

# THE VENLO KIDNAPPING

19.2.48

## GERMAN IDENTIFIED AS AUTHOR OF INCIDENT

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

NUREMBERG, FEB. 18

Walter Schellenberg, one of Himmler's chief intelligence officers, and a defendant in the Wilhelmstrasse case at Nuremberg, was identified by a Dutch witness to-day as the author of the Venlo incident in November, 1939, in which two British officers, Major R. H. Stevens and Captain S. P. Best, were kidnapped and taken across the Dutch-German frontier.

Jan Lemmers of the Hague, who drove a Dutch Lieutenant Klop and the British Officers to Venlo, and shared their later captivity in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, picked out Schellenberg among the 21 defendants in the dock as the man who, under the name of Schaemmel, kept a *rendezvous* with them near the frontier in November, 1939.

On Schellenberg's signal, he declared, they were attacked by gunfire from a party of Germans arriving by car and in the fracas Lieutenant Klop received wounds from which he later died. The officers were forced into the German car, taken to Berlin, and interrogated and a month later thrown into Sachsenhausen. Lemmers added that Hitler decorated Schellenberg with the Iron Cross for his exploit.

Documentary evidence, later introduced by the American prosecution, suggested that Baron von Weizsacker, the major defendant in this trial, together with other officials of the German Foreign Office, used the Venlo incident as a pretext for Germany's invasion of the Low Countries.

NOTES ON DUTCH CLANDESTINE ORGANISATIONS IN EXISTENCE  
IN HOLLAND DURING 1941 - 1943.

I. GENERAL.

The occupation of HOLLAND by the Germans called into being a number of indigenous bodies of people whose objects varied. Most of them carried out clandestine resistance to the Occupying Power in some form or other, whilst some were concerned with the preservation of Dutch institutions and culture against German encroachment and absorption. All were, unfortunately, permeated with political rivalries, survivals of the previous Dutch heterogeneous political system, and this was a source of considerable weakness, since much valuable time was wasted and much energy dissipated on unprofitable squabbling, the main object being often lost sight of.

The principal movements were :-

II. ORDE DIENST (O.D.)

(a) Composition.

The party nucleus was composed of the leaders of the following political parties :-

- (i) Anti-revolutionary party.
- (ii) Roman Catholic party.
- (iii) Socialist Democratic party.
- (iv) Socialist Democratic Labour party.
- (v) Liberal party.

(b) Leaders.

A committee of twelve was originally formed, including prominent people such as Dr. COLIJN, SCHOUTEN, DEKKERS, VERSCHUUR, KOOS VORRINK, WAARDI BEEKMAN and JOLLES.

(c) Aims.

- (i) Maintenance of internal order.
- (ii) Opposition to excesses by departing German troops.
- (iii) Prevention of lynching of N.S.B. members and other collaborators.
- (iv) Action against Communists who might take advantage of the situation to create disturbances.

(d) Organisation.

Cells were in existence in various districts but the co-ordination between them was extremely loose. It was not possible to speak of an O.D. organisation controlled from a supreme Headquarters and organised from top to bottom. A result of this was that co-ordinated action on a large scale was out of the question, the loosely-knit federation precluding this.

(e) German penetration.

This was considerable. Mostly it was done in a very unobtrusive fashion, so that groups were penetrated without being aware of it. This caused the organisation to become all the

(f) Strength.

Estimated at about 125,000, excluding the organisation "HET IOF", the league of ex-service men, who amalgamated with O.D. in July 1941, and whose membership was estimated at 30,000.

III. R.V.V. (RAAD van VERZET - Council of Resistance).

(a) Formation.

The event which caused serious-minded Dutchmen to realise that unco-ordinated resistance was worse than useless, was the failure of the attempted General Strike in May 1943. The Germans were able to break this due to the lack of centralised leadership. The lack of contact between the organisers of the strike and the strikers was a serious deficiency which the R.V.V. was intended to remedy.

(b) Composition.

The Council was composed of leading members of well-established illegal organisations and accordingly had a wide sphere of influence.

(c) Aims.

The co-ordination of resistance by the centralisation of the time, place and nature, as well as the <sup>method</sup> ~~character~~, of resistance.

(d) Methods.

The proposed plan of action envisaged the following :-

- (i) Passive resistance by the population to the enforced transfer of labour to GERMANY.
- (ii) Denial of food supplies to the enemy. Obstruction by all possible means of the enemy's requisitioning schemes.
- (iii) Denial to the enemy of essential labour in connection with communications in general. This to be accomplished by supporting workers who went underground.
- (iv) Destruction of public administration.
- (v) Appropriation of ration papers, identity documents &c. for use of "illegal" workers and people in hiding.
- (vi) Interruption of communications by rail, telegraph, land and water.
- (vii) Sabotage of industries.
- (viii) Intimidation of co-operating officials.

(e) German penetration.

There is no doubt that there was penetration in some spheres, but it was not such as to render the whole movement useless. The rank and file were loyal and the Council could be considered sufficiently sound to be reliable and operationally efficient.

#### IV. C.S.VI.

This organisation derived its name from "CENTRUM van SABOTAGE", and the "VI" represents the sixth attempt to form such a sabotage group in HOLLAND after five similar attempts had failed due to political differences.

It was created in the summer of 1942.

(a) Composition.

HANS KATAN, a student, Dr. CASTIJN, a medical practitioner, and K. de GRAAF, joined forces to establish it.

(b) Organisation.

This was in small cells, each containing three or four members at first. Subsequently it was modified to a military basis, with brigades, groups and sections. Each brigade had 240 men, divided into 8 groups of 30 each, the groups being subdivided into five sections of six men.

It was recruited from all walks of life. It co-operated with the Communists at times, but claimed to be non-political.

(c) Aims.

Active acts of sabotage against population registers, labour bureaux and railways. Supplying of ration cards and identity cards to Jews and others; elimination of undesirables.

(d) Penetration.

So far as is known, the organisation was sound.

#### V. THE "ILLEGAL" PRESS.

##### GENERAL.

(a) The Underground Press was a potent weapon against the Germans, and deserves high praise for its tenacity, bold policy and efficiency under conditions of extreme danger and difficulty.

(b) Chief constituents.

The main papers with regular circulation were :-

"HET PAROOL".  
"JE MAINTIENDRAI".  
"TROUW".

(c) Organisation.

The editorial staffs were in the main composed of resolute men who had previously been editors of pre-war journals suppressed or nazified by the Germans. They continued a relentless campaign against the oppressor, in which ridicule played a not inconsiderable role. Unfortunately, political

currents were still strong, and journalistic hankering after "scoops" contributed towards a weakening of the combined effort. On the whole, however, the common goal was striven after with commendable perseverance. The combined effects on German morale was considerable, and the corresponding fillip to Dutch morale was notable.

(d) Distribution.

Countless means were adopted for distributing the papers produced. Special care was taken to introduce copies into German circles as a source of annoyance and a gesture of defiance. Copies were placed in letter-boxes by night and posted as commercial papers besides being circulated by couriers. The number of copies produced has been variously estimated and naturally fluctuated with the fortunes of the papers' printing facilities - often hard pressed by confiscation and destruction. It is certain that circulation figures were maintained at a remarkably high level, sufficient to be widely enough read to counteract the poison put out by the Nazis through the controlled press.

(e) Finances.

This was a difficult question. The material such as paper, ink, lead etc. was usually stolen from the Germans. The difficulty was to maintain the workers on the staffs. This was mostly done by co-operation with underground movements. Money was also donated by firms and individuals. Much support would have come from ENGLAND had our plans succeeded, as we had the right kind of man for this job, and ample supplies of the necessary material and financial assistance, as well as the facilities for giving sound advice and the latest news of the real position in the "free" world.

(f) Measure of success.

The Germans never succeeded in suppressing the publication of these papers, which continued throughout the occupation with a buoyancy which calls for great admiration.

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OPERATIONS - 1943.

(a) Total "successful" sorties: 37  
(b) Aircraft lost : 8  
(c) Total Containers : 262  
(d) Stores delivered :

H.E. 5,895 lbs.  
Stens: 284  
T.SMG.: 9  
LMG: 58  
Pistols : 1,001  
Grenades : 4,131  
Clams : 135  
Limpets : 125

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MARCH 1944.

GENERAL SITUATION.

a) AT H.Q., S.O.E.

The Dutch Section, although given a new lease of life, was faced with an extremely difficult task. It not only had to live down the stigma which reared over its head but also had to tackle anew the problems of building up a new organisation in the field with apparently very little time to spare.

The S.O.E., Security Section, in good faith, considered that everything that mattered in the field had been penetrated, and strongly advised against sending agents to the field but on the other hand, gave no guidance and, in fact, did everything it possibly could do to discourage further operations in Holland. This utter feeling of distrust of having anything to do with Dutch activities filtered through to the Air Operation's Section & in due course to the AIR MINISTRY, who already having had severe losses over Holland, were extremely difficult in the selection of DROPPING POINTS and would only consider "BLIND DROPS" in zones more or less selected by them.

b) IN THE FIELD.

Although S.O.E. had no contact the following was, however, the true picture of clandestine activity in occupied Holland at that time. Many spontaneous resistance groups existed and were derived from the ex-officers' organisation which existed to aid officers who had been forced to live underground in order to avoid deportation to Germany and the student groups which were formed to assist young Dutchmen who were liable to the German Labour Laws.

Due to the needs of these groups other groups had grown up which were concerned with acquiring false papers, accommodation and supplies for those living illegally. The CLERGY were active in this respect and did splendid work in aiding ALLIED AIRMEN in the same way. Many people in the liberal professions formed similar groups and, although a very large number of Dutch people were concerned with some clandestine activity or other in one of the following organisations :

O.D.,	Intelligence. Political & Post War Planning.
R.V.V.,	Sabotage & "Radio Dienst" Wireless Contacts.
K.P.,	Knokploegen - Refractaires.
L.O.,	Landelijke Organisatie - False Papers etc.,
N.S.F.	National Steun Fonds - Finance.
N.C.,	National Committee - Welfare & Social problems.
C.I.D.,	C.E., & underground telephone system.
C.P.,	Clandestine Press.

their activities had grown in a slapdash fashion through lack of guidance or directives from the U.K. They were by no means watertight and most of the leaders and organisers of different movements knew each other personally. There was a semblance of security but it was not all that could be desired, added to which, there were also many minor personal and political feuds.

ENEMY FORCES.

Much must however be said for the courage & bravery shown by the Dutch Resisters who had survived in a very small country with little or no natural cover. Facing them they had a formidable enemy force to control underground

underground activity consisting of the following units :

The Grune Polizei.  
The G.F.P.  
S.D. & Gestapo.  
N.S.B. ( Dutch Civilian Collaborators).  
Dutch & Flemish S.S.  
Feldgendarmerie.  
Landwacht.  
Wehrmacht.

RELATIONS WITH DUTCH GOVERNMENT AND S.I.S.

Major General VAN OORSCHOT, having taken office, recruited one Capt. DE GRAAF who had recently arrived from occupied Holland and who had been working with a sabotage organisation called " C.S.6." and dispensed with Colonel de BRUYNE'S assistants MAJOR LIEFTINCK and LT.COMMANDER SCHILP.

As a first step towards closer collaboration, VAN OORSCHOT, who was an old friend of MAJOR SOMER, called for a meeting between the four services i.e., S.I.S., S.O.E., B.I., B.B.O., during which Commander JOHNS & Lt.Col.DOBSON expressed the wish for real cooperation and made clear to S.I.S. & the B.I., the S.O.E. Charter and likely functions that the Resistance Forces would be called upon to do, the SUPREME COMMANDER.

The meeting was satisfactory and was followed up by a further meeting with COLONEL CORDEAUX of S.I.S., and Commander JOHNS & Lt.Col.DOBSON.

Our relations with the B.B.O., remained exceedingly good throughout the whole period of relationship with them. They had very little knowledge of the inner workings of our clandestine methods and, apart from looking after the interests of their agents, they were satisfied to leave the whole matter to us. We kept them fully in the picture, with the exception of Army Plans and, having gained their confidence, no difficulties arose.

Having gained the confidence of the Dutch B.I., S.I.S. fell into line and our relations with them were excellent. In fact, so good, that from September 1944 until the German Capitulation, it was they who attended our Daily Meetings at S.F.HQ., and we who dropped practically all their agents and stores for them to our reception committees during that period.

PLANNING.

Having gone through this groundwork the Dutch Section commenced planning for three missions :

- 1) To contact the CLANDESTINE PRESS, gain their confidence and through them hope to be able to contact one or more of the active Resistance groups.
- 2) Mission to contact the C.S.6., based on information brought out by Capt. DE GRAAF.
- 3) Mission to build up an effective sabotage organisation to disrupt enemy communications on the main RAILWAY lines in Holland leading to GERMANY and South the to BELGIUM.

These Missions were agreed to by the B.B.O., and S.O.E., subject to the means of infiltration being on a " Blind Drop " basis.

AGENTS IN THE FIELD.

NIL.

AGENTS IN TRAINING.

20.

APRIL 1944.

DEVELOPMENTS WITH DUTCH.

LT.COL. KLUZING, who arrived in the U.K. from Holland in March, was established in the Office of the B.B.O., as Major General VAN OORSCHOT's personal assistant. His relations with the Dutch office of the B.I. were good.

AGENTS SENT TO THE FIELD.

CLANDESTINE PRESS.

T. BIALLOSTERSKI ( @ DRAUGHTS ) and his wireless operator J.A.STEMAN ( @ BEZIQUE ), were dropped on the night of 31 March/ 1 April, to contact the Clandestine Press and also to obtain through them some good contacts with the active Resistance movements. The operation was successful but unfortunately their package containing the wireless transmitter, which was buried on landing, was taken away by a farmer and never traced again. DRAUGHTS successfully made contact with the CLANDESTINE PRESS, delivered money to them & also the printing block of Queen Wilhelmina's letter to the Dutch people which was later reproduced in the Clandestine Press and, after nominating a DRAUGHTS 2, returned to the U.K., on the 9th. July by way of Belgium, France, Spain & Gibraltar. He arranged a dropping ground with BEZIQUE to which a new transmitter would be sent. BEZIQUE was however able to contact us first of all through an S.I.S. transmitter & later on by the transmitter we were able to send him.

C.S.6. & R.V.V.,

N.J.CELOSSE ( @ FARO ), A.J.M. CNOOPS ( @ CRICKET ), J.H.SEYBEN ( @ PING PONG ) and H.A.J.SANDERS ( @ SWALE ) were dropped successfully on the night of 31st. March/ 1st. April. FARO to contact the C.S.6., and CRICKET the R.V.V. Unfortunately a second operator SKITTLES, refused to jump, leaving only one operator to work for three organisers. This may have had some bearing on their future fate as the two teams now only had one operator necessitating the organisers to more or less keep together with the ultimate result that they were all arrested in May. CRICKET, before his arrest, was however able to contact the R.V.V., and delivered our directives to them. They requested stores should be sent to them and also that if the R.A.F. would drop parachute flares over the DORDRECHT POWER STATION they would attempt to sabotage it. The R.A.F. were unwilling to undertake the operation & in consequence the whole project fell through. The R.V.V., reported that as a result of a well carried out sabotage attack on the factory at HOEK PIERSON, the A.S.M., of AMSTERDAM had been forced to cut its consumption of oxygen by half.

GERMAN CONTROLLED S.O.E. TRANSMITTER - HECK/BLUE.

On the 1st. April, a telegram was received from the old German controlled transmitter, reading :

" MESSRS BLUNT, BINGHAM AND SUCCS LTD LONDON. IN THE LAST TIME YOU ARE TRYING TO MAKE BUSINESS IN THE NETHERLANDS WITHOUT OUR ASSISTANCE STOP WE THINK THIS RATHER UNFAIR IN VIEW OF OUR LONG AND SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION AS YOUR SOLE AGENTS STOP BUT NEVER MIND WHENEVER YOU WILL COME TO PAY A VISIT TO THE CONTINENT YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT YOU WILL BE RECEIVED WITH THE SAME CARE AND RESULT AS ALL THOSE YOU SENT US BEFORE STOP SO LONG ".

Although the S.O.E. Security Section produced this as further

further evidence of German penetration - especially as it coincided with the despatch of the six agents on the night of the 31st. March/ 1st. April - the Dutch Section felt that there was no connection as the time factor was too short.

STORES SENT TO THE FIELD. - 2 Packages.

AGENTS IN TRAINING. - 20.

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MAY 1944.

GENERAL SITUATION. Nothing outstanding.

AGENTS SENT TO THE FIELD.

G.M. DEKKERS (@ POKER) and his wireless operator G.J. KUENEN (@ FOOTBALL) were dropped on the night of the 31st. May to build up a sabotage organisation to destroy enemy rail communications throughout Holland but unfortunately their aircraft was shot down over the GILZE-RIJEN airfield. Both POKER & FOOTBALL and the crew were killed.

COMMUNICATIONS.

An attempt was made to send two packages containing wireless material to BEZIQUE by the same aircraft doing the POKER/FOOTBALL operation but unfortunately these were lost when the aircraft was shot down. BEZIQUE did however contact us on an S.I.S. transmitter belonging to ST. JUDE.

CASUALTIES.

FARO, CRICKET, SWALE & PING PONG, were arrested on the 19th. May. FARO refused to talk and was subsequently shot. CRICKET and his operator SWALE both played the game and did not divulge their security checks with the result that we were able to play back the German controlled traffic until such time as it were deemed safe for CRICKET & SWALE'S security before closing down. The fact that the R.V.V. reported the arrests through an S.I.S. transmitter was, from a security point of view, in their favour and confirming to us that they, as an organisation, were still safe. In closing down the SWALE traffic it was decided to send the following message to the Germans as a rebuff to their famous message of the 1st. April :

" WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR MESSAGE OF APRIL FIRST WE HAVE TRIED YOUR AGENCY ONCE MORE BUT CONSIDER IT TO BE SO TERRIBLY INEFFICIENT AS TO WARRANT OUR CHANGING FOR GOOD STOP PLEASE DO NOT WORRY ABOUT ENTERTAINMENT AS THAT MATTER WILL BE IN OUR HANDS AND NOW HAVING A DETAILED LIST OF YOU ALL YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT IT WILL HARDLY BE PINPOINTS. "

POKER & FOOTBALL, were killed when their aircraft was shot down on the night of the 31st. May/ 1st. June.

AGENTS IN TRAINING.

25.

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APPENDIX : - WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS WITH HOLLAND.

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JUNE 1944.

SPECIAL SECURITY MEETING.

An important meeting was held in London to determine, if possible, the extent of German penetration of the R.V.V. The meeting was attended by the security sections of S.I.S. & S.O.E., the B.I., B.B.O., and ourselves. The S.O.E. Security Section had been pushing for this meeting for some time and S.I.S., on the other hand, were just as equally keen not to have it. The result was unsatisfactory and S.I.S. felt satisfied that the R.V.V., so far as could be determined, were still sound. This did give however an opportunity to the S.O.E. Dutch section to plan ahead.

OPERATIONAL BAN.

Owing to the Security ban, all operations were stopped to Holland until after D Day. As the ban also applied to foreigners arriving in the U.K. it affected our recruiting possibilities. It also prevented ~~that~~ the all important RUMBY/PODEX mission, to check the security of existing organisations, from leaving the country for the field.

AGENTS SENT TO THE FIELD.

Nil. See operational ban.

STORES SENT TO THE FIELD.

Nil.

COMMUNICATIONS.

As per appendix.

ARRESTS.

Nil.

AGENTS RETURNED.

Nil.

AGENTS IN TRAINING.

22.

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SEPTEMBER 1944.

GENERAL SITUATION.

H.R.H. PRINCE BERNHARD.

Prince Bernhard left for the Continent on the 9th. September accompanied by Capt. A.G. KNIGHT of the S.O.E. Dutch Section, Capt. DE JONGH of the B.I. and two S.O.E. wireless operators Sergeants SPENCE & HANNAFORD. His H.Q., was established in BRUSSELS and his wireless contact with us was on plan NORTHAW. Henceforth Prince BERNHARD worked in close liaison with No's. 1, 2 & 3 S.F. Detachments and 30 Corps Rear H.Q. In early 1945, a second H.Q. was established in BREDA until a final H.Q. was formed in APELDOORN, at the Royal Palace, later. He became actively engaged in arming reliable Resistance Groups in liberated Holland, South of the Rivers, for the maintenance of law and order, also to assist Allied troops in their requirements. For this purpose some 50 TONS of arms were flown by TEMPSFORD in Hudson aircraft to BRUSSELS from where they were transported by road to EINDHOVEN.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES.

Although each service maintained its own links with the field, the S.I.S. and S.O.E. wireless channels were from now on more or less pooled and put at the disposal of PRINCE BERNHARD. This caused some confusion in the beginning as the Prince also used the S.I.S. Internal wireless net at EINDHOVEN and replies to his messages sent on this net would very often come in on the U.K. channels, necessitating retransmission to the Prince on the NORTHAW channel. Owing to the fight for supremacy between the O.D., R.V.V., & K.P., Prince Bernhard called for unity and the first step towards this end was the forming of the DRIEHOEK ( TRIANGLE ) which ultimately became the D.C. ( DELTA CENTRUM ), staff to the C.B.S. Although a certain amount of internal opposition existed between the organisations, they were at any rate combined in their efforts against the Germans.

ARNHEM AIRBORNE OPERATION " MARKET ". This took place on the 17th. of September and one JEDBURGH Team was attached to each of the

following units :

<u>AIRBORNE CORPS HQ.</u>	Team "EDWARD".	Capt. STAAL. DUTCH.
		Capt. SOLLENBERGER. U.S.
		Capt. MILLS. BRITISH.
		2/Lt. WILLMOTT. BRITISH.
		Sgt. BILLINGSLEY. U.S.
<u>I AIR TRANSPORTED DIVISION.</u>	Team "GLAUDE"	Capt. GROENEWOUD. DUTCH.
		Lt. KNOTTENHELT. DUTCH.
		Lt. TODD. U.S.
		Sgt. SCOTT. U.S.
<u>82 DIV. (U.S.).</u>	Team "CLARENCE"	Capt. BESTEBREURTJE. DUTCH.
		Lt. VERHAEGHE. U.S.
		Sgt. BEYNON. U.S.
<u>101 DIV. (U.S.).</u>	Team " DANIEL "	Maj. WILSON. BRITISH.
		Lt. DU BOIS. DUTCH.
		Sgt. FOKKER. DUTCH.
		Sgt. MASON. BRITISH.

Concurrent with this Arnhem Airborne Operation, secret wireless messages were transmitted to the Resistance by S.O.E., and S.I.S. The text read :

"PARACHUT TROOPS HAVE LANDED ON THE BRIDGES AT ARNHEM NIJMEGEN AND GRAVE STOP REINFORCEMENTS WILL FOLLOW QUICKLY STOP GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THESE ALLIED TROOPS SO THAT THE BRIDGES OVER THE RHINE, NEDER RHINE AND THE MAAS CANAL ARE NOT RPT NOT DESTROYED STOP RESISTANCE GROUPS INSIDE THE AREA SHOULD ONLY PROVIDE GUIDES GIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND PROVIDE LABOUR STOP RESISTANCE OUTSIDE THE AREA BUT WITHIN TWENTY KMS WILL GIVE THE SAME ASSISTANCE BUT ALSO TRY TO PREVENT ENEMY TROOPS APPROACHING THE AREA STOP RESISTANCE OUTSIDE THE TWENTY KMS RADIUS SHOULD INTERFERE WITH ENEMY MOVEMENTS TOWARDS AND FROM THE AREA BUT BUT PROTECT AND PRESERVE PETROL DUMPS STOP PUT INTO ACTION IMMEDIATELY THE INTELLIGENCE PLAN WITH THE PASSWORD TELEPHONE AS PER OUR PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS STOP SPECIAL TRAINED ALLIED RESISTANCE TEAMS IN UNIFORM HAVE LANDED IN THE AREA WITH PARACHUTE TROOPS AND CAN BE CONTACTED DAILY AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE OUDENHOF BETWEEN BESSER AND BEMMEL AT 0900 HOURS STOP PASSWORD IS IK ZOEK JAN BLOM AND THE REPLY IS U WILT ZEGGEN VAN UTRECHT STOP GIVE THEM ALL THE HELP AND INFORMATION YOU CAN REGARDING THE NORTHERN AND NORTH EASTERN AND EASTERN PARTS OF HOLLAND STOP. "

Of the airborne operation itself, little more need be told. Of the four Jedburgh Teams, the team "EDWARD" was the only one to maintain wireless contact with the U.K. The first message was transmitted by them at 2000 Hours on the 17th. September. The teams put up an exceedingly good show and were able to act as liaison between the Airborne Forces and the Dutch local resistance forces, arranging for labour for the building of air strips, guides, guards and collection of intelligence. They were commended by the Airborne Force Commander for their valuable work. It is unfortunate, however, that up to the time of the airborne landing no weapons had been dropped in the area and, in fact, only some 700 weapons in all had been despatched to HOLLAND up to that time.

#### RAILWAY STRIKE.

Concurrent with the Arnhem operation and at the suggestion of the field, special wireless broadcasts were made to the Railway personnel in Holland, requesting them to go on strike & into hiding. This they promptly did and upset the whole of the railway traffic in Holland with the exception of such lines which the Germans put back into commission with their army personnel. The result of this strike, although not then apparent, not only impeded the Germans but eventually rebounded on the Dutch population themselves and prevented the transport of food from the better stocked larders of Eastern Holland to the poorer ones in Western Holland. This eventually led up to the terrible famine in Central and Western Holland and the ultimate dropping of food in daylight to the stricken areas by the Allies.

#### RUSSIANS WORKING FOR WEHRMACHT.

Of some 50,000 Russian Georgians and Turkestans captured by the Germans on the Eastern front, the bulk of whom were starved to death or murdered, about 2/3000 were forced into submission and eventually put on German uniform and worked for the Germans as a labour corps in Holland. They were stationed on the West coast of Holland on general defence duties and, being anti-German at heart, eventually came into contact with the Resistance Movements and expressed their willingness to mutiny & kill their German officers.

A pre-arranged B.B.O., message was broadcast to reassure them but owing to subsequent events and international policy, the action message was never broadcast.

SPECIAL DAILY MEETING.

Although relations were extremely good with S.I.S. and both the Dutch offices of the B.B.O. and the B.I., it was generally felt that, owing to the pressure of work and the need for prompt and collective action, a daily Conference should be held to study messages from the field and ensure complete unity vis-a-vis the field, the Dutch Government, Prince Bernhard's H.Q., and army requirements. This procedure was agreed to and from September 1944 until May 1945, a daily conference was held between the four services S.I.S., S.O.E., B.B.O., & B.I., in LT.COL.R.I.DOBSON's room at S.P.,H.Q.,

AGENTS SENT TO THE FIELD.

T.BIALLOSTERSKI (@ DRAUGHTS I) and his wireless operator P. DE VOS (BACKGAMMON), were dropped on the night of the 8th. September to build up resistance in the Amsterdam and North Holland areas. This was DRAUGHT's second mission. The operation was successful and they both put up a magnificent show. The whole of the central executive of the N.B.S., was built up through the DRAUGHTS liaison. Vast quantities of stores were dropped which found their way down to AMSTERDAM by a motor barge having a specially constructed double bottom. DRAUGHTS was unfortunately arrested by chance on the 10th. February when returning from a dropping operation. He was fatally wounded whilst trying to escape & died later in SCHEVENINGEN prison. BACKGAMMON faithfully carried on his work with DR.X. - DRAUGHTS SUCCESSOR - until the German capitulation in May 1945. The ingenious methods he employed for transmitting his messages to the U.K. were instrumental in maintaining vital communications with DR.X. and the C.B.S. (Commander Binnenlandsche Strijdkrachten) appointed by Prince Bernhard to lead the N.B.S. in Holland.

MAJOR BRINKGREVE (@ DUDLEY), MAJOR OLMSTED U.S. and their wireless operator SGT. AUSTIN, three Jedburgh trained men, were dropped in Eastern Holland on the night of the 8th. September in

order to build Resistance in the Veluwe area. Conditions there were unsatisfactory - DUDLEY and his team returned to the OVER-LIJSSSEL area where they were able to build up a first class resistance movement under the command of the Zone Commander EDUARD. A number of dropping operations took place in their area and its Resistance Forces put up a very good show when the Allies pushed the enemy back in April 45 through OVERLIJSSSEL into the Northern provinces of DRENTHE, FRIESLAND & GRONINGEN. Sgt. AUSTIN was unfortunately arrested in December 1944 and shot later together with other prisoners for the attack on RAUTER. DUDLEY, however, maintained contact through the W/T operator CHARADES & EDUARD'S operator SQUEAK, until he was shot whilst trying to escape from a house search on March the 5th. 45.

W.H. HOOGEWERFF (@ COURSING), P. POLAK (@ BOATING), M. CIEREMANS (@ CUBBING) & G. DE STOPPELAAR (@ MONOPOLY), three sabotage instructors and

the wireless operator BOATING, were dropped to the ROTTERDAM area on the night of the 15th. September. At their own request they dropped in uniform but had to revert to civilian clothing soon after their arrival. A number of containers were subsequently dropped to them through their reception committees. COURSING & MONOPOLY settled down in the area and did very good work. COURSING was however arrested in February 45 and subsequently shot. CUBBING went to the UTRECHT area & linked up with

with SCULLING and carried on SCULLING's work after he was caught and shot. BOATING, at his own request, joined DRAUGHTS I & BACKGAMMON as a second wireless operator to the Amsterdam Group.

S.A.S. PARTY " REGAN " .

S.A.S. wishing to liven up resistance activities dropped a party of four men in uniform in the DRENTHE area. As movement in allied uniform was impossible they reverted to civilian clothing. They were instrumental in arranging the delivery of a few consignments of containers. The security of these S.A.S. men and of the resistance members in the area was not good and eventually numerous arrests and the seizing of arms dumps took place. The party split up and eventually returned through the lines.

STORES SENT TO THE FIELD.

During the month of September there were 86 Air sorties over Holland of which 42 were successful. In all some 765 containers and 71 packages were dropped.

COMMUNICATIONS .

See APPENDIX " A " - WIRELESS COMMUNICATION WITH HOLLAND copies of daily summary on yellow sheets.

SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES.

Reports which came through were encouraging and the following activities were reported :

- 1) The K.P. effectively carried out sabotage on the railways as per SHAEF/17240/28/OPS.C. Directive of 27 Aug.44. This was confirmed by messages received by S.I.S. reporting that the line ROOSENDAAL/BREDA/TILBURG/s'HERTOGENBOSCH was seriously affected - railway traffic in South and South Eastern Holland was at a standstill and that lines in Eastern Holland were being cut nightly.
- 2) Lines cut between VEENENDAAL & RHEENEN, AMERSFOORT & APELDOORN, AMERSFOORT to the SOUTH. Sabotage carried out on the Railway bridges over the DEDEMSVAART & ZWOLLE - MEPPEN.
- 3) The three blockade ships the " BORNEO " , " WESTERDIJK " & " AXENFELS " had been sunk by Resistance in the port of ROTTERDAM.
- 4) Acting upon intelligence received from the field, some successful air attacks were carried out on rocket sites North of the HAGUE.

CASUALTIES.

Capt.GROENEWOUD - Killed at ARNHEM.

AGENTS RETURNED FROM THE FIELD.

Nil.

AGENTS IN TRAINING.

16.

APPENDIX.

" B " - Map showing location of Agents & Stores' delivery as at September 17th. 1944.

WIRELESS COMMUNICATION WITH HOLLAND.SEPTEMBER 14.

<u>Plan Name.</u>	<u>Being used by.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
TEES.	RUSBY, POLEX, CRIBBAGE.	Carried forward.
TRIPI.	DRAUGHTS 2, ROWING & BEZIQUE.	
WAVELEY.	SCULLING, TURNQUOITS.	
DUDLEY.	DUDLEY.	Commenced 13 Sep 44.
FLIM.	DRAUGHTS 1, BACKGAMMON.	-do- 14 Sep 44.
TORRIDGE.	DRAUGHTS 1, BOATING.	-do- 23 Sep 44.
WINGSUN.	CHARADES.	-do- 15 Sep 44.
WITHERAM.	SHOOTING, RAAD (R.V.V.)	-do- 18 Sep 44.
CLARENCE.	Jedburgh Team " EDWARD ".	-do- 18 Sep 44.
		Ended. 26 Sep 44.

AddedAdded

MARCH 24th.

FRIESLAND.

1. NECKING reports that he has 2100 armed men ready in FRIESLAND and that the Intelligence branch of the Resistance group in his area has now got to work.

OVERIJSSSEL.

- 2.a) EDUARD says in answer to a query from SFHQ (See Summary 17 Mar, para 3) that according to the Commandant of ZWOLLE, the most important buildings of the SD are situated around the VAN NABUISPLEIN. In addition, important detachments of troops are quartered in the RACHTSINGEL School.
- b) The Commandant of ZWOLLE plans to release 150 political prisoners detained in ZWOLLE and asks SFHQ to support him by arranging a simultaneous attack on the buildings occupied by the SD.  
Note: The target is being submitted to the Dutch Government for approval.

UTRECHT.

3. CUBBING says that CHARLES will not now be coming out. (See Summary 20 Mar, para 2). He adds that questions about the ARMENIANS are being considered.  
Note: e the ARMENIANS, CUBBING has been told that special action-messages in German could be broadcast on the BBC, and was asked if this was suitable. He was also asked if there were quick means of communications between the main body of ARMENIANS and those stationed at WESTERVOORT E 77, and what language they understand.

MARCH 25th.

OVERIJSSSEL.

1. CHARADES says that the SD have a photograph of HUNTING who is a brigade instructor under EDUARD.

UTRECHT.

2. CUBBING says that about 400 people were murdered as a reprisal for the attack on the SD chief RAUTER (See Summary 14 Mar, para 3). The attack was made on the APELDOORN - ARNHEM Road, but CUBBING does not say by whom. RAUTER is now in APELDOORN, having been shot in the lung. His driver and one other were killed.
3. CUBBING states that the FRANS whose operator was arrested (See Summary 19 Mar, para 5), is not FRANS HALS, but an organiser who was to arrange the SIS dropping on ground LEX 2 00. FRANS himself, another SIS man called ANTON and their organisation are still alright.

ROTTERDAM.

4. SCRAPE has acknowledged the receipt of the action messages broadcast to his zone for the sabotage of telecommunications.
5. SCRAPE, in answer to a query from SFHQ (See Summary 23 Mar, para 8) says that the man he wanted to put in charge of the telephone communications is VAN VUUREN.

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APPENDIX " E "

SUMMARY OF DUTCH SECTION PERSONNEL.

JANUARY 1944 - END AUGUST 1945.

On the 1st. January 1944, the Dutch Section consisted of the following personnel :

Major	S. Bingham.	Section Head.
Jnr.Cmd.	S.I.Bond. A.T.S.	Training Officer.
Capt.	A.C.Knight.	Operations Officer.
2/Lt.	D.G.Mortlock U.S.	Asst. -do-
Mr.	B.H.Olink.	Communications.
Sgt.	W.A.Thomas F.A.N.Y.	Asst. -do-
Capt.	W.E.Mills.	Admin. & Finance Officer.
Capt.	J.W.C. Kay.	Conducting Officer.
Lieut.	A. Snewing.	-do-
Lieut.	A.C.Parr.	-do-

10

On the 26th. February 1944, Major S. Bingham relinquished his command of the Dutch Section and Major R.I.Dobson, who transferred from the Belgian Section, took charge.

The section underwent the following changes in additions, departures and promotions :

1944. JANUARY - Departures - Capt. J.W.C.Kay. X

FEBRUARY - -do- - Major S. Bingham. <

Arrivals - Major R.I.Dobson. *2nd from Belgium*

APRIL - -do- - Capt.C.F.Dadley. X Assist. to S.H.

MAY - -do- - 2/Lt.H.Hooper. X Conduct. Officer.

Promotions - Lieut.A.Snewing. To Captain.

JULY - -do- - Mr.B.H.Olink. To Captain.

SEPT. - -do- - Lieut.H.Hooper. To Captain.

-do- - Lieut.A.C.Parr. To Captain.

OCT. Arrivals. - F/Lt.E.O'C.Tandy. X Assist. Ops.

NOV. -do- - Lt.H.S.Gardiner. X Wireless Off.

1945. JANUARY -do- - Major W.A.Murphy. X Assist. to S.H.

-do- - Capt. C. Tivey. X Asst.Ops.Off.

-do- - F/Lt.R.H.Flower. X Asst.Training Off.

-do- - Capt.A.P.Irby. X Asst. W/T. Off.

Promotions - Major R.I.Dobson. To Lieut.Colonel.

FEB. - - Nil.

MARCH. Arrivals - Ensign J.Dane.F.A.N.Y. X Training Asst.

-do- - Capt.G.C.Bowden. X Asst. W/T. Off.

Departures - Capt. A.C.Parr. X

-do- - Capt. A. Snewing. X

Promotions - Capt. C.F.Dadley. To Major.

1945. APRIL. Departures - Capt. G.C. Bowden.  
-do- - Capt. A.P. Irby.  
MAY. -do- - Ensign. J. Dane F.A.N.Y.  
JUNE. -do- - P/Lt. E.O'C. Tandy.  
JULY. -do- - Capt. D.G. Mortlock U.S.  
-do- - Capt. B.H. Olink.  
-do- - Jnr/Cmd. S.I. Bond. ✓  
-do- - Capt. A.C. Knight. ✓  
-do- - Lt. H.S. Gardiner.  
-do- - Capt. C. Tivey.  
-do- - P/Lt. R.H. Flower.  
AUG. -do- - Major C.F. Dudley.  
-do- - Lieut. W.A. Thomas F.A.N.Y.

Nucleus of Dutch Section as at 1 September 1945 - engaged on liquidation matters :

Lt.Col. R.I. Dobson.

Major W.A. Murphy.

Capt. W.E. Mills.

Attached to H.R.H. Prince Bernhard's staff as Wireless Communications' Officer :

Capt. H. Hooper.

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