

21. "Source" in this series is obviously an S.I.S. Agent: I cannot find that any further information about him has been passed by S.I.S. to S.O.E.

S.O.E. has no Agent named "DRAKE", but "DOULIN" might be DOURLIN, the real name of SPROUT, who was dropped to MARROW on the 9th March 1943 and was arrested on landing.

22. In fact only three Agents were dropped on 9.III.43 all to MARROW - SPROUT, SEAKALE and KOHLRABI. None of these was a woman, but a woman CHICORY had been dropped to CATARRH on 13.II.43. She was an M.I.19 Agent, and S.O.E. has no further information about her, which is natural. If HOCKEY and TENNIS (dropped to MARROW on 18.II.43) and PARSLEY and RADISH (dropped to CATARRH on 16.II.43) are included, the eight Agents are accounted for as being those dropped to CATARRH and MARROW during February and March 1943. Before that time the last Agents dropped to either of these Reception Committees had been in October 1942.

23. Finally the password "I am a friend of Marius" had in fact been given to:

KOHLRABI } dropped to MARROW 9.III.43.
SPROUT }

MUSTARD dropped with BROCCOLI to TURNIP 28.XI.42.

GRESS dropped to LETTUCE on 29.XI.42 and arrested on landing in all probability

RADISH dropped to CATARRH with PARSLEY A on 16.II.43.

24. The inference from this S.I.S. information is that both CATARRH and MARROW/KALE Organisations had been fully penetrated by mid-February 1942 at the latest.

S.O.E. has no information from S.I.S. as to the S.I.S. Agents who were dropped on 24.III.43 and 23.VI.43 from the same aircraft as dropped stores to CATARRH but at difference points, both of which aircraft failed to return.

C. CONCLUSIONS:

1. PHASE A: ORGANISATION

I think that the critical date is that of the capture and death of MARROW and his W/T Operator i.e., 8th or 9th November 1942, which, upon the evidence now available, I conclude was due to D/F. It is not known what, if any, documents were captured with these Agents. CUCUMBER supposes in his Signal of 27.XI.42 that only the Signals sent out on the day of the casualty fell into Enemy hands, but I find it difficult to accept that the traffic could have been carried on without the past Signals being kept for reference.

There is no evidence that MARROW was arrested through denunciation or other treachery.

2. Up to this date, the end of November 1942, I think that the MARROW Organisation was intact and with it KALE, CAULIFLOWER, the two CUCUMBERS, the three TOMATOES, the three CELERYS, MANGOLD and PUMPKIN.

But at the end of November, 29.XI.42, CHIVE with CRESS went down to a LETTUCE committee for KALE and was arrested on landing, and on 14.I.43 CUCUMBER B, a KALE W/T channel was under control, and from that time on there is ample evidence that all the Phase A sets were under Enemy Control. Therefore at some time during December 1942 the whole MARROW - KALE Organisation fell into the hands of the Enemy.

3. If these assumptions be correct then LETTUCE or at any rate his Reception Committee was intact on 24th. September (when KALE and CAULIFLOWER went down to it) and in the hands of the Enemy by 29th. November (when CHIVE and CRESS went down) but these dates can be narrowed further, because, up to 17th. November, KALE was using TRUMPET, LETTUCE W/T Operator to report the casualty of MARROW.

4. The most probable hypothesis which fits these facts is that, through the arrest of MARROW and his W/T Operator, the Enemy found documents which put them on the track of KALE; and that KALE himself led the Enemy unwittingly to the LETTUCE Organisation, when, no doubt because KALE had lost his W/T connection, he went back to LETTUCE to avail himself of TRUMPET.

It is quite in accordance with what is known of Enemy methods that KALE should for a time be allowed to remain in liberty, in the hope that his surveillance would yield a higher dividend than his immediate arrest, as, indeed, on this hypothesis, it did.

Whether KALE himself was caught as the result of CHIVE and/or CRESS giving information to the Enemy, or as the result of the surveillance of himself, it is not possible to conclude.

5. Once KALE, or indeed any of his important assistants was in Enemy hands, it is easy to understand how rapidly the penetration spread. For it is certain that most, if not all, of the captured Agents gave all the information they could to the Enemy, and, I think, continued to collaborate with him.

6. SABOTAGE ORGANISATIONS

It was through this initial capture I conclude, that the CATARH Organisation was broken up, as I think it was at the latest by February 1943.

7. It was also by the same means that the Enemy was I think enabled via LETTUCE to apprehend BROADBEAN and GOLF on their arrival to a PARSNIP Committee in February as, I think, happened. In spite of considerable evidence to the contrary in the BROADBEAN/GOLF traffic, I think that it was under control from the outset.

8. How ENDIVE who descended in February 1943 to what should have been an entirely independent Committee, TURNIP, was caught was, I think, probably through BROCCOLI, who had preceded him in November 1942 to TURNIP, but was a KALE W/T Operator.

It may be however that the rot started with BROCCOLI, because he went down to a Committee whose Organiser on the evidence of CARROT was perhaps in Enemy hands as early as May. I am inclined however to believe that it was the other way round, and that the penetration spread out from the capture of KALE and the whole of his organisation.

9. As to LEEK there is little evidence, but I conclude that he would not survive long after LACROSSE went down to CATARH in April 1943 for him, if indeed LEEK had survived as long.

10. The position with regard to SPINACH, PARSNIP and POTATO is very obscure see Appendix VI. Up to the report by POTATO of SPINACH's arrest on 2.IV.43 of which there is some evidence from S.O.E. reception of his Signal of that date, one is strongly inclined to regard all these Agents as being intact. But POTATO sent these Signals through EBENEZER, CATARH's W/T Operator, and I find it difficult to believe that that Organisation was intact as late as April 1943. I can find no wholly satisfactory explanation of this story, but I think that it would be wrong on the strength of it to reject the strong evidence of control before that date. I am inclined to regard the whole of the SPINACH story as being controlled by the Enemy.

11. The fact that the BROADBEAN line has been kept open is, in my view, explicable by the known desire of the Enemy to get as many Agents as he can into this country. This suggests that he has considerable knowledge of the VIC line through France, but has not yet decided to close it.

12. I regard ANTON and SERGEANT as being both examples of an attempt by the Enemy to get information from this country by means of returning Agents. It may be that both were innocent dupes: indeed I am inclined to think that they were. The arrest of ANTON in Paris was, I think, fortuitous, and was no doubt due to lack of liaison between the S.D. in Holland and in France. Once arrested, ANTON would not be safe for the Enemy to use again, especially if he were innocent.

13. The part played by the German Agent de WILDE was not, I think, a large one, although it is conceivable that it was through contacting J. de BEER with whom de WILDE is now known to have been friendly that KALE fell into Enemy hands. But on the whole, I prefer the explanation of KALE's arrest which I have already given.

14. It follows from the above reasoning that the whole of the Phase A, Sabotage and Escape Organisation of S.O.E. in Holland was in Enemy hands at the beginning of 1943, and that all the traffic has since been controlled by the Enemy, and that every Agent sent to a Reception Committee during this year has immediately fallen into his hands.

15. The cause of this disaster was initially the capture of important Agents who could and did give the Enemy extensive information. The rapidity with which the Enemy was enabled to act was due to the system of Reception Committees.

16. As the facts are known at present, there is no justification for assuming a leakage of information from S.O.E. or Dutch H.Q. The possibility of such leakage cannot of course be excluded, but it would in my view be quite wrong to adopt this hypothesis when the losses are fully explicable, as the facts at present are known, by events which occurred in the Field.

B. ~~REPORTED~~ SCENE AS NOT BY SIGNAL TO KALE, shortly before his 'return' he was almost certainly in enemy hands.

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PROVINCES</u>	<u>LEADER</u>	<u>N/T</u>	<u>INSTRUCTORS</u>
<u>ANGE</u>	FRIESLAND (SPLENDIDE) GRONINGEN (SAVOY) DEVENTE (RITZ)	VICTOR DOUMA (CUCUMBER B)	LOUIS UDMA (ORIVE)	{ KERING EDDY (TOMATO A) DIEFERBROEK PAUL (SPROUT)
<u>BEAVERLY</u>	N.OVERIJSSSEL (CLARIDGES) S.OVERIJSSSEL (BENNETT) N.GELDERLAND (CARLTON) S.GELDERLAND (MONICO)	FIFTY FIFTY	MAAS PRAAG (TOMATO C)	{ GOLF MURK (CHERRY A) SEVENSTER FELT (CHERRY B) v. UNBICK SAM (CHERRY)
<u>CORRY</u>	N.HOLLAND (MIRAMAR) S.HOLLAND (WALDOFF) UTRECHT (ASTORIA)	OGM	ERST ROLSVELD (NETBALL)	{ (NAME or HAARLEM) MEYERS HERBERT (POLO) (Amsterdam) ANEMA DIJK (SEALIE) (Rotterdam) v.d.HOORN OTTEN (RADISH) (Utrecht) de KUIF IVAN (LACHOSSE)
<u>DODDY</u>	ZEELAND (SHEPHERDS) W.BRABANT (RAFFLES) C.BRABANT (CHILLON) O.BRABANT (HUNGARIA) N.LIMBURG (KEDGEE) S.LIMBURG (APERITIF)	(East) NEEMAN BLEEKER (KOHLEBARI)	FRINS RUTGERS (BROCCOLI)	{ (East) FERNBERG SIKER (SQUASH) (Middle) DE BLANK TEGG (CHOCLET) (Middle) DE KILLEN ELST (MUSTARD) HOOGLAND RUTS (TOMATO B)

APPENDIX III

DUTCH SECTION AGENTS IN THE FIELD

<u>No.</u>	<u>NAMES</u>	<u>DATE OF JOINING</u>	<u>IN THE FIELD</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL NAME</u>
1.	T. N. ARKEMA R.N. ARKEMSE Pieter Arnoldus Alias ARKOSTEIN Pieter Code Name "DIRK"	15 Jul 42	9 Mar 43	SEAKALE
2.	" ARKEMAN ANDRINGA Leonardus VAN GIELEN Willem "LEO"	28 May 41	28 Mar 42	TURKIP
3.	" VAN BAKEL BRAGGAAR Cornelis Carel VAN VEEN Pieter "BERT"	23 Jun 42	16 Feb 43	PARSLEY A
4.	" BEEKMAN BEUKEMA THOS WATER K.W.A. KUIPERS. Frederik "BILL" "HENRIK"	18 Jun 42	24 Sep 42	KALE
5.	" DE BLANK DE BRUY Oskar Willem DE BOOY Oscar "THEO"	18 Jan 43	21 May 43	CROQUET
6.	" BLEEKER BOOGAART Pieter Cornelis VERSTRATEN Pieter "HERMAN"	28 Sep 42	9 Mar 43	KOHLRABI
7.	" BOOGAERTS BUCKERS (BAKKERS) Joseph LOOCHUIZEN Evert "SMIT"	23 May 42	26 Jun 42	MARROW W/Op..
8.	" BOUWMAN BAATSEN Arnoldus Albert BAATSEN "ABOR"	28 May 41	27 Mar 42	WATERCRESS
9.	" VAN DER BRAND VAN DER BOR Klaas PEWING Klaas "HUIS"	24 Sep 42	16 Feb 43	ENDIVE
10.	" BROUWER BUIZER Johannes Jan BRUGMAN Jan cor "PIET"	3 Mar 42	22 Jun 42	SPINACH
11.	" COLENBRANDER MOOY Adriaan Klaas MOOY Willem Wijnand "THOMAS" "GERARD"	20 May 42	25 Sep 42	CAULIFLOWER

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<u>No.</u>	<u>NAMES</u>	<u>DATE OF JOINING</u>	<u>IN THE FIELD</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL NAME</u>
12.	T.N. R.N. Alias Code name DISPENBROEK DOURLEIN Pieter DIJCKMAN Pieter "PAUL"	24 Sep 42	9 Mar 43	SPROUT
13.	" DOUMA DANE Johannes Cornelis DIJESHOORN Johannes "VICTOR"	18 Jun 42	27 Oct 42	CUCUMBER A
14.	" FELDERS DROOGLEVER PORTUYN Cornelis Dirk LAUMEN Arie Johannes "DEKKER" "WIM"	23 Mar 42	24 Sep 42	MAINBOLD
15.	" GOOR GRUEN Johan SCHRODER Johan Bernard & VERBRUGEN Johan "BRUTUS"	2 Apr 43	18 Oct 43	BRUTUS
16.	" VAN HAAFTEN VAN HEBERT Gerald John VAN HASSELT Gerrit "JACOB"	15 Jan 42	23 Jul 42	LEEK A
17.	" DE HEER DE HAAS Johannes Henricus Marie DE HAAS "PYL" "JANTJE"	2 Mar 42	19 Apr 42	POTATO
18.	" HOGLAND HOPSTEDE Jan HOUEMAN Jan "RUYSS"	18 Jun 42	24 Oct 42	TOMATO B
19.	" VAN DER HOORN VAN HULSTEYN Cornelis Eliza VAN HOEK Cornelis Eliza "OTTEN"	15 Jul 42	16 Feb 43	RADISH
20.	" JANSMA JONGELIE Roelof Christiaan HAVER Henri Jean C Cornielle "Arie"	3 Jul 42	24 Sep 42	PARSLEY
21.	" JEFFERS JORDAAN Hendrik Johan ROESSINGH Johan "HAN"	15 Jan 42	28 Mar 42	TRUMPET

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<u>No.</u>	<u>NAMES</u>	<u>DATE OF JOINING</u>	<u>IN THE FIELD</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL NAME</u>
22.	T.N. JURGENS Gerard Lodewijk R.N. JAMBROES George Louis Alias JONKERS Gerrit Leendert Code name "JANSEN "JOHANNES"	25 May 42	26 Jun 42	MARROW
23.	" KARELS KIST @ WILSON Jan Christian KOK Johannes "WALT"	11 Nov 42	18 Feb 43	HOCKEY
24.	" KERKHOF KAMPHORST Pieter VAN PUTTEN Pieter "EDDIE"	18 Jun 42	21 Oct 42	TOMATO A
25.	" KIEK KLOOSS Barend KLOOS Barend "BOB"	28 May 41	5 Apr 42	LEEK
26.	" DE KLIJN DE KRUYFF Arie Johannes KUYPER Arie Johannes "ELST"	15 Jul 42	28 Nov 42	MUSTARD
27.	" DE KLUIF WEGNER Antonius Johannes VAN WIJK Antonius "IVAN"	23 Mar 42	21 Apr 43	LACROSSE
28.	" KOLFF KOOLSTRA Meindert KLEIN Minne "MURK"	18 Jun 42	21 Oct 42	CELERY A
29.	" VAN KRIPFEN VAN DER GIESSEN Arie Cornelia GROEN Anton Gerrit "BRAM" "MIK"	17 Mar 42	1 Oct 42	CABBAGE
30.	" LOOMAN LAUWERS Hubertus Mattheus Gerardus LAUWERS Hubertus	13 May 41	8 Nov 41	EBENEZER
31.	" MAARTENS MOLENAAR Jan MOLENAR Jan "JOHN"	13 May 41	28 Mar 42	TURNIP W/Op.
32.	" MEBBINS MACARE. H. M. MERENS Barend "SCHAAP"	18 Jun 42	24 Oct 43	CELERY C.
33.	" MERTENS MINK Anton Barend MINK Antoon Berend "HERBERT"	18 Jan 43	21 May 43	POLO

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<u>No</u>	<u>NAMES</u>	<u>DATE OF JOINING</u>	<u>IN THE FIELD</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL NAME</u>
34.	T.N. R.N. Alias Code name OOMBEN OVERES Herman Johannes OUD Hermanus Johannes "KEUR"	15 Jul 42	29 Nov 42	CRESS
35.	" VAN OOSTEROM VAN OS Gerard VAN EMDEN Gerard "JOOST" "FRANS"	24 Sep 42	18 Feb 43	BROADBEAN
36.	" PIJNACKER PARLEVLIET Herman FRINS Herman "FUTE"	22 Feb 42	29 May 42	BESTROOT
37.	" PIJNENBURG PUNT Laurentius Marie SMIT Leo "SIMON"	18 Jan 43	21 May 43	SQUASH
38.	" POST PALS Marinus VAN DE PLAS Marinus "POSTMAN" ANKE"	18 Jun 42	21 Oct 42	PUMPKIN
39.	" FRAAG FOUWELS Christiaan PIETERS Christiaan "MAAS"	18 Jun 42	24 Oct 42	TOMATO C
40.	" ROELEVELD ROUWERS Frederik Willen ROOSENDAAL Frederik Willen "ERNST"	15 Jul 42	21 Apr 43	NETBALL
41.	" ROLPS RAS Gozwijn Hendrik Gerard ROELOFS Gerard "RIKKY"	28 May 41	28 Mar 42	LETTUCE
	" VAN ROSSUM VAN RIETSCHOTEN John Jacob VAN ROOYEN Johan "JAN"	23 Jan 42	22 Jun 42	PARSNIP
43.	" RUTGERS RUSSELER George Lodewijk REINDERS George Lodewijk "FRINS"	18 Jun 42	28 Nov 42	BROCCOLI

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<u>No.</u>	<u>NAMES</u>	<u>DATE OF JOINING</u>	<u>IN THE FIELD</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL NAME</u>
44.	T.N. SALBERG R.N. SEBES Hendrik Alias SEBES Hendrik Code name "HEEK"	10 Feb 42	5 Apr 42	LEEK
45.	" SEVENSTER STERIGMA Horst Reijnder VERSTEG Hendrik Reinder "PELT"	18 Jun 42	24 Oct 42	CELERY B.
46.	" VAN SITTARD VAN STEEN Antonius SWART Antonius SOLK	22 Feb 42	29 May 42	BESTROOT
47.	" STEEN SPORRE Cornelius Johannes STARING C. "COR" "KEES"	2 Apr 41	7 Sep 41	GLASSHOUSE (2)
48.	" STOKKERS VAN SCHELIE Jan David Anthon SCHOLTEN Jan & SLUIS Jan Anton "APOLLO"	17 Jun 43	18 Oct 43	APOLLO
49.	" THOMPSON TERWINDT Beatrice VAN DER VELDEN Johanna Maria "FELIX"	1 Dec 42	13 Feb 43	CHICORY
50.	" TIMMER TACONIS Thijs TIGER Thijs "THIJS"	28 May 41	8 Nov 41	CATARRH
51.	" UDEMA UBBINK Johan Bernard VAN DER HALEN Frans "LOUIS"	23 May 42	29 Nov 42	CHIVE
52.	" VAN URNIK VAN UYTVANCK Ivo VAN VLIET Herman "SAM"	15 Jul 42	21 Apr 43	GHERKIN
53.	" VAN DER WESTEN VAN DER WILDEN Willen WINTER Willen "DOLF" "KRIS"	15 Jul 42	18 Feb 43	GOLF
54.	" WILLEMS BAKKER Jacob BAKKER Jacob "HOEK"	20 May 42	27 Oct 42	CUCUMBER B

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<u>No.</u>	<u>NAMES</u>	<u>DATE OF JOINING</u>	<u>IN THE FIELD</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL NAME</u>
55.	WOUTERS VAN DER WILDEN Pieter VAN DEN BERG Pieter "NOL"	15 Jul 42	18 Feb 43	TENNIS

APPENDIX IV A.

ANTON DE WILDE.

1. In February 1943, KALE, in answer to a request from H.Q. for someone who could report fully to S.O.E. to be sent back from the field, reported that his chief assistant ANTON could leave in two weeks' time. He stated that ANTON was fully informed on all points.

On the 3rd March 1943, KALE signalled the identity of ANTON as follows:-

NICOLAAS DE WILDE.
Born 5th October 1903.
Address: Charlotte de Bourbon straat 228,
The Hague.

In a later message he described ANTON as 1.m.80 in height fair, with blue eyes; having been a former Police Commissioner in Amsterdam Arnhem, who was now living illegally.

On the 13th of May, ANTON was signalled by KALE as having left Holland on the 12th. There is no doubt that he went out to Belgium by the BROADEBEAN/GOLF line.

2. In Brussels he was met by the Belgian agent ARNAUD who conducted him to Paris, where he was met by the French Agent GLAZIER @ MARCEL, on or about May 17th, at a safe house provided by GLAZIER.
3. MARCEL, who was interrogated on 5th July 1943, and whose evidence I accept, describes ARNAUD by the field name of ADRIAN, as about 6ft. high, aged about 35, square out and fairly stout, blue eyes, mousy to fair hair, fat rosy cheeks, square jaw, with no scars or pimples on his face; fattish hands; a real Dutch type, who spoke no French. His identity papers were in the name of VAN MULLER.
4. As the LYSANDER Operation by which it was intended to extricate ANTON could not be performed that moon, and as it was thought unsafe for him, as a Dutchman, to remain in Paris until the next moon, he returned on the 20th May to Brussels with ARNAUD. On the 8th June ARNAUD and ANTON returned to Paris, where, on the morning of the 9th, they were met, as had previously been arranged between them, at the Restaurant des Capucines, by MARCEL. Shortly afterwards, ANTON was arrested outside the cafe, as set out in the interrogation of MARCEL which forms part of this Appendix.
5. KALE was advised of this casualty by signal from H.Q. on the 14th and 16th of June, and replied that ANTON had been living illegally in Holland to escape arrest for "assisting R.A.F. pilots to fly", and that he KALE was sure that ANTON would declare this as a reason for attempting to escape. Nothing further has been heard of ANTON from any source.
6. On the 13th May, the O.D. wireless set sent a signal:

"Do you know DE WILDE pretending to act for you?"

After reference to S.O.E. an answer was sent that DE WILDE was a member of a sister organisation (i.e. S.O.E., who at that time assumed that the message referred to ANTON).

7. On the 28th May, a long cable was received from Dutch Diplomatic sources in Berne having courier contact with the O.D., which stated that a Dutch indigenous organisation had been betrayed by a person using the names of TOON and A.C. de WILDE, who was supposed to have proved his legitimacy to VORRINK (a subversive worker in Holland whom the S.O.E. agents PARSNIP and SPINACH had been instructed/in collaboration with POTATO, and whom the SOE agent CARROT had also had the mission of contacting) by having read by Radio Orange a letter of Meyer SLUYSER now in this country.

8. On the 9th June, Berne gave further particulars stating that DE WILDE claimed to be an Allied agent, having as his mission Invasion preparations, and that on the arrest of VORRINK, DE WILDE and his wife and parents-in-law were arrested, but were probably released a short time afterwards.

9. On the 21st June 1943, the O.D. wireless stated:

"Since long time we know with absolute certainty that two persons, both code name DE WILDE working for the Enemy".

This might refer to the S.O.E. agents GOLF and TENNIS, whose real names were both DE WILDE, and who are reported by CHIVE and SPROUT to have been in the Concentration Camp at Haaren with the two latter.

10. On the 6th June the Netherlands Consul General in Sweden wrote to the Dutch Prime Minister in this country, giving information obtained from a Mr. VAN HOUTEN, who had lately escaped from Holland, that VORRINK had claimed to be in contact with London through a certain ANTON, who called himself DE WILDE, and claimed to belong to the family of the former Minister of that name. VAN HOUTEN further stated that ANTON claimed to have engineered the broadcast of a message from Radio Orange:

"JACOB's papers have arrived".

In fact, such a message was broadcast by Radio Orange on the 23rd March at the request of S.O.E. Agent SPINACH, in one of his "Victory" messages on the 20th March 1943. VAN HOUTEN described ANTON as a man of 35 years, whose face was marred by pimples.

11. Early in August 1943, the Dutch Minister in Berne reported that DE WILDE very definitely works for the Enemy, and described him as, aged 28, but looks 35, height 1 m. 80; eyes almond, nose crooked, hair dark, and stated that he had been identified as "Antonius van WAALS" who had worked for the Sicherheitsdienst since 1940, and who had stayed with J. de BEER, Rochusenstaat, Rotterdam. It is to be noted that this is the name and address given by the signal of the 1st December 1940 by KALE via CUCUMBER as a contact address to which agents could be sent.

12. In a Hague newspaper of the 21st July 1943, there is a report that on the 19th July, Antonius van WAALS was assassinated in a street in Rotterdam, but in an Extract from German Intelligence Activities in Holland, issued by S.I.S. on the 29th November 1943, there is a statement as follows:-

"Antonius van WAALS @ DE WILDE @ VAN DILLON of Rochusenstraat 60 or 66 Rotterdam, who was advertised by the Germans as having been assassinated in July 1943, but is known to have been active since near Arnhem, has now been reported as having been seen in Utrecht in August 1943 and Nijmegen September 1943".

DE BEER's address, as given by KALE, was Rochusenstaat 25.

13. On this material, the ANTON DE WILDE who was arrested in Paris on the 9th June cannot be identical with the DE WILDE who is described as a German agent.

APPENDIX IVB

EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATION OF MARCEL

ARREST OF ADRIAN

Source met ADRIAN for the first time about May 17th, 1943, when he came with ARNAUD to the safe house, whose address Source had provided. ADRIAN was staying at a hotel known to ARNAUD, where the fiches were not sent in.

Source described ADRIAN as about 6 ft., aged about 35: square cut and fairly stout: blue eyes, wavy to fair hair: fat, rosy cheeks, square jaw, with no scars on his face: fattish hands. A real Dutch type. He does not speak French. ARNAUD said he spoke German fluently, but would not speak it. His identity papers, Source thinks, were in the name of VAN MULLER.

As Source decided it was impossible to do the operation before June, he agreed to ADRIAN's suggestion that he should return with ARNAUD to Brussels, which they did on the evening of May 20th, having fixed a rendez-vous for the Capucines for 10 o'clock on June 9th. Between May 20th. and June 9th. Source had no contact with ADRIAN and ARNAUD, and no one knew of the rendez-vous except the son of the friends at the safe house.

They met at the Capucines as arranged, ADRIAN and ARNAUD being already there when Source arrived. Only about five tables were in use inside the café, the rest of the café being roped off for cleaning, and at one of the tables on the terrace outside the café, was a civilian in a grey hat and a mackintosh, with nothing on the table in front of him. ARNAUD afterwards said he did not think this man was there when they arrived: up to about a minute before Source arrived, the café was empty, and then suddenly it was full of people.

They had been there a little time and Source was in conversation with ARNAUD, when he noticed ARNAUD looking over his shoulder at two German officers dressed in green uniforms (they might have been Feldgendarmarie) questioning other people. Immediately ADRIAN got up and with his hands in his pockets, walked out: not fast enough to be in a hurry, and not slow enough to be quite natural. The German officer looked up, watched ADRIAN go out and went on with the examination. ARNAUD who saw ADRIAN being taken across the road by a civilian, said to Source: 'They have arrested ADRIAN.' Source told him to be quiet, and they proceeded to discuss their cover story. The German officer then asked for their papers, which he examined thoroughly, but took no further action. Source and ARNAUD left the café separately and Source joined MONIQUE and DELPHIN at the Napolitain.

Three theories are possible: (a) that the Germans knew of the rendez-vous: (b) that ADRIAN and ARNAUD had been followed to the café: (c) that ADRIAN's arrest was a mere chance. It was quite certain that he had been arrested as at 4 o'clock the following afternoon ARNAUD still had no news of him.

(a) Source thinks it unlikely that the Germans knew of the rendez-vous. ADRIAN and ARNAUD had only arrived back in Paris the previous evening, and ARNAUD said that ADRIAN had behaved very well in Brussels. If the civilian in the grey hat and the mackintosh, who appears to have been the same civilian who conducted ADRIAN across the road from the Capucines, had been there when ADRIAN and ARNAUD arrived, then there might have been some reason for the theory that the rendez-vous was known: but, on the other hand, ARNAUD does not think that the civilian was there when they arrived.

(b) If ADRIAN and ARNAUD had been followed to the café, it seems strange that both were not arrested. Source does not think it likely that they went to the café separately, since ARNAUD would probably not have left ADRIAN alone as he spoke no French.

(c) It seems most likely that the Germans were conducting a rafle and that ADRIAN was taken by chance. He and ARNAUD had an agreement that if anything happened to them, they would separate, and that is probably the reason why ADRIAN, who was nearest the door, got up and left. He may also have thought this was the wisest course as he did not speak French. Source thinks it may have been a rafle as the Germans came back to the café five minutes after he and ARNAUD had left, and again five minutes after that, and then men in helmets searched the whole area. He also thinks the German officer must have had men waiting outside, since he took no notice of ADRIAN's leaving the café. The reason he thinks ADRIAN alone was taken, was that when the German officers came into the café, Source was talking to ARNAUD, and ADRIAN may have seemed to be nothing to do with them.

ADRIAN's cover story was probably the same as ARNAUD's - the black market: but he had photographs stuck in his shoes, probably on the soles of his feet.

APPENDIX V

SPINACH

1. CARROT was sent to the Field blind on the 27th February, 1942, as a sabotage organiser in ROTTERDAM, and one of his tasks was to get news of KOOS VORRINK, the ex-President of the Socialist Democratic Workers Party. He was to contact VORRINK through one VINUS, whose address he had been given by MAX SLUYSER in this country before he left.

CARROT, however, soon left Holland, without fulfilling any of his tasks.

2. Accordingly PARSNIP and SPINACH, who were sent to the Field together on the 22nd June, 1942, were instructed to collaborate with POTATO, who had arrived by sea route on the 19th April, in contacting VORRINK.

3. In October 1942 MAX SLUYSER received a letter from AMSTERDAM, apparently from VINUS, which seemed to indicate that CARROT, who was still missing, could be located through VINUS. Accordingly it was decided to ask CABBAGE (who had gone to a CATARRH reception committee on the 1st October, 1942, with the mission of contacting PARSNIP and collaborating with him in sabotage) to try to contact VINUS or CARROT.

4. On the 21st November SPINACH reported contact had been made with VINUS through one ALEX WINS of AMSTERDAM, whose address had been given to PARSNIP and SPINACH before they went into the Field as a means of contacting VINUS. This is curious, as in August SPINACH had reported that WINS was too dangerous, and that he hoped to find some other means of contacting VINUS if possible.

5. After making contact with VINUS, as above described, SPINACH reported that VINUS wished the bona-fides of himself, CABBAGE and PARSNIP to be established by causing a message to be broadcast on Radio Orange, beginning with the words:

"This is a letter for VINUS"

and containing at some point the name which VINUS had used in his letter to MAX SLUYSER. This broadcast was made, and acknowledged with thanks by SPINACH on the 4th December, 1942.

It appears that CARROT was found through VINUS during the month of December, 1942, but SPINACH reported that VINUS had found him "light-minded and unreliable."

This is extraordinary, because according to CARROT he had left Holland in September, 1942.

6. After Christmas SPINACH started sending a long series of "Victory Traffic" from VINUS in addition to his usual traffic for PARSNIP and CABBAGE. These "Victory" messages consisted of vague and verbose political information intended for Queen WILHELMINA. During January 1943 twelve were sent, the last of which was signed KOOS VORRINK.

7. The "Victory" traffic continued through February and March, the last being the twenty-second of the series dated 20th March, 1943, in which SPINACH asked that the receipt should be acknowledged by broadcasting on Radio Orange a message:

"Jacob's papers have arrived"

which was in fact done on the 23rd March.

8. On the 2nd April, SPINACH's transmitter was heard for the last time, but the signal was completely undecipherable and ended with a long emission as if the operator's hand was resting on the key. On the 7th and 13th April, POTATO via EB ENEZER reported that SPINACH had been arrested on the 2nd of April while transmitting.

APPENDIX VI

INTERROGATION OF SERGEANT

October 5th, 1943.

HISTORY

1. When war broke out, Source was chief inspector of a radio technical school at Soesterberg, and on the mobilisation of the Dutch army the school was moved to Rotterdam, where all navigation, wireless, bombing schools etc. were to be combined.

Five days after the first bombing of Rotterdam, the order was given to all Dutch troops to unload their arms and the Germans marched through the city. As they passed the school, shots were fired from a nearby house and the man who had fired them rushed into the school to hide. The Germans followed, and thinking the shots had really come from the school, took all its occupants prisoner. 768 officers and men (Source remembers the exact number because he was responsible for obtaining their food) were kept for five days in a church which was only meant to hold 500, after which they were sent back to the school, and from there to Utrecht. Source remained in Rotterdam, as he was responsible for putting the building in order before handing it over to the Germans. On July 15th the officers and men were sent home, with the promise of full pay for a certain period and half pay until they found other work.

Through Colonel KOPPERT, who had been the Commandant of the 3rd. Regiment at the school and became head of the Afwikkelings Bureau which investigated compensation claims for the requisition of buildings etc. due to the mobilisation, Source joined the Opbouwdienst and was seconded to work under Colonel KOPPERT in the Afwikkelings Bureau. This work continued until it was completed in May 1941.

Source now found himself without employment, with prices rising and no means of supporting his family. His old firm, the Nederlandsche Sein Toestellen Fabriek, renewed the offer they had already made while he was with the Afwikkelings Bureau, that he should join them, but he again refused as they were working for the Germans. For the same reason he refused an offer through the official Arbeitsbureau of a wireless post at the aerodrome at Eindhoven. He had, however, to find some means of livelihood, since the authorities refused to allow him half pay as an ex-officer on the grounds that he had been in employment.

In Blaricum, his home town, he was asked by a German Jew, Gustav LANDAUER, who had fled from Germany in 1938, if he would become his traveller for his business of manufacturing cushion stuffings etc. since he, being a Jew, was not permitted to travel. Source agreed and travelled for LANDAUER until the early part of 1942, when LANDAUER, being a Jew, was put out of business, and the factory not being big enough to give to a Verwalter, it was liquidated in fourteen days. Source then approached the Reichsbureau for a permit to set up in the same line of business on his own, which, in view of his military service, was granted. This business he still has.

ILLEGAL WORK

2. The illegal work which Source undertook in Holland consisted in the first place of the distribution of pamphlets, and later in delivering messages during his travels. His contacts appear to have been rather casual, nor did he give any clear account of the type of messages he carried: as an instance he said that he sometimes collected money from one person to take to the wife or family of a man who had been arrested for resistance. He also helped many Jews, chiefly by finding them safe houses in which to hide and by getting their ration cards stamped by his friends in the food office at Blaricum, the latter work now being carried on by his wife in his absence. He explained that by law a Jew can only get his ration card stamped in Amsterdam, nor can he use it in any other place.

He gave the following information on his contacts with organisations and individuals.

CONTACTS WITH ORGANISATIONS

3. (a) Ned. Unie.

The Ned. Unie was a patriotic organisation which came into existence after the occupation of Holland by the Germans, and included 90% of the Dutch population - in fact all parties except the Fascists. Its aim was only to unite the Dutch people into an anti-German body, under the belief apparently that this would influence the German attitude to Holland. It had a local organisation in each town for the distribution of leaflets, which was not forbidden by the Germans as the leaflets were not deliberately anti-German.

The first illegal work undertaken by Source was to help VOUTE, a member of the Ned. Unie to distribute anti-German leaflets which VOUTE himself stencilled and prepared. VOUTE was the sales director of a factory making artificial fertilisers and lived in a villa behind the Villa Rustoven near Maartensdijk (between Hilversum and Utrecht.)

(b) O.D.

Source had no contact with the O.D. except that he had twice been asked to join it, first by RIDDER, a smith in Maartensdijk, in August 1940, and again in November 1940 by BERGMAN of Blaricum. On both occasions he had agreed to join, but had heard nothing further. He thinks that the O.D. makes a list of patriots with the idea that, when invasion comes, they will be able to prevent revolution. Beyond this Source knows nothing about the organisation, except that it has encountered great difficulties and many of its leaders have been arrested.

(c) DODDY WOLZAK'S ORGANISATION

Through Lt. WEINBERG, an ex-colleague of the Military Air Force, Source met his sister-in-law, Diddy WOLZAK, who claimed to be the secretary of an organisation, which Source has called the 'Hoofd' (head) organisation, because he does not know its name. He thinks it is one of the best organisations in Holland, its work being:

- (1) Military resistance i.e. sabotage. Only one attempt had been made, however, on a railway, and reprisals were so heavy that further sabotage was abandoned. Source does not know if the organisation possesses any arms.

- (2) Semi-military resistance, organising sabotage and strikes in factories etc.
- (3) Non-cooperation of the civilian population, e.g. refusal to obey orders for handing in waste paper, wireless sets etc.

Sections (1) and (2) are divided into small local groups. Section (3) is organised by a council in each town with over 10,000 inhabitants, each council consisting of a financial organiser, a food controller, a factory representative and a local government representative.

The organisation is in contact with resistance movements among doctors and students, among the clergy and in the underground press.

As soon as it was certain that Source was going to England, a report on the Doddy WOLZAK organisation was prepared for him to bring over: it was not however ready when he left, and was handed to him in Paris by ARNAUD and subsequently given to one of VIS's men in the South of France, who said he could not take it with him to the Zone interdite des Pyrenees. Source read the report and states that it merely contains details of the organisation and its programme, asking for England's approval or alternative suggestions.

Source has no further information on the Doddy WOLZAK organisation or any of its members. Doddy had mentioned Admiral QUANT as a member, but again Source has no details.

(d) VAN VLIET'S ORGANISATION

VAN VLIET @ RIDDERHOF, who lived at Blaricum, got into touch with Source at the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943, to ask if he could use Source's address as a contact address, to which Source agreed. VAN VLIET himself had an official address in Blaricum, but hardly ever went there except to see his father-in-law whose name Source cannot remember. The approach was made by VAN VLIET, who called at Source's house, and not finding him at home told his wife that he was living under the name of VAN VLIET, but that his real name was RIDDERHOF. This Source was able to check up before pursuing the contact.

VAN VLIET was connected with General MAHIEU's (? spelling) organisation in Belgium: the General wishes him to have no direct contact with Dutch organisations, but to find information about them. For this purpose, he asked Source's help, but Source is unable to say why VAN VLIET selected him. He did not carry messages for VAN VLIET, nor work for him directly, though VAN VLIET had asked him to.

Every Wednesday or Thursday VAN VLIET went to Belgium returning on the Sunday, when he rang Source up to make an appointment for them to meet. He travelled to and fro by train, with a false letter purporting to come from one of the chiefs of the Gestapo, on production of which he was issued with an orange coloured paper allowing him to cross the frontier fourteen times. Source has seen these papers.

Besides the information about various Dutch organisations, Source gave VAN VLIET details about various factories (e.g. Fokker factories, the PANDER factory at the Hague, which makes glider wings.) This information Source obtained from a friend called DE JONG who lived at Blaricum and worked at Amsterdam in a group of insurance companies responsible for war insurance in factories.

Source states that he has entire confidence in VAN VLIET. It was VAN VLIET who asked him to go to England, saying that England had asked for someone to be sent over for instructions and then return to Holland. VAN VLIET said he was in touch with the U.K. by transmitter. Source's own idea was that an officer with more authority than himself should be sent over, and he went as far as to approach two officers of his acquaintance. Neither, however, was willing to go, probably because it was dangerous, as they said that if he did the journey successfully, they would be willing to go later. He was not willing to give the names of these two officers, because it might look as if they had failed in their duty, but their names have been given to Major Bingham among the safe addresses in Holland. Neither is a member of Doddy WOLZAK's organisation.

During Source's absence in this country, VAN VLIET is taking over his contacts, to which the General has agreed. VAN VLIET knew Source as HENK.

He is described by Source as very like Albert DE BOOY, the Dutch singer, who broadcast on the Dutch radio before the war. He is about 50 to 52, 1.70. m. in height, a heavily built man with grey eyes, clean shaven, hook nose, plenty of hair which is going grey, no spectacles. Before the war he had a small factory in Amsterdam, making art metal goods and also apparatus for making ozone. This business ceased after the war owing to the lack of raw materials.

(e) RINUS ORGANISATION

Through the Mesdames PONT, who were active in helping the Jews to escape to Switzerland, Source came into touch with Jan DE HAAN, a member of the RINUS organisation, who introduced him to BART, who was second to RINUS.

RINUS was a Dutchman who had left for England, but according to a message received in Holland about fourteen days before Source left (July 13th) had been arrested in Spain. WILLY, the organisation's contact man in Belgium, whom Source states he had never met, was also arrested about May this year in Antwerp.

The aim of the organisation was to obtain military intelligence and for this purpose they had divided Holland into sections. They had no arms and did not wish to have any. The organisation was short of money, and BART asked Source if he could get help from England. This Source tried to put through VAN VLIET, but the reply came back that England had not heard of RINUS nor of his organisation. VAN VLIET then offered to produce the money from Belgium, and arranged to hand it over to BART in Breda, but BART did not keep the rendezvous.

Source does not know where BART can be contacted, as it was always BART who telephoned to arrange their meetings. His description is: aged 38 - 40, 5 ft. 9½ in. with fairly dark hair, clean shaven, medium colouring, does not wear glasses and smokes: quite a usual type, his only striking features being prominent cheek bones.

(f) WITTE BRIGADE

This is an organisation in Belgium, about which Source knows nothing beyond the fact that BART was in touch with them and had asked them to get into WILLY's house after his arrest and collect whatever documents and money were left there. He thinks the General's organisation, to which ARNAUD belongs, is in touch with the WITTE BRIGADE.

(g) ORGANISATION OF JEREMIAH I

This is an organisation for sabotage of the chemical industry, of which JEREMIAH II and MARCUS IO are also members, and about which he heard from ARNAUD in Paris. ARNAUD gave him to bring back a photo copy of a report on this organisation, asking for instructions from England, which report he left with the Doddy WOLZAK report in the hands of VIC's men.

(h) COMMUNISTS

Source knows nothing about Communist organisations in Holland, except that they had a clandestine leaflet. He had sometimes met at the homes of his friends a Communist called 'ROODE WILLY' who was not in hiding. He stated that one never heard of the Communists committing acts of sabotage: the only reliable body which undertook sabotage was the Marineers, the remaining active part of the army in Holland, who were all in hiding.

INDIVIDUAL CONTACTS

4. (a) Lt. WEINBERG

WEINBERG, to whom Source passed information gained on his travels before he came into contact with VAN VLIET, was not a member of any organisation. Through him Source was able to sell to Kernopa (see below) who used cushion stuffings to make childrens' toys.

At the end of June 1943, WEINBERG, as a reserve officer, was taken as a prisoner of war to Germany. Source explains his own escape from this fate by the fact that he was registered as a member of the Passive Air Defence at Blaricum: he had indeed been an active member of this for a short time and although he had had to find a substitute as he travelled about so much, he still nominally drew the pay.

(b) Colonel KOPPERT

After the work of the Afwikkelings Bureau was completed in May 1941, Source remained in constant touch with Colonel KOPPERT, who treated him like a son and had indeed often jokingly introduced him as his son.

The Colonel had a legal education, though he had never practised law, and most of his time was spent investigating the genealogy of Jewish families, which he did with official sanction. He was able to save a number of Jewish families, by telling them how to complete the official forms, and he also saved two factories and a small business. One of these factories was M.V. Kernopa, belonging to WEINBERG and another Jew, and by saying the business had been sold before May 1st 1940, WEINBERG and his partner were able to keep it intact. It is now running under the name of WOLZAK and HUETING, the Colonel being a Director. WOLZAK, an estate agent, is the father of Doddy WOLZAK, who is WEINBERG's sister-in-law, and HUETING the chief accountant of one of the big Dutch banks. The factory makes collars, pullovers etc.

At the end of 1941, all Dutch officers who had not given up their commissions under the Queen, were sent as prisoners of war to Germany. Among those sent to Nuremberg at this time was the Colonel, but after about five months - around April 1942 - he came back to Holland in charge of a party of repatriated sick officers.

Apparently he was selected by the Germans themselves to take charge of the party, on the grounds that he had done more than any other officer for his fellow prisoners: the prisoners themselves would certainly not have selected him, as he was extremely unpopular. This story was confirmed by the wife of Captain PIETERS, one of the officers still in Germany, who showed Source her husband's letter on the subject.

On his return the Colonel continued to work for the Jews, and it was also at this time that he became a Director of Kermopa, which made sheets and pillow-cases for the Dutch prisoners in Germany. The Kermopa factory employees obtained permits to stay in Holland, instead of being sent to Germany, and as the permits were signed by the Director of the factory and did not require a German stamp, it was quite easy to issue additional ones and use them elsewhere.

Also on his return from Germany, the Colonel asked for an interview with General CHRISTIANSEN, the military commander of Holland, to complain about the lack of food in the Nuremberg camp. This, he told Source later, was remedied. Having heard the Colonel telephoning on two or three occasions to Major EHRHARDT, General CHRISTIANSEN's Adjutant, Source asked him if he had any military information which might be passed on to England, to which the Colonel replied that he himself was in touch with England by wireless. Source thinks this is possible but not probable, as the Colonel is fond of boasting about his powers and achievements. Regarding his friendly relations with General CHRISTIANSEN, Source attributes this to the fact that the latter is one of the Kaiserliche Wehrmacht and not a Nazi: so little is he a Nazi that he is constantly watched by a member of the Gestapo.

Source states that the Colonel's main activities were in helping the Jews, but it is possible that he had other schemes similar to a plan which had been arranged with an ex-member of the Afwikkelings Bureau named POORTVLIET, to seize the Yperburg aerodrome, which was adjacent to POORTVLIET's house. POORTVLIET was secretary to a Red Cross Division in a suburb of the Hague, with twenty men under him who were exempt from going to Germany, and he and his twenty men would take the aerodrome immediately upon the Allied invasion. The Colonel had also an arrangement with all ex-officers and N.C.O's remaining in Holland to meet at Maartensdijk where they would endeavour to get in touch with the invading army. Source kept a car in readiness at Blaricum to collect the Colonel and take him to Maartensdijk.

The Colonel was opposed to Source's coming to England, partly on the grounds that it was dangerous, and partly because he would be needed, probably for wireless communication, in an Allied invasion. Source did not tell him the purpose of his visit, nor that he intended to return to Holland.

Asked to what he attributed the Colonel's very active interest in the Jews, Source stated that it was not through friendship to the Jews themselves, whom he had stated he did not like, but because this was one way of hitting back at the Germans.

Source describes the Colonel as: 1.60 m. in height, not really thickset, but being small he looks it. What hair he has left is grey and he had a small grey Hitler moustache. He will be 62 on 31st Jan, 1944. He is a military type with fierce blue eyes, using spectacles only for reading. One or two teeth are missing and his teeth are generally discoloured, though he smokes only about one cigar a day. On the lapel of his coat he wears an 'outside' WILLEMSORDER cross.

(c) Kees VISSER @ Kees PRIUM

In Huizen Source visited Kees VISSER, a printer, to get some printing done for his own business. They spoke of the Underground Press, and VISSER offered Source a copy of 'Frij Nederland' and from the fact that it was not folded, Source deduced that VISSER had printed it himself. VISSER asked Source to carry messages for him, which he did.

VISSER's alias is PRIUM (meaning 'prune') because he has a deformity on one cheek which makes him look as though he is chewing tobacco and has a plum in his cheek: this is called chewing 'prium'.

(d) BUITENHOF-TEN-GATE

This man, who lived in Bussum, approached Source, who had taught him in Rotterdam, saying that he had a transmitter and would send to England any military information Source could give him. Before developing the contact, Source asked to bring him a pistol and ammunition: when he failed to do this, saying that Source could obtain them from a third party by giving a certain password, Source became suspicious and dropped the contact.

He also stated that he could send messages through another ex-trainee of Source's, STAM, who was in Switzerland. When, however, Source asked to send a message, he was told that STAM was now back in Holland which again made him suspicious.

(e) TULP

Source did no illegal work with him. TULP is now in Sweden, waiting to come to England.

(f) VAN EL

Source knew VAN EL through the Boy Scout Movement, where VAN EL was the leader of the seniors and Source the leader of another section. Although VAN EL resigned from the Scouts, the two were still in contact. Source himself was still connected with the Scouts, inviting a few boys to his home each week, which did not attract any particular attention, although the movement itself was forbidden.

(g) KOK

Source stated that he knew no one of this name.

(h) ANTON DE WILDE

Source stated that he had not heard of him.

(i) Jan BOTTEMA

VAN VLIET had mentioned Jan BOTTEMA as one of his contacts, saying that he could always hide with Jan BOTTEMA at Zoutkamp, but Source himself had not met him. According to VAN VLIET, Jan BOTTEMA was well known at Zoutkamp as the skipper of a lifeboat. After the Germans occupied Holland, he had apparently taken Major HOOD in the 'Helene' to an English ship.

Jan BOTTEMA had a false letter similar to the one which VAN VLIET used to cross into Belgium, and if VAN VLIET was caught, the arrangements were that VAN VLIET should take over from him.

(j) The DOMINIK at Bussum

This clergyman, whom Source was unable to meet because he was called away to a dying member of his flock, was illegally helping the Jews to get away to Switzerland. He was to put Source in touch with the Organistie X, about which Source can give no other information.

SUMMARY OF SOURCE'S CONTACTS

5. Source himself appears to be the link between his various contacts.

The Colonel, he states, would have nothing to do with any organisation, saying they were all childish and were only playing at adventures. He is stated to have known about the Ned. Unie and the work done by VOUTE, but if he belonged to any organisation, he must have been exceedingly clever to conceal it from Source. He apparently had nothing to do with the O.D. and advised Source against joining it, as it was dangerous.

Of all Source's contacts, the only one the Colonel knew was Doddy WOLZAK, but here again Source states that he had nothing to do with her organisation.

VAN VLIET was introduced to the Colonel by Source. They had arranged to meet in Utrecht, but the Colonel did not turn up. Later Source arranged for VAN VLIET to visit the Colonel at his house, whence he returned after half an hour's interview, saying that the Colonel was not dangerous, but that he could not be used for any organisation.

Doddy WOLZAK appears to be connected with no organisation except her own; at least Source states that she never mentioned it.

VAN VLIET had no other contact until introduced by Source to Doddy WOLZAK, the Colonel, Jan DE HAAN, the Mesdames PONT and through them to BART and the RINUS organisation. VAN VLIET knows ARNAUD, who is a member of the General's organisation in Belgium which, Source thinks, is in contact with the WITTE BRIGADE. VAN VLIET however, had no contact with the WITTE BRIGADE, and this contact was being arranged for him by BART.

It was VAN VLIET who took the report on the Doddy WOLZAK organisation and handed it over to ARNAUD to give to Source in Paris, and it was through ARNAUD and VAN VLIET that Source sent back to Holland a copy of a book called 'L'Heritage de ...' (he does not recollect the complete title) from which he had arranged a code, bringing another copy of the book with him to England. VAN VLIET was asked to give the book to BART, as the code was to be used for BART and Source himself by one of Source's former assistants in the Nederlandsche Sein Toestellen Fabriek, who, he thinks, is a member of BART's organisation, as BART knows him. This code was to be used for communication in case Source did not return to Holland and the agreed message over Radio Orange for its use was 'We will have a piano recital from Letty' - the operator is called LETTINGA.