



**SECRET**

m/Gen/2

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION

**MOST SECRET**

INDEX

C/5175.

LONDON.

14th December, 1943.

*Ref has  
TMB  
11/12/43*

INDEXED

S.III / 3.

WITH C/D COMPLAINTS.

**MOST SECRET**

MR. LOXLEY.

reports to me that at your meeting Colonel Nicholls stated that he was engaged in a communication network for agents in Europe which would provide for them no red communication channels. I would point out that this arrangement is completed without consultation and would constitute a breach of standing agreement with me, which is the subject of correspondence to you for confirmation in June 1943.

I restrict S.O.E. to the use of "a total number of channels in Western Europe to cover the whole of Europe for transmitting to and receiving from agents in Europe". This imposes the two contingent obligations on me that interference or embarrassment with the result, I must reserve the right to limit the number of channels", and any increase in the number of channels and when S.O.E. require to increase the number of channels the matter would be brought up to me.

The fact that in the first instance, before I had referred the matter to the Foreign Office at all, I had to refer to the Foreign Office on a constitutional issue was at stake and also that the matter, unless very carefully controlled, might be a serious handicap to my own communications, and the danger of the lives of my agents abroad, is a serious compromise to the communications of other agents. It is necessary to write to C/D asking that no increase in the number of channels be taken without consultation with me.

For/

**MOST SECRET**

m/Gen/2

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION

INDEX

**MOST SECRET**

C/5175.

LONDON.

14th December, 1943.

Gambier-Parry reports to me that at your meeting on the 8th inst., Colonel Nicholls stated that he was engaged upon the planning of a communication network for agents in North-West Occupied Europe which would provide for them no less than four hundred communication channels. I would point out that if this scheme is completed without consultation with me it would constitute a breach of standing agreement between C/D. and myself, which is the subject of correspondence in March 1942 and of confirmation in June 1943.

This agreement restricts S.O.E. to the use of "a total of seventy-five channels in Western Europe to cover the whole of their requirements for transmitting to and receiving from agents". It also imposes the two contingent obligations that "if it is found that interference or embarrassment with S.I.S. communications result, I must reserve the right to ask for a reduction in the number of channels", and an agreement that "if and when S.O.E. require to increase the number of channels the matter would be brought up to re-consideration".

In view of the fact that in the first instance, before making this concession at all, I had to refer to the Foreign Office because a constitutional issue was at stake and also that any such scheme, unless very carefully controlled, might result not only in serious handicap to my own communications, but an increase to the danger of the lives of my agents abroad, and also in serious compromise to the communications of other Services, I find it necessary to write to C/D asking that no positive steps be taken without consultation with me.

For/

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

INDEXED

For your private information, Gambier-Parry was informed by Nicholls outside the meeting that a first contingent of one hundred American Army wireless operators, forming the advance guard of three hundred wireless operators, had just reported to him and were to be used to man wireless transmitting and receiving stations in this country. It would appear, therefore, that already measures are well advanced towards the project of a very large communications undertaking. Both in my own interest and that of the general war effort, I feel that this must be subjected to scrutiny.

I am therefore writing to C/D asking for a clarification of S.O.E. intentions and am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Loxley.

V. F. W. Cavendish-Bentinck, Esq., C.M.G.

**MOST SECRET**

m/Gen/2

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

British Embassy,  
LISBON.

INDEXED

S. III / 3

INDEXED

MOST SECRET.  
PERSONAL.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,  
4th October, 1943.

A line in reply to your letter to me of  
the 18th September to let you know that I have  
had a word with Harry Sporborg of S.O.E. about  
the passing to you and to our friends'  
representative of any intelligence which their  
man may pick up in Lisbon.

Sporborg readily agreed that the right course  
was for their man to pass to our friends'  
representative any and all intelligence which he  
might be able to gather, and that if it was of any  
political significance it should be passed to you  
as well. He promised to look into the matter  
with the departments of S.O.E. concerned, and to  
have a suitable telegram sent to their man in  
Lisbon.

Yours sincerely,  
(SGD) P.N. LOXLEY.

H.L.d'A. Hopkinson, Esq.,  
British Embassy,  
LISBON.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

*H.L.d'A. Hopkinson*

ns  
thing  
no  
er.  
tent  
no  
ntly  
a  
ld  
bove  
rsa-  
his  
ctions  
orts  
er-  
not  
y  
its  
ate  
on  
it  
ey  
l  
ie  
d  
cal  
E.  
t  
ut

MOST SECRET

m/Gen/2

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

INDEXED

British Embassy,  
LISBON.

18th September, 1943.

MOST SECRET.

PERSONAL.

*Dear Peter,*

I am still far from satisfied in regard to the relations between S.I.S. and S.O.E. in Lisbon. On the surface everything is perfectly amicable, and so far as I know there are no personal difficulties. On the other hand I am constantly getting small pieces of evidence to show that in fact the two organisations are working almost independently of one another. I will give you an example. As you know, I am in intermittent touch with Pangal, the former Roumanian Cabinet Minister, who from time to time provides bits of information and who recently has been acting in some degree as contact with the astellite countries. Through him I recently received an enquiry from a Roumanian emissary in regard to the measures which Roumania would have to take to give effect to unconditional surrender. This was reported in my telexgram to Moley Sarzent No. 1849 of 11th September.

A day or so after the meeting with Pangal referred to above S.O.E.'s representative here brought me the enclosed report which, as you will see, corresponds very closely to my conversation with Pangal. It transpired that he had only brought this to me because his headquarters in London had sent him instructions to report to us any information obtained in regard to peace proposals. He then produced various other intelligence reports which also would normally only have gone to London. Now, apart from the fact that it has always been very clearly understood that S.O.E. is not an intelligence organisation and is not expected to go out of its way to obtain intelligence but only to report such information as may reach it in the course of its other functions, it seems to me wholly wrong that S.O.E.'s people here should be sending stuff home which they communicate neither to the diplomatic staff nor to C's representative.

I am writing to you about this because I feel that action can probably only be secured from above: in other words, that if I were to try to insist on S.O.E. showing me everything they send back and at the same time passing it to C's man it would probably result in our being told that their streams of information had dried up. I do not want to make a row of the thing because, as I say, personal relations are satisfactory, but I think that S.O.E.'s representative here should get a directive from his headquarters that all intelligence obtained is to be communicated to C's man, and that anything of political interest is to be shown to myself.

I do not wish to raise the question of whether S.O.E. intelligence should be collated here or in London. In the Middle East, as you probably know, the procedure is that S.O.E. turn in all their information to C's man, who then assesses it and reports it to London in whatever form he thinks best. Personally I think that would be the best system here also, but there may be considerations which render this impossible.

*Yrs. ever,*

*John - Hopkinson*

P. Loxley, Esq.,  
FOREIGN OFFICE.

S.O.E. Liaison Arrangements.

MINUTE SHEET

ADSI - Liaison 4 **B**

CX .....

Source .....

No. 1008.

Date 7.9.43.

DISTRIBUTION

C.S.S.

It is not easy to understand what is really proposed in paragraphs 7 to 13 of this paper. Paragraphs 8 and 9 seem definitely to propose that Intelligence messages of the highest importance received by S.O.E. will be sent to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat by S.O.E., and paragraph 10 proposes that alternatively they may be passed direct to operations sections in the Service Ministries. Paragraph 12, however, states that messages dealing only with Intelligence will continue to be sent only to us.

2. Paragraph 11 is also vague, but it seems to suggest that we are to receive copies of the Intelligence reports which S.O.E. send to operations sections of Service Ministries, but not copies of those messages which S.O.E. deem of sufficient importance to send to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat as proposed in paragraph 9.

3. On the assumption, however, that it is definitely proposed that S.O.E. should send Intelligence received by themselves direct either to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat or operations sections of Service Ministries, I consider that we should strongly oppose the proposal. S.O.E. are in fact going infinitely further in this line than we do ourselves, for they apparently propose to cut out the Intelligence departments of the Service Ministries. My experience is that S.O.E. are utterly incapable of handling Intelligence and assessing what its importance may be. They have recently got wildly excited concerning the most fantastic reports from Denmark which suggested, inter alia, that Hitler was under arrest, and I am quite sure that under the proposed arrangement this is one of the reports that they would have decided to send direct to the Chiefs of Staff Secretariat. It would be dangerous from the point of view of a false value being placed on these Intelligence reports if S.O.E. were to cut us out and send them direct to Intelligence departments, but it would be infinitely more dangerous if the present proposals were adopted.

4. Also, if this arrangement were approved, I feel sure that S.O.E. would start creating a regular Intelligence department of their own. I suggest that we strongly oppose the suggestions which I understand are being made in paragraphs 7 to 13, and stand out for the present arrangements continuing unaltered.

ACTION PROPOSED

7. 9. 43

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

# MINUTE SHEET.

CX .....

Source .....

No. ....

Date .....

### DISTRIBUTION

C.S.S.

I take grave objection to the proposals in paras. 7 - 13 of C.O.S.(43)505(O), as I think they will create the utmost confusion.

Para. 7. I have no remark to make.

Para. 8. Unfortunately intelligence received through S.O.R. sources has not always been sent to "C" only.

Para. 9. Whilst this can be done, of course, it is surely much better that the Chiefs of Staff should receive this information properly vetted by their Directors of Operations or Directors of Intelligence, as the case may be.

Para. 10. Were this to read that S.O.R. should be authorised to pass direct to the appropriate Operation Sections of the Service Ministries messages of an operational character, there would be little objection.

Paras. 11-12. Surely there is no real difficulty in differentiating between intelligence and operational messages. Where the message contains both, it is elementary that the Operation and the Intelligence Sections of a Staff should each receive a copy. Where it contains only operations it should go to the appropriate Operation Section of the Service Ministry concerned; where it contains intelligence it should go to S.I.S. and be distributed by the circulating sections to the intelligence sections of the Service Departments concerned, with appropriate comments, if any, in accordance with S.I.S.'s knowledge of the matter from other sources.

Such practice will avoid all the duplication and confusion that is likely to result from the proposals of the above paper, and will keep the whole procedure in accordance with what has hitherto been considered sound General Staff practice.

### ACTION PROPOSED

6.9.43.

THIS IS A COPY  
 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
 IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
 ACT 1958



## MINUTE SHEET.

C.X. \_\_\_\_\_  
Source \_\_\_\_\_  
No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. I consider the proposals in paras: 7 to 13 of C.O.S. (43) 505 (O), which come under the heading of "S.O.E. Intelligence", are most undesirable.

2. If approved, the effect will be tantamount to setting up a new intelligence service, with all the duplication and confusion which that implies.

3. Para: 8 lays down that "messages of the highest importance" will be transmitted direct to the C.O.S. Secretariat, who will be responsible for giving them such further distribution as they consider necessary. There is no guarantee, therefore, that we shall see such messages.

4. The C.O.S. Secretariat is not, and does not purport to be, a body which is able to judge the significance or importance of a message, from either the operational or intelligence aspect. In effect, all the C.O.S. Secretariat will do is to hand on such messages to the Directors of Operations or Intelligence, or to the J.I.C. as a whole, and ask them to indicate what distribution these messages should receive, and what action, if any, is required. At this stage, the Directors of Operations or Intelligence may wish to consult us.

5. The effect of introducing another distributing authority or "post office", viz. the C.O.S. Secretariat, will merely be to cause more delay, before any action can be taken, than would have been the case if the messages had been sent straight to us and passed by us to the appropriate authority. In other words, just one more link in the chain.

6. A similar effect will be produced by the proposal in para: 10 that S.O.E. should pass messages of lesser importance direct to the "appropriate operations sections of the Service Ministries." If such messages are concerned, as seems likely, with events in foreign countries and the operations of foreign guerilla forces or resistance groups, the operational sections in the service Ministries will want to pass them back to the intelligence sections in order to obtain their views. The intelligence sections may then wish to consult us. Hence there will be more delay than if they had been passed by us direct to the intelligence sections; also more duplication, because copies of these messages are apparently going to be passed through us as well.

### DISTRIBUTION.

C.S.S.

### ACTION PROPOSED.

P.T.O.

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

7. I do not think this system of distribution will appeal to the Directors of either Operations or Intelligence who will probably be the first to realise how much confusion and duplication it will entail.

8. As regards Annex "B", I understand that Air Commodore Thornton proposes to take exception to the arrangement whereby all liaison between S.O.E. and the Admiralty, irrespective of whether policy, plans, or administration are concerned, is through Admiral Taylor, whereas he, Thornton, is supposed to deal with the Air Ministry merely on questions of air policy, and not on questions effecting the planning of S.O.E. air operations, or those affecting the administration of S.O.E. air personnel. I anticipate that the Air Ministry will support him in this.

9. This is primarily a matter between the Air Ministry and S.O.E., but it also affects me when I find myself in the ridiculous position of discovering that a paper on air policy, which had apparently been agreed to by you, CD, Thornton, Boyle, Barry and Major General Gubbins has apparently been turned down again at the last moment because the latter has had second thoughts about it.

8.9.43.

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT  
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT  
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF  
THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958.

COS(43)505(0)

4 September 1943

**MOST SECRET**

M/Gen/2

PLANS/311/582

6 Jan 43.

TO: D/CD(10) and MG, D/S, D/NAVY, S/N,  
D/RE

FROM: D/PLANS.

**MOST SECRET**

6 - MAR 1943

**SECRET**

ADP/IE/2838.

5.3.43.

134

TO: D/PLANS.

FROM: AD/P.

Copies to C.D., D/CD(6) & AD/S.

Your Plans/481/921 of 4th March. The C.O.S. decision as to the overriding importance of C.'s work is a re-affirmation of a previous declaration. I feel that there is a very useful opportunity for C.D. to ask C in what way we can help apart from the normal supply of information sent to him as and when received.

Would he, for instance, like a special directive sent to agents in any part he could not cover? Would he like instructions to be sent to any of our personnel in particular places to lie low and not take any S.O.B. action etc?

We should try to cooperate in every possible way as you say though I don't expect our dropping or infiltration plans will have to be curtailed. I doubt if 'C' has enough trained men or reporting sources.

ies  
e  
ould  
er  
d  
form  
.S.  
f  
ght  
ner  
the  
e  
he  
e  
der-  
h  
rity.  
ience  
s-in-  
uld  
ned  
il  
lown

**MOST SECRET**

m/Gen/2

PLANS/311/582

6 Jan 43.

TO: D/OP(1) and MG, D/S, D/NAVY, S/N,  
D/RF

FROM: D/PLANS.

**MOST SECRET**

C.O.S. (43) 53rd Meeting (C)

**MOST SECRET**

PLANS/481/321 14th March, 1943.

TO: C.S., (S/S), D/PLANS.  
AD/P, AD/S.

FUTURE OPERATIONS  
LACK OF INTELLIGENCE.

1. Colonel Price told me yesterday that this decision had been taken in the morning, and I said that "C" of course got all the intelligence we obtain, and made such use of it as he thought fit.
2. You may consider it worthwhile suggesting to Country Sections that, while this priority allotted by the Chiefs of Staffs obtains, we should do all we can to obtain information of this nature.
3. I am not sure whether this activity would be acceptable to "C". We ought perhaps to ask him first of all whether he requires our cooperation.
4. The sooner the information required has been obtained the sooner will this priority accorded to intelligence be removed.

of C.O.S.

OF INTELLIGENCE

importance of  
ace concerning  
s, with particular  
rman formations

difficulties which

of view of the  
the war, "C's"  
t Europe were

D/PLANS.

PLANS

**MOST SECRET**

m/Gen/2

PLANS/311/582

6 Jan 43.

TO: D/GEN/1 and MG, D/S, D/NAVY, S/N,  
D/RF

FROM: D/PLANS.

**MOST SECRET**

C.O.S.(45) 33rd Meeting (C)

Extract from Minutes of Meeting of C.O.S.

held on 3rd March, 1943 at 10.30 a.m.

Item 3. FUTURE OPERATIONS - LACK OF INTELLIGENCE

SIR ALAN BROOKER emphasized the importance of obtaining the best possible intelligence concerning the movement of enemy forces in Europe, with particular reference to the identification of German formations in France and the Low Countries.

"C" explained to the Committee difficulties which had been encountered.

THE COMMITTEE:-

Agreed that, from the point of view of the effective prosecution of the war, "C's" requirements in North West Europe were over-riding.

D/PLANS.

Distribution:

- DCD(O)
- AD/P
- AD/S

PLANS

**MOST SECRET**

m/Gen/2

PLANS/311/582

6 Jan 43.

TO: D/CE(O) and MG, D/S, D/NAVY, S/N,  
D/R, D/CE, D/RF, F, D/CCO, AMV, D/HV.

FROM: D/PLANS.

STATE RAIDING

31 JAN Entd

m/Gen/14

PLANS/130/721.

30th January, 1943.

To: C.D. through AD/W.

Copy to: DCD(O)

From: D/PLANS.

1. We have been shown a copy of a telegram from Field Marshal Wavell to the Chiefs of Staff, the gist of which is as follows:-

1. Investigating feasibility of (a) better information and (b) anti-Japanese activity in Northern Sumatra.
2. Both projects made difficult by lack of transport particularly submarines and shortage of suitable personnel. In view of shortage of both consider S.O.E. and S.I.S. should pool resources for this neighbourhood and ask Chiefs of these organisations should issue appropriate orders.
3. Consider Dutch authorities London should know of my projects. Will do nothing without consulting Dutchmen here.'

2. It is possible that the C.O.S. may consider this telegram on Monday morning the 1st February, and in order that C.I.G.S. may be briefed as to our re-actions, I have, after our discussion this afternoon by telephone, informed Major Gotch that we would welcome Field Marshal Wavell's proposal.

3. We have after all set the precedent in West Africa in regard to personnel, and we virtually share S.O.E. and S.I.S. aircraft for transport operations from this country.

  
D/PLANS.

PLANS

**MOST SECRET**

m/Gen/2

PLANS/311/582

6 Jan 43.

TO: D/CE(O) and MG, D/S, D/NAVY, S/N,  
D/R, D/GE, D/RF, F, D/CCO, AMV, D/HV.

FROM: D/PLANS.

SMALL SCALE RAIDING

Reference ADL/534 dated 24 Dec 42.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee, on 4 Jan 43, considered the paper on Small Scale Raiding submitted by the C.C.O.

THE COMMITTEE:-

- (a) Agreed that it was necessary to maintain the activities of S.I.S. both in France and in Norway. Where the proposed activities of S.O.E. and S.I.S. and minor raids clashed in any area, S.I.S. would ordinarily be given priority;
- (b) Agreed that it was for the Admiralty to decide whether the Chief of Combined Operations' seaborne raiding operations and the activities of S.O.E. did in fact prejudice the security of S.I.S. operations;
- (c) Agreed that the Admiralty should be requested to inform the Chiefs of Staff if at any time the needs of S.I.S. operations were seriously restricting the ability of C.C.O. and S.O.E. to operate. In this event it might be necessary for the Chiefs of Staff to decide whether the raids were of sufficient importance to override the needs of S.I.S.;
- (d) Agreed that the planning of all clandestine seaborne operations, whether originated by C.C.O., S.O.E. or S.I.S., would be co-ordinated by the Admiralty or the Flag Officer delegated by them. The conduct of the operations would normally be directed by the Commander-in-Chief concerned, except for those raids for which the C.C.O. was authorised to be the operating authority.
- (e) Took note that the planning, organisation and experience of C.C.O. would be available to the Naval Commanders-in-Chief. Suggestions by C.C.O. were welcome and should be forwarded through the Commanders-in-Chief concerned or to the Admiralty;
- (f) Invited the Admiralty to inform Commanders-in-Chief concerned (including the Commander-in-Chief, Coastal Command) of the policy for small scale raids laid down by the Prime Minister.

*MawR*  
D/PLANS



27 JUL 1942  
158

25th July, 1942.

To. AD/S.

From. A.D.4.

I send herewith papers which will I hope be of use to you in considering the S.O.E. charter. The foundation is of course the White Paper drafted by Gladwyn when S.O.1. and S.O.2. were amalgamated under Dr. Dalton. This I am told is in your own office.

The papers are:-

(1) File P. which contains:-

- (a) A draft of S.I.S. proposals for an amended annex II (of the original charter) to the paper entitled "Subversion", and various comments on this paper. I can find no trace that an agreement was ever signed.
- (b) Papers concerning the appointment of Sir S. Findlater Stewart as high level conciliator.
- (c) A letter from C.D. to the D.N.I. dealing with the creation of N.I.D.(Q) and draft instructions for the work of an S.O.E.-Naval Section.
- (d) Letters concerning relations with the C.C.O.
- (e) Letters sent by the Foreign Office to Chiefs of Allied Governments defining the role of S.O.E.
- (f) Letters exchanged between General Ismay and Brigadier Hollis concerning relations between the Chiefs of Staff and S.O.E.
- (g) A long paper on collaboration between British and American S.O.E.

(2) File I.10,5 (Ministry of Information, liaison with),

In this you will find flagged the Ministry of Information paper on liaison with S.O.E., with amendments by S.O.E. underlined in red. I understand that this is an agreed paper save as regards West Africa which is still under consideration.

- (3) The Treaty with the Foreign Office.
- (4) Copy No. 9 of D/CD(A)'s report to S.O.
- (5) S.O.'s report to the War Cabinet.
- (6) File C.D. I.10/2a, containing the Anderson Award and all the documents concerning it.
- (7) File C.D. P.5/23, which deals with the creation of P.W.E. and an attempted allocation of duties as between S.O.E., P.W.E. and the Ministry of Information.

For the purpose of my records, would you ask your secretary to send me a note saying that these files and papers mentioned above, have been received by you. You will of course return them to this office as soon as convenient and I ask you not to break up any of the files unless it is essential that you should do so.

10 Downing Street.  
Whitehall, S.W.1.

15th June, 1942.

Reference P/4074/134.

To: S.O.

From: AD/S.

Here are some letters which I think you will be interested to read.

Major Horton's letter to G.D., which begins the series, was written by him following his meeting with the Chiefs of Staff to discuss the problem of the relationship between S.I.S. and S.O.E. You will remember that when he last came to see you it was partly to obtain information to bring him up to date before attending this meeting with the Chiefs of Staff.

The correspondence seems to me to show a very satisfactory outcome.

*RS.*

*Very good indeed.*

*S.O. 15.6.*

1942.  
I do  
st.  
ry  
we should  
E, and  
ajor  
are  
ur ordinary  
ter Stewart  
be

1117 W/1201/111  
2500,000 541 JCB/L  
Gp 7K/210  
(REGIMITE)

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Committee.

2nd June, 1942.

10 Downing Street.  
Whitehall, S.W.1.  
29th May, 1942.

C O P Y

MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM

CD/2162

6th June, 1942.

With whatever feelings you may have in the matter I do think we should go together and call on Findlater Stewart. He has been appointed by our elders. He is a very charming and clever person and out of common politeness we should visit him even if only to give a nil report.

Will you let me know time and date that would be convenient and I will make an appointment with him. As the matter is social, why not a lunch?

Personally I believe he will be very useful to us, and while I agree that, whether our friend exists or not, major questions of policy must go to the Chiefs of Staff, they are busy men and cannot possibly be expected to attend to our ordinary problems.

You will also agree that the existence of Findlater Stewart is in itself a guarantee that his services will rarely be required. We must at least remember our manners.

CD.

C.S.S.

(Sgd.) A.F. BROOME

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Committee.

2nd June, 1942.

C O P Y

MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM

AM/XX/2141

4th June, 1942.

TO: AD, H, AD/W, AD/S, AD/U, AD/P  
AD/E, I/PIH.

FROM: AD/L

I attach a letter which has been sent by the C.I.C.S. as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to the following Allied Governments:-

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| NORWAY - H.E., O.P. Topp,<br>Minister of Defence.  | FRANCE - General C. de Gaulle  |
| BELGIUM - Mons. H. Rollin,<br>Ministry of Defence.   | HOLLAND - Admiral Purstner,<br>R.N. Navy H.Q.  |
| YUGOSLAVIA H.E. Dr. Slobodan<br>Jovanovic,<br>(Copy to - Colonel Racic,<br>Military Representative, Cairo.)            | GREECE - Dr. Konolopoulos,<br>Vice-President of<br>Greek Council, Cairo.<br>(Copy to - M. Michalopoulos,<br>Under Sec. For Information.) |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA - General Rudolph<br>Viest,<br>Minister of State.<br>(in the absence abroad of - H.E. General S. Ingr.) | POLAND - H.E. Gen. Sikorski.   |

2. I also enclose copy of a covering letter from the C.O.S. to the F.O. asking them to forward this letter as it was in a number of cases addressed to civilian authorities.

3. The original will be filed in the C.O.S. office and I enclose sufficient copies for issue to all country and mission sections and to missions in the field. Would you please let me know if you require further copies.

(Sgd.) A.F. BROOKE

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Committee.

2nd June, 1942.

C O P Y

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

C O P Y

SECRET

Ref: B/S.O./1.

3rd June, 1942.

Dear Strang,

The paper about action by patriots in the occupied countries, to which you referred in your letter (C 4847/G) of 26th May, has now been approved by the Chiefs of Staff and has been signed by C.I.G.S.

The list of addressees, with which S.O.E. have furnished us, includes, as you will see, a certain number of civilian authorities. In view of the penultimate paragraph of your letter, you will probably prefer to send the memorandum through Foreign Office channels.

.... I, therefore, enclose enough copies of the signed document, to go to all recipients, civil and military, and I should be very grateful if you could arrange for them to be ... forwarded. I enclose two spare copies for your file.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) G.R. PRICE

W. Strang, Esq., C.B., C.M.G.,  
Foreign Office.

(Sgd.) A.F. BROCKE

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Committee.

2nd June, 1942.

C O P Y

MOST SECRET

MEMORANDUM

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

It has been suggested that a common Allied Staff should be formed to deal with all subversive activity in the occupied territories. The special function of this staff would be to co-ordinate and direct such activities in order that they might render the maximum assistance in any future Allied offensive.

2. The importance of the preparation of the peoples of Europe, at present subject to Nazi rule, to take their share in the overthrow of Germany has long been accepted by His Majesty's Government, and by its Military Advisers, and it was largely with this object in mind that the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) was created. The functions suggested for this common Allied Staff are at present covered by the S.O.E.

3. The present method by which S.O.E. works in close collaboration with our planning staff, and with the Chiefs of Staff Committee, enables activities in occupied Europe to be co-ordinated with the whole war plan.

4. We believe that the organisation of a common Allied staff to deal with these activities would serve no useful purpose, particularly as it would not be in a position to relate its recommendations to the requirements of the war as a whole.

5. S.O.E. should therefore continue to act as the co-ordinating authority, dealing with the General Staffs of the Allied Governments whose territories are occupied, and with the Free French General Staff, and acting as the agent to whom these General Staffs should refer all matters in connection with sabotage and the organisation of resistance and secret armies.

6. In view of the importance which we attach to subversive activities on the Continent, I am sure that you will give S.O.E. the closest and most whole-hearted co-operation.

Copies of this letter have been sent to the appropriate Belgian, Czechoslovakian, Netherlands, Free French, Greek, Norwegian, Polish and Yugoslav authorities.

(Sgd.) A.F. BROOKE

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Committee.

2nd June, 1942.

10 Downing Street.  
Whitehall, S.W.1.  
29th May. 1942.

MOST SECRET.

Dear C.H.

Copy.  
CH/2121.

3rd June. 1942.

Offices of War Cabinet,  
Great George Street, S.W.1.  
8th June. 1942.

SECRET

Copy.

B/S.O./1.

Dear CH.

I thank you for your letter of 3rd June (CH2121) which I placed before the Chiefs of Staff this morning. They cordially accepted your proposals which they thought would provide an excellent liaison system between the S.O.E. and the Chiefs of Staff organisation. The C.I.G.S. will be away for a day or two during this week and so it might be better if your first meeting with the Chiefs of Staff was arranged for next week. I will, of course, give you as much notice as possible.

Signed. L.C. HOLMES

for your letter of 29th May.

I am assured that I will do everything possible to ensure that the Chiefs of Staff organisation work in the best way possible and, as I told you at our conversation, I believe the problem can best be tackled in

at the top to consist of a regular monthly meeting of Staff to run over the ground and, in addition, individual visits to the Chiefs of Staff on specific points of interest or difficulty. This has been undertaken by Brigadier Gubbins and myself. Both the Brigadier and myself should have access to the Liaison Office which may be of value to us in the future. This could be seen by visits to the Liaison Office so that the documents need not

be sent to the Liaison Office. Liaison on the lower plane with the Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Planners, to be carried out by Colonel Guinness.

The Secretary of Staff and therefore is responsible for all plans throughout the whole organisation. Existing arrangements which he has made are being reviewed and I will take steps to see that he is given sufficient staff to enable him to be more available for the above

of Staff feel that the above arrangements are suitable to them, Gubbins and I will be at their disposal.

Yours sincerely,

Lt-Gen. L. Ismay. CB. D.S.O.

any time a matter on which they wished to consult S.O.E. was not of major importance.

I hope Lord Selborne and you will not find any great difficulty in coming to an agreement with the Chiefs of Staff on the above lines, if they are put forward. I hope they will be, as I think they could be made very helpful to you.

Yours ever

DEMOND MORTON.

10 Downing Street.  
Whitehall. S.W.1.  
29th May. 1942.

MOST SECRET.

Dear G.H.

Copy.  
CH/2121.

3rd June. 1942.

Dear General.

Thank you for your letter of 29th May.

You can rest assured that I will do everything possible to ensure that S.O.E. and the Chiefs of Staff organisation work in the closest possible touch and, as I told you at our conversation yesterday afternoon, I believe the problem can best be tackled in the following way:

1) A liaison at the top to consist of a regular monthly meeting with the Chiefs of Staff to run over the ground and, in addition, frequent individual visits to the Chiefs of Staff organisation to discuss specific points of interest or difficulty. This liaison will be undertaken by Brigadier Gubbins and myself. I would also ask that the Brigadier and myself should have access to most secret information which may be of value to us in carrying out our tasks. This could be seen by visits to the Chiefs of Staff Organisation Office so that the documents need not leave the premises.

2) A day to day liaison on the lower plane with the Chiefs of Staff Organisation and the Joint Planners, to be carried out as at present by Lt Colonel Guinness. This officer is on my Secretariat and therefore is responsible for the co-ordination of all plans throughout the whole organisation. I believe that the existing arrangements which he has made are satisfactory and I will take steps to see that he is given sufficient assistance so that he could be more available for the above work.

If the Chiefs of Staff feel that the above arrangements will be satisfactory to them, Gubbins and I will be at their disposal at any time suitable to them.

Yours sincerely,

Major General Sir Hastings L. Ismay. CB. D S.O.

any time a matter on which they wished to consult S.O.E. was not of major importance.

I hope Lord Selborne and you will not find any great difficulty in coming to an agreement with the Chiefs of Staff on the above lines, if they are put forward. I hope they will be, as I think they could be made very helpful to you.

Yours ever

DESMOND MORTON.



10 Downing Street,  
Whitehall, S.W. 1.  
29th May, 1942.

MOST SECRET.

Dear G.H.

I have telephoned the substance of the following

Circulate to  CD  
AD, 1, 4  
AD/Reg

F/134

Ref. CH/2032.

31st May 1942.

Many thanks for your letter of the 29th May.

You seem to have had a very successful hour with the Chiefs of Staff for which S.O.E. and S.I.S. should be indebted to you. As I told you I think our anxieties regarding our relations have been greatly exaggerated and if we can both have direct liaison with the Joint Planners and the Chiefs of Staff I do not believe there will be very much to worry about.

With regard to your para: (b) and (c). I have already had an invitation to go and see General Ismay so I expect this will be to arrange the details.

The rest of your letter is quite clear and I have only to add thank you very much.

Major Desmond Morton, C.M.G., M.C.,  
10 Downing Street,  
S.W. 1.

any time a matter on which they wished to consult S.O.E. was not of major importance.

I hope Lord Selborne and you will not find any great difficulty in coming to an agreement with the Chiefs of Staff on the above lines, if they are put forward. I hope they will be, as I think they could be made very helpful to you.

Yours ever

DESMOND MORTON.

about the  
the upset

their anxiety  
is at present  
present

Selborne  
periodically  
ent reason  
option of your  
ticular  
ly interested  
ne or yourself

personally to  
ilitary  
e C.O.S.  
ment which has  
the person

d desiring to  
the Ch efs of  
es yourself  
in (b) and (c)  
pt for this  
ossible  
of Staff  
n London.  
n you see that  
Officer of  
e to Lord  
o date in  
er of

as liaison  
d Chiefs of  
informed  
ile like you,  
pere and  
present you  
end, or if at

10 Downing Street.  
Whitehall, S.W.1.  
29th May, 1942.

MOST SECRET.

Dear C.H.

I have telephoned the substance of the following to Lord Selborne.

I had an hour with the Chiefs of Staff today about the affairs of S.O.E. and S.I.S. in broad terms. I think the upshot will be as follows.

(a) The Chiefs of Staff accept the view that their anxiety regarding the relations between the two departments is at present unnecessary. They will not press for any change in present arrangements.

(b) Ismay will probably write a letter to Lord Selborne asking if you may attend the Chiefs of Staff meeting periodically e.g. once a month for certain, and more often if urgent reasons arise, in order to give the Chiefs verbally a description of your activities in general, your difficulties and any particular operation or matter in which you or they are specially interested at the moment. I expect that neither Lord Selborne or yourself will object to this.

(c) The Chiefs of Staff are ready to allow you personally to see any documents or telegrams whatever regarding military operations, so long as you make arrangements with the C.O.S. Secretariat Offices here. This is the same arrangement which has been made between the Chiefs of Staff and P.W.E. in the person of Dallis Brooks.

(d) Seeing that you must be a very busy man, and desiring to maintain in future the closest liaison with S.O.E., the Chiefs of Staff may suggest to you that one other person besides yourself is nominated as the Deputy for the duties described in (b) and (c) above. They are not at the moment prepared to accept for this purpose any other officer at present in S.O.E. A possible exception could be Brigadier Gubbins, but the Chiefs of Staff understand that he is by no means always available in London. The Chiefs of Staff therefore may suggest to you when you see them that they themselves should appoint an Armed Forces Officer of reasonably high rank, who would have to be acceptable to Lord Selborne and yourself, and who would be fairly up to date in Armed Forces Affairs, though not necessarily an officer of uninterrupted military service. This officer would be attached to you simply to act as liaison officer, in addition to yourself, between S.O.E. and Chiefs of Staff. The idea would be that you should keep him informed of all material affairs of your own organisation, while like you, he would be at liberty to see all Chiefs of Staff papers and telegrams in this office. He could, in addition represent you with the Chiefs of Staff if you were too busy to attend, or if at any time a matter on which they wished to consult S.O.E. was not of major importance.

I hope Lord Selborne and you will not find any great difficulty in coming to an agreement with the Chiefs of Staff on the above lines, if they are put forward. I hope they will be, as I think they could be made very helpful to you.

Yours ever

DESMOND MORTON.

Secret and Personal.

Offices of the War Cabinet  
Great George Street. S.W.1.  
29th May 1942.

My dear CH.

The Chiefs of Staff are anxious, and I am sure that you share their anxiety, that everything possible should be done to ensure that S.C.E. and the Chiefs of Staff organisation work in the closest touch.

At their meeting this morning, they requested me to ask you if you would be so good as to discuss the whole question with them sometime next week. If you agree, we could fix a date later; but I think that it would be useful if you and I could have a private talk before the official meeting. Will you be Whitehall way in the early part of next week? If so, let us meet at my office, if not, I will try to get round to yours at the earliest opportunity.

Yours sincerely.

H.L. ISMAY.

THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT  
RETAINED IN DEPARTMENT  
UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF  
THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958.

J P (42) 502

15 May 1942

L/XX/726

PERSONAL

3.5.42.

To: C.D.

From: M

High Level Conciliator: S.I.S./S.O.E.

Reference your CD/OR/1714 dated 30.4.42.

1. The principal subjects of dissension between ourselves and the S.I.S. fall under the following broad headings:-

- (a) Recruitment and selection of agents, especially where the field of recruitment is limited.
- (b) Priorities for air and sea transport for the field.
- (c)
- (d) Provision of documents, especially where their capture might allegedly incriminate "C" agents.
- (e) Use of and courier's passports for our representatives abroad.
- (f) Sharing agents in the field.
- (g) Communications with the field, especially radio.

2. There are also two major questions which are constant sources of difficulty.

Firstly, the diametric difference in our work, which is active as opposed to "C"'s which is passive, and the fact that, on the whole, we must "get on with the business" and take the normal risks of war, whereas "C" employs a more defensive technique.

The second question is a matter

- (a) of the distribution of Intelligence which we receive from abroad, and of
- (b) the access by our officers to Intelligence at "C"'s disposal which we urgently need for our operations.

Neither of these are, in my opinion, at present satisfactorily dealt with.

In my opinion, the work of the proposed conciliator will comprise, firstly, arbitration over small matters of detail, such as those enumerated in para.1. These are none the less important since, if a deadlock is reached in any of these trivial matters, it may, in fact, paralyse a far more important project. His second duty will be on a much higher level, i.e. to weigh the value to the war effort of any S.O.E. operation which may be represented by "C" as endangering an Intelligence organisation.

I therefore warmly approve your suggestion that the conciliator's office should resemble a judicial body, and I agree that it is most important that the facts on both sides upon which the conciliator's ruling is to be obtained should be properly marshalled before they are submitted. I do feel however, since a great many of the cases where arbitration is required,

THIS IS A COPY —  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

is required will concern technical details, that the officers of S.O.E. and S.I.S. who are concerned, no matter on what level they may be working, should be allowed to present their case themselves and, furthermore, that experts should be available from both sides to give an opinion where required.

5. The picture I therefore have in my own mind is of a small committee consisting of Sir Findlater Stewart in the chair with S.O.E.'s representative and "C"'s representative also present each of whom will be responsible for ensuring, in the first instance, that the case in question is of sufficient importance to require high level arbitration.
6. Regarding S.O.E.'s representative on the committee, I think this is for yourself to decide and I will naturally abide by your decision. S.O.E.'s representative must, however, have the need for "action" as opposed to "intelligence" constantly in mind, and must push our case in that sense. In my own appointment here as head of the Operations Directorate, I have constantly before me the Chiefs of Staff's directive for "action", and the fact that one day, and soon, they will demand results; and yet on the other hand I am constantly baulked and handicapped by the alleged demands of Intelligence. I have spent five years myself in Intelligence (at the War Office and C.H.Q., India) and know something about its methods!

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

MOST SECRET

S15/11

From C.D.

CD/OR/1714

To n/cr

Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square, W.1.

4th May, 1942.

C/9372.

6th May 1942.

Many thanks for your letter C/9372 of the 5th May about a proposed Liaison Committee between S.S. and S.C.E. I gather that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have agreed to Lord Selborne's proposal and that Sir Findlater Stewart has accepted the post.

As I told you when we met I did not agree with you that one umpire was wrong. I think it is essential that if the rare occasion should arise, that you and I feel we cannot compose a difference of opinion between us we should have one Father Confessor rather than many. Sir Findlater Stewart is in a position to consult any of the War Cabinet Office people if a point should arise which may effect them and he could consult them in a completely disinterested manner.

Personally I should feel great hesitation in going with you to different people on different subjects. Surely this is likely to create two arguments between us; first an argument of the subject under discussion second, who was the person to approach?

I am sorry you do not think that Findlater Stewart is the right man because although I do not know him, from his reputation I should have thought he was ideal, but in any event thank goodness the matter has been settled for us by the Prime Minister. You may rest assured that I shall do my best to make the arrangement run as smoothly as possible.

I am telling Lord Selborne about our different views in this matter in case he should be approached by the Secretary of State.

C.S.S.

... the confusion worse confounded if C.D., C.S.S. and the Conciliator meet with neither of the three of them sufficiently briefed to enable the Conciliator to give any clear cut ruling.

9. Two points arise immediately to my mind upon which preliminary decision must be taken as soon as Sir Findlater Stewart has been appointed and has accepted the post:-

MOST SECRET

S1511

From C.D.

GD/OR/1714

To n/on

Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square, W.1.

4th May, 1942.

C/9372.

5th May 1942.

Dear C.D.

Many thanks for your letter DCD/1748 of the 2nd May about the proposed Liaison Committee between S.I.S. and S.C.S.

You will remember that I told you last Friday that I wanted to take a little time to think over Lord Selborne's proposal for a Committee under Sir Findlater Stewart's Chairmanship. I am extremely reluctant to dissent from a proposal which I know Lord Selborne has made with the object of promoting the best possible relations between our two services, particularly when, as I see from your letter of the 2nd May, that Sir Findlater Stewart has already been approached. But, after much anxious thought, I have felt bound to tell the Secretary of State that I do not think that this proposal meets what seems to me the real difficulty.

As I see it, from the nature of our different tasks, there is likely to arise from time to time a fundamental cause of dispute between us, namely whether your task or mine should have precedence in a given area or during a given period. What is wanted, therefore, is someone with a sufficient knowledge of the higher direction of the war to be able to judge between us. I do not think that Sir Findlater Stewart can have sufficient to be able to do this.

I should like to suggest that you and I should try to settle all minor matters in dispute without recourse to outside help. Where either of us sees a major disagreement on policy I think that we should agree to approach someone in the War Cabinet Offices, i.e. on the staff of the Minister of Defence, or in the Chiefs of Staff's organisation, or possibly someone in the Foreign Office, who, with his knowledge of Government policy should be able to advise which operation should have precedence. Where he considered that the matter was of sufficient importance for the Chiefs of Staff to decide, we could submit a paper or ask for a meeting with them.

... the confusion worse confounded if C.D., C.S.S. and the Conciliator meet with neither of the three of them sufficiently briefed to enable the Conciliator to give any clear out ruling.

9. Two points arise immediately to my mind upon which preliminary decision must be taken as soon as Sir Findlater Stewart has been appointed and has accepted the post:-



is required will concern technical details, that the officers of S.O.E. and S.I.S. who are concerned, no matter on what level they may be working, should be allowed to present their case themselves and, furthermore, that experts should be available from both sides to give an opinion where required.

5. The picture I therefore have in my own mind is of a meeting of Sir Findlater Stewart in the representative

I have put this suggestion to the Secretary of State. I am extremely sorry not to be able to agree with the arrangement suggested by Lord Selborne, but as I have said, I really do not think that it is the right one.

Yours ever.

C.

MOST SECRET

S15/11

From G.D.

GD/OR/1714

To D/GR

Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square, W.1.

4th May, 1942.

My dear Sir Findlater,

The Foreign Secretary has quite approved the Terms of Reference of the Liaison Committee, and I hereby enclose them.

He agrees with me that it would be very desirable that the Committee should meet as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Sir Findlater Stewart, G.C.B., G.C.I.E.,

...the Commission worse confounded if G.D., G.S.S. and the Conciliator meet with neither of the three of them sufficiently briefed to enable the Conciliator to give any clear cut ruling.

9. Two points arise immediately to my mind upon which preliminary decision must be taken as soon as Sir Findlater Stewart has been appointed and has accepted the post:-

the post  
necessary  
that in  
fairly  
e may  
s  
s, and  
t to  
forward  
as to  
of the  
ing-  
my  
ppoint  
are  
to  
ould  
is  
war  
t

MOST SECRET

Sir H

From C.D.

CD/OR/1714

To D/CD

30th April 1942.

Copies to A.E., M., AD/P.

High Level Conciliator - S.I.S./S.O.E.

DCD/1748.

2nd May 1942.

Liaison Committee S.I.S.- S.O.E.

I understand that Sir S Findlater Stewart has accepted the post of umpire if the games that we both play should make it necessary to appeal to one.

Subject to any views which you may have I would suggest that in order to keep him sufficiently informed we should have a fairly regular meeting with him/once a fortnight, even though there may be nothing to complain of and all we want to do is to have a general review of the situation.

If we have any complaint which we cannot agree between us, and this I hope will be very seldom indeed then I think we ought to be formal about it. I suggest that each complaint is put forward in writing to Sir F. Stewart with a copy to each other. The memorandum should be sent in advance of the meeting so as to give him sufficient time to consider the two cases and make enquiries. We should then meet with the respective heads of the departments concerned in attendance and answer any questions he may wish to put.

I think his decision should be communicated to us in writing. So far as I am concerned I intend to appoint Archie Boyle as my rapporteur for complaints, and I would suggest that if you appoint somebody on your side it may very well result that when they are drawing up their respective "indictments" they will exchange notes and so come to an agreement without having to refer it to the umpire.

Let me know what you think and if you do not disagree I would like to put my proposals up to Sir Findlater Stewart for his comments.

C.S.S.  
Broadway.

to AD/P in his organisation and I suggest that an excellent name to put forward in this connection would be Colonel Beddington.

8. I can see nothing but confusion worse confounded if C.D., C.S.S. and the Conciliator meet with neither of the three of them sufficiently briefed to enable the Conciliator to give any clear cut ruling.

9. Two points arise immediately to my mind upon which preliminary decision must be taken as soon as Sir Findlater Stewart has been appointed and has accepted the post:-

MOST SECRET

S1511

From C.D.

CD/OR/1714

To D/CD

30th April 1942.

Copies to A.E., M., AD/P.

High Level Conciliator - S.I.S./S.O.E.

1. So far as anything is certain in this uncertain world, there seems no doubt that Sir Findlater Stewart has now been agreed between the Foreign Secretary and S.O. as the "deus ex machina" to fulfil this role; and it is also established that the P.M. has agreed to the principle.
2. It has occurred to me that it may be useful if I put down on paper my ideas at this early stage as to how this most important (and in my view most favourable) development can best be utilised to the advantage of all concerned. I do not want to be parochial in this matter and I think it is absolutely essential that we should endeavour to dismiss from our minds any attempt at using this new set up in order to pay off old scores or to "put one across" S.I.S. by means of the Conciliator.
3. We have everything in our favour i.e. a first class staff, a reasonably good organisation, and all that we want is to lessen intrigue and friction as between S.I.S. and S.O.E. Unless we approach this problem on the highest possible basis we run the risk, in my view, of increasing friction rather than decreasing it.
4. My first thought as to how this should be put into practical operation is that C.D. should have a Member of the Council to act as a sort of Clearing House and high level secretary, whose duty it would be to assemble into proper form the matters which come up before the Conciliator.
5. I suggest that AD/P should undertake these duties.
6. I assume that the weekly meeting between C.S.S. and C.D. will continue and I visualise that when thorny problems, such as W/T sets etc., come to the fore, it should be AD/P's duty to assemble and co-ordinate with the relevant officers in C as well as in S.O.E. the facts on both sides upon which the Conciliator's ruling is to be obtained.
7. C.S.S. should be persuaded to appoint an opposite number to AD/P in his organisation and I suggest that an excellent name to put forward in this connection would be Colonel Beddington.
8. I can see nothing but confusion worse confounded if C.D., C.S.S. and the Conciliator meet with neither of the three of them sufficiently briefed to enable the Conciliator to give any clear cut ruling.
9. Two points arise immediately to my mind upon which preliminary decision must be taken as soon as Sir Findlater Stewart has been appointed and has accepted the post:-

(a) It should be the right either of G or S.O.E. to choose which matters must go to the Conciliator, for otherwise there will be constantly arising a position where one or other of the two parties do not agree that this is a point upon which the Conciliator should arbitrate.

(b) Should these "conciliation" meetings be held whether or not there are any points arising? In my view there is much to be said for a fortnightly meeting on generalities, for only in that way will the Conciliator be able to absorb the general atmosphere and get himself trained into the conditions constantly arising in the day to day work of S.I.S. and S.O.E.

10. I favour the view that these meetings should be as formal as possible, even trenching on the judicial. I have formed this opinion because I can visualise such S.I.S. officers as for instance Gambier-Parry and Squadron Leader Long being confronted in a formal atmosphere with their terminological inexactitudes, inconsistencies and even worse - which would not be to the liking of C.S.S. and might engender salutary deodorisation of S.I.S. methods generally if it is realised in that institution that their sins of commission and omission may have to be strewn out on a table in the presence of their Chief as well as other high officials.

11. Finally - if properly handled in its inception - I can see dimly the final solution of the greatest problem which S.O.E. has ever had internally, namely the implacable opposition and worse from which we have suffered so long on the part of S.I.S.: but if it should start on the wrong foot it may be difficult, if not impossible, ever to get it on the right basis again and to this end I suggest that the recipients of this memorandum should bend their minds to all the implications and possibilities of this far reaching high level decision, for I am convinced that we have all the ingredients making for a final healing of this running sore of S.I.S. and S.O.E. friction.

C. D.

CO-OPERATION OF G AND S.O.E.

DRAFT letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

*Original on file*

Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square, W.1.

M.E.W.  
29th April, 1942.

CO-OPERATION OF C. AND S.O.E.

A Liaison Committee shall now be established consisting of:-

C.  
C.D.  
Sir S. Findlater Stewart. ( Chairman)

The functions of the Committee shall be to review such points of mutual interest to C and S.O.E. as may be brought before it by C. or C.D., and to determine their solution.

In the event of the Committee not being unanimous on any matter, it shall be open either to C. or C.D. to raise the question with their respective Ministers.

Signed. ANTHONY EDEN.  
SELBORNE.  
29.4.42

is  
you are in agreement with me as to the  
up a Liaison Committee between C and S.O.E.  
Stewart should be Chairman of it.  
ted draft terms of reference or constitution  
r improvement.  
ful to have your views about this as soon

Yours ever.

Selborne.

. M.C. M.P.

1st May 1942

o ANTHONY EDEN stating that S.O. had  
ert and that the terms of reference.

t the Liaison Committee should start  
ossible.

1/1

document would be produced.

ver,

only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

Original on File 4.1.

SECRET

Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square, W.1.

M.E.W.  
29th April, 1942.

My dear Anthony.

C and S.O.E.

I am so glad that you are in agreement with me as to the desirability of setting up a Liaison Committee between C and S.O.E. and that Sir Findlater Stewart should be Chairman of it.

I attach a suggested draft terms of reference or constitution for your approval or improvement.

I should be grateful to have your views about this as soon as possible.

Yours ever,

Selborne.

The Rt HON Anthony EDEN. M.C. M.P.

Note.

1st May 1942

Letter from S.O. to ANTHONY EDEN stating that S.O. had seen Sir Findlater Stewart and that the terms of reference were acceptable to him.

S.O. suggested that the Liaison Committee should start functioning as soon as possible.

IV

document would be produced.

over,

only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

Original on F/1042  
copy on 0/30

F/134.1.

MOST SECRET

Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square, W.1.

0/3793/29

20th April, 1942.

Dear Prime Minister,

I have heard from Major Horton to-day that you have directed my Report on S.O.E. to be printed and circulated to the War Cabinet and to the Defence Committee. I am very glad you have done this, and thank you most sincerely.

Horton, however, tells me that you do not favour the appointment of Sir Frederick Leith Ross to conduct the enquiry proposed by me, but that you favour the appointment of Mr. Justice Singleton instead.

You will remember I made two chief recommendations in my report:-

(1) A review of the organisation of S.O.E. and the conditions under which it has to work, by an experienced and qualified person. This should take a comparatively short time.

(2)

document would be produced.

C.D./-

ver,

only/-



(2) The appointment of a Conciliator as Chairman of the  
Liaison Committee between C. and S.O.E.

It seems to me that Mr. Justice Singleton would be an excellent selection for the second of these two functions. The Foreign Secretary has now agreed that such a Liaison Committee and Conciliator shall be appointed and it is merely a question of finding a suitable Conciliator. I have not suggested Singleton's name to Eden, but so far as I am concerned he would be most acceptable. I believe that his knowledge of affairs and complete impartiality would enable him to smooth out the frictions that exist, and are bound to arise from day to day, between C. and S.O.E. This is a work of great importance as the present lack of harmony between the two organizations is a source of grave danger to very brave men. In fact, I go so far as to say that neither C. nor S.O.E. can function with the greatest efficiency unless complete co-ordination and collaboration is achieved, and if Mr. Justice Singleton can give the time for this very important work, I believe he would succeed admirably in it.

On/

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

---

Original on F/104.2  
copy on 0/20

F/134.1.

3

On the other hand it does not seem to me that Singleton's experience is of the sort that we require for the review of the organisation of S.O.E. The case for such a review may be summarized as follows:-

- (a) S.O.E. has been carrying out work of such a secret nature that its conduct can never be debated in Parliament nor can it be examined by the Public Accounts Committee.
- (b) A number of men discharged from its staff for inefficiency have spread slanderous rumours which have reached the highest circles.
- (c) S.O.E. is run by a body of very able and well-known men who have undertaken the work from motives of patriotism, but whose outside reputations are involved. It is necessary, in fairness to them, and to squash the rumours, that someone who has experience in the administration of Government Departments should be able to certify either that the organisation is all that it should be, or that it could be improved in this respect or that.

It/

C.D./-

document would be produced.

over,

only/-

It does not seem to me that Mr. Justice Singleton's experience has lain in the field of administration, and a suggestion made by him in regard to office organization, etc. would not be of anything like the value of one made by a leading Civil Servant or political administrator.

Furthermore, if it became known (and these things apparently have a most deplorable and shocking capacity for becoming known) that you had appointed a Judge of the High Court to enquire into S.O.E., the inference that most people who knew nothing more about it would draw, would be that some criminal offence had been alleged. The result on the reputations of the very prominent men of business, lawyers, soldiers, and civil servants who have worked so well at this task would be such as I could not expect them to tolerate. I anticipate that I should be faced with large scale resignations on the part of key men, with disastrous results on the efficiency of S.O.E.

For these reasons I hope very much you will consent to my appointing a leading Civil Servant or political administrator to make the review of the organisation and conditions, while I would/

The Rt.

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

---

Original on F/104.2

F/134.1.

5

would welcome the appointment of Mr. Justice Singleton in the really much more important and lasting work of Conciliator between the two Secret Service organisations.

If you have difficulty in agreeing to this course, I should be grateful if you would see me. The matter is urgent because this delay is causing great unrest among the key men.

I should like to add for your information that Sir Frank Nelson (administrative head of S.O.E.) has had to resign on account of ill health. He has a duodenal ulcer and is suffering also from serious overwork. I am glad to say that I have prevailed on Sir Charles Hambro to occupy his place. I am also making certain other changes that will improve efficiency.

Yours sincerely,

The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, C.H., M.P.,  
10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall, S.W.1.

C.D./-

document would be produced.

ver,

only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

Original on F/104/2  
copy on 0/29

F/134.1.

COPY.

Copy to A.D.2  
MS

17 APR 1942

F/134.1.

MOST SECRET

CD/OR/1565

17th April 1942.

Ozanne has handed me a letter from Gambier Parry dated 15th April, a copy of which I attach hereto. In view of the important issue which this raises, I thought perhaps it would be desirable for me to reply to you direct.

I have gone into this personally and my people will inform me as follows :-

- (1) They are rather surprised that Gambier Parry states that he did not realise that Grendon was going to be used for our Main Station, as in various conversations which Ozanne and Pollock have had with him and his people regarding this new station of ours no other place than Grendon had been suggested; in fact all their conversations have centred round the Grendon site.
- (2) The Grendon site, as you know, has been used as a training centre for some time, when of course transmitters were used; and it was actually chosen after consultation with Gambier Parry's people. We had originally proposed to go to Newport Pagnell area, but Gambier Parry expressed the opinion that the Grendon area was more suitable from his point of view. Up to date, so I am informed, no interference has been experienced at Grendon from your station and we have received no complaints from your people.
- (3) The site was very carefully vetted as regards

C.D./-

document would be produced.

over,

only/-

1.2.47

S.P.A. (1947)  
2M

interference by the G.P.O. who were responsible for the design of the station; following on the receipt of Gambier Parry's letter we again approached this authority and they have reaffirmed in the most categorical terms that in their opinion neither they nor Gambier Parry need to be in the least worried by the possibility of undue interference by the erection of our station at Grendon.

If after considering the points raised above you still feel unhappy about the matter, I suggest that it is brought up to the W/T Board who are already aware of our intentions and who have given us to understand that they will have no objections to offer.

Naturally I do not wish to move to another site at this stage, in view of the fact that our Station is well on the way to completion.

I am, of course, more than willing that Ozanne and Gambier Parry should try and settle any possible cause of future disagreement before such arises rather than take them formally to the W/T Board - but I suggest that, as we are I think mutually anxious to get this matter tied up, we could save time by going to the W/T Board at this stage, whose decision I take it we would both be willing to accept.

*W.P.*

C.S.S.

Two letters were written in March 1947 to the W/T Board regarding the proposed station at Grendon. The Board decided that it would be best to refer the matter to the G.P.O. who were responsible for the design of the station. The Board also decided that it would be best to refer the matter to the G.P.O. who were responsible for the design of the station.

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

Original on F/104/2  
copy on 0/29

F/134.1.

COPY.

COPY

HIGHEST SECRET

13th April 1942.

Dear Suzanne,

Sandhurst tells me as the result of a conversation with Pollock to-day that it appears that a final decision has already been reached in your minds with regard to the siting of your station for communicating with agents. I gather this decision is that it should be sited at Grendon Underwood.

When we lunched recently you did mention Grendon Underwood rather vaguely as a possible site, but I am not at all sure that it is not going to result in our being an infernal nuisance to each other. Grendon is only 10 crow miles from one of my most important receiving stations, and as we are bound to be working fairly closely within the same frequency band, I think it is more than probable that interference will result. I hope therefore that you will not involve yourself in a lot of constructional work until the possibilities of interference have been thoroughly explored.

I expect you have already made an application to the W/T Board both in regard to the site as well as for the allocation of frequencies and call signs, and I have no doubt the Board will, as they have always done in the past, inform us of the proposals.

I think it would be much better if we went into the matter now between our two selves and settled any possible causes of future disagreement before they arise, rather than wait until we have to take them formally to the W/T Board, should your detailed proposals be of a nature likely to cause embarrassment to existing services. As you will remember, there is a clause in 'C's letter to C.D. covering this particular point, and reserving to him the right to ask you to curtail your activities should they result in interference with existing services. It therefore makes it obviously desirable that we should start right and not get into a position where friction might result.

C.D./-

document would be produced.

over,

only/-

I imagine that with the establishments your organisation possesses up and down the country, there should be no difficulty in finding a place for your S/T centre which could not possibly involve 'C' in having to fall back on his rights in the matter.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) R. Gambler Parry



D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

Original on F/102.2  
copy on 0/29 F/134.1.

COPY.

SECRET  
MOST SECRET.

Foreign Office,  
S. W. 1.

9th April, 1942.

Dear Gladwyn,

With reference to our conversation on the telephone this morning, the following are the effective passages in the Prime Minister's minute to the Secretary of State about his talk with your Minister the night before last.

"I had a long talk with Selborne after dinner tonight. He is quite willing that you should assume full responsibility for all S.O.E. activities in neutral countries and will take your directions about them. I hope you will see him and make friendly arrangements with him about this.

"With regard to activities in enemy countries, it is of the utmost importance that S.O.E. and S.I.S. should work in the closest harmony. I have asked Selborne to see Menzies and put an end to the friction there is between the two branches. You must of course be consulted as far as you wish to be.

"Selborne tells me he is quite ready to have an investigation into his Department as he found it if you desire it."

The Secretary of State is of course quite willing that you should pass the above to your Minister. He also agrees that it is desirable that we should complete as soon as may be the "treaty" which we have on the stocks.

Yours ever,

SGD. A. C.

Gladwyn Jebb, Esq.,  
C.H.G.

document would be produced. C.D./- ver, only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

*File copy.  
Copy sent to  
C.D.*

SECRET

W/3494/134.1

Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square, W. 1.

31st March, 1942.

My dear Anthony,

S. I. S. and S. O. S.

As I think you are aware, the Prime Minister, when appointing me, asked me to make a careful investigation of the work of S.O.S. and I propose to report to him very shortly.

One feature of what I have found worries me considerably, and that is the friction that exists between S.O.S. and S.I.S. I accordingly asked Sir Frank Nelson for a candid statement to me personally of the difficulties he had to complain of in regard to S.I.S. I gathered from you, in our conversation the other day, that you were unaware of this friction, and I accordingly enclose Sir Frank's statement (which was intended only for my own eyes) together with a covering note by Mr. Jebb. You promised me that it should be seen only by yourself and Sir Alexander Cadogan, and I hope you will be able to

The Right Honourable

confine/-

Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P.

C.D./-

document would be produced.

ver,

only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

---

confine its perusal accordingly, as I shall have only made matters worse if recriminations are started.

These documents reveal a deplorable state of affairs. I am far from saying that the fault lies entirely with one side, and I have little doubt that if you were to ask S.I.S. for a similar list of grievances against S.O.R. an equally formidable document would be produced. This would, however, only confirm the fact that the friction exists, and I am most anxious that it should be eradicated. To my mind it is not that any one individual is to blame; it is that the system needs some adjustment to meet the present circumstances.

It must be realized that S.O.R. is a mushroom organisation which has sprung up during the war and has been pushed with the greatest energy by those who are responsible for its gigantic task. They were told to organise subversion and sabotage in every enemy-occupied territory, and even in other countries were necessary - in the Prime Minister's words, to "set Europe ablaze". To this end they have trained and despatched as many agents as possible and have now about 300 men who have been trained "in the field". This number is growing and -

document would be produced.

C.D./-

ver,

only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

---

- 3 -

and will continue to grow. With all these agents S.O.S. endeavour to keep up regular wireless and other communication. It results from this that a great deal of information is sent back by these agents, all of which is transmitted through S.I.S. For some territories more information is actually received from S.O.S. than from S.I.S. agents, because they happen to be more numerous in that country. For instance, for some months past we have had three agents working in Madagascar with whom continuous wireless communication has been maintained whereas I am informed that S.I.S. have no agent there. In consequence, the Services are getting all their information in regard to Madagascar from S.O.S.

There is, therefore, an inevitable overlap between S.O.S. and S.I.S. which means that the two Services must work in harmony. Up till now this has been attempted by the methods described in the enclosed documents, particularly by means of the weekly meeting between the administrative heads of S.O.S. and S.I.S. It is because this system is failing so badly that it seems to me to be necessary that there should be an adjustment/-

C.D./-

document would be produced.

ver,

only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

---

adjustment.

The course which I suggested to you and to Sir Alexander Cadogan the other day, is that there should be weekly meetings of the heads of S.I.S. and S.O.S., presided over by a Conciliator. It would be necessary that the Conciliator should be a person of sufficient status and experience in these matters, to carry weight with all parties. It would, of course, follow that if, in the event of any dispute, either side was unable to accept the Conciliator's decision, the matter should be referred to Ministerial levels; but provided the Conciliator was of sufficient status, neither side would be over-anxious to do this, which is what we desire.

The friction develops from a series of small incidents, as the accompanying documents show. These occur de die in diem, therefore the only way to deal with them is by a regular weekly meeting such as I have suggested. If we cleared up everyone of the disputes referred to in these documents, and did not adjust the machinery, we should get into the same trouble in a very few weeks time. The issues involved are so immensely serious, and the danger caused to the lives of brave

men/-

document would be produced.

C.D./-

11c

ver,

only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

My dear Anthony,

- 5 -

Reference 2/14.1.

men is so great that I feel justified in asking you to examine the matter as one of urgency.

Yours ever,

~~(Sgd) GLADWIN JESS~~

Sgd: Selborne

I fear that the matter of late arrivals' names will give rise to all kinds of suspicion. The Foreign Office would have thought, therefore, that it would be better to leave the identity of the 'blacklist'...

There are various points to note, I think, are not quite accurate as stated, and I was wondering whether it might not be better to refer to 'blacklist'...

C.D./-

document would be produced.

ver,

only/-

D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

My dear Anthony,

S.I.S and S.O.E.

MOST SECRET

Reference F/134.1.

S.O.

I have just seen the attached draft letter to the Foreign Secretary and would like to give you my initial reactions which are these:-

(1) I think myself that it would be a mistake to bring in M.I.5., who have really no disputes either with us or with 'C', and that it would simply be a waste of Sir David Petrie's time to sit on a weekly meeting, listening to disputes between ourselves and the Secret Service.

(2) I fear that the mention of Lord Swinton's name will give rise to all kinds of suspicions in the Foreign Office and I should have thought, therefore, that it would be better to leave the identity of the 'Conciliator' vague.

(3) There are various points in Para. 3 which are not quite accurate as at present drafted, and I was wondering whether it might not be better not to define the respective spheres of S.O.E. and S.I.S. in your covering letter at all?

(4) I hope you will feel able to put in some additional paragraph, saying that the minutes by Nelson and myself are for the Secretary of State's and Cadogan's eye only, and that equally any counter-blast by 'C' should be shown to you and to me, but to nobody else in the S.O.E. organisation.

C.D./-

document would be produced. This would, however,

only/-

(1525) W/1526/1129  
1,500,000 11/59 JCA/SLJ  
C/44250  
(REGIMITE)

C.D. tells me that he personally agrees to the  
above remarks.

*S*

30th March, 1942.



D R A F T letter from MINISTER to FOREIGN SECRETARY.

My dear Anthony,

S.I.S and S.O.E.

As I think you are aware, the Prime Minister, when appointing me, asked me to make a careful investigation of the work of S.O.E and I propose to report to him very shortly. One feature of what I have found worries me considerably, and that is the ~~acute~~ friction that exists between S.O.E and S.I.S. I accordingly asked Sir Frank Nelson for a candid statement to me <sup>personally</sup> of the difficulties he had to complain of in regard to S.I.S. I gathered from you, in our conversation <sup>the other day</sup> ~~today~~, that you were unaware of this, <sup>(fiction)</sup> and I accordingly enclose Sir Frank's statement (which was intended only for my own eyes) together with a covering note by Mr. Jebb. ↗

*Handwritten note in left margin:*  
 I am assuming that the list of grievances that I have given to you will be able to help you to find out how many grievances have been in the Administration since the war.

These documents reveal a deplorable state of affairs. I am far from saying that the fault lies entirely with one side, and I have <sup>no</sup> ~~no~~ doubt that if you were to ask S.I.S for a similar list of grievances against S.O.E an equally formidable document would be produced. This would, however,

only/-

only confirm the fact that the friction exists, and I am most anxious that it should be eradicated. To my mind it is not that any one individual is to blame; it is that the system needs some slight adjustment to meet the present circumstances.

It must be realised that S.O.E is a mushroom organisation which has sprung up during the war and has been pushed with the greatest energy by those who were responsible for its gigantic task. They were held responsible for organising sabotage in every enemy-occupied territory.

*told to Russian Intelligence and + later in other countries have been working.*

Prime Minister's words, to "set Europe ablaze".

In pursuance of this they have trained and despatched

as many agents as possible and have now nearly two hundred and fifty men "in the field".

*been also known as Kaminik*

They have sent them not only in to enemy-occupied territories but also, (and in my view quite rightly,) to territories that are not yet occupied by the enemy, but which are in danger of being so occupied. With all these agents S.O.E endeavour to keep up regular wireless and other communications; and the number of agents is growing, and will grow. It results from this that a great deal of information is sent back by these agents, all of which is transmitted through

S.I.S. For some territories more information is <sup>actually</sup> received from S.O.E than from S.I.S agents, because they happen to be more numerous in that country.

For instance, for some months past we have had <sup>five</sup> ~~four~~ agents working in Madagascar with whom continuous wireless communication has been maintained, whereas

I am informed that S.I.S have no agent there. <sup>in</sup> ~~at~~ <sup>consequence</sup> ~~as a result~~, the Services are getting all their information in regard to Madagascar from S.O.E.

There is, therefore, an inevitable overlap between S.O.E and S.I.S which means that the two Services must work in harmony. Up till now this has been attempted by the methods described in the enclosed documents, particularly by means of the weekly meeting between the administrative heads of S.O.E and S.I.S. It is because this system is failing so badly that it seems to me to be necessary that there should be an adjustment. <sup>and</sup> The course which I suggested to you and to Sir Alexander Cadogan the other day, is that there should be weekly meetings of the heads of S.I.S., <sup>and</sup> S.O.E ~~and M.I.6.~~, presided over by a Conciliator. It would be necessary that the Conciliator should be a person of sufficient status and experience in these matters to carry weight/-

weight with all parties, and I suggested the name of Lord Swinton as an example. It would, of course, follow that if, in the event of any dispute, either side was unable to accept the Conciliator's decision, the matter should be referred to Ministerial levels; but provided the Conciliator was of sufficient status, neither side would be over-anxious to do this, which is what we desire.

The friction develops from a series of small incidents, as the accompanying documents show. These occur de die in diem, therefore the only way to deal with them is by a regular weekly meeting such as I have suggested. If we cleared <sup>up</sup> every one of the disputes referred to in these documents, and did not adjust the machinery, we should get into the same trouble in a very few weeks time. The issues involved are so immensely serious, and the danger caused to the lives of brave men <sup>is</sup> so great that I feel justified in asking you to examine the matter as one of urgency.

Yours ever,

MOST SECRET

C.E.O.  
27 MAR 1942

COPY To All Members of Council.

C/9029

LONDON.

26th March 1942.

S.O.

Copy to all Members  
of Council.  
CD/TC/1367

MOST SECRET

27 MAR 1942

C.E.O.

27th March 1942.

R.P.

Dear C.S.S.

Communications.

Thank you for your letter of the 26th March and I am glad to note that we have now reached agreement on the point that S.G.S. shall take over their own Secret W/T communications from this country.

the 21st instant.  
I have put to establish  
rights in agreeing to your proposals.  
of reference must be altered.  
terms was  
control the  
from this  
system  
Board,

1. I accept your interpretation that (a) and (b) in my letter of 21st March 1942 are really indivisible - and am in agreement with the further observations contained in your paragraph 2.

think there  
As you  
direction  
ty which  
I assume  
Western  
s.  
if it was  
S.I.S.  
right

2. I most certainly agree to your request that we will not undertake communications for the representatives of Allied Powers without reference to you.

3. In view of the fact that you state in your postscript that the principle is now decided, I am instructing Oranne to get in touch with Gambier-Parry with a view to going ahead with the details of handing over.

its is that  
will not,  
communications  
Power without

4. As already advised, we hope to take over on 1st June.

establishment  
or  
and I am

Yours sincerely

C. D.

st that the  
and

Yours  
(Signed) C.

Since dictating I am told that F.O. agree so the plans can now be put into force.

||

Copy to all Members of Council.

MOST SECRET

C.E.O.  
21 MAR 1942  
F/1451341  
RC

In any further communication on this subject please quote

and address,

not to any person by name,

but to—

The Director-General,  
Ministry of Economic Warfare,  
Berkeley Square House,  
Berkeley Square, W.1.

TELEPHONE  
GROSVENOR 4090.

Noted, thank you.  
C.D.  
25.3.42

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,

March 25th, 1942.

✓  
S. 27.3.42

Dear Frank,

Yes, I agree there is a certain discrepancy between what I say now and what I said on Feb. 2nd last. I had forgotten about this last minute, but shall of course show it to S.O together with your comments.

Nevertheless, as you know, I have never really accepted the theory that S.I.S and S.O.E should be under one head, and in my minute of February 2nd I made it clear that I thought they should be separate and distinct organisations. It would be possible, say, for some member of the War Cabinet to be called in to "iron out" disputes of a major character, but that would be different from having a whole-time "Co-Ordinator" who would, by the nature of things, become the "Administrator" of both. At the

present had the traffic.

your most urgent attention in view of what I explained to you after the meeting.

(Signed) C. D.

Copy to all Members of Council.

MOST SECRET

C.E.O.

21 MAR 1942

F/151341

R.C.

Reference

- 2 -

present moment the Minister has his "right of appeal" against the S.I.S and against the Foreign Office. I rather think that the Foreign Office view is that this right of appeal lies only to the Prime Minister. But it would often be absurd to bother the Prime Minister personally; and I should have thought that some other member of the War Cabinet ought to be brought in (? Mr. Attlee or Sir J. Anderson).

In any case, whatever views one may have as to the "ideal" solutions, the simple fact remains that, as things are, there is not the remotest chance of S.I.S and S.O.E being combined in any way - unless indeed the Foreign Secretary takes over S.O.E. I therefore think that the considered solutions which I have put forward are the best ones.

Please let me have these papers back with the main dossier which you have.

(Sgd:-) G.J.

25. 5. 42.

... that the matter would have your most urgent attention in view of what I explained to you after the meeting.

(Signed) C. D.

lay  
iting

erations".

t.

unications".

als or  
in

ade the  
angered  
ts were

ld limit  
channels.  
now inform  
ly limit  
s.

when S.O.E.  
er would

ing the  
ould have

r  
e had the  
he traffic.

is

Copy to all Members of Council.

C.E.O.

21 MAR 1942

F/134.1

RE

MOST SECRET

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

C.E.O.

S.O may care to see AD/H's Paper on his idea of amalgamation of S.I.S and S.O.E.

In one of his recent telegrams he stated this matter was to the fore again - tho' how it can come up in any concrete form out in the Middle East - I cannot imagine.

I think there is some divergence of view between your remarks (as attached) and your proposed foreword to the S.I.S/S.O.E matter. Without having the latter in front of me I may be entirely wrong, but if you show AD/H's effort to S.O., it might be as well to read them through together.

C.D.

24.3.42.

lay  
iting

erations".

t.

unications".

als or  
in

ade the  
angered  
ts were

ld limit  
channels.  
now inform  
ly limit  
s.

when S.O.E.  
er would

ing the  
ould have

r  
e had the  
be traffic.

your most urgent attention in view of what I explained to you after the meeting.

(Signed) C. D.

1000  
JCA:LM  
10  
(ITE)



Copy to all Members of Council.

C.E.O.

21 MAR 1942

F/134.1  
R.C.

MOST SECRET

CD/TC/1304

21st March 1942.

MOST SECRET

*File*

Dear C.S.S.,

Communications.

With reference to our conversation yesterday afternoon, you asked me to confirm to you in writing our proposals in respect of S.O.E. having their separate radio station in this country.

They are as follows:-

1. S.O.E. wish to transmit and receive from agents -

(a) in respect of what you term "military operations".

On this point I think we are in agreement.

(b) In respect of what you term "Secret Communications".

i.e. S.O.E. agents working with individuals or groups conducting subversive operations in Western Europe.

In this connection Colonel Gambier Parry made the point that in his opinion security would be endangered in Western Europe if more than say 100/150 agents were operating "secret communications".

To meet his point I suggested that we should limit ourselves for the moment to a certain number of channels. After consultation with my Operations people I now inform you that the minimum to which we could reasonably limit ourselves would be seventy five working channels.

We agreed that if and when the time arose when S.O.E. required an increase over this figure, the matter would be brought up for reconsideration.

2. It was understood that as opposed to adopting the "pirate" system of obtaining frequencies, we should have our frequencies allotted to us by the W/T Board.

3. We stated that we are prepared to take over communications as from 1st June 1942 and that we had the necessary material and operators to cater for the traffic.

You kindly informed me that the matter would have your most urgent attention in view of what I explained to you after the meeting.

(Signed) C. D.

M

MOST SECRET

M/XX/44 **MOST SECRET** 10.3.42.

To: C.D.

From: M

1. AD/S's note attached covers satisfactorily the general relations between our Country Sections and 'C', and the difficulties that have been experienced in the past. A year ago we were looked upon as rather inefficient and ridiculous collection of amateurs who might endanger S.I.S. if we were not kept quiet. The general attitude on a high level now appears to be that we are very dangerous rivals and that, if we are not squashed quickly, we will squash them. The change in attitude is due entirely to the fact that we have outstripped them in many directions, have proved ourselves on the whole more hardworking and enthusiastic, and that we are not afraid of challenging them when they try to double-cross us.
2. Now, however, the majority of 'C's' Country Sections and also their transport Sections realise that we can help them very much and that on the whole it would be better for their own advantage to play with us. But there is still in the higher circles no real attempt at collaboration at all, and pin-prick efforts are continuously made to hamper our work, both as regards intelligence, communications, relations with Allied Governments, etc.
3. You will note that the French and Belgian Sections have not got many definite instances. There have been large changes in these Sections recently and they are not fully aware of concrete instances of trouble that have occurred in the past.
4. I have attached the full story of the Stockholm 'imbroglio' which was discussed at length in the presence of 'C', D/CD, and the First Secretary of H.M.'s Legation at Stockholm, as it is an obvious instance of the methods by which 'C's' organisation try to deride us and get us into difficulties.

17

10,

this

i's

new/-

MOST SECRET

From C.D.

GD/XX/1169

To All Members of Council.

6th March 1942.

S. I. S.

1. S.C. has asked us to compile for him a statement which will show clearly, but dispassionately, why our relations with S.I.S. have been so consistently bad and are definitely deteriorating at the present time.
2. I suggest that this be broken up into the following parts:-
  - (a) Agents and Operations - to be compiled by M., with the assistance of his Regional Heads.
  - (b) Intelligence - to be compiled by AD/P.
  - (c) Communications - to be compiled by AD/Z.
3. A certain number of instances in which there is definite evidence of "suppressio veri" or definite mis-statements should be appended; but generally it should be in narrative form with the "leit-motif" being that the word "co-operation" is usually interpreted by G. as one way traffic, i.e. from us to them.
4. When I have received the various papers, which I should like to have during Monday next, I will write a foreword myself, linking them all together and tracing the whole history from August 1940 to date.
5. May this please be treated as urgent and extremely important, and I would ask all Members of the Council to give their personal attention to see that I get the best type of memorandum in the circumstances - for much depends upon making this case.
6. Any Members who are <sup>not</sup> specified as in paragraph 2 above should not consider themselves debarred from contributing to this if they have any outstanding instances or episodes which would support this case.

C. D.

MINUTE

MINISTER.

I attach a Minute by C.D. covering a memorandum on our relations with the S.I.S. It all makes regrettable reading and I feel it incumbent on me both to tell you what I feel myself and to make suggestions as to how the existing state of affairs could best be remedied. Perhaps I had better start with a brief history of our relations with S.I.S. up to date, so far as machinery is concerned.

In his original Charter, attached at Flag A., Mr. Dalton was instructed to "co-ordinate" the activities of various bodies, one of which was the "sabotage service", alternatively known as the "D" section of the S.I.S., the administrative authority of which was, at that time, the Foreign Office.

Para. 4 (e) of Mr. Dalton's Charter laid it down that - "The various departments and bodies taking part in underground activities will, for the time being, continue to be administered by the Ministers at present responsible for them."

Subsequently, however, Mr. Dalton suggested to Lord Halifax that the only way to achieve efficiency was for him to administer the "D" section himself, and Lord Halifax agreed to Mr. Dalton's proposal in a letter dated the 16th August, 1940, a copy of which is attached at Flag B. You will see that this letter is entirely categorical and places the "D" section under the control of Mr. Dalton without any reserves.

As a result of this it became obvious that the spheres of "C" and "D" must be defined on paper and I therefore drafted, and got the C.S.B. to agree to a document, dated the 15th September, 1940, a copy of which is attached at Flag C. (I should add that it was after the signing of this document that we decided that the whole of Mr. Dalton's

new organisation should be known as S.O.E., and that for administrative purposes it should be divided up into S.O.1. - subversive propaganda - and S.O.2. - all other subversive activities.)

On the whole, my agreement with "C" has stood the test of time, but it has already - with "C"'s consent - been modified in certain important respects. Thus the "D Board" (which subsequently became the S.O.2. Board) was found, after a period of several months, to be too cumbersome, and with the rapid expansion of S.O.E., was replaced by a system of close liaison between S.O.E. and the various departments, including "C", with whom they came most into contact. So far as "C" was concerned, this meant, in practice, that C.D. and I went to see the C.S.S. once a week and communicated to him in advance (and to the A.C.S.S.) our internal Progress Report which is seen by no-one else outside our organisation and contains details of all our activities. A.C.S.S. also was invited to attend meetings of our "Council" - which replaced, for internal purposes, the old "S.O.2 Board" - and came, occasionally, though this practice now seems to have lapsed. In any case, there was not the faintest attempt on our part to hide any of our activities or projects from "C": on the contrary, we made every effort to bring him in and to see that the two organisations should work in the closest possible co-operation.

The agreement of the 15th September, 1940, has also been modified in regard to communications in that we now handle our "main line" traffic <sup>ourselves</sup> (i.e. Telegrams to our own representatives abroad) and have in addition the right to organise our own W/T communications with agents in the field who are dependent on centres other than London (E.G. Middle East). We have now formally requested "C" to also agree to a

complete/-