

(CATARRH continued).

Containers to CATARRH combined with 2 S.I.S. men at a different point. A/C lost after delivery - 24.3.43.

A. LACROSSE.
Organiser Instructor.
22.4.43.

Containers to CATARRH combined with 1 S.I.S. man at a different point. A/C lost after delivery.
23.6.43.

(MALLOW continued.)

A. CUCUMBER A.
Organiser Instructor.

A. CUCUMBER B.
W/Op. 27.10.42.

A. HOCKEY.
Special liaison Officer to replace PARSLEY.

TENNIS.
W/Op. to HOCKEY.
18.2.43.

A. KOHLRABI.

Organiser Instructor.

A. SEAKALE.

Organiser Instructor.

A. SPROUT.

Organiser Instructor.
9.3.43.

A. GHERKIN.

Organiser Instructor

A. NETBALL.

W/Op. 22.4.43.

A. POLO.

Organiser Instructor

A. GROQUET.

Organiser Instructor

A. SQUASH

Organiser Instructor
22.5.43.

Legend.


A. = Phase A. Agent.

S. = Sabotage Agent.

----- Agents identified by CHIVE as being in captivity.

- - - - - Agents who must, on the assumption that CHIVE and SPROUT are correct, also be in captivity.

APPENDIX 1. - Diagram of Droppi



Dropping Operations.

S. PARSNIP
Sabotage Organiser
S. Holland.

S. SPINACH
W/Op. to PARSNIP & POTATO.
22.6.42.

S. BROADBEAN
Organiser of Escape Route -
Pigeon Service - Safe Houses

S. GOLF
W/Op. to BROADBEAN.
18.2.43.

S. TURNIP } Blind,
Sabotage Organiser } 28.3.42.
W/Op. SWEDE (?) }

1 man killed on landing.

A. BROCCOLI
W/Op. to KALE.

A. MUSTARD
Organiser Instructor.
28.11.42.

S. ENDIVE
Sabotage Leader to N. Brabant (?)
and Limburg.
16.2.43.

S. LEEK } Blind 5.4.42.
Sabotage Leader in in Overijssel }
W/Op. HECK.

No man was dropped to LEEK, but he had 11 Container operations of which 3 were successful: 3 A/c lost. LACROSSE, received by CATAHHH, was sent to LEEK (?) also LEEK A. received by LETTUCE.

S. CARROT Blind 27.2.42.
Sabotage organiser in Rotterdam.
No receptions: returned to U.K. on 2.9.43
having accomplished nothing.

GLASSHOUSE Blind 7.9.41.
No reception - returned U.K. 17.2.42.

S. POTATO
Sea route 19.4.42.
Organiser of Dutch end of ferry service U.K./Holland.
No receptions.

STATISTICS

HOLLAND

Number of Interrogation Reports analysed 65

Number of other reports analysed 23

In addition, all relevant information
has been extracted from Group 'B' Reports.

I N D E X

	<u>Page</u>
Agents and Casualties	2
Amphibious Operations	5
Arms	8
Arrival	5
Attacks	10
Bribery and Blackmail	10
Briefing	3
Cameras	9
Camouflage	9
Casualties	2
Codes and Cyphers	6
Communications, Internal	6
" Signal	5
Container Deliveries	2
Counter-Scorching	9
D-day Plans	3
Deliveries	2
Despatch	4
Dogs	9
Eureka	7
False papers	3
Financial Operations	10
Inks, Secret	6
Internal Communications	6
Medical Stores	9
Operations, Amphibious.. .. .	5
" Container	2
" Financial	10
" Sabotage	9 & Appdx. 'A'
Personal Attacks	10
Pigeons	6
Planning	3
Propaganda	9
Reception, Stores.. .. .	7
Sabotage	9
" Operations	Appdx. 'A'
Secret Inks	6
Signal Communications	5
S-Phone	6
Stores, Arms	8
" Cameras	9
" Camouflage	9
" General	8
" Medical	9
" Reception.. .. .	7
Summary	1
Training	4

EVALUATION
OF
S.O.E. OPERATIONS IN HOLLAND.

SUMMARY.

S.O.E. operations in HOLLAND were subject to the following important factors:-

- (i) Lack of co-operation from the Dutch authorities, especially during 1941-1943, which had a very adverse effect on operations and above all on recruiting.
- (ii) The small size and dense population of HOLLAND, which makes the selection of dropping grounds very difficult and pick-up operations virtually impossible.
- (iii) The geographical situation of HOLLAND rendered it a difficult and dangerous area from the operational point of view.
- (iv) Lack of co-ordination between S.O.E. and S.I.S. during 1941-1943, which had an adverse effect on S.O.E. activities.

As a result of these factors S.O.E. operations in HOLLAND were very difficult. These difficulties were unfortunately aggravated by the fact that the first W/T operator despatched to the field was arrested by the enemy and played back. In spite of this agent's efforts to warn the Home Station, the Country Section continued to have confidence in him and as a result dropped about 48 agents and some stores to enemy controlled reception committees during the period 1941-1943. As a result, there was in 1943, no British contact with Dutch resistance and from the beginning of 1944 to the end of the war a new organisation had to be built up and operated with great haste and under difficult conditions.

In spite of these handicaps an efficient organisation was built up and carried out successful attacks against road, rail and water communications, as well as industrial installations. In addition, the organisation was responsible for useful counter-scouring activities, particularly in port areas.

Although the results obtained were not as great nor as widespread as those in some other countries they were nevertheless significant and, considering the circumstances under which they were achieved, the Dutch Section who were working from 1944 onwards should receive full credit for them.

CONTAINER OPERATIONS

<u>Period</u>	<u>Containers</u>	<u>Packages</u>
1941	-	3
1942	282	21
1943	262	50
1944	2,789	336
1945	2,034	365
TOTAL	<u>5,337</u>	<u>775</u>

NOTE: Almost all 1941-43 deliveries were dropped to enemy controlled reception committees.

AGENTS AND CASUALTIES

<u>Period</u>	<u>Agents Sent to Field</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Missing</u>	<u>Survived</u>	<u>Note</u>
1941-43	55	34	13	8	
1944-45	86	15	4	67	Excluding Jedburghs
TOTAL	<u>141</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>75</u>	

NOTE: Nearly all agents dropped in the period 1941-43 were dropped to controlled reception.

PLANNING.

During the period 1941-1943 all plans were directed to establishing contact and building up an organisation. Unfortunately the plans adopted depended on too great centralisation in the field and early penetration by the enemy resulted in the destruction of the whole organisation.

From 1944 to the end of the war, the planning of the Dutch Section appears to have been sound and methodical. This is confirmed by the results obtained in a short time and working with haste under difficult circumstances.

BRIEFING.

S.O.E. briefed agents on their missions and the Dutch authorities briefed them on general conditions.

Seven agents stated that they were satisfied with their briefing and seven were dissatisfied, but of these seven two were handled by Airborne Forces.

The Country Section comments that up to early 1944 very little detailed information was available on conditions of work in HOLLAND and that for that reason briefing was not as good as it became later. This is true, and it was one of the prices paid for the early disasters in this country.

FALSE PAPERS.

The Country Section provided false papers which were to serve until new papers could be secured in HOLLAND. Agents were informed that the papers issued were not perfect and should be changed as soon as possible. Most agents understood the necessity for this system and there were no major complaints about papers.

D-DAY PLANS.

- (a) Agents were almost unanimous in saying that the D-day plans issued were clear and satisfactory. The only complaints came from two regions which were not in direct touch with LONDON.
- (b) It would seem certain that it would be disastrous to call out resistance under the circumstances which existed more than 48 hours before the arrival of Allied troops.

TRAINING.

1. W/T.

Agents generally considered the W/T training which they received to be satisfactory. Several of them felt that more time could have been spent on learning maintenance.

2. General.

Most agents stated that they were very satisfied with the training which they received. Group 'B' training was felt to be the most useful.

The only adverse comments received were:-

- (a) Several men reported that the Group 'B' course overstressed the need for security measures. (The history of the Section scarcely supports this contention).
- (b) Several wished they could have had training in driving motor cars and motor cycles.
- (c) A number felt that training in S-phone and Eureka was a waste of time as these devices were seldom used in HOLLAND.
- (d) One or two expressed the need for further military training if they were to engage in guerilla warfare.

DESPATCH.

Agents were satisfied with the arrangements for despatch as a whole.

The arrangements for searching seem to have been unsatisfactory. A number of agents report that they were not searched before departure. It may be that this was in part due to the fact that they were despatched from various aerodromes and that the system was not always the same. Nevertheless, some system should be devised by which searching is never omitted. This is essential, not only for the security of the agent, but also for national security.

A number of complaints were made that leg bags gave trouble. This was partly due to inexperience on the part of despatchers in affixing leg bags and adjusting them, but there is no doubt that the leg bag needs improvement.

Arrival /

ARRIVAL.

There are many complaints of bad despatch from aircraft. Despatchers were reported to be inefficient and sometimes indifferent. There were also many complaints of drops being either too high or too low.

The Country Section state that this was because Dutch operations were done by 38 Group who did not have the technique used by TEMPSFORD. Nevertheless this failure on the part of 38 Group to despatch efficiently was a serious one and in future every effort must be made to prevent such incidents which are bound to affect the agents' morale.

In two instances agents were dropped to the wrong committee. It seems that some system should be instituted by which such an accident cannot take place.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

Although two agents escaped by sea and various small boat operations were mounted across rivers there are no points of general interest to record under this head.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

- (a) From the technical point of view W/T communication with HOLLAND proved reliable and no special difficulties were experienced.
- (b) One W/T operator used a remote control system by which he could operate any one of five stations from a central control. He used assistants to tune the individual stations and could switch from one to another if enemy D/F activity made it desirable.
- (c) In the early stages of S.O.E. work in HOLLAND one W/T operator was arrested by the enemy and played back successfully for a long time. Other operators, who were arrested as a result of this original capture, were also played back. This serious sequence of events shows how necessary it is to produce a good system of safe checks and also how important it is for any suspicious messages received to be subjected to critical scrutiny by high authority.
- (d) One report emphasises the importance of broadcasts being issued before curfew to facilitate the work of couriers and messengers.

CODES AND CYPHERS.

All operators agreed that the O.T.P. was completely satisfactory.

INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

The two main systems used were couriers and telephone.

- (a) The courier system was quite satisfactory. Girls on bicycles proved the most useful messengers.
- (b) The use of the telephone on a wide scale for clandestine communications was peculiar to HOLLAND. It was made possible by the fact that responsible officials of the telephone service were members of the Resistance and were able to arrange for lines to be connected to secret switchboards worked by Resistance operators. The extensive Dutch telephone system, with a great number of underground cables, facilitated this system. In addition to its use for communication, this use of the telephone system proved very valuable in obtaining information on enemy intentions.

SECRET INKS.

There is no report of the use of secret inks in HOLLAND. Probably the system of telephone communication referred to above rendered such methods unnecessary.

PIGEONS.

S.O.E. did not use pigeons in HOLLAND.

S-PHONE.

A number of instruments were despatched to the field, but results were disappointing. Later on S-Phones were used most successfully for communications between the enemy-occupied area of HOLLAND and the advancing B.E.F. This was really an S.I.S. operation, although the personnel were from S.O.E.

The reasons for failure in S.O.E. operations appear to have been:-

- (a) A reluctance on the part of the R.A.F. to employ the S-Phone. This was aggravated by the use of 38 Group, which seldom had S-Phones fitted.
- (b) The fact /

- (b) The fact that the S-phone is not so simple to operate as it appears and that S-phone training was not sufficiently thorough.

EUREKA.

Several successful operations using Eureka were reported, but it was not widely used. This seems to have been due to two causes. One was the fact that Dutch operations were carried out by 38 Group, who do not seem to have been very keen on the use of Eureka. The second was that not many S.O.E. agents were in direct contact with reception committees and that the Country Section did not therefore send many Eureka's to the field. Some agents reported having asked for Eureka's but not receiving them.

STORES RECEPTION.

- (a) There are a number of complaints of loads being dropped to the wrong reception committee.
- (b) One agent complains that one delivery was laid on at short notice without an opportunity for him to confirm that he could accept. This led to a number of arrests.
- (c) There are an unusually large number of reports of parachutes failing and containers breaking up in the air. This may be due to the fact that the Group carrying out the operations were not accustomed to the work.
- (d) Although many successful deliveries are reported there are a large number of reports of very bad deliveries, some loads being dropped into the sea or up to 20 miles away. Scatter was often excessive and seems to have been due to high drops and inaccurate running up onto the lights.
- (e) There are several reports that containers and packages were not correctly numbered.
- (f) A few containers exploded or caught fire on landing. One package of hand grenades exploded in the air and betrayed the committee to the enemy.
- (g) Packages were frequently difficult to find, owing to scatter.
- (h) Several agents complained that the aircraft circled for too long, thus prejudicing security.
- (i) There are a few complaints that stores specially requested were never received. This was probably due to the need for standardising container contents.

(j) Packing /

- (j) Packing was on the whole satisfactory but there are a few complaints that Stens were rusty and that Medical kits and MCRs were not well packed. Fog signals were sometimes found to have deteriorated while packed.
- (k) Reception committee torches proved reliable.
- (l) A Waterproof container would have been valuable for work in HOLLAND.

STORES.

General.

All agents expressed their satisfaction with the quality of the stores received. No failures were reported and the only complaints were that the proportions received were not always suitable and that greater quantities were required. The first complaint is inevitable when standard cell contents are employed. The second was caused by the higher priorities allotted to other areas and to the difficulties of store deliveries in HOLLAND.

- (a) Many agents expressed the view that the most useful time pencils were the 10 minute and 30 minutes.
- (b) Tyre bursters were found very useful by several operators.
- (c) Incendiaries were praised by two operators.
- (d) Rail charges were found efficient and easy to handle.
- (e) White cordtex was considered too noticeable.

Arms.

- (a) For clandestine work the .32 Colt was preferred, but one or two men liked the Luger on account of its accuracy.
- (b) The Welrod was used successfully for liquidation.
- (c) The Silent Sten was also used successfully for liquidation.
- (d) Several agents expressed preference for Brens and Rifles over Stens, but complained that Brens were often damaged on landing.
- (e) Bazookas were often received with flat batteries and do not seem to have been very popular in HOLLAND.

Camouflage.

- (a) Several agents complained that the clothes with which they were supplied were too new.
- (b) Camouflage of tyre bursters was praised by one man.
- (c) Several operators used disguise with success. This usually consisted of wearing spectacles, changing hair style, growing or cutting moustaches and other simple changes.

Cameras.

35 mm. cameras were used for intelligence work, but require skilled operation.

Medical Stores.

These were found very useful.

DOGS.

One agent reports being searched for by Germans using dogs. He attributed his safety to a friendly gamekeeper who hid him and then took a bitch in heat over his trail.

SABOTAGE.

Sabotage in HOLLAND was not as widespread as that in other countries. This was in large part due to the late start of an effective S.O.E. organisation in the country. Nevertheless many useful operations were successfully carried out and a list of these is given in Appendix 'A'.

A study of the methods used in operations shows that there must have been a shortage of fully trained sabotage instructors. No doubt additional training in this subject would have produced enhanced results.

COUNTER-SCORCHING.

Reports show a number of successful counter-scorching operations, of which the most important were the sinking of blockships at ROTTERDAM and the immobilisation of a very large floating crane in the same port.

PROPAGANDA.

Few agents had anything to say about propaganda. Two mentioned seeing German notices and signs mutilated.

One man pointed out that dropping propaganda

leaflets /

leaflets endangered the population, who might be shot if found with a leaflet or seen picking one up. He considered it would have been better to distribute leaflets through the underground movements.

BRIBERY AND BLACKMAIL.

The most effective form of bribery, both with Germans and collaborators, was the promise of a favourable report on them when the Allies arrived.

This promise was used on several occasions - to obtain the release of arrested resisters, to prevent enemy demolitions, to adulterate enemy petrol and to obtain stores and materials.

FINANCIAL OPERATIONS.

One operator stole a large sum of money which was to be used by the Germans for paying railway employees.

The same man stole the title deeds of a large sum of Dutch money which was available for German use in SPAIN for the purchase of wolfram. The documents were stolen in the train from the man who was about to take them to SPAIN.

PERSONAL ATTACKS.

No special reports were received on this subject other than statements that Welrods and Silent Stens were successfully used for liquidation.

OPERATIONS.

ZONE 1.

REGION 1

- (1) Railway lines cut at BUITENPOST, DRONRIJP, HEBRENVEEN, OUDEGA-NIJHUIZUM and ST.NICOLAASGA.
- (11) Two telecommunication cables cut between LEEUWARDEN and KRONINGEN.
- (111) Local P.T.T. establishments saved by tampering with demolition charges.
- (iv) Explosive charges removed from several bridges in the Friesland area.
- (v) Attacks on German lines of communication, small patrols and straggling enemy elements - the Germans suffering a considerable number of casualties.

REGION 2.

- (1) Attack on the prison at LEEUWARDEN on 8 Dec 44 and effecting the release of 50 members of the local Resistance movements.

REGION 3.

- (1) Railway lines sabotaged at:-
 - (a) Junction south of MEPEL on lines running in direction of FRIESLAND, DRENTE and GRONINGEN.
 - (b) Between HOOGEVEEN and ASSEN.
 - (c) South of COEVORDEN, at the junction ZWOLLE-COEVORDEN and COEVORDEN-ALMELO.
 - (d) COEVORDEN-GERMANY.
- (11) Sabotage of Water Communications:
 - (a) Lock at STIELTJESCANAL rendered useless, also the lock in the ZWINDERSCHE CANAL, causing an interruption in the traffic to and from COEVORDEN for three months.
- (111) Sabotage of Telecommunications:
 - (a) Telephone lines cut in several places along the railway lines.

ZONE 2.

REGION 4.

- (1) Some 150 ton barges sunk in the TWENTSCHE-RHEIN canal.

- (ii) Draining of the ALMELO-HENGLO canal by opening the locks at WIENER, near DELDEN and destroying the electrical machinery controlling them. A delay 4/5 weeks was caused.
- (iii) Successful attack on the lock gates at KLOOSTER, near ALMELO.
- (iv) A number of successful attacks on railroads in the area.
- (v) Transport on roads crippled by tyrebursters, blowing down trees and using bent nails.
- (vi) In March 45 the whole Railway system in OVERIJSEL was put out of action and cuts effected at BORNE and on the line ALMELO-ZWOLLE at NIJVERDAL.
- (vii) German effort to divert rail traffic via DEVENTER-ZUTPHEN to HENGLO was frustrated by a derailment carried out between DELDEN and GOOR.
- (viii) Removal of signposts on crossroads and minefields.
- (ix) Sabotage of telecommunications.
- (x) Successful attacks on German demolition squads at bridges and a number of bridges held including two over the Canal from ALMELO to COEVORDEN.

REGION 5.

- (i) Three derailments after Sep 44 on the line RUURLO-WINTERSWIJK and one derailment on the line AALTEN-WINTERSWIJK.
- (ii) Delays caused on the railways by the removal of signal and Block system apparatus.
- (iii) Fuses removed from a charge on the bridge at s'HEERENBERG.
- (iv) Bridges at AALTEN occupied to prevent destruction.

ZONE 3.

REGION 6.

- (i) Derailment of a troop train on the line APELDOORN-ZWOLLE.
- (ii) Enemy telecommunications disrupted in the suburbs of APELDOORN.

REGION 8.

- (i) Having tapped the German telecommunications, the N.B.S. learned that an ammunition train was leaving ROTTERDAM for the ARNHEM area. They decided it had to be stopped before it reached the EDE DE KLOMP area. They blew the line up near DRIBBERGEN, near ZEIST, and as a precaution, also nearer ARNHEM. The attack was successful and the train had to return to ROTTERDAM.
- (ii) Railway office at UTRECHT raided to supply Resistance Forces with money. The sum of 1½ Million Guilders was seized.
- (iii) Complete dislocation of all railway traffic to and from UTRECHT by the cutting of lines at some 200 places in the area.
- (iv) Destruction of a large number of Wehrmacht cars in the area.

REGION 9.

- (i) Three cuts in the line AMERSFOORT - AMSTERDAM.
- (ii) One cut on the line HILVERSUM - UTRECHT.
- (iii) Three derailments on the line BUSSUM - WEESP.
- (iv) Two cuts on the line HILVERSUM - BUSSUM.
- (v) Small railway bridge over the canal at BAARN destroyed twice, each time resulting in a derailment.
- (vi) Small railway bridges at PRUINGRACHT, KARNEMELKSLOOT and KEVERDIJK destroyed resulting in the escape of some 600 political prisoners.
- (vii) Bridge over the VECHT on MERWEDECANAL destroyed.
- (viii) 60 German cars and lorries damaged by tyre-bursters and bent nails.
- (ix) 40 cuts in German field telephone lines.
- (x) Two kilometers removed from the HILVERSUM - BERLIN telephone cable.
- (xi) Two munition barges sunk by limpets.

ZONE 4.

REGION 7.

Nothing to report. No material was ever sent there and as no specific information trickled through, the area was not built up. In addition, owing to defences, the Air Ministry would not entertain air operations in the area.

ZONE 5.

REGION 10.

- (i) Attack on a battery charging installation. Two chargers were blown up and the factory set on fire.
- (ii) Attack on the PANDER factory for glider bodies at RIJSWIJK and by using bottles of phosphorous and benzol the factory was completely burned out.
- (iii) Continual attacks on the AMSTERDAM - HAARLEM railway line, delays caused varied from one day to some weeks.
- (iv) Destruction of the railway bridge at DIEMEN, near AMSTERDAM.
- (v) Hundreds of German cars destroyed by sabotage. In April and May the number varied from 10 to 12 per day.
- (vi) Destruction of a school building containing labour conscription registers. The records were completely destroyed.
- (vii) Sinking of a barge loaded with 200 tons of Gun Cotton in the River AMSTEL.

REGION 12.

- (i) D/Fing station at ARDENHOUT attacked and burned out.
- (ii) Five derailments on the lines LEYDEN/HAARLEM - HAARLEM/AMSTERDAM - HAARLEM/YMUIDEN.
- (iii) In March 45, forty Wehrmacht cars destroyed in garages in and around HAARLEM.
- (iv) Telephone lines were sabotaged.

REGION 13.

- (i) Railway sabotage. Points cut were: Railway bridges at ZEVENHUIZEN, between HEKENDORP and GOUDA, HET HAANTJE near DELFT. These lines were destroyed by means of explosives during the months of MARCH/APRIL 45 when a great deal of transport of V.2 material was taking place. Lines were blocked for periods varying from 1 to 8 days.
- (ii) Derailment of train loaded with A.A. material and troops, blocked the UTRECHT/ROTTERDAM and UTRECHT/HAGUE lines for 24 hours. Four derailed trucks loaded with A.A. material lay on the rails for some time.
- (iii) A number of German cars destroyed by tyrebursters and nails.
- (iv) German telephone lines cut at several places.

REGION 14.

- (1) In Nov 44, the Resistance, supplied with limpets from the U.K., sank the blockade ships "SCHONFELD" and "HANSA" in the port of ROTTERDAM, vessels of 11,000 and 9,000 tons respectively. As they were only able to place one limpet on the "HANSA" the Germans were able to refloat her fairly quickly. Three limpets were used on the "SCHONFELD" and it took the German engineers ten weeks to refloat her.
- (ii) In Jan 45, the "WESTERDAM" fully laden with gravel and cement and destined for the final blocking of the River Maas, was sunk by means of limpets on the 18th at her mooring berth in ROTTERDAM. She is still in the same position, upright, but sitting on the bottom of the dock.
- (iii) Resistance men sank the 180 ton floating crane TITAN in order to prevent its removal to Germany. She has since been refloated.
- (iv) A small railway bridge over a canal between SCHIEDAM and VLAARDINGEN, 3 kms. from SCHIEDAM, was blown up and prevented the further use of this line for onward traffic to the HOEK OF HOELAND up to the time of the German capitulation.
- (v) Raids on Ration book depots produced the following:-
- | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---|--------|-------|---|---------|----------|
| KLOOSTERZANDE | - | 48,000 | books | & | 150,000 | coupons. |
| MAASSLUIS | | 10,000 | " | & | 200,000 | " |
| DOORN | | 12,000 | " | & | 200,000 | " |
- (vi) The destruction of 300 bags of cement used for road blocks.
- (vii) Preservation of an electric pumping station at MAASSLUIS by cutting the underground detonating fuse.
- (viii) Destruction of 80 H.E. containers intended to blow the dykes surrounding the land below sea level near the HOEK OF HOLLAND.
- (ix) Removal of fuses leading to explosive charges under a railway bridge across the harbour at MAASSLUIS.
- (x) Removal of H.E. charges from lock gates just outside the HOEK OF HOLLAND.
- (xi) Rails cut at ACHTERDIJK.
- (xii) Rail cuts at GORKUM and ARKEL.
- (xiii) Barge, containing 300 Dutch political prisoners, sunk near DORDRECHT enabling them to escape.
- (xiv) Bridges at SLIKKERVEER and ALBLASSERDAM saved from demolition by cutting of fuses leading to the charges.
- (xv) About 200 Wehrmacht cars destroyed or damaged by abrasives, tyrebursters and bent nails.

- (xvi) In Apr 45 all railway lines around ROTTERDAM were cut simultaneously.
- (xvii) A 1000 ton lighter loaded with iron was sunk at the BOOMPJES near the LEUVEHAVEN, ROTTERDAM.
- (xviii) Two lighters loaded with engine parts, iron and copper, moored opposite the POSTHOORNSTEEG, ROTTERDAM, were sunk.
- (xix) A lighter loaded with engines (believed to be for U-boats) was sunk in the KATENDRECHTSCHER HARBOUR at ROTTERDAM.
- (xx) With the co-operation of a German, quay mines in the SCHIEHAVEN, MERWEDEHAVEN and WAALHAVEN, were rendered useless.

REGION II.

- (i) Railway tracks were cut at several places and, during the two months preceding the German capitulation, railway traffic was practically paralyzed.
- (ii) Attack on a railway bridge resulting in its complete destruction and also the derailment of the engine.
- (iii) Changing of signposts, placing of road blocks and sniping.
- (iv) Landmines placed on main roads.
- (v) Large lorry carrying Diesel oil completely burned out.
- (vi) All enemy cables destroyed North of a line SCHAGEN - MEDEMBLIK.
- (vii) A lighter loaded with machinery sunk and recuperated after liberation.

The following additional acts of sabotage have been reported:-

- (i) In Mar 44 as a result of a sabotage attack on the factory at HOEK PIERSON, the consumption of oxygen was cut by half.
- (ii) In Sep 44 the line ROOSENDAAL/BREDA/TILBURG/S'HERTOGENBOSCH was seriously affected - railway traffic in South and South-eastern HOLLAND was at a standstill and lines in Eastern HOLLAND were cut nightly.
- (iii) Lines cut between VEENENDAAL and RHENEN, AMERSFOORT and APELDOORN, AMERSFOORT to the SOUTH. Sabotage carried out on the railway bridges over the DEDEMSVAART and ZWOLLE-MEPPEL.

- (iv) The three blockade ships the "BORNEO", "WESTERDYK" and "AXENFELS" were sunk at ROTTERDAM.

October:

- (v) On 4 Oct it was reported that since 10 Sep thirty rail tracks had been cut and five major canals put out of action.
- (vi) The railway between AMERSFOORT and APeldoorn was cut, derailling a train and causing two days' delay on the line. A railway bridge two miles south of AMERSFOORT was blown up by the Resistance on 13/14 Oct. The line between AMERSFOORT and ZWOLLE was cut in four places on the night 20/21 Oct 44.
- (vii) The railway bridge between RIJSWIJK and DELFT was sabotaged.
- (viii) The lift bridge at WIJK BIJ DUURSTEDS was attacked, damage being caused to the lifting machinery.

November:

- (ix) Train derailed at HEERDE -EPPS.
- (x) German troop train derailed at BUDEL and WEERT - several Germans killed and wounded.
- (xi) Both tracks on the GROSBEEK-NIJMEGEN line blown up.
- (xii) Several waggons on the MAARSSSEN-BREUKELEN line derailed.
- (xiii) Railway line WEPPEL-ZWOLLE sabotaged.
- (xiv) Railway line ZWOLLE-MARIENBERG sabotaged.
- (xv) Derailment of one locomotive and 20 waggons at EDE DE KLOMP.
- (xvi) Raid on the Wehrmacht bank at ALMELO - 46,000,000 guilders seized.

January:

- (xvii) In Jan 45 a successful attack was reported on the ATLANTA building, AMSTERDAM, which contained registers of personnel due for labour service in GERMANY. Similar attacks were carried out on another building on 5 Jan. Another registration building in the PASEENDERGRACHT, AMSTERDAM, was also destroyed on 7 Jan and various registers of the population brought to a place of safety.

February:

- (xviii) Transformers supplying current to German Naval Establishments and important factories working for the German War Industry had been sabotaged.
- (xix) ROTTERDAM reported the sinking of a newly launched 3,000 ton vessel.

- (xx) UTRECHT reported the sinking of four barges loaded with 180,000 litres of oil.
- (xxi) 5 H.E. charges were placed in the S.D. office at the Singel, DORDRECHT - 16 S.D. personnel being killed.

March:

- (xxii) UTRECHT reported the cutting of all railways from AMERSPOORT to the EAST to impede the transport of political prisoners to GERMANY.

HISTORY

DCS

Anglo-Dutch Boundary Section

THIS APPENDIX IS FILED WITH THE DUTCH
Section Histories as no ANGLO-DUTCH Section
History has been found.

Appx B

3 copies

INTELLIGENCE APPENDIX TO
A.D.C.S. HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

The first successful operation launched by A.D.C.S. was introduced into SUMATRA at the end of June 1945, whereas JAVA did not come under the Group 'B' area of operations until after the Japanese surrender. As a result, the vast majority of intelligence received from the N.E.I. referred to the post-surrender period, relating principally to the activities and political attitude of the Indonesians rather than to the Japanese. Furthermore, a proportion of the parties introduced after the surrender were primarily concerned with R.A.P.W.I. work and consequently produced little or no intelligence: This was notably true of JAVA where only one operation (MOSQUITO) produced any intelligence at all. In spite of this, intelligence was received from eleven out of a total of fifteen parties introduced, representing a very high percentage of all intelligence from the N.E.I. received by army formations from the clandestine services.

During the period of concentration of 26 Indian Division in INDIA, daily intelligence summaries containing all information from field stations were passed to Force 136 Liaison Officer with Divisional Headquarters. This procedure was continued after the Division landed in SUMATRA, and the same procedure was subsequently applied to Force 136 Liaison Officer with H.Q. A.F.N.E.I. in Batavia.

With the increase of political unrest, however, and the consequent change of policy in regard to DUTCH parties, the volume of intelligence decreased rapidly and, at the time of writing, these parties have been withdrawn and preparations are in hand for the introduction of BRITISH parties under army and not Force 136 control. A short description follows of the intelligence activities of each party in order of introduction, parties which produced no intelligence at all being excluded.

S U M A T R A

1. TETHER/MUFF

This operation was parachuted into the HOETA-SAROE area at the end of June 1945, and later operated in the RANTAUPRANT area, producing intelligence of considerable value particularly with regard to communications. The value of TETHER'S information in this respect was recognised by an appreciative signal received at this H.Q. from A.L.S.S.E.A.

Analysis of all items of intelligence received from this operation:

Communications	21
Harbour Installations	4
Troop Dispositions	2
Troop Movements	1
Political	22
Economic	6