

One of the principal organisers in AMSTERDAM used as headquarters an apartment in a boarding-house which was owned by a German lady whom he had known before the War. Up to October 1944 only German officers had lived in the building. When they moved out, no one would take a room there, so the organiser took the whole of the top floor. At first he used it as his headquarters when he was in charge of the transportation of stores and later as the headquarters of the whole or the organisation in AMSTERDAM. Nobody knew he was there and the room was rented in somebody else's name. If the house was searched while he was there he would be a doctor visiting a patient.

#### In the Country.

In the country districts - notably in the VELUWE and the OVERIJSEL - isolated farm houses were used for all purposes and men lived in fox-holes in maquis style. Headquarters in these areas were mobile, and groups moved from place to place as and when events made a move necessary. Headquarters in these country districts would usually comprise three farm houses within 30 minutes' cycling distance one from the other - one farm housing the chief of staff and his assistant, one accommodating the Zone commander, and a third in which the W/T operator functioned. A courier service would ensure communications. Isolated country houses, clergymen's houses, garages or smithies were also used.

#### CONTACT ADDRESSES AND RENDEZVOUS POINTS.

Most organisations used for internal communications accommodation addresses which were changed every month, or as and when necessary, and which were used as courier terminal points. These accommodation addresses were usually banks, large shops, doctors' surgeries or any premises where a number of people could go in and out without attracting attention. In the main it was thought that the doctor's surgery was the best place to be used as an accommodation address. Private houses were used, however, for this purpose, as were libraries, cafes and churches. The bank's safe deposit system was used by making a safe deposit box a dead boîte-aux-lettres, the necessary keys being given to all users with the connivance of the bank employees.

To maintain communications in country districts, there was always a contact address somewhere near the headquarters of the Zone. Here messages could be deposited without necessitating a visit to headquarters itself. This contact address would often be a shop in a village near to which headquarters was located.

Meetings were held in business premises during working hours, in doctors' surgeries and in private houses. One meeting, for instance, took place in the offices of the Chamber of Commerce in one of the larger towns. The meeting took place in a private room allotted to the organisation and, although work was going on in the offices of the Chamber of Commerce, nobody knew that a meeting was taking place with the exception of the director's secretary, who had been warned about the meeting 30 minutes before it was due to commence.



### TRAINING PREMISES.

In 1944 and 1945 larger classes were arranged in towns, and agents were trained in groups of 20 to 30 at a time in swimming baths, gymnasia, dance halls etc. Small classes were held in shops, private houses, stables or garages. In the country men gathered in farmhouses to receive their training, or alternatively in fields well off the beaten track and with guards posted.

### W/T SITES.

As already stated, most W/T operators were agents newly arrived from England, and in general the group for whom they were working found transmitting sites for them through friends or contacts or again with the assistance of L.O. Priests and doctors were also of great assistance in finding transmitting sites for operators. In some cases, however, it was left to the agent himself to find places from which to work. Some agents during their mission used as many as 50 different houses, being obliged to move frequently owing to the danger of enemy D/F-ing activity. Consequently, without assistance from the organisation it was very difficult for them to find suitable premises. Frequently they were forced to transmit from houses in which other forms of clandestine activity were taking place, with obvious danger to their security.

Using a suitable cover story, an operator seeking a transmitting site would visit a house, flat or farm, and, having examined it from the technical viewpoint, would try to rent accommodation without revealing why he needed it. In most cases, however, this was impossible and the operator was obliged to take the people into his confidence. If they were unwilling to co-operate, he merely asked them to forget the incident and withdrew. Needless to say, the operator would only visit people whose names had been given him by friends or acquaintances in resistance.

The following are extracts from reports received from two operators working in AMSTERDAM:

"A priest, a Protestant minister and a doctor did all the searching for addresses. When the two padres and the doctor had found them addresses, the two operators went round inspecting them to see if they were suitable. Some were not high enough; some had too thin walls. It was preferable to have unoccupied flats round the one chosen, and operating always had to be done away from an adjoining apartment, especially during the night, so that the neighbours would not hear anything. The occupants of the premises chosen only knew they were being used to operate from but nothing else. The owners of those houses not chosen merely thought that the two operators were young doctors looking for somewhere to live and that the rooms were unsuitable for some reason best known to the operators."

"One agent had a W/T site in a house opposite a school to which he had a key, and there were plenty of facilities in the school for hiding material."

"The other agent's headquarters was situated in the basement of one of the houses of a hospital. Entrance



was obtained through the house of the hospital's chief engineer, out into the garden in the centre of the hospital and down some stone stairs leading to an unlit corridor below the nurse's home. At intervals along the passage metal plates, approximately 3 ft. x 3 ft., were riveted to the wall. The first two would not come away when pulled by a hole in the middle but the third let down on chains when a piece of wire was pushed downwards through the hole to release a catch. These metal plates were about waist height. Behind the plate thus removed was a fairly large, low cellar where it was impossible to stand up straight and which was below ground level. No one, not even the director of the hospital, knew what was happening, or that anything was happening, except the chief engineer of the hospital, who helped the agent to set up his C.P. The agent would use various covers to get into his C.P. - either that of a doctor, a nurse or a plumber. He nearly always rang up the chief engineer before coming to see that everything was all right and he enquired again of the chief engineer when he passed through his house before going down to his C.P. if it were still all right. The C.P. was equipped with everything to enable the agent to stay down there, if necessary, for any length of time. He had in it his broadcast receiver and transmitter sets, his T.D. apparatus, inside and outside telephones, spare accumulators and other spares for his W/T sets, food, water, heating, electric light, hand grenades and fire-arms etc. If, for any reason, the warning system failed and the agent could not get out of his C.P. before the police reached the passage, it would be highly probable that they would not find it and if they did he was prepared to fight it out. All the materials were taken down there at night and special rubber-soled shoes were asked for from England to enable them to walk up and down the passage. It took two months to equip the C.P. fully. The agent had a house telephone in his C.P. with a secret number which only the chief engineer knew, so that the latter could ring him up and warn him of any danger. He, though, could ring up any one from this phone, both inside and outside the hospital, through the secret exchange. The only snag was that certain very high-pitched morse buzzes vibrated on the central heating pipes which ran through the cellar and could be heard in the room immediately above, so the occupant of the room above was moved out and a woman put in who knew she must not speak about any peculiar noises she might hear. One of the agent's reasons for choosing this place for his C.P. was that it was safe from bombardment as it had several feet of steel and concrete above. He wanted to be able to go on transmitting even if AMSTERDAM were being bombarded right until the very end."

#### SECRET TELEPHONE EXCHANGES.

For the manipulation of the black telephone system, which will be discussed later, many secret telephone exchanges existed all over Holland. Old houses and shops were chosen, and for this purpose the solidly-built Dutch house, with its thick walls and many steps, stairs and cupboards, was ideal. Houses with suitable facilities were chosen, or, where these facilities did not exist, carpenters and builders were called in to construct

hidden rooms and cupboards. The Dutch are very clever at this type of work, and many ingenious hide-outs were thus created. However, in every case two or three men would be required for a number of days to do the work entailed, with obvious security implications. In some cases an attic or cellar would be sub-divided and a secret room walled off, entrance being made in the secret room through a cleverly constructed door which could not be found without a long search. In other cases the rooms would be completely built in, leaving no means of entry other than a secret door constructed in the fire-place of an adjoining room.



Security Precautions

The following extracts illustrate security precautions taken by agents in the Field:-

"EDUARD had his own men in touch with or working in SD offices and was thus fully informed with regard to planned raids or impending SD activity.

HQ and dwelling places were changed as frequently as possible, and the addresses known only to the minimum number of people."

"In the office informant kept a certain amount of material connected with his Insurance business and had he been questioned would have attempted to explain his presence there by saying that his Insurance Company's office had been bombed and that he was continuing to do his work in the office lent him by his friend.

One precaution, however, was taken in that the manager of the factory had a bell push under his desk, by means of which he could warn informant if the Germans were visiting the factory.

In the office itself, informant had, with the connivance of the factory manager's brother, who was an engineer, constructed a cavity in the floor in which a large box containing his weapons, papers and other incriminating material was stored. The cavity was carefully concealed by a concrete slab on which stood a large electric fire. The box itself could be raised to the surface by means of an electrical lift which the engineer had installed in the room. By pressing a switch, the cavity in the floor could be opened or shut at will and the box raised to the surface very quickly and without any trouble at all. In case of alarm, everything would have been put into the box and lowered into the floor."

"Apart from an understanding among the members of informant's group and among all contacts that warning of enemy action was to be circulated immediately, no security rulse existed in the organization. Informant's own personal courier knew all addresses and could warn everybody in a very short time."

"He always had one house, the address of which was known to nobody, where he could go and sleep with no fear of his whereabouts being betrayed. He had a small office consisting of one room which he used as his headquarters and whose whereabouts was never known to more than two or three persons at the most.

He had a chain of rendezvous addresses where he could meet and discuss his work with other resistance leaders. These meeting places were never used more than twice running, and new rendezvous addresses were acquired as often as possible."



"Informant's organisation was careful to remain as anonymous as possible, and provided them with only one address, which automatically became obsolete if any arrest were made."

"With regard to meetings in houses, they had certain safety signals (e.g. ringing of the door bell) and in addition a girl was posted at a second floor window, from which she could see who was ringing the bell, and in the case of a stranger, she would immediately sound the alarm before going to open the door, thus giving them time to hide all compromising material. When it was impossible to hide everything in time they went to the door armed with their Sten guns and pistols, etc."

"Source remarked that the most important qualifications for a house were that entrance might be made unobtrusively, that bicycles might be taken inside, and that there should be a means of escape in case of a raid. Source had one safety house which he used only as a refuge, and not for training.

The only safety signal used was the riging of the door bell in a special way to obtain admittance. Only certain men were allowed to visit HQ."

"Informant used his own home as his headquarters throughout the occupation, and kept all illegal material in a suitcase which never left his side. His plan if the police called was to lower this suitcase from a window into the garden of his next-door neighbour.

As regards the concealment of illegal material at the printing office, informant said that it would have been easy enough to hide anything among the masses of material in the office."

"At first security was exceedingly poor - e.g. as many as 20 or 30 men would attend for arms instruction, each bringing a bicycle and leaving it outside the premises! Agent forbade this and instructed all trainees that they should arrive on foot, in small groups and at different times.

On arrival in ROTTERDAM, agent found that only one central arms depôt, containing the entire supply of arms, existed. Agent at once decentralized, in case of a razzia.

An agent should never know the address of his chief, and should know as little of the organization as is compatible with efficiency. (Agent says that an exception to this rule was to be found in the case of couriers, who, of necessity, knew several addresses.)"

"As far as possible he changed houses from time to time and had his set moved. This was always done by a girl, sometimes by JOS. When the agent was going to transmit from a house where he was not known a password was used and at certain premises the safety signal was always used. At one time he was using the old Belgian Legation, which was inhabited only by a concierge and where he fitted up the set between the ceiling and the roof, thus working in complete concealment."



"With regard to the first four places mentioned, informant had nothing of interest to say. At the farm where he was living in VLIEDEN, there were four means of egress, and from his own room he had a very clear view of the surrounding countryside and could see for very long distances. He arranged with the farmer's son that if anything should happen while he was away from the farm, a message would be sent through to headquarters who would contact him by messenger. There were no other safety precautions and informant relied on the service of people in the organisation who quickly circulated news of enemy activities.

He had several hiding places, all well scattered, in outhouses and stables. At the headquarters at DEURNE the smith was always working, during the day, in the front of the house, and his wife worked at the back. At night the headquarters at DEURNE was never used.

There was no material stored at headquarters, in the house, but arms and explosives were hidden in a water-proof box in the garden. Informant knew of no other material which was kept at the house."

"This man took the house over in his own name and allowed informant to live there. BOB and META lived in the house as a "jeune menage", informant passing himself off as META's brother. The neighbours accepted them without question. Nobody knew of this address except informant's reception committee chief. It was impossible to find hiding places in the house and they were always armed in the house and ready to repel any attack made upon them. The only security precaution taken was a vase of flowers placed in a particular position in the window which would indicate to any of the residents returning home that it was safe to enter."

"When the agent had an appointment at the second flat he would go there before the appointment and await the arrival of the person he was going to see. The safety signal used was that the hall of the flat, a very dark place, was kept in semi-darkness unless there was danger, in which case the electric light was lit, and could be seen from outside. It would have been normal for the light to be lit when someone was admitted to the flat, so that had any unwelcome visitors arrived before the appointment it would have been perfectly possible for the person coming for the appointment to see that there was danger."

"Only five people knew the H.Q. building - the organiser, the liaison officer, a girl courier, a girl secretary and a despatch rider."

"Informant's home after he left the 'safe house' in ROTTERDAM was a ground floor flat in a block. His friend VAN VELZEN knew the neighbours, who evinced no curiosity when informant arrived there. To them he was just another refractaire, and they did not talk. This also applied to the middle-aged couple whose flat it was. There were two exits from the apartment. Informant was unable to find a suitable hiding place in his room for incriminating material, and hesitated to ask the owners of the flat. He therefore locked his codes in a metal box, which he placed, together with his other belongings,



in a locked suitcase. He always locked the door of his room when going out, and was always very alert and careful when leaving or returning to his home. He always called first at a neighbour's house before going home to find out if anything interesting had happened in the neighbourhood during his absence."

"ZWARTE WIM once slept for three weeks in a different house every night because nobody dared to have him. He got his addresses from L.O. He asked them for 10 or 12 and used some as cover addresses and some to live in. He had no time to find addresses for himself."

"Together with the boy whom he was given as his assistant, he organised a system of guards for the various safe houses. They were four girls who cycled round the house reporting every car which appeared in the immediate neighbourhood. If all were well, they carried a handkerchief in their hand but, the absence of the handkerchief indicated danger. Informant made this arrangement bearing his security training at Group "B" in mind."

"They had to be very careful to keep the group as small as possible; when they made outside contacts, they never allowed outsiders to know where they were living or what their real names were. Appointments were always made away from their own homes.

Informant never made any really serious to conceal her materials and papers when she had them in her room, because she knew that there was no way of hiding them from any thorough search. She simply scattered them about the room, hidden under other objects."

"At the beginning private houses were always used for meetings, and when this was the case members always arrived singly and at different specified times, the leader, ERKENS, always being the last to arrive. The safe houses were always the property of a personal friend of the organisation whom they knew they could trust. These people did not know exactly what was going on but realised that, whatever and whoever they saw or heard, they must be discreet about it, and knew that in some way they were helping the resistance. Informant states that at these meetings cover stories were not arranged beforehand, but as soon as the members were assembled the first thing they did was to arrange one, such as playing cards etc. These safe houses were selected by all members, Capt. PIETERS acting as courier between the other members."



## INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

### Couriers

Girl couriers were used extensively by the Underground Movement, and indeed, they maintained 50% of internal communications. In general, couriers and the "black" telephone provided practically all internal communication facilities. The girls would travel about on bicycles, carrying verbal or written messages, and using as cover a pretended visit to relatives, or an expedition in search of food, milk, etc. They were not specially trained, but acquitted themselves admirably of their task. In their own districts they were well-known, and their excursions aroused no interest or suspicion. Only in the later stages of the occupation did the Germans begin to stop and search women. Many cases were known in the later stages of women being stripped and thoroughly searched. Written messages were usually carried in the frames of bicycles or concealed in handbags or shopping baskets, or frequently in the lining of a costume. The messages were taken to a courier terminal point, where they were collected by another courier or cut-out. Most Regional Commanders maintained a separate courier service consisting of about 20 girls who covered their own particular areas on foot or on bicycles. An agent would thus only need to send his own personal courier with a message to the Headquarters of the Internal Communications Section, and the latter would then take on the responsibility of delivering the message to the addressee. The couriers were trained gradually by experience, and worked out their own alibis. In the towns, many posed as housewives doing their daily shopping. Organisers were unanimous in their high praise of the girls' achievements and their courage and devotion. The girls frequently accepted missions which the men refused to undertake. The girls were not trained, but relied on their thorough knowledge of local conditions and on their natural resource to get them through.

As a precautionary measure, the couriers were often rested for some considerable time whilst new couriers were used in their place. By this means no courier could learn too much about locations, nor did they become familiar figures in any one place for any length of time. Another precaution taken was that each courier had instructions to say that she did not know where to deliver the message if she were stopped and searched en route. Her story would be that she had been given a message by some unknown person with a request to deliver it to another person in the town or elsewhere at a fixed rendezvous. Each courier normally knew a number of addresses which were unknown to other couriers, and only the Chief of the Internal Communications Section would know all the addresses used. He always knew where each courier should be, and how long the courier's job should take, and if the courier did not return punctually a search was made. Couriers were sometimes arrested with their letters upon them, but the system worked sufficiently well in that no further arrests were made as a result. In the case of an arrest, all addresses known by the courier arrested were warned and the people living there immediately moved elsewhere. Couriers frequently changed their clothes to confuse possible followers, and inconspicuous girls were chosen for the work. There was little risk of women being picked up in razzias.



Live letter-boxes were used as contact addresses and collecting points with the necessary security precautions (see Premises). Cut-outs were frequently used for the collection of messages left by couriers at these points. One very ingenious live letter-box was used by an agent at APELDOORN, who obtained military information by having a group in every village responsible to a chief, who would collate the intelligence acquired by his group, place it in an envelope marked with a blue cross, but with no address, and send a courier to a small village near APELDOORN where the courier would leave the envelope in the official letter-box at the Post Office. Envelopes were always deposited before 9.30 a.m. Between 9.30 a.m. and 10 a.m. the official responsible for the Post Office extracted the letters, put them aside, and the courier called at 10 a.m. at the Post Office and carried the messages away to the organiser's address. In this manner by 11 a.m. every day the organiser had in his possession up-to-date military information for the whole region. The couriers who went with the information only knew they were to put the envelopes in the letter-box at the Post Office. The official at the Post Office only knew the courier who called to collect the envelopes, and he asked no questions. He had a perfect alibi, as he could always say he did not know who left the letters or for whom they were destined.

#### Personal Meetings.

Much clandestine work was planned at personal meetings between agents who knew each other's address and called openly to discuss their work, but always with a suitable alibi, and having previously fixed the time and the reason for the meeting by telephone, employing veiled language. Meetings were very often arranged by telephone, using conventional phrases to indicate the time and place. Most meetings took place indoors, and when more than three or four people were to meet, suitable cover stories were always arranged collectively for all the people concerned. Some organisers, having fixed a meeting, took the precaution of sending a cut-out to transact business for them, providing him with the necessary means of identification. One method of arranging a meeting was to mail a business letter fixing a business appointment, but with the necessary conventions pre-arranged. This was, of course, only possible when the post functioned normally.

#### Post.

Up to 1943, when the official post functioned normally, it was used as a means of intercommunication. After 1943, however, there were to all intents and purposes no facilities for public use except inside towns. In the early days of the occupation letters in connection with clandestine work were sent through the normal Post Office system, but veiled language was always used. Frequently the Post Office officials worked hand-in-glove with the Underground Movement. One service rendered by the Postmaster in a small town was the handling of correspondence addressed to a certain name, the addressee supposedly living at a boarding-house in the town. This correspondence was really destined for the local organiser.



These letters were set aside for the organiser and collected by his courier. The Postmaster had never met the organiser, and only received his instructions from the courier. He was, however, very discreet, and never wanted to know what was going on.

A group in ROTTERDAM had a contact in the Post Office who handed over to them all letters sent from civilians to SD Headquarters. There were sometimes 10 or 20 a day, usually letters of denunciation, which would be destroyed, the people denounced being warned. Any harmless letters were put into new envelopes and sent on.

If agents had recourse to the post they usually had letters sent to accommodation addresses, so that their homes could not be traced.

#### Telephones.

Telephones were used extensively prior to September 1944, when all lines were disconnected by the Germans except those in use by the Wehrmacht, the police, administration, hospitals etc. Conversation was in veiled language and most agents had some contact with the P.T.T. officials, who would warn them if their line was being tapped. In the small towns and in the country districts even when normal facilities no longer existed, Post Office officials were very helpful, and agents were allowed to use the official Post Office telephone in cases of emergency. If agents were wanted urgently, a contact called the Post Office, and the man in charge would send a message to the agent's home.

Black Telephone: After September 1944, when the normal telephone service was withdrawn from the general public, a "black" telephone exchange was installed in most of the principal towns and was worked by an NBS operator with the connivance of the telephone manager. There were in some towns up to 30 or 40 illegal extensions. One flaw in the system was that the telephone manager and the operator at the "black" exchange knew all the people who had access to the "black" telephone. The organisation controlling this secret telephone network was known as CID, and only one man in each town knew how to get in touch with its local representative. This telephone system was used freely, and in this way the Commandant of the NBS in AMSTERDAM received his orders by telephone from PRINCE BERNHARD in clear from ALMELO when this town was freed. The system was of great help in intercommunications, and was even used in conjunction with W/T sets in the system of radio transmission by remote control which is discussed later. So secure was the "black" telephone that urgent letters could be read over the line from one town to the other. A full report on the "black" telephone system as it operated in the LEEUWARDEN area is attached at Appendix A.

#### General

Trunk calls on local telephone lines, telegrams and the official postal services were avoided in principle, although most agents are unanimous in declaring



that there were no signs of any form of censorship of correspondence. Trunk calls were, however, frequently tapped by the Germans, and this means of communication was therefore not utilized. One reason for not using the post when it did function was the delay involved, and the inefficiency of the postal services, which made receipt of a letter by post very uncertain. Dead letter-boxes were not used as most agents regarded them as unsafe. Codes and ciphers were rarely used for internal communications due to the delay entailed and, in most cases, to the limited staff available for cipher work. Routine messages were sent in veiled language by post, and couriers carried messages in clear or in veiled language. They sometimes carried important messages in code or reports in microphotograph form with all names and addresses in the report reproduced in code. In these cases they were ignorant of the details of the messages they carried. Combinations were used for time and place conventions used to arrange a meeting. One method employed by a food controller was to send a veiled language letter by post announcing the place of the meeting, and later on to send a bill of certain expenses in which certain figures would indicate the time of the meeting.



INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

A P P E N D I X I

Introduction

At the time of the occupation, informant was working at the LEEUWARDEN telephone exchange as an instrument mechanic. He never changed his identity or his real papers, and was not bothered by the Germans in view of his profession, which was regarded as essential work. When there was some danger of single men being sent to work in GERMANY, he married to avoid conscription, but afterwards he was quite safe in view of his usefulness in LEEUWARDEN as a technician at the exchange.

Only in the last weeks of the occupation did he run any risk at all, and that was when everybody was being conscripted for trench digging.

He did not take part in resistance work until the beginning of 1943, when a friend introduced him to a clandestine National Committee, branches of which had been set up in every town to unite members of the liberal professions - engineers, technicians, etc. - in resistance against the Germans. The Committee's activities were restricted to helping members of certain professions who, because of Resistance activities, were forced to live underground. Although receiving assistance from LO in the matter of papers and other facilities, the Committee functioned independently, and informant worked with them obtaining papers, funds and accommodation for people in trouble. He also carried on a propaganda campaign among young Dutchmen to dissuade them from complying with the German labour laws. This activity he carried on under the name of POSTMA, and few people outside his circle of intimate friends knew his real name or profession. Only very recently did the NBS Chief of Staff himself discover that POSTMA and BOSMAN were one and the same person.

When special telephone facilities were required in Sep 44, KRAMER the regional chief himself got in touch with informant and recruited him as technical adviser and assistant for communications. Informant also helped in repairing weapons and doing other technical work for the NBS. Clandestine work on telephone lines was performed quite openly by telephone personnel on informant's instructions, and the men did the work without knowing any of the ramifications of the underground system. Once, when informant himself was tampering with certain connections in the exchange, he was surprised by German supervisors and had to go underground for some weeks, as their suspicions had been aroused. Hearing later from colleagues at the exchange that the affair had blown over, he returned to work, explaining his absence by a long illness. There had been some changes in the German supervisory staff at the exchange, and there were no repercussions.

Apart from this incident, informant was never troubled by the Germans and worked actively for resistance without let or hindrance until the liberation.

For guidance on the secret telephone network installed by informant, see diagrams attached.



his contacts in the Town Hall, Food Office and Labour Office informant was more or less in control of the entire administration.

6. Informant's Introduction to N.B.S.

Early in 1944, informant being an ex-Army officer, he decided he would transfer his activities from the civil to the military sphere and passing control of his group to friends, he began to collect information of military value for a small group of friends who were in touch with England by W/T and later in touch with the Albrecht group. These people numbered among them R.V.V. as well as K.P. members and he knew them all as they had previously worked with him.

Informant had previously, in the early days in UTRECHT, been an O.D. officer, but he did not like their programme or their principles. He therefore worked with this small group until September 1944 when a series of arrests began in the region.

The O.D. chief had sent a boy messenger to a prominent woman member of the R.V.V., the boy was arrested, searched and the message he was carrying was found. The R.V.V. woman was arrested as was the O.D. chief and anybody visiting either house was also arrested. The result was confusion in resistance circles in APELDOORN and many casualties. The O.D. chief was shot and many leading R.V.V. and K.P. men were arrested. From that moment O.D. in the region was blacked out and the other groups were quiescent. Some O.D. members, however, said to informant "wait and see the marvellous organisation we shall have after the war". He, however, was still seeking military contacts and some of his friends were helping in the search. Finally one of his friends introduced him to PIET VAN ARNHEM, who stated there was no organised resistance at all on the VELUWE and enlisted informant's help in reorganising resistance in the area. This was very difficult as each group which still existed strongly suspected the others of being penetrated and feared also that indiscretions or imprudence committed by the other groups might incriminate them. PIET VAN ARNHEM, with informant's help, finally succeeded in uniting the different groups in the area and his organisation ultimately became the N.B.S.

7. Informant's Work with PIET VAN ARNHEM.

The organisation built up by informant and PIET VAN ARNHEM was very elastic and there were no watertight compartments. Small groups of men would form themselves into cells and the cell leader would report to informant or PIET VAN ARNHEM. In the main, they were men who had previously worked for informant for L.O. or other resistance movements and they more or less continued to do under PIET VAN ARNHEM what they had done before in their own groups. Thus they would be engaged in all sorts of resistance activities, false papers, sabotage and providing accommodation for escaped pilots and refractaires. Informant himself had little to do with the organisation of the movement after the initial contacts had been made between PIET VAN ARNHEM and the local leaders. He became the officer responsible for collecting information of military value which he passed to his chief. He used many of the men who had worked with him in the past, but recruited others for this particular work, who had been recommended to him. He trained them in military matters himself and explained what type of information he required. In this he was helped by being introduced to a member of the Albrecht Group, who gave him much assistance and advice on how to collect



information and what sort was wanted. If a potential recruit was introduced to him and he was not impressed by the man's manner or qualifications, he did not refuse to use the man but omitted to find him work and did not see him again.

Informant obtained information by having a group in every village responsible to a chief who would collate the intelligence acquired by his group, place it in an envelope marked with a blue cross, but with no name, and send a courier to BEEKBERGEN, where the courier would leave the envelope in the official letter box at the post office. Envelopes were always deposited before 9.30 a.m. Between 9.30 and 10 the official responsible for the post office extracted the letters, put them aside and a courier called at 10 o'clock at the post office and carried the messages away to informant's cottage. By this manner, by 11 o'clock every day informant had in his possession up-to-date military information for the whole region. The couriers who went with the information only knew they were to put the envelopes in the letter box at BEEKBERGEN. The official at the post office only knew the courier who called to collect the envelopes and asked no questions. He had a perfect alibi as he could always say he did not know who left the letters or for whom they were destined. Informant submitted his reports to PIET VAN ARNHEM, who sent the information on to EDE, where it was sent to NIJMEGEN by courier or black telephone or transmitted direct to London by an operator who was working near EDE, called KING and later by another operator - FRANS BECKERS. Informant was not clear about the methods of onward transmission of his intelligence as after handing it to PIET VAN ARNHEM he was no longer responsible.

In the matter of communications, the post office official was very helpful and informant could use the official telephone at the post office in case of emergency. If informant were needed urgently, a contact could call the post office and the official would send a messenger to informant's home. Another service the official rendered was the handling of correspondence addressed to a Mr. VERSTRATEN at a boarding house in BEEKBERGEN, which correspondence was really destined for informant. These letters were set aside for informant and collected by his courier. This man at the post office had never met informant and only received his instructions from the courier, but he was very discreet and never wanted to know what was going on.

#### 8. Enemy C.E.

In October 1944 there were 60,000 evacuees in APELDOORN area with consequent difficulties for the Germans in respect of controlling papers of all kinds, especially temporary passes etc. The job was too much for the Germans and although the Grönepolizei and especially the Fleming and Dutch S.D. were very dangerous still, control of individuals ceased and mass raids and razzias commenced early in 1945. No warning was possible about these raids, the city would be surrounded and all young men driven to the market place. Papers and explanations were disregarded and only men working for the Germans were released. The employers of these men had to come themselves to the spot and vouch for their men. The men arrested were deported to Germany but many afterwards returned, having escaped. Foreign workers were apparently not too rigidly supervised. House to house searches were frequent but although informant's own house was searched, nothing was found as all incriminating material was always buried in a tin box in the garden, and a small fire was always burning in the cottage for the destruction of any papers in the event of a surprise visit.



9. Escapee Pilots.


Although much good work was done by informant's organisation in assisting allied pilots to return to allied lines, informant did not himself take part in these operations. There was no organised escape line but pilots were instructed to try to contact a priest who would pass them on. What usually happened was that a pilot took refuge in a cottage or farm house, and rumours about his arrival quickly spread. All informant's men were acquainted with the procedure laid down by PIET VAN ARNHEM and when any man in the organisation heard of a pilot being harboured somewhere, he would go to the house, take particulars and report to informant, who issued the necessary papers and clothing and informed PIET VAN ARNHEM. The latter arranged for the pilots to be transported on P.T.T. vans or bicycles to other safe houses on a line running from East to West, terminating at a concentration point where batches of refugees were gathered and taken by guides across the Rhine at night to the allied lines. These guides knew the country to be traversed like the back of their hands but all the people concerned in these escapes were unanimous in their condemnation of the pilots' indiscretion and lack of prudence. They frequently endangered the lives of their helpers. Two things which made escapes difficult were the lack of clothing and the lack of medical necessities needed to help wounded pilots. Informant said all the dungarees in the VELUWE must now be in England.

Organisation  
New Hall officials  
Institutions  
Police Section  
Military Police  
Partners contacts  
Distribution section



DIAGRAM ATTACHED TO INTERROGATION OF DR. ERNE G VAN DE WEERD

(paragraph 3 refers).



Quite a different technique was used by the editor and General Manager of HET PAROOL in the NETHERLANDS. His method of selecting recruits was intuitive rather than anything else. After talking to a person for ten minutes he would make up his mind whether or not the person was likely to be suitable. Most of the people he recruited had been recommended in the first place by some friend of his, but sometimes he simply spotted someone and decided that he might be a useful man. Informant did not even bother to check the antecedents or background of new recruits. He worked on feeling and found this very successful. He personally tested all new recruits to the staff and said that they were never penetrated because he could "smell" a German agent without difficulty.

The IAB, after the amalgamation in the autumn of 1944, recruited on a descending scale, that is, the District Commanders recruited the Company Commanders, who in turn recruited Group Leaders and so on. It was usual to check potential recruits' suitability by making a study of their activities throughout the Occupation, but a thorough check was not always possible, especially since during 1944 the area to be covered invariably was



## RECRUITING

Prior to September 1944 most recruits were obtained by personal recommendation, and recruiting was on a friendly basis, a member vouching for the integrity of a potential recruit. In some groups the recommendation itself was considered insufficient and a careful investigation followed, information being obtained from the recruit's circle of friends and acquaintances. This investigation was carried out by the group's Intelligence or Security Section. There was never any serious attempt at creating any particular machinery for recruiting, as in 1943 and 1944 the supply of potential recruits was much greater than the demand.

When recruits were required, some organisers could have recourse to youth movements, students' organisations etc. with whom they had been in touch before the war. Others, who occupied prominent positions in administrations or in the liberal professions, had a wide field for recruiting new members. Dr. "X" is a typical example. He was a prominent member of the Doctors' Underground Committee, formed to resist German repressive measures, and knowing all the doctors in AMSTERDAM and the region, he was in possession of a very long list of useful contacts well-placed to assist him in his work. He never approached any of these contacts himself on business connected with the Resistance, but instructed one or the other of his assistants to visit a contact and recruit him without mentioning Dr. "X"'s name. The person sent to recruit a new member did not even know Dr. "X" himself, and the potential recruit had no idea that his colleague, Dr. "X", had sent someone to recruit him. In this way Dr. "X" succeeded in keeping in the background and becoming known to very few people as an agent working for LONDON, although a number of people knew him as a member of the Doctors' Committee.

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/somebody in the



somebody in the local group, and were often accepted without question.

Some organisations did more recruiting than others. KP did not recruit much until August 1944, and at this time they only had about 500 members in the whole of the NETHERLANDS. On the other hand, OD in the HAGUE alone had several thousand members. In September 1944 the need to swell the ranks of the NBS for forthcoming operations led to a period of hasty and insecure recruiting. Previously great care was taken in recruiting, and full information was obtained of potential recruits, but in September 1944 a flood of people came in to be enrolled, and no check was possible. The possibility of penetration during this period is definitely a thing to be considered. In October security with regard to recruiting was tightened up.



## TRAINING

### Operational Training.

Resistance groups received instruction in the use of Sten, U.S. carbine, rifle, grenade, Bren, Bazooka, German weapons and explosives. Training varied from district to district according to the reception of arms and explosives from ENGLAND. In some areas, where there were few receptions, agents concentrated on stolen German weapons and home-made explosives. In some areas no English weapons and explosives were ever received, and in general training was hampered by the lack of material. In the whole of the UTRECHT region, for instance, there were only 100 Allied weapons.

Weapon training was not entirely necessary as many Resistance members were ex-soldiers or policemen and were familiar with most weapons, but after September 1944, when supplies and instructors were arriving in quantity from ENGLAND, clandestine classes were organised in most groups.

Some instructors gave their students elementary courses in fieldcraft and tactics. Instruction was given by agents sent expressly for the purpose from ENGLAND and by ex-officers and NCOs from the Dutch Army, or by policemen. Many agents had already a good knowledge of explosives, and chemists recruited by the Underground Movement worked clandestinely, making up home-made explosives and instructing the Underground Movement in their use. The English-trained instructors were usually attached to Regional Headquarters, where they trained selected men from the districts, and these men in turn would return to their districts and pass on their knowledge to the various groups under their command. Many instructors, however, went round visiting the districts and trained small groups whenever training was required. Much of this training was purely revision.

In 1944 and 1945 larger classes were arranged in towns, and agents were trained in groups of 20 to 30 at a time in swimming baths, gymnasia, dance halls etc. Small classes were held in shops, private houses, stables or garages. In the country men gathered in farmhouses to receive their training, or alternatively in fields well off the beaten track and with guards posted.

LONDON-trained instructors were in great demand in view of their specialised knowledge, but they ran a certain risk, especially when instructing large groups of men, as they became too well-known. One instructor in ROTTERDAM is said to have personally trained 12,000 men, and when he went out he met people he had instructed every few yards.

Arrangements for training were usually made by a liaison officer who would fix the time and place and bring the students and instructors together. Trainees would be brought to a pre-arranged contact address by girl couriers, and from there conducted by another courier

/to the place



to the place where training was to take place. These places would be used three or four times in succession and then abandoned. Look-outs and guards were usually posted when training was proceeding, and in places like swimming-baths the staff provided special facilities and kept watch.

Material for the training would be taken to the spot every night by selected couriers and sometimes, suitably camouflaged, by trainees themselves in broad daylight. In the country, stores and arms would be left at farmhouses for training purposes.

Most instructors provided themselves with some sort of alibi to cover their activities, but trainees rarely took the trouble.

The following extracts from reports on operational training are of interest:-

- 1) "The numbers attending informant's classes varied from 10 to 40. He thought the numbers were often too large. Three armed sentries would patrol the district during the actual training. Hours of training would vary from 2 to 10 hours a day for one or two days. Informant first visited Zone 3 where he stayed for two days in a safe house. These safe houses were nearly always isolated farms, and informant used his same cover story of helping the local farmer as his own farm was flooded. Here he met and trained the local commanders of the region."
- 2) "Eventually instruction was proceeding at the rate of about 20 to 30 a day under much better conditions. It was arranged that this should take place in a room opening off a large gymnasium hall. About 100 to 150 men would go to the hall for gymnasium, and from these people every half hour they would take 10 or so to a separate room to instruct them in arms. There was a fixed code word for entry. The doors were covered by guards, but gymnastics went on all the time, and the instruction went on in a separate room, which could not be seen from the street."
- 3) "Training was carried out by informant to groups of about 30 at a time. Different places were used for this instruction. On several occasions a room at a swimming-bath was used. Students would go singly to the swimming-bath early in the morning, carrying bathing-suits, and the instruction would go on all day, food being brought in. No look-outs were placed, but the attendant was in their confidence and would have given the alarm had it been necessary. They relied more on their weapons than on security measures for protection. The weapons for training were taken to the swimming-pool by members of the organisation in sacks, with an innocent article such as a broomstick protruding from the top."



### Security Training.

In general no special security training was given to recruits, who were deemed to be reliable and intelligent people who could be trusted to behave sensibly and who should be, in any case, fully alive to the dangers of the work as a result of their having lived under occupation conditions for some time. Indeed, some members laughed at the idea of security training, and most were more interested in para-military operations than in security. This attitude was largely overcome by instructors combining weapon training with security and giving talks on commonsense security principles. Most organisers gave detailed security briefing to their seconds-in-command, with instructions to pass on the principles of security in informal talks with their group leaders.



### P A Y

It was a generally accepted principle in the Underground Movement that only those who were working full-time in Resistance, and therefore had no other means of livelihood, should be paid. Occasional workers would be paid expenses and any members who were out-of-pocket through taking part in active resistance work could count on reimbursement. A courier, for instance, who incurred travelling expenses, would be paid about 200 guilders a month.

The Underground Movement was never short of funds, and had several sources of supply, namely the NSF (Dutch Welfare Organisation), the Underground Press, taxes levied on known Black Marketeers and bank robberies. Payment was more often than not made in kind, for it was impossible to buy food, cigarettes, bicycle tyres, shoes, clothing, fuel or tea, and gifts of one or the other of these commodities would be made in lieu of cash. The NSF, with Headquarters in AMSTERDAM, controlled all the underground finances and made a monthly allotment to each of the 14 regions. The UTRECHT region, for instance, received approximately 30,000 guilders a month. The commanders of each of the three component groups of the NBS, that is, KP, RVV and OD, stated each month what money they would require, and lists were sent to the district commander of the NBS, who received the money for distribution from NSF, whose contact with NBS was usually the local LO agent. The money was handed in cash to the group leaders, who passed it down through their cells by personal contact.

In KP an unmarried man would receive 125 - 150 guilders a month, and this amount might go up to 250 or 300 guilders according to the man's dependants. Payment was never organised in a methodical way, but was done according to the merits of the individual case, those receiving payment for their regular jobs not needing to be paid by the Underground organisation. Financial difficulties were very rarely experienced in any of the groups.

Care of dependants was done by NSF in close co-operation with LO agents in the district, and local groups looked after the families of married men who had been arrested or killed until such time as NSF or LO could cope with the matter.

NSF funds were derived from voluntary contributions. Many members of NSF were bankers, big business men, accountants etc. The Underground Press was able to contribute considerable sums to Resistance coffers. In the case of HET PAROOL, for instance, finances were provided by the sale of the paper. Each person who took the paper paid a subscription of 2½ guilders a month. This was not really enough to pay all the necessary salaries and other expenses of the movement, but there were also some wealthy supporters of the paper who would be able to pay special subscriptions of as much as 2,000 guilders a month. Another source of income was the large-scale Black Marketeer making huge profits, who was blackmailed and offered



protection in true gangster style in return for his cash contribution to Resistance funds. Finally, when cash was required urgently, KP could usually provide a small-scale raiding party who would raid a bank or a post-office and make off with useful sums of money. In September 1944 one KP group raided a post-office in the ROTTERDAM area and obtained  $1\frac{1}{2}$  million guilders.

As commodities were as important as money for Resistance purposes, the Underground had a special section to deal with the Black Market. This section sent out patrols during the night to the farms which dealt with the Black Market, and they once obtained 23 tons of sugar and 16 tons of potatoes. Resistance members obtained their own bicycles, either by buying them on the Black Market, stealing them from the Germans, or borrowing them from friends. Everybody could get food through the organisation. Food was obtained from Black Market sources. Many farmers, however, contributed willingly, and many of them were members of reception committee groups. In each town there was a special food section known as CVD, which stored and distributed clandestine stocks of food. Wehrmacht stores were also frequently raided by KP groups.



## P R E M I S E S

### SAFE HOUSES.

These were necessary to accommodate agents arriving from England and refractaires forced to live illegally. They were rarely used for any length of time and the proprietor or tenant was usually a member of a group or on the list of sympathisers rendering occasional services.

A newly arrived agent from England was normally housed in a farm or farm labourer's cottage near the dropping point or in a house in or close by the nearest village. The local schoolmaster or priest would usually be of assistance in this respect. Frequently barges or houseboats would be used.

After spending a few days near the dropping point, the agent would journey to the town where he was to make his first contact, and here he would go to a second safe house. This second safe house was often some sort of local headquarters or rendezvous point with much coming and going and too much incriminating material on the premises. In this respect security was bad and often had an adverse effect on the morale of the agent trained in security principles in this country. The curiosity of local men, who visited the safe house merely to see the new arrival, was a constant source of danger.

Refractaires from German labour laws usually stayed in the homes of friends, changing their residence as often as possible, but, when things became too hot for them and their friends were unwilling to house them, L.O.'s Special Section would find them accommodation.

L.O. had useful contacts with estate agents and billeting authorities and could find billets with legal cover. One organisation in the APELDOORN area, working independently of L.O., was very active in housing students who were living illegally, having refused to be conscripted. This organisation had a section to whom parents came for assistance when their sons had fallen foul of the labour laws. In and around APELDOORN there are a number of small summer-houses which the group took over, and there the boys were billeted, under close supervision, until other accommodation could be found or situations obtained for them.

### LIVING ACCOMMODATION.

Indigenous agents, living quite openly and working legally under their real names, lived with their families in their own homes or with friends. Some, as in the case of ex-Army officers who had omitted to register their particulars, were, however, obliged to make certain small adjustments on their papers and remove all mention of their Army status. Many of these agents lived quite securely in their own homes throughout the Occupation, their only precaution being to keep all incriminating material elsewhere.

Agents from England and indigenous agents living illegally had the same facilities as the refractaires, and



through their group or organisation applied to L.O., who obtained accommodation for them. In many cases this was unnecessary as most agents had friends or contacts who were willing to take the risk of housing them in their own homes.

#### HEADQUARTERS AND OFFICE ACCOMMODATION.

##### In Towns.

In towns a variety of premises were used, including private houses, flats, churches, business premises, shops etc. In UTRECHT, as in other towns, about 20 addresses were used as headquarters, but not more than three, or at the most four, people lived in the same house at the same time.

Some organisations had a special engineering section which was in charge of securing the houses. They always went to view them first to see what were the prospects of hiding compromising materials etc. They invariably had a cover story for taking over a house - e.g. one was that they had been bombed out of ARNHEM - and, armed with false papers to verify their statements, they nearly always succeeded in their object.

Furnished or unfurnished flats or houses were afterwards rented for the organisation by quite innocent people like doctors, dentists or clergymen, and then handed over to the person needing accommodation, a suitable cover story being arranged for the use of both tenant and occupant.

In THE HAGUE, the organisation controlling the issue of "Je Maintiendrai" first duplicated the newspaper in the Peace Palace, where there were the necessary facilities and to which the organisation had access through a woman who held an official position which enabled her to place keys at their disposal. The Peace Palace was looked upon as an international building, and the Germans always respected this. There was never any question of their having access to it. From the Peace Palace copies of the paper were transported to a grocery warehouse from which they were sent out to the distributors.

One organisation in UTRECHT had a small office which was one room in a factory making tools and instruments for the Germans. The manager of the factory was the organiser's friend and allotted him this room but accepted no responsibility if the police raided the factory and discovered what was going on. If the police called at the factory the manager would inform them that he had in fact allotted this room to his friend but he had no idea on what work his friend was engaged.

The group producing false papers in UTRECHT used as headquarters a small printing factory. The firm was engaged in dye-setting, photogravure and engraving. The total personnel employed was five people, whose functions were manager, photographer and three labourers. Prior to September 1944 the firm was working quite legally and openly for industrial concerns in UTRECHT and in the region of UTRECHT, and was also producing letter-heads and various types of permit for the Wehrmacht. The clandestine work was carried out after the ordinary day's work had finished. Some or all of the staff worked every evening to supply the resistance with all types of identity cards, permits etc. Finished products were immediately removed in order that as little compromising material as possible might be left on the premises.