

### Conditions prior to Sep 44

Until Apr 44 the telephone service was quite normal and was used extensively by underground workers employing veiled language in their conversations. In April 44 the Germans withdrew the telephone service from all general subscribers and restricted its use to certain people working in the administration, in medicine, food distribution, etc., and collaborators. A modified system of the black telephone came into operation as a result of these restrictions, and continued until Sep 44. This was done in connivance with Dutch operators who still retained their positions, working under German supervision, at the telephone exchange. These operators re-connected secretly to the exchange certain extensions whose numbers were known only to the operators themselves and certain subscribers. A black telephone subscriber wishing to ring another person on the circuit would dial the operator, ask for a secret number, and the operator would connect him. In case of need, the operator could disconnect these lines at will.

It is worthy of note that the German telephone personnel supervising the Dutch in the telephone exchange were fully qualified engineers and fully acquainted with the system, which was of German origin and manufacture. In spite of this, and in view of the large number of subscribers and the complex automatic telephone network covering LEEUWARDEN and half a dozen sub-exchanges which already existed, it would have taken the Germans almost a year to check every line which had previously functioned and those which were working at the time. The services of Dutch personnel were retained right up to the liberation, and without their help and co-operation the black telephone system would have been impossible.

### Installation of the black telephone network.

In Sep 44 power for telephone lines was made inaccessible by the Germans to everybody except the German authorities and collaborators. Therefore a complete black telephone system had to be installed.

### Internal (LEEUWARDEN)

The system installed by informant in Sep 44 was only available to half a dozen leading personalities in resistance - namely, KRAMER the chief and his staff officers. In the homes of these leading personalities the automatic telephone which had been used under normal conditions was replaced by the old-fashioned battery power crank telephone. The formerly authorized lines to the exchange still existed, and these half-dozen black lines were connected to the same terminal at the exchange, thus creating a party line (telephone ring). In this way, a conversation between two members of the ring could also be listened to by the others. Each user was assigned a special call signal such as two short rings, three short rings, or one long and one short ring, and by using the crank-operated bell he could call any other person in the ring. In case of emergency, the apparatus could be quickly disconnected and hidden.

### External

In LEEUWARDEN, as in many other towns (UTRECHT, ZWOLLE, etc.), existed a clandestine telephone exchange

still secretly connected to the automatic system going through the official exchange. The internal black telephone ring was connected to the operator at the black exchange by one member of the ring knowing the secret (automatic) number of the black exchange. A counterpart of this system in LEEUWARDEN existed in ZWOLLE. Although the direct line to ZWOLLE had been disconnected by the Germans, informant had arranged for a secret connection to be made at HEERENVEEN. This was possible because the lines from LEEUWARDEN to HEERENVEEN and HEERENVEEN to ZWOLLE were still functioning. When a person at LEEUWARDEN wished to ring up a person in ZWOLLE he called the black operator in LEEUWARDEN through the internal ring system, and the operator then called his counterpart in ZWOLLE by automatic telephone, and the latter made the necessary connection in ZWOLLE. Calls from ZWOLLE to LEEUWARDEN operated in the same manner.

#### Installation of Microphones in SD Commandant's Office.

Some days before the SD took over the building which is now NBS headquarters in LEEUWARDEN, news of the arrival of the SD commandant reached informant and his colleagues in the telephone exchange. They first considered the possibility of placing explosive charges in the building and thus liquidating the new occupants. This idea they later discarded, and decided to install one microphone in the SD commandant's personal telephone and two more in adjoining rooms. He succeeded in doing this while the SD were already in the building and under the noses of the Germans working there. The telephone authorities had received orders from the Germans to make certain adjustments in the telephone system at SD headquarters, and informant himself came to carry out the work. He was thus enabled to carry out his intention while performing his legitimate duties as a representative of the telephone exchange, and while the Germans were present in the rooms he installed microphones in three telephones. Informant's task was facilitated by the fact that the cables leading from the exchange to the three telephones in question contained spare lines which were not at the time being utilised. At the exchange these spare lines were tapped and new lines laid from the exchange to a bookshop in the town which served as a listening post.


A direct line also existed, passing through the exchange from the office of the Judge Advocate of the LEEUWARDEN Military Court to that of the SD commandant. This line was tapped at the exchange and another diversion made to the bookshop.

This listening post began to function on 4 Mar 45 and until the liberation all conversations passing on the lines were recorded, translated and passed in report form daily to KRAMER, the NBS chief. In this way the NBS knew in advance all details regarding impending razzias, arrests, condemnations, etc., and were able to issue warnings to the people concerned, not only in LEEUWARDEN but also in other regions.

Informant said he would endeavour to obtain extracts from these daily reports, and promised to forward them when available.


INTERNAL BLACK TELEPHONE SYSTEM

LEEWARDEN



MICROPHONE SET-UP

LEEWARDEN



## EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

Ninety per cent., if not more, of external communications was maintained by wireless transmission. Other methods were used but were relatively unimportant.

Innocent Letter seems to have been used very infrequently: some agents confessed to having forgotten their conventions, whilst others admitted having overlooked the possibility of using this method of communication. There was also a feeling that the strict censorship of foreign mail made this form of communication impracticable. In any case, postal facilities ceased to exist for the general public a long time before Holland was liberated. One agent, working through Holland into Germany, used Innocent Letters utilising Playfair conventions. Postcards reached London via Switzerland and Sweden, in which countries he had been given addresses before leaving London, and they took about a month or three weeks to arrive. He never had a reply, but he learned subsequently from his Country Section that they had reached their destination. The messages were about 30 letters in length, and in order to post them in Germany it was necessary to produce all his papers at the Post Office. As his identity in Germany was "legal" the production of a sheaf of documents enabled him to post his mail. Another agent sent Innocent Letters into Sweden but never discovered if they arrived in London.

Pigeons were rarely used owing to the difficulty of housing them, and, although London often promised to despatch consignments of carrier pigeons to the Field, the promised consignments did not arrive. An agent in the ROTTERDAM area sent some messages by pigeon but he never heard if they reached England. Altogether he sent away about 20 pigeons carrying microphotographs. On one occasion he sent 10 pigeons, each carrying the same picture of the defences of the North Sea coast of Holland.

Some information was smuggled in and out of the country by courier lines working through Belgium and France into Switzerland, and after D-Day in France by infiltrating and exfiltrating agents through the battle-fronts. Information smuggled through in this way was normally in the form of microphotographs sewn into the lining of the agents' coats. The editor of the underground press in THE HAGUE had a line of communication with Switzerland which ran from Paris. Couriers carrying false German papers would travel by train to Paris and there get in touch with a former K.L.M. colleague of the editor who was able to send them on by train to within 40 km. of the Swiss frontier, which they crossed on foot. Some agents with wives and families in Belgium or France had permits to pass backwards and forwards between the two countries and were thus able to pass communications through contacts in France and Belgium to England.

Other means of external communication were never actively sought after, for it was always possible in the underground movement to link up with W/T operators almost anywhere. Even when they had no direct communication with England, the groups knew that constant radio contact was maintained and knew how to get messages passed to a W/T operator if it was required to send a message to England. When a group did want to get in touch with England, they simply wrote out the message en clair and handed it to a contact who was in touch with the W/T operator. Replies would frequently be passed back to them on the black telephone.

### WIRELESS TRANSMISSION.

Some aspects of the W/T operator's difficulties in the matter of W/T sites have already been dealt with under "PREMISES". The question of guards and D/F-ing will now be discussed.

In general, the same precautions as in use elsewhere were practised in Holland, namely frequent changes of site, duration of sked reduced to a minimum, body-guard or team of watchers, spare sets installed for use at site, and transport of set and accessories effected when necessary by couriers.

In view of the fact that many operators were nervous of D/F-ing, a guard armed with Sten or pistol would often stay in the room during the sked. There was usually some one on the watch outside the house during transmission, generally patrolling on a bicycle and with some one in the house looking out of the window for a signal in case of danger. In spite of these precautions, and in spite of being on the air only for 20 minutes or half an hour for each sked, operators were frequently D/F-ed in a very short time. It was not always possible, however, to obtain a sufficient number of people to form a team, and operators were often obliged to rely on their own personal couriers for protection. In these cases the couriers would leave the premises and wander about outside. On the arrival of anything suspicious, the courier would re-enter the premises at once with a key and would warn the operator, who usually had a hiding-place for his set. In country districts the operator would often be assisted by only one person, and he and his body-guard would frequently live together in the same house. Sets would always be transported by girl couriers, who were invaluable in this respect. If caught, they would merely say that they did not know what they were carrying.

It was an accepted principle of underground life that reports should be circulated immediately on any suspicious activity on the part of the Germans, such as a concentration of vehicles or anything which might possibly have some connection with D/F-ing. By means of this intelligence service operators were warned immediately there was any danger.

Enemy D/F-ing activity varied from place to place. In the early days of the occupation, and even up to the end of 1943, it was comparatively rare, but in 1944 it grew in intensity and reached its peak in early 1945. Activity in THE HAGUE and AMSTERDAM in 1944 and 1945 was intense, whereas in ROTTERDAM, even in 1945, only six to eight cars were operating. In the country districts, notably in the OVERIJSSSEL, there was little, if any, activity. In the autumn of 1944 there were only about 12 D/F cars in North and South Holland and the UTRECHT area, but this area was very efficiently covered by them.

The cars were often Wehrmacht cars or civilian armoured vehicles camouflaged as ambulances or laundry-vans. The cars' number-plates were changed almost daily. The cars were always petrol-driven and worked in two's and three's, frequently drawing a characteristic trailer behind them. Inevitably, both cars and drivers became known to the underground intelligence service who reported changes in number-plates or other details to the appropriate quarter immediately. In this way their presence in any locality was immediately notified, and they were not much feared, provided the operator worked with a body-guard and had a place where he could quickly hide his set and material.

Another form of D/F activity was the portable apparatus carried about by Luftwaffe personnel, who could be seen wandering in the streets with earphones and suspicious-looking suitcases.

In general, there was no serious D/F-ing before December 1944, but when the Germans first began on a big scale they caught quite a lot of operators napping.

The following extract on D/F-ing is of interest:

"The agent had considerable difficulty in achieving a state of security from the point of view of safe houses, as these were difficult to obtain. He was transmitting from the same place for days at a time without changing the address and at one time was transmitting for 4 months (September to December, 1944) from the Belgian Legation. However, as far as possible he did move about, although this was always very much limited by the lack of accommodation. Partly as a result of this and partly because he found home station tended to prolong the skeds unduly he was D/F-ed on three occasions that he knows of. The first time (in September, 1944) was while he was working in the Belgian Legation and a D/F car was observed in the vicinity by some one looking from the window. He stopped transmitting and that was the end of that. On the second occasion (in December, 1944) he was still in the Belgian Legation and a D/F car stopped at the end of the street. A Dutch policeman was going into each house along the street and he decided that to stop would have betrayed to the listener in the car the fact that the man was entering the house where the set was, so he continued to transmit and as he was in a completely concealed place he was not found. About half an hour later, when he had finished his sked and gone, five Germans in civilian clothes came and searched the house and spent about an hour doing so, including a visit to the roof where they found several pre-war serials, but not the agent's own, which was concealed in the same place as the set.

"About a fortnight later, the agent was sending from another house in a street of 5 houses. He had been using the same signal plan for nearly five months, but this was the first time he had used the house. About ten minutes after he came on the air the immediate vicinity was surrounded by 5 D/F cars and 75 Grünepolizei. They began to search the 5 houses from the other end of the street and they went about it very thoroughly indeed, practically pulling the first four houses to pieces. The agent had only time to hide his set under some coal. The search began at about ten past 11 in the morning, and at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon the agent took his hat and coat and went out. One of the policemen asked him where he was going, and he said he was going to work and was allowed to continue. Although they searched the ground floor of the house where the agent was, for some reason they did not go upstairs and so the set was not found and the next day the organisation was able to move it elsewhere. The agent stopped transmitting on the signal plan because he knew that a new one was on the way and he was able to start the new plan about five days later. He was never again D/F-ed as far as he knows.

"At one time the agent tried to use guards outside the house from which he was transmitting, but he found that these people were constantly interrupting his skeds with false alarms about slow-moving cars and so he abandoned this method and merely used a guard in the house, looking out of the window."

### Coding.

In general, organisers did the coding themselves, using their own conventions, or they entrusted this work to reliable girl couriers. The operator used his conventions only for personal messages. Messages, therefore, arrived and left the W/T operator in cipher and he was thus ignorant of their contents. O.T.P. cipher was used and was quite satisfactory. Some agents burnt all copies of messages immediately after despatch or receipt and had no difficulty in referring back to previous messages as they had memorised the contents. Others kept copies long enough for a repetition to be provided if required. Copies were kept from five to fourteen days and then destroyed, but in most cases some precautions were taken against a sudden search, and if possible a fire would be available to burn both message and code. One agent always had an incendiary bomb handy when decoding or encoding. In a few cases, where a really secure hiding place could be found, all copies of messages were kept.

### Inter-Communication.

Organisers kept in touch with their operators by means of a courier service, by legal or illegal telephone, or by each visiting a contact address known to both. A courier would bring the organiser's already-enciphered messages to a contact address and the operator's personal courier or body-guard would collect them and leave at the address any incoming messages, also in cipher. Some organisers lived in the same house or flat as their operators, or, when this was not so, visited their operators quite openly.

### General.

In most parts of Holland, there was no electricity in flats or private houses after September 1944, and even before that current was not always available. Batteries were, therefore, used and some difficulty was experienced in getting them re-charged. Establishments still using electricity, such as hospitals, breweries, bakeries etc., were contacted, and with their help batteries were re-charged. Girl couriers carried the sets and batteries from place to place - but always suitably camouflaged, as the operational suitcase was well-known to the Germans. Later, pedal generators were dropped, but in many cases they arrived too late to be of assistance.

The following is an extract from a report received from an organiser in AMSTERDAM:

"There was no current in AMSTERDAM after October except in hospitals and certain big buildings. The batteries were charged with steam generators, bicycle generators or from hospitals. It was dangerous, though, to tap electricity mains as this could be detected. However, they had special contacts with the electricity company. They applied for generators from England in October and did not get them until March. Three generators were sent but they were too heavy and were smashed on landing. The most suitable accumulator sent out was a British accumulator that had stamped on it "Not to be dropped", and this always arrived in the best condition. They had to buy one-tenth of their accumulators before these began to arrive from England. It was very difficult to buy them on the spot. Some were stolen from the Germans and some from telephone offices. Operators often pointed out that the technical side of their work was far



more difficult than the security side. Certain operators stated that skeds fixed for transmission after 5 or 6 o'clock in the evening were inconvenient, especially in winter, owing to the difficult conditions under which they worked. It was suggested that the best time for skeds would have been between 3 a.m. and 4 p.m."

#### T.D. System.

In the autumn of 1944, when the Germans began to intensify their D/F-ing activity, certain operators asked England for suggestions and were told to go out into the country. This, in the opinion of the operators, was one of the worst things to do, as a D/F-ing car would find the area where they were operating and then the police would throw a cordon round and there would be no chance for the operator as there would be so few houses in the area to be searched. On the other hand, in the town the D/F-ing cars would only track the operator down to a block of flats and it would take the police so long to search everyone that the operator would have plenty of time to conceal his set.

As an answer to D/F-ing, the T.D. system was introduced. They built up their own telephone exchange to which each W/T set was connected. This enabled an operator to sit in a room and tap out a message which would actually go out on a set situated some distance away. The set was tuned by somebody on the spot. These secret lines were connected partly by P.T.T. experts and partly by the electricity company, neither knowing exactly what the other was doing. Where there were existing telephone lines these were used, but diverted so as not to go through the central exchange. Sometimes new cables had to be laid and, as most of the lines had been disconnected, some had to be reconnected. This special secret telephone exchange was used in the AMSTERDAM area instead of the ordinary underground exchange, as they expected the latter might be blown and they did not want to be without communications. With the T.D. system it was possible for each set in a different part of the city to work in rotation for, say, five minutes. This completely foxed the German D/F-ing cars.

A full report on the T.D. system is attached.

### T.D. IN HOLLAND

In Holland it was found that in many cases it was not possible for a W/T operator to work in the country. The country is so densely populated that it is almost impossible for an operator to work or live in the country without getting known. People began to talk - probably with no wrong intention - but in the end it would reach the ears of an informer. Travelling was also very difficult, and couriers making regular journeys to and from the operator and his chief found it harder and harder to find suitable cover for these journeys. For these reasons many operators were forced to work in towns. Here an operator was able to work quite successfully until the end of 1944, when the Germans improved their methods of D/F-ing to such an extent that it was considered unsafe to be on the air for more than 10 minutes. At the same time the traffic increased daily and, although there was a sufficient number of houses from which an operator could transmit, it was found impossible to pass all the traffic during the short time an operator could be on the air, even if he worked two or three times a day. The danger from D/F-ing was overcome by having an efficient protection service which was able to give danger signals to the operator well in time to prevent the risk of arrest, but 10 minutes per sked was too short a time, and the traffic to be sent began piling up more and more.

To meet this difficulty the following system, called the Transmission Dispersal System, was used:

Several transmitters were ready to go on the air at the same time from different places with the keys substituted by relays which were worked from one central point. These transmitters were tuned by people specially trained in this work who were in constant telephonic communication with the W/T operator at the central point during each sked. The T.D. operators would be at their posts half an hour before sked time and would then ring up the W/T operator for their instructions. The W/T operator would work out his sked beforehand, deciding on which frequencies, for how long and from which T.D. points he would transmit. Each T.D. operator was supplied with a number of crystals and, according to the instructions he received from the W/T operator, would tune up his set. Five T.D. stations were prepared, and these would be tuned as follows:


Stations A. and B.	to Frequency 1.
" C. and D.	" " 2.
Station E.	" " 3.

Station A. was as far as possible from Station B. and Station C. was as far as possible from Station D. At sked time the W/T operator from the central point would begin his transmission, using Frequency 1. from Station A. After about 5 minutes he would switch over to Station B., using the same frequency. A few minutes later he would switch over to Station C., using Frequency 2., followed by Station D., also on Frequency 2. In the meantime, Stations A. and B. would retune their sets to Frequency 4. The W/T operator at the central point, after having worked for 10 to 15 minutes on Frequency 2. - one half of the time from Station C. and the other half from Station D. - would switch back to Station A. and continue transmitting on Frequency 4. Station E., tuned to Frequency 3., would be kept in reserve. In this way the traffic was being sent without interruption but from a different part of the town every five minutes, with a change of frequency every 10 minutes. Thus a sked of, say, 40 minutes could be worked with very little danger from D/F-ing.

Only one set of wires was laid on to the T.D. stations and these had to be used both for telephoning to and from the central point and for taking the relay. For this reason a private, five-line exchange had to be installed. If the wires had passed through the ordinary exchange, the A.C. current passing through when being used for relay would have caused great interference. Having tuned up their sets, the T.D. operators would listen in on the telephone and, as soon as they heard the loud hum denoting that the relay had been switched on to their particular set, they immediately switched the connection over to "Send". They would go on listening until they heard the hum cease, when they knew their set was no longer being used. According to arrangements previously made, the T.D. operator would then retune his set to a new frequency and listen once again for the sign that his set was again on the air.

There was a broadcast receiver working at the central point which was tuned in to the frequency on which the W/T operator was sending. Thus the operator would listen in to his own traffic which was being transmitted from the T.D. station, and in this way he could be sure, when changing from one station to another, both working on the same frequency, that the T.D. operator had not omitted to switch his set on. He could also check his own keying. The various T.D. addresses were guarded as normal W/T addresses, but, as the time worked from each address was very short, the T.D. operators who had to tune the sets were not exposed to much danger. In order to speed up traffic as much as possible, a second broadcast receiver was also fitted up at the central point and this was tuned up to Home Station, so that the latter could "break in" at any time during transmissions.

The technical side of T.D. was not very complicated. At the central point a power-pack of a 3/II set was used and from it was tapped 90 v. A.C. which was passed over the telephone line to the relay point together with a normal telephone apparatus. At the relay point the inductor coil of the relay was connected parallel to the telephone on the line. This line was, therefore, used for normal telephone conversations as well as for the relay.



## SECURITY PRECAUTIONS, ENEMY C.E. & CASUALTIES.

### Security Precautions

Some idea will already have been gained regarding the various security measures adopted by the Underground Movement and made necessary by German C.E. activities. In the early days of the occupation and during the early struggles of the Resistance Movement, security was almost negligible, and most groups, although taking common-sense precautions, had no knowledge of the most elementary rules of security. Few groups, if any, had at any time during the occupation any definite rules which were observed by all members, but agents gradually became security-minded, the process being assisted and accelerated by the knowledge of casualties sustained in movements where few precautions were taken, and also by personal experience of narrow escapes.

There came into existence, therefore, a list of "do's" and "don't's" for the underground worker, principles being generally accepted and practised by most agents. Agents would try to be discreet and know as few people as possible, and then only by their field names. Real names were avoided and addresses as far as possible kept secret. Couriers were, of course, always in possession of a number of addresses, but it was forbidden to carry lists of names or addresses or, in fact, any incriminating material at all unless absolutely necessary. Agents were not expected to carry arms if this could be avoided. Individual agents were not given information more than was necessary for the efficient handling of their immediate task, and were not expected to find things out which did not concern them. The agents became expert in the use of cover stories and alibis. Precautions used in connection with premises have already been discussed, but one rule which was generally followed for meetings was to reduce the number of people convened to a minimum and to take care in arriving and leaving the meeting place on account of possible surveillance. Punctuality was always stressed for personal meetings.

Agents usually had a hideout somewhere where they could retire in comparative safety, and whose whereabouts was known only to a few people. Visits to agents' homes were discouraged, and hiding-places and means of quick get-away in case of trouble were always considered when premises were chosen. An attempt was made to keep the groups as small as possible, and recruits had to be vouched for before being accepted. Some groups had a small security section, numbering about a dozen men, who made it their job to keep watch over enemy activities, and who were responsible for the security of the organisation. These men acquired intelligence which would be useful in the self-preservation of resistance members. For this purpose a number of them were installed in various police, SD and Gestapo offices, and in this way the Underground was always warned in advance of impending raids, controls, arrests etc.

Also there was a general warning system whereby members passed on any information relating to casualties of any sort which were the result of any form of enemy activity, and because of this grape-vine system the Underground workers usually contrived to be just one jump ahead of the enemy police.

One very definite rule which was observed by everybody was that in case of arrest, the person taken by the police would endeavour to keep silent for at least 48 hours, and thus give his colleagues time to make their own get-away, or if possible make arrangements for the release of the arrested person.

#### Enemy C.E.

##### Controls.

Snap controls carried out by one or the other of the enemy C.E. bodies already mentioned, often assisted by the Dutch Police or Landwacht, were frequently encountered in the cities. If the control was effected by Dutch Police alone, irregularities were often overlooked, but if German or NSB police were present this was not likely. There was no point in trying to avoid the controls as they were to be found everywhere, on bridges, main streets, road crossings, stations and on trains. One had no idea where they were likely to take place. The towns were patrolled by policemen on foot and in cars, but less of them in the centre of the town than in the outskirts. The personnel employed sometimes worked in civilian clothes but usually there would be a uniformed soldier or SD man working with them. The controls operated mainly for obtaining forced labour for GERMANY. Papers, even if in order, were often disregarded, and people arrested and deported for no reason at all. A lot depended on the individual who effected the control.

Body searches were not thorough, weapons and W/T sets being objects which most interested the Germans. Certain people would be picked out for a thorough search and completely stripped. Anybody carrying arms was likely to be shot immediately.

Controls in the trains were frequent. Sometimes they would pick out one person in each compartment and go over his papers very thoroughly, but sometimes they would just pass along the carriages glancing at the papers of everyone in each compartment, and take no further action.

Controls differed widely, some being dangerously efficient, others being merely routine verifications of papers, which were often only subjected to cursory examination. Some agents spent months in the field without ever being controlled at all, and outside the towns few controls were ever encountered except at strategic points on main roads or near Wehrmacht camps or barracks.

The following incidents illustrate different types of controls encountered:-

- 1) Once, when returning from a dropping operation carrying compromising material in the form of a piece of silk and a pistol concealed in a basket of onions, they had to pass through a control. This was about 8 a.m. and when the Germans stopped them and asked them for their papers they were suspicious, and asked why they were so dirty. They merely replied that they had been collecting onions and were allowed to pass.
- 2) On another occasion, when travelling by car from the HAGUE to ROTTERDAM together with certain high officials in the Underground Movement on their way to see the head of Resistance for all HOLLAND, they were stopped by a control which happened to include the chief of the Gestapo in the HAGUE. They were immediately told to alight from the car, and were separated and interrogated in turn for about half-an-hour, being asked who they were, what they were doing and how they all came to be together in a car. They had fortunately prepared a cover story for just such an emergency, and it was that they had all separately asked for a lift. After half-an-hour's questioning they were permitted to pass on, but not before the driver had received a warning about giving strange people lifts, being told that had one of the passengers been revealed as a terrorist, the whole lot of them would have been shot.
- 3) Informant was several times controlled, sometimes while carrying illegal papers. She always carried such papers tied round her waist, and since she was never made to strip, these were never discovered. Once or twice controls were very thorough indeed and the police felt all her pockets and examined her papers very carefully, holding them up to the light and studying the signature and watermark. She always carried a forged identity card for a non-Jewish person. At first she was nervous that her appearance might betray her Jewish origin, but although during such controls the police were particularly on the look-out for Jews, she was never suspected.

#### Razzias

In the later stages of the occupation there were thousands of evacuees in the cities, with consequent difficulties for the Germans in respect of controlling papers of all kinds, especially temporary passes. The job was too much for the Germans, and although the Grunpolizei and especially the Fleming and Dutch SD were still very dangerous, control of individuals ceased and mass raids and razzias commenced in late 1944 and early 1945. No warning with regard to these raids was possible. The city would be surrounded and all young men driven to the market place. Papers and explanations were disregarded, and only men working for the Germans were released. The employers of these men had to come themselves to the spot and vouch for their employees. The men arrested were deported to GERMANY, but many afterwards returned, having escaped. Foreign workers were apparently not too rigidly supervised.

If a suspect was taken in a razzia and removed to Police Headquarters he would be stripped, thoroughly searched, and interrogated. The raids were usually made by Dutch Police supervised and controlled by SD and Grunpolizei.

#### House Searches

House-to-house searches were frequent. Sometimes whole streets of houses were blocked and cordoned off, and frequently the Germans would without warning surround and search a building which they had under supervision. People whose papers were not in order would be sent to GERMANY. Houses would often be selected at random on the pretext that some proof existed of the occupants' illegal activities, and the house would be subjected to a very thorough search. Most of these house searches were the result of W/T activity in the area.

#### Informers and Street Watchers.

The Germans made use of Dutch informers up to September 1944, but afterwards no Dutchmen would work for them in view of the then certain victory of the Allies. Most informers were NSB members, and were known by sight to the Underground workers. They were often employed as street watchers to report anything suspicious that they noticed. They were also used to listen to conversations in trains or trams and in all public places. Many were used to watch certain houses and follow the people who came out. These informers counted among them many women and former Underground workers who had been turned by the Germans. They were used everywhere in official positions, in the Police, and generally in places where their work would permit them to overhear conversations and observe any unusual behaviour.

They were to be found among the peasants and farmers as well as in the towns. Quite a number of policemen were acting as informers because of their NSB tendencies, and members of the Landwacht kept their eyes open and were always ready to denounce people to the Gestapo. One instant of a peasant's activities is the case of a man living near DEURNE who was well-known by everybody as a man who had denounced to the Germans certain people who had looked after British airmen and removed parachute silk for their own use. He had threatened to denounce others, but having mentioned his opinions to an acquaintance who happened to be a member of the organisation, he was subsequently liquidated.

#### Surveillance

Plain-clothes men of the NSB, Landwacht, SD or even Dutch Police were used for this work, but were apparently badly trained and not particularly effective. Few agents report cases of being followed, although certain arrests were made as a result of this form of C.E. activity. One agent reports that followers often picked him up outside his house or office, and when he knew that he was followed he would give up any subversive work he had planned for that day. The agent does not think more than two people were ever employed to follow him and he was always able to pick

them out, and even came to recognise them when he saw them again. The methods employed by followers rendered them rather conspicuous. For example, one man would stand on a street corner watching a building for a long time, and another man would come up to him and ask him for a light for his cigarette. The first man would then go away and his place would be taken by the newcomer. It was not difficult to shake them off once having noticed that followers were on the trail.

The hide-out of a Resistance chief in ROTTERDAM was once discovered through a plain-clothes policeman following a girl courier who went to the house with a message straight from the correspondence address, where she had been picked up by watchers.

#### Agents provocateurs

Agents provocateurs were used extensively. They went round offering people arms and false papers and arrested those who accepted their offer. A favourite trick was to cycle beside girls and engage them in conversation in connection with Underground work. More than one unwary courier has been arrested as a result of indiscreet conversation. The Germans frequently used Dutch Jews for this work, and in UTRECHT one young Jew was notorious for his A.P. activities. He had been taken under the protection of the German Commandant who, like many of the SD men, was known to be a homosexual. This young Jew acted as A.P., informer and spy for the Germans.

#### Impersonation

Very few cases of impersonation were known, but this was a method used by many enemy C.E. personnel to trap the unwary. A German agent closely resembling a prominent Underground worker and on a bogus mission would arrive in a town and try to make contact with the Resistance Movement. The method sometimes succeeded and resulted in a number of arrests. The following case was possibly a German attempt at impersonation: A farmer who was harbouring refractaires received a visit from two men, one of whom stated he was VAN KLEFFENS, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The other man gave only the name JAN. They requested introduction to Resistance leaders, and a woman from UTRECHT introduced the two men to a local W/T operator, who is said to have recognised VAN KLEFFENS from a photograph he had previously seen. A local organiser later met JAN, and there was some talk of LONDON methods and personalities, but the organiser was not convinced of JAN's sincerity. The latter stated he was running an escape line. The organiser contacted LONDON and received the news that VAN KLEFFENS was not in HOLLAND. He therefore made arrangements to liquidate both VAN KLEFFENS and JAN at a future rendez-vous, but neither turned up, and were not heard of again.

#### Penetration

Methods of penetration of Underground organisations were many and varied. Impersonation was one method which has already been discussed. Another way of getting on the inside of a subversive group was to employ Dutchmen who, through bad recruiting on the part of the Underground movement, became members of a group and subsequently betrayed its members to the police. Fortunately although the lower levels were often penetrated by this method, security was sufficiently good to prevent the penetration going any higher.



There were many cases of Dutchmen having fallen foul of the police for minor offences being blackmailed and forced to act as police spies for penetration activities. The most successful agents used by the Germans for penetration former Underground workers who had been caught, tortured and forced to rejoin their organisation after having been released from prison. One man caught by the SD and turned sat in public places and quietly and unobtrusively pointed out former colleagues to the German police. Among the cases of released agents used by the Germans for penetration were those of a girl courier who had been in prison for some weeks and who was "persuaded" by the German prison Commandant to co-operate, and a man who was kept in prison for 18 months and who embarked on subversive work immediately on his release. Both rejoined their groups and were afterwards instrumental in turning over to the Germans many former colleagues.

The practice in the Underground Movement of employing SD contacts to provide them with information on German activity was often dangerous, as these contacts worked in both directions, and there was much leakage of information. Thanks to some of these bad contacts the SD knew more about the organisation than was generally supposed. On one occasion there was a disastrous raid on a Gestapo Headquarters which, incidentally, had for object the theft of the lists of Dutch informers used by the Gestapo. This raid was expected by the Gestapo, the proof being that whereas normally only two or three guards were posted there at night, on the occasion of the raid there was a strong guard, and everything had been done to receive visitors. Members of the group involved in the raid were certain that there was treachery of some kind, and the organiser must also have suspected it, hence the raid to acquire information from Gestapo records.

A full report on the penetration of SOE set-up in HOLLAND from June 1942 to December 1943 is attached, and shows how organisers and W/T operators were caught and their sets and radio plans used by the Germans.

#### Casualties

Before September 1944 most casualties were sustained by results of agents' provocateurs activity, informers gaining information from talkative and indiscreet agents, and by controls falling accidentally upon a resistance member with some tell-tale material on his person. If one man was arrested it usually resulted in a number of other arrests although the Germans were not particularly good at following up clues and facts. They would arrest someone carrying a pistol and question him on that, but never ask him about his papers. On the whole, Resistance members were very imprudent. Strict orders were issued with regard to indiscreet talk, but without avail. Everybody talked far too much, and finally full-time workers were threatened with death for indiscreet disclosures.

One very real danger was that the principle of one man one job was entirely ignored, with the result that in a small village would be found about 4 men engaged on a multiplicity of Resistance activities such as housing escapees, obtaining papers, doing Reception Committee work

sabotage etc. It was unavoidable under the circumstances that the men became well-known not only to their neighbours but to police informers.

Before September 1944 more care was taken in recruiting and full information was obtained on potential recruits, but after September a flood of people came in to be enrolled and no check was possible. It was during this period that penetration became a very real danger.

Heavy casualties were suffered in the Autumn of 1944, when there were rumours everywhere that the Allies were 10 kms. away from almost every town in HOLLAND. Resistance groups threw caution to the winds and rose in open revolt. Unfortunately, although there was a good stock of explosives, the arms available were insufficient to protect the Resistance groups from German attacks, and the revolt was suppressed with heavy casualties. It was not thought that the Germans had started the rumours of Allied successes, but Underground workers put all the blame on the BBC and Radio Oranje for broadcasting the official view that by October HOLLAND would be free. Most of the subsequent casualties were due to repercussions from the September rising. Many men had been arrested, some had talked, and the unavoidable chain of clues led on to still more arrests.

Many casualties were the direct result of information obtained by the interrogation of arrested agents; the usual methods were employed, and attached at Appendix A is an account of an agent who was arrested in January 1944 when working for the Underground Press.

Among the various methods already mentioned which were adopted by the enemy, penetration was responsible for a big proportion of casualties, but bad luck played a big part also. There were many cases of police accidentally stumbling on some clue which led to a chain of arrests. For example, an agent taken in a razzia and selected out of hundreds for close search and interrogation; an agent unwittingly living in the same house as a suspect and being found in possession of incriminating material when the house was searched; a farmhouse as H.Q. being visited as the result of an investigation of clandestine slaughter of cattle. One group of agents was arrested as the result of incriminating material being found in the debris of their burned-out premises after an air raid.

Casualties were also sometimes caused through panic. An agent stopped at a control, on being questioned as to his papers would take off at high speed with the police after him, and frequently nervous agents would begin to shoot on the first sign of a house search, though these house searches were often routine measures and a plausible alibi would have sufficed.

Unfortunately the Germans were often assisted in their C.E. work by the agent's bad security and, in many cases, sheer bravado. As already stated, a sort of "grape-vine" information service existed in the Underground Movement which enabled news of enemy activity to be very rapidly passed round, but many cases were known of people

refusing to take evasive action on receipt of a warning, through bravado and with disastrous consequences. The most common security mistakes made were: premises used too often and without proper precautions or safety signals; carrying arms unnecessarily; being in possession of incriminating written material, lists of addresses etc.; and not having carefully concealed incriminating material in houses or flats. Indiscretion in conversation was prevalent and one agent was arrested after a public discussion he had had on the subject of BBC news items. Contact in spite of warning with already suspected persons, assisting Jews and too open complicity in Black Market transactions also had disastrous consequences. One agent was arrested for living too near a prison camp on the grounds that he was smuggling information into the prison and attempting to arrange the escape of certain prisoners.

Bad recruiting was, of course, responsible for many casualties, but the use of untrained couriers also resulted in casualties. One girl sent with a message and without proper means of finding the addressee called at a strange house to make enquiries, and walked straight into a Gestapo Headquarters, where she was interrogated, searched and arrested with the message on her.

Some incredibly foolish things were done. In one case an arms dump was located in a hut on a football ground, and a note pinned on the gate stating where the key could be found for obtaining entrance. This attracted the attention of the police, who gained admittance and discovered the arms dump. In another case the organiser attended a Reception Committee, his presence being entirely unnecessary and extremely dangerous. He was wearing at the time a pair of Canadian parachute boots, and when returning from the reception he, together with 4 other people travelling in the same car were stopped by a routine control who examined their papers. The occupants of the car had no alibi to explain their journey together and all 5 occupants of the car were carrying doctor's papers, which fact was sufficient to arouse the suspicions of the police, and the party was interrogated more fully, with unpleasant results.

The following is an account of the ill-fated meeting in UTRECHT in November 1944 when over a dozen prominent Resistance chiefs were arrested:-

The UTRECHT NBS decided that in view of certain difficulties which existed in the region, especially with regard to friction between OD and KP, the dual command of the area, shared by DESTEMBRES and COR, should be replaced by a sole commander-in-chief, in the person of KRIKKE, who in turn appointed DESTEMBRES chief of civil administration and COR chief of sabotage. KRIKKE was an ex-regular colonel of the DUTCH Colonial Army, and as such was not the ideal person to command a subversive organisation. He was a thoroughly reliable man but had no training or background for this particular type of work. He insisted, immediately he took command, on meeting personally all the district commanders, and ordered a meeting in UTRECHT at which all the district commanders were ordered to be present, together with prominent UTRECHT staff officers including COR and DESTEMBRES, and at which meeting CUBBING was also present.

Informant pointed out to KRIKKE that the meeting presented very real dangers and that for security reasons he did not wish to attend. In this he was backed up by SIEM and CUBBING. KRIKKE, however, was adamant, and the meeting was therefore convened. It took place on 22nd November 1944, in a private room allotted to KRIKKE at the offices of the Chamber of Commerce in UTRECHT. Although work was going on in the offices of the Chamber of Commerce, nobody knew that a meeting was taking place with the exception of the director's secretary, who had been warned about the meeting 30 minutes before it was due to commence.

Fortunately for some members of the group, they arrived late and were able to make off without entering the building and being taken by the GERMANS. Unfortunately for the others, they arrived on time, and five minutes after the meeting had begun, the SD surrounded the premises and arrested all those present. The only people to escape were CUBBING and one other person (name unknown), who hid in a cupboard and made their escape at night over the roofs.

According to informant, the district commanders were summoned to the meeting by written messages in clear, carried by couriers who took the messages to the addresses of the district commanders. Informant states that, in his opinion, the SD found out about the meeting because a girl courier carrying one of these messages was sent to VEENENDAAL to warn one of the district commanders that he was expected to attend. On arrival at VEENENDAAL, not being certain of the exact address of the district commander, she enquired at the house of a stranger for information as to his whereabouts. The house at the moment was either being searched by the SD or was a house which had been requisitioned by them, because immediately the courier knocked at the door she was confronted by uniformed SD who arrested her, searched her, found the written message and possibly found on her the address of other members due to attend the meeting. Whatever were the true facts, it appears certain that the meeting-place was betrayed to the GERMANS by an insecure means of internal communication.

CASUALTIES

APPENDIX A

Search & Interrogation

Here source himself was asked to empty his pockets. All papers relating to the proclamation were discovered. Source was not carrying a weapon or other compromising material on him.

After this rather summary search source was interrogated by groups of 4 men, who were changed over every 8 hours. The interrogation went on for 56 hours non-stop, during which time he was quite well-treated, being allowed food, cigarettes, etc. but not a moment's sleep. During this lengthy interrogation, the S.D. first tried to establish source's real identity, evidently suspecting that the name on his identity card was false. Informant does not think that any check or verification of this was carried out at the town hall as he afterwards heard that the employee who had assisted in obtaining his identity card was never questioned. Source's game, of course, was to play for time, in order to give the 48 hours warning he had promised his friends. After this time limit had expired informant, through sheer exhaustion, admitted his real identity, stating that he had been an officer in the Dutch army, who had managed to reach England, from which country he had come to Holland as an agent.

He was packed off and sent under guard to SCHEVENINGEN (Orange Hotel) where he was subjected to further interrogation on his mission, contacts in Belgium and Holland and training in England. Source withheld this information and was badly knocked about by his questioners for about half an hour. In the end he told them the address of V.O.'s house. (As the occupants of V.O.'s house had not left, as they had promised source they would, they were all arrested and a thorough search of the house was made. As far as informant knows the only compromising article belonging to him that they found was the pistol given to him by V.V. DODO, one of the refracteurs, who lived at V.O.'s, on questioning admitted that this pistol belonged to informant. Source, however, was never confronted with or accused of having had this pistol in his possession.)

On the 12th January informant was moved to HAAREN, where he as a Dutch officer complained of the treatment he had received at SCHEVENINGEN. He was told that treatment of this kind was completely unauthorised and that the matter would certainly be reported and that the men concerned would be "taken down a peg or two". Here informant was subjected to further questioning - firstly by a man called MEY, later by a man called SCHUEMACHER. This interrogation started on 16th January and went on until the end of March.

MEY - an extremely clever interrogator - was obviously concentrating on questions regarding source's training in England, schools attended, etc. At first source would admit nothing. MEY then showed him an almost complete list of the S.T.S. in this country to refresh his memory. This list not only gave the names, locations, layout of rooms and grounds, etc. etc. of the various "schools" but was so detailed that it even gave the colour of the bathroom tiles, etc. Everything down to the smallest detail seemed to be known and carefully listed.

A very complete card-index giving names of personnel, instructors, etc. employed at each school was also in the possession of these interrogators. Schuhmacher left this index on the desk one day when he was called out in the middle of an interrogation and source was able to have a quick look through it. Names and personal descriptions of the members of the Dutch section were also given - source remembered seeing the following names: SNEWING, KNIGHT, BINGHAM, OLIVER, MISS BOND. The address of the Dutch office was given as Eaton Square and there was an added note that students were usually asked to turn up at the Cumberland Hotel, the usual meeting-place.

In the "schools" list informant remembers seeing the names - HORNSBY, CLARK (and his dog "Smuggler"), DOBIE (previously librarian at the Scottish University), etc. etc. These were all listed under the correct schools. Particulars of the subjects taught, plans and drawings of the various buildings had all been carefully collated. The only school they didn't appear to have much information about was the propaganda school.

During MEY's interrogation source had been asked leading questions about Beaulieu but source denied having been there and stuck to his story even though his memory was being constantly fogged by the production of more and more detailed descriptions of each of the houses there.

MEY asked him to give a complete list of all the schools he had attended, all the subjects taught, the names of the instructors and those of his fellow students. In view of their obviously extensive knowledge of the "set-up" informant admitted having attended some of the schools and having learnt such subjects as weapon-training but left out such things as experience in the use of secret inks, codes, ciphers etc. He was also asked one or two leading questions on "silent-killing" but as he told them that he was a peace-loving man he had not shown any interest in this and had not received instruction. When asked to give names of fellow-students at S.T.S.52, source replied that he had been trained with an assortment of nationalities and had no memory for foreign names. These questions were all repeated to him after a lapse of 24 hours. Informant was not quite sure if he always repeated himself correctly, but thinks he must have as he was seldom subjected to further repetition of the same questions. MEY wrote down his answers without comment.

When hard pressed to give the names of the instructors source gave completely fictitious names and volunteered the information that no list of instructors' names could really be kept up-to-date as they were changed so frequently.

He was also questioned about THAME of which he was shown a very accurate drawing. Guessing that they were really very ignorant about the propaganda school, source gave a full and lively description of a completely fictitious place, existing only in his imagination. All this was carefully annotated. MEY also questioned him on local conditions in England:- rationing restrictions, newspapers, propaganda, etc. etc.

He was then given pen and paper and told to write out all briefing instructions given him before his departure from the U.K. After putting it off for a long time he produced half a sheet of phoney briefing. No comment was made but a number of fresh sheets of paper, each bearing the same heading as his original briefing dossier were put in front of him and he was told that with this further aid to his memory he might be able to tell them a little more. He still managed, however, not to give too much away, explaining that his briefing had been very short and not at all comprehensive and that further instructions should have been sent him from time to time but he had been arrested before receipt of them.

SCHUHMACHER then took over the interrogation. He was a very talkative man and source found it comparatively easy to distract his attention from the matter in hand, consequently time passed and SCHUHMACHER did not obtain much more information. This went on for about 6 weeks. SCHUHMACHER evinced great interest in the works of the German philosophers and the interrogation of source usually turned into a discussion on philosophy. The authorities, however, suddenly awakened to the fact that SCHUHMACHER was not producing the "goods" and source thinks that he must have been severely reprimanded because he suddenly got down to real business once more. Source was asked in great detail what he knew about resistance groups and secret organisations. Source denied all knowledge of such activities. The entire interrogation was carried on in German and informant was quite well-treated although he was extremely conscious of the fact that it was his interrogator's intention to wear him down with non-stop questioning. Source learnt later that much more brutal methods were used on other suspects during interrogation. Interrogation was completed by the end of March.

Source continued to be held at this prison after his interrogation was over until the end of July. During this time he was shown various photographs, and asked if he could identify any of them. Source did recognise one of the photographs as that of a fellow student called KOOPS, but he did not admit recognition. He was never confronted by the actual subjects of these photographs.

During his entire stay here, informant was kept in solitary confinement. The cells on either side of and below informant's were either kept empty or were used by S.S. guards or other German personnel. Source was taken out by his guards for exercise. He was not allowed to leave his cell without first donning a mask which he was not allowed to remove until he returned to his cell.

On only one occasion were the precautions re isolation of cells relaxed, when on 5th June source was moved into another cell. He had been aware during the day of an atmosphere of barely controlled excitement throughout the prison but could not guess the reason for this, having been out of contact with the outside world for so long.

During his first night in his new cell, source overheard voices in conversation below him. Lying on the ground he was able to determine that there were at least three people in the lower cell and they were talking in Dutch. Next day he thought he heard tapping and after a bit replied by tapping out Morse on the heating pipes.

The men below were apparently Dutch refracteurs. They "morsed" up to source the day's great news, namely that the long-awaited Allied invasion had begun. This was the first news of the outside world source had had since his arrest, other than from German-controlled Dutch newspapers.

Source had managed to get on fairly friendly terms with one of the S.S. guards and this man kept him supplied with newspapers even after the invasion and he was, therefore, able to keep fairly up-to-date with current happenings.

In his new cell, source had been quick to note that the cardboard put over the fan-light above the door for black-out purposes, was unprotected by glass or a metal grid as was usual. He managed to cut a small hole in this cardboard and by standing on a chair could watch what went on in the corridor outside his cell. In this way he managed to observe and identify several of the prisoners from neighbouring cells. Amongst these he recognised 2 fellow students HARRY SEYBEN (real name) and BOB ZIPMA (student's name). He could not, however, speak to either.

About 24th July informant was moved to VUGHT, where he was kept for 5 weeks until the end of August. During the journey he recognised one of his fellow prisoners as GRIEP (the man living at V.O.'s home) and managed to exchange a few words with him. From GRIEP he heard that V. V. had turned out to be a double agent working for the Germans and that the whole set up of the organisation was, therefore, known to the enemy for some time. During his stay at VUGHT he managed to contact other fellow prisoners, one of whom was SEYBEN, whom he had seen at his last prison. SEYBEN told him that he had been arrested six weeks after his arrival in April 1944, together with 3 or 4 others. Source also met 2 girls; the husband of one of these girls was an agent, who had been trained in England from November 1943 and had been dropped along with ZIPMA and a Dutchman from South Africa - TONY KOSTER by name - in April or May 1944. Both of these men had been arrested shortly after their arrival.

About the end of August source was given a red document called a "Schutzhaftbefehl", which he was ordered to sign. This paper decreed that source was to be committed for trial as having participated in an illegal organisation. Source stated that a white Schutzhaftbefehl was also in existence. The "white" variety stated that the authorities were satisfied and that no further interrogations or trials were deemed necessary, the holder would merely be retained as a prisoner from the date of signature.

In a few days' time informant was moved for trial to UTRECHT. Owing to the extremely rapid advance of the Allies, however, he was not given a trial at UTRECHT but was whisked away within less than a week to ANRATH together with 80 others, some of whom had already been tried.

Here he remained for a week during which time he learnt that the dossiers relating to the cases of all members of this party of 80 had been mislaid - this was probably due to the state of chaos already resulting from the Allies' lightning advance.



About 10th September, the whole party was moved to LUTTRINGHAUSEN, where thanks to the continued absence of any records whatsoever, they were able to pass themselves off as civilian internees. Source remained here until 11th November, during which time he met a Lt. DE JONGE, a Lt. BOSSE BUYSMAN and a Lt. TONNET, all of whom belonged to Major SOMERS' office. All three had been tried and condemned to death.

4) When source was moved to HAMLIN on 12th November 1942 other members of the original party of 80 were also transferred. This move, in source's opinion, was occasioned by the rebellious attitude which he and the others had adopted towards the authorities. The move was, therefore, by way of being a punitive measure. The 3 Dutch officers above-mentioned were included in the transferred party, TONNET and BOSSE BUYSMAN managed to escape en route by jumping from one of the last coaches of the train when half-way through a tunnel.

At HAMLIN the "civilian internee" story did not go down, although their papers had not yet been brought to light. Several members of the party were subjected to interrogation and the Governor of the prison was able to establish that 29 members of the party had already been tried and had been condemned to death and the others were awaiting trial for major offences. Eleven members of the latter category, including informant, were sent to HANOVER on 26th January, 1945.

They were interrogated here by the Gestapo until 11th February, all of the 11 being accused of having worked for the O.D.

NOTE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF ABWEHR IIIIF, THE HAGUE, AGAINST S.O.E.

This note on the activities of Abteilung IIIIF, The Hague, is not intended to constitute a full report, which could only be prepared against all the available S.O.E. records on the activities in Holland, and, more important still, against the whole of W/T traffic which has passed between this country and Holland. The note is slender and gives no more than an indication of the methods employed and the problems with which both sides were faced; it does, however, illustrate certain points which may be useful in conducting other activities from this end and some lessons can be learned from its perusal. During the period under review a battle was being fought between S.O.E., who were engaged in setting up a secret army in Holland, and Abteilung IIIIF of the Hague, who were engaged in frustrating that enterprise. The German objective was, not only to defeat the particular enterprise in which the British had embarked but also to penetrate, control and preserve the organisation which was being set up in order to ensure that Allied activities would not be diverted into other less well known channels; in this endeavour Abteilung IIIIF had a very considerable measure of success.

The S.O.E. Project.

In June of 1942 a certain JOHANNES and a W/T operator to whom he was attached arrived in Holland. JOHANNES had been sent to contact the O.D., an indigenous loyalist organisation. He was to tell its leaders that he had come from a joint Dutch/British mission and was to disclose to them the "Plan for Holland" which had been worked out. He was to obtain their comments upon this plan and to emphasise that the Dutch Government in London had approved it in principle and expected it to be accepted in substance. After introducing himself to the leaders of the O.D., JOHANNES was to make contact with its various sub-groups operating throughout the country. JOHANNES was to report to London and London was to send out trained organiser instructors to the groups as and when JOHANNES reported they were ready to receive them. The members of the secret army were thus to be recruited from the O.D.; but once so recruited they were to be debarred from their previous activities and were thereafter to regard themselves as part of a separate organisation controlled from London. For the purpose of carrying out this mission JOHANNES had to organise reception committees for the weapons and supplies and additional personnel which were to be sent. Such was the ambitious plan and during the next 18 months the whole of S.O.E. activities in Holland were directed towards making it a success. Its failure at the end of that period would mean the failure of by far the greater proportion of Allied activities against Holland directed from London.

As events have shown the plan had in it a flaw which proved fatal. If JOHANNES or the man sent to relieve him were to be captured and turned round the plan would not merely be defeated but might be successfully used by the Germans for the penetration of the O.D. itself. The way was opened for a German agent of Abteilung IIIIF, not merely to pose as an Allied agent, but to do so with all the authority and character of an S.O.E. agent in direct touch with, and under orders from, London.

The Organisation of Abwehr IIIIF.

Abwehr IIIIF was the organisation whose business it was to counter such Allied activities in Holland. Two of the principal officers responsible for penetration work were Hauptmann Ernst KEISEWETTER @ BADEN and Oberstleutenant GISKES @ GERHARD. KEISEWETTER had been in the Balkans and joined the Abwehr in Holland in about April 1942.