resistance troops should be concentrated in companies, immediately after Liberation, and be provided, if possible, with uniforms; if this were not possible, they should be provided with arm bands which could not be imitated easily. In view of the situation that had arisen, however, he had not been able to carry out these ideas, nor had the Resistance commanders been able to do so. He had intended to make the carrying of arms illegal by anyone except those in uniform or wearing the authorized arm band.

GENERAL FOULKES finally agreed that it was most unlikely that Resistance personnel had been the cause of the above mentioned

mentioned incident, but in order to eliminate those elements which might create trouble, PRINCE BERNHARD agreed that he would telephone immediately to AMSTERDAM to issue orders that in the three towns of AMSTERDAM, THE HAGUE and ROTTERDAM, as from Tuesday, MAY 8, 0700 Hours, all Resistance troops should carry no arms, as those seen on the streets carrying arms would not be authorized Resistance personnel. At the same time GENERAL FOULKES said that, in order to ensure that these people would be able to carry arms again as soon as possible, he would provide uniform arm bands from Army sources, to be issued to personnel assisting 1st.Corps.

On Tuesday, MAY 8, PRINCE BERNHARD again telephoned to GENERAL KOOT at AMSTERDAM. The necessary orders had been passed out during the night but GENERAL KOOT pointed out that the local Allied commander had asked Resistance personnel to carry arms in the HAGUE in order to help him. PRINCE BERNHARD agreed that this private arrangement should not be interfered with, as local commanders must be allowed to use their own judgment.

On the evening of Tuesday, MAY 8, PRINCE BERNHARD was informed by 1st.Corps that GENERAL FOULKES was going to issue enough arm bands to arm all Resistance personnel in Western Holland that would be needed by 1st.Corps, and that he would, at the same time, issue an order that no other type of arm bands would authorize the wearer to carry arms. PRINCE BERNHARD agreed that this was a very logical solution and hoped that it would be carried out satisfactorily everywhere.

On Wednesday, MAY 9, PRINCE BERNHARD passed through AMERSFOORT, UTRECHT, ROTTERDAM, THE HAGUE & AMSTERDAM. He noticed that the above mentioned order had not yet been carried out anywhere, and that armed Resistance troops were on duty at several places, sometimes together with German armed personnel on guard duty. They wore different sorts of arm bands but not a single one provided by 1st. Corps. However, on first sight, everybody seemed to be content -- at least those that he saw. He also saw a great number of Resistance personnel not carrying arms.

During the evening of MAY 9, PRINCE BERNHARD had a meeting in a house near AMSTERDAM with GENERAL KOOT and his junior commanders, where he discussed the whole situation and its possibilities. It was agreed there was very little they could do at that moment and that, as it was a very bitter disappointment for the Resistance Troops to be standing idle after waiting four years for this moment, the best that could be done was to give them something to do as soon as it could possible be arranged.

On Thursday MAY 10, PRINCE BERNHARD telephoned to GENERAL FOULKES to inform him of several authorisations that S.H.A.E.F. had given regarding the employment of German prisoners, and several requests from the Dutch Government regarding material used by the Germans & which was previously Dutch property. GENERAL FOULKES informed PRINCE BERNHARD that everything was going very well, that he had a great number of arm bands now available which would be issued and that everything should continue to be quite satisfactory.

On Friday, MAY 11, several reports came in from PRINCE BERNHARD's liaison officers from Western Holland. According to these reports there were cases of the public getting out of hand because the interior forces could not ensure law and order because, not having armbands, they could not be armed. There were cases of individuals who should have been arrested but were still free & this was also causing unrest amongst the civil population. In some places arrests were carried out by the civilians themselves. There were other serious instances but too numerous to relate.

- 4 -

PRINCE BERNHARD therefore decided to send MAJOR MEYEN and MAJOR BOEKHOOF, both of his staff, to 1st.Corps to make sure that the issue of arm bands, which authorized the carrying of arms would be taken in hand at once, as more delay would cause greater confusion and have a lasting influence on Dutch internal affairs.

The two Officers were informed by BRIGADIER KITCHING, Chief of Staff 1st.Corps, that everything was well in hand and that the Corps Commander would personally issue a proclamation to the Interior Forces to the effect that he would issue the necessary arm bands for all personnel requiring arms to carry out their duties.

In the afternoon LT.COLONEL de ROME, O.C., 2.S.F.DET., who had been attached to 1st.Corps came to see PRINCE BERNHARD & MAJOR FROWEIN and the different problems that had arisen out of the confusion of carrying arms and armbands was discussed. LT.COL.de ROME promised to discuss the matter with 1st.Corps the same evening and where he hoped that their wishes would be met with full sympathy and dealt with.

LT.COL.DE ROME was especially asked to point out to the Corps Commander that the Interior Forces had already shown discipline by carrying out orders strictly - orders, which under the circumstances, made discipline most difficult indeed.

On Saturday, MAY 12, PRINCE BERNHARD flew to S.H.A.E.F. to discuss with Lt.General BEDELL SMITH the raising of battalions from Resistance forces, and to hear their views on the employment of the resistance during these days and in the near future. He was informed that the Interior Forces of the Netherlands were still directly under GENERAL EISENHOWER's command, and that if ~~except~~ PRINCE BERNHARD as their commander, wanted any additional equipment for them, GENERAL FOULKES, who would then hold all German equipment, was naturally authorized to issue as much as ~~re~~considered necessary for the duties of the Interior Forces, either for the Allies or for the Dutch themselves.

As things were running quite smoothly now, GENERAL FOULKES agreed that arm bands and arms should also be handed out for purely Dutch requirements, i.e., for arrests, maintenance of law and order, and so on.

On Sunday, MAY 17, GENERAL FOULKES visited PRINCE BERNHARD's H.Q., together with Lt.COL. DE ROME, for a final conference & informed PRINCE BERNHARD that he had more than 20,000 arm bands i.e., the number needed for Canadian & Netherlands' requirements. LT.COL.DE ROME was made responsible for handing out these arm bands and it was agreed that the Regional Commanders should be held responsible for distributing them to those people that they could vouch for.

Henceforth the procedure to receive arm bands for each region was as follows : the Regional Commander would inform the PRINCE's Liaison Officer or the 2 S.F. Liaison Officer as to the numbers required for Army duties and numbers for civilian duties. These in turn order the necessary number through LT.COL.DE ROME at 1st.Corps.

The next few days the country was toured to make sure that this arrangement was being carried out satisfactorily.

Summing up the whole situation it can be definitely stated that under the circumstances the discipline of the INTERIOR FORCES was extraordinarily good and, although provocations from the German side were not lacking, no serious incidents occurred again.

The following are personal notes by H.R.H. PRINCE BERNHARD on the problems which had to be coped with :

- 1). I realized from the start that it was an impossible thing to ask the Resistance Forces to leave their arms at home, not so much in view of the Germans still being armed, but of the Gestapo, S.D., collaborators etc. They would feel completely powerless, which would be too much for a man who has been a good Dutchman.
- 2) In view of the fact that it was reliably reported that S.D. Agents and Landwacht were using orange arm bands and possibly the same as Resistance, measures had to be taken in order to ensure that the confusion should not become greater. Therefore, new arm bands were the only logical solution, and we naturally complied with the Corps' Commander's wishes in this matter.
- 3) I realized that many of the Resistance personnel would perhaps not understand any these difficulties, neither would they understand my position. They should realise, however, that as soldiers they, as well as I, had to carry out orders issued to us, however unpleasant they might be.
- 4) All my Staff Officers and myself have taken every available opportunity to make clear to the Allied Commanders the psychologically difficult situation in which the Interior Forces found themselves. This was fully understood by these Commanders.

O.C.M.E. 27 (SPECIAL FORCE MISSION NETHERLANDS) PROCEEDS OVERSEAS. In view of the general situation, LT. COL. DOBSON proceeded overseas on the 4th. May 45 and temporarily joined 2 S.F. Det., then situated at HARSKAMP, South West of APELDOORN, with a view to establishing the Mission when this became possible.

At that time the situation was still rather hectic, food had been dropped to the famine stricken areas and, by special arrangement with the Germans, lorries containing food were being driven through the GREBBE LINE into Western Holland. Some of these lorries were attacked, it is believed by Dutch S.S. Some German elements were still in a dangerous mood & reports of continued flooding came through. In the meantime the C.B.S. & SWISH had made an agreement with the German S.D. that if further sabotage etc., were stopped, they would stop all further executions & political prisoners would be released.

The instruction to the Resistance Forces forbidding them to carry arms in the streets was well adhered to & there were very few incidents. The Resistance Forces were eventually issued with proper military arm bands which entitled them to be armed if on special duties appointed by the Canadian Force Commanders. These duties consisted of maintaining law and order, rounding up German stragglers, undertaking guard & point duty, arresting collaborators & guarding bridges.

The first main task was the guarding of the GREBBE LINE, from the IJSSSELMEER to the NEDER RHINE, in order to prevent the population from the EAST streaming over into the Western provinces where food was very scarce & to prevent possible sickness spreading back to the Eastern provinces. Special Guards were also placed on the bridges over the IJSSSEL river to prevent Germans or collaborators escaping back to Germany in civilian clothing. It is estimated that some 20/30,000 resistance personnel were employed by the Canadians in some form or other.

When the 1st. Canadian Corps set up its H.Q. at HILVERSUM, 2.S.F. det. moved into UTRECHT on Thursday, MAY 10, and M.E. 27.

set up its Mission on the 12th. May 1945. at UTRECHT.

The Mission consisted of the following officers :

Lt.Col. R.I. Dobson.	O.C.,
Major W.A. Murphy.	G.S.O.2.
Capt. A.G. Knight.	G.S.O.3.
Capt. Olink.	G.S.O.3.
Capt. Tivey.	G.S.O.3.
Capt. W.E. Mills.	G.S.O.3.
Lieut. Gardiner.	Staff Lieutenant.

plus Sgt. Spence, the Mission's wireless operator and 12 Other Ranks. Major Olmsted and Capt. Mortlock, two O.S.S. U.S.A. Officers were also attached to the Mission.

Captain Hooper & Sgt. Hannaford who also belonged to M.E.27., were however retained by PRINCE BERNHARD at the Royal Palace at Het Lo, APELDOORN, to maintain his wireless link on NORTHAW with the U.K.

The Mission's initial function was the collecting of the agents who had been overrun or liberated, interrogating them and sending them to the U.K., liaising with PRINCE BERNHARD, S.H.A.E.F. Mission to the Netherlands, Netherlands District, B.B.O. and the S.I.S. Mission at the HAGUE. Redundant wireless material was collected throughout Holland and all Regional Commanders & their areas visited.

JUNE & JULY 1945. Brigadier MOCKLER FERRYMAN, C.B.E.M.C., accompanied by Mr. MILLAR & MAJOR WILLARD of O.S.S. visited the Mission on the 6th. June & remained until the 9th. June. On the morning of the 7th. June the visitors inspected the local Resistance sights of interest in UTRECHT, including the famous underground telephone exchange used during the German occupation. They returned to the Mission for a luncheon party which was attended by :

Lieut. General H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands.	
Major-General Koot.	C.B.S.
Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman.	S.F.H.Q.,
Mr. Millar.	O.S.S.
Lt. Col. de Rome.	O.C. 2 S.F. Det.
Lt. Col. R.I. Dobson.	O.C. M.E.27.,
Lt. Col. Van Houten.	Prince Bernhard's Staff
Lt. Col. Six.	N.B.S., H.Q. A'dam.
Lt. Col. Klijzing.	B.B.O.
Major P. Borghout.	Agent SWISH. Dep. C.B.S.
Major de Boel.	Delta Centrum.
Capt. Tivey.	Adjutant M.E.27.

This was followed by a small ceremony during which the agent LT. DE COEDE (© HUNNY) was invested with the Order of the M.B.E. (Military) by Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman.

In the afternoon a reception was held at the Mission H.Q. which was attended by all the principal Resistance personalities throughout Holland and also the following :

Lieut. General H.R.H. Prince Bernhard.  
Lieut. General Ch. Foulkes, G.O.C. 1st. Canadian Corps.  
The Regional Commanders & one saboteur leader of each of the 13 N.B.S. Regions.  
Staff Officers of Prince Bernhard,  
Staff Officers of the B.B.O.  
Staff Officers of M.E.27., & 2 S.F. Det.

On Friday JUNE 8, Brigadier Mockler Ferryman & party accompanied by Lieut. Col. R.I. Dobson made an all day tour comprising visits to the Resistance H.Qs' at ROTTERDAM & AMSTERDAM.

The Mission completed its work of collecting surplus explosives, Regional Commanders' reports and disbanded on the 7th July, 1945 and returned to the U.K. on 10th July.

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS - See APPENDIX " A " - WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS WITH HOLLAND and DAILY SUMMARY.

TOTAL LIST OF CASUALTIES - See APPENDIX " B ".

SABOTAGE SUMMARY - See APPENDIX " C ".

STORES' DELIVERY SUMMARY - See APPENDIX " D ".

SUMMARY OF DUTCH SECTION PERSONNEL - JAN 44/AUG 45 - See APPENDIX " E ".

FINANCIAL REPORT OF OPERATIONAL CURRENCIES ISSUED DURING PERIOD JAN 44/MAY 45 - See APPENDIX " F ".

AGENTS SENT AND/OR DROPPED IN HOLLAND DURING PERIOD JAN 44/APR 45. - See APPENDIX " G ".

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See Volume II for Regional Commanders' Reports.



APPENDIX " A "

WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS WITH HOLLAND.

MAY 1945.

<u>Plan Name.</u>	<u>Being used by.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
ULLIS.	SWISH.	Ended 3 May 45.
ORVAL.	VALIDATE.	Liberated 6 May 45.
KRIEK.	VALIDATE.	Liberated 6 May 45.
TANGE.	CUBBING & TURNQUOITS.	Liberated 6 May 45.
PIES.	HOOT & SQUEAK.	Liberated 7 May 45.
SIL.	DR.X.,D.C., BACKGAMMON.	Liberated 10 May 45.
AERON.	RUMBLE.	Liberated 12 May 45.
PERCH.	RUMBLE.	Liberated 12 May 45.
SPEAR.	DRAUGHTS 2, CACKLE & BEZIQUE.	Liberated 13 May 45.
TAY.	PING.	Liberated 15 May 45.

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APPENDIX " E "

SUMMARY OF DUTCH SECTION PERSONNEL.

JANUARY 1944 - END AUGUST 1945.

On the 1st. January 1944, the Dutch Section consisted of the following personnel :

Major	S. Bingham.	Section Head.
Jnr.Cmd.	S.I.Bond. A.T.S.	Training Officer.
Capt.	A.C.Knight.	Operations' Officer.
2/Lt.	D.G.Mortlock U.S.	Asst. -do-
Mr.	B.H.Olink.	Communications.
Sgt.	W.A.Thomas F.A.N.Y.	Asst. -do-
Capt.	W.E.Mills.	Admin. & Finance Officer.
Capt.	J.W.C. Kay.	Conducting Officer.
Lieut.	A. Snewing.	-do-
Lieut.	A.C.Parr.	-do-

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On the 26th. February 1944, Major S. Bingham relinquished his command of the Dutch Section and Major R.I. Dobson, who transferred from the Belgian Section, took charge.

The section underwent the following changes in additions, departures and promotions :

1944. JANUARY - Departures - Capt. J.W.C. Kay. X

FEBRUARY - -do- - Major S. Bingham. X

Arrivals - Major R.I. Dobson. *for*

APRIL - -do- - Capt. C.F. Dudley. X Assist. to S.H. *See above*

MAY - -do- - 2/Lt. H. Hooper. X Conduct. Officer.

Promotions - Lieut. A. Snewing. To Captain.

JULY - -do- - Mr. B.H. Olink. To Captain.

SEPT. - -do- - Lieut. H. Hooper. To Captain.

-do- - Lieut. A.C. Parr. To Captain.

OCT. Arrivals. - P/Lt. E.O'C. Tandy. X Assist. Ops.

NOV. -do- - Lt. H.S. Gardiner. X Wireless Off.

1945. JANUARY -do- - Major W.A. Murphy. X Assist. to S.H.

-do- - Capt. C. Tivey. X Asst. Ops. Off.

-do- - P/Lt. R.H. Flower. X Asst. Training Off.

-do- - Capt. A.P. Irby. X Asst. W/T. Off.

Promotions - Major R.I. Dobson. To Lieut. Colonel.

FEB. - - Nil.

MARCH. Arrivals - Ensign J. Dane. P.A.N.Y. X Training Asst.

-do- - Capt. C.C. Bowden. X Asst. W/T. Off.

Departures - Capt. A.C. Parr. X

-do- - Capt. A. Snewing. X

Promotions - Capt. C.F. Dudley. To Major.

1945. APRIL. Departures - Capt. G.C.Bowden.  
-do- - Capt. A.P.Irby.  
MAY. -do- - Ensign. J.Dane P.A.N.Y.  
JUNE. -do- - P/Lt. E.O'C.Tandy.  
JULY. -do- - Capt. D.G. Mortlock U.S.  
-do- - Capt. B.H.Olink.  
-do- - Jnr/Cmd. S.I.Bond. ✓  
-do- - Capt. A.G. Knight. ✓  
-do- - Lt. H.S.Gardiner.  
-do- - Capt. C. Tivey.  
-do- - P/Lt. R.H.Flower.  
AUG. -do- - Major C.F. Dadley.  
-do- - Lieut. W.A. Thomas P.A.N.Y.

Nucleus of Dutch Section as at 1 September 1945 - engaged on liquidation matters :

Lt.Col. R.I.Dobson.

Major W.A.Murphy.

Capt. W.E.Mills.

Attached to H.R.H.Prince Bernhard's staff as Wireless Communications' Officer :

Capt. H. Hooper.

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