

0/25
Sp...
SECRET

O/2740/25.

9th September, 1941.

Many thanks for sending me a report on subversive organisations in Greece, which, I am sure, will be of great use to my people; also the two reports on Roumanian refugees, which are of much interest.

It had occurred to me, in regard to the latter, however, that, seeing that our Balkan organisation are, in point of fact, running Beza and Vulpescu, your local representative might conceivably have discussed the question with Maxwell or Bailey on the spot, before sending in his report. Perhaps he did. Anyhow, I imagine that the liaison will be far better now that Mr. Lyttelton has formed his Committee, on which, as I understand it, both S.O.E and S.I.S., Middle East, are represented.

(Sgd:-) GLADWYN JEBB.

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

No. 566.

To: the C.E.O.

From L/DI.

4 JUL 1941

0/25

0/25

ROB

MOST SECRET

Registry No.

M.E.W.

PERSONAL

6th August, 1941.

25
5.

Draft. Letter
To: "C"
From: Mr. Jebb.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

If what I am told is true, the documents known as I.S.O.S contain information of the highest possible interest to S.O.2. Indeed, I believe that, of all the Services, S.O.2 would be the most directly interested in I.S.O.S reports, since the lives of their agents might very well depend on the information they contain.

Would you, therefore, consider letting Archie Boyle have copies of these reports? Needless to say, he would not circulate them as such to anybody and only pass on the gist to the country section concerned, if necessary. Further, no action of any kind would be taken on such a report without first obtaining your permission.

I think you will agree that Boyle has great experience in handling such matters, and that, from the point of view/-

5660 1-46 (7774) 1215/183 15m 1-46 PAC114 76

to my Christian in August N.S. in 38. Keep in copy for last. 10.1947

SECRET

view of security there would be no danger at all if you agreed that the reports should go to him.

a

[Faint, mostly illegible text follows, appearing to be a continuation of a letter or report.]

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

No. 566.

To: the C.E.O.

From L/DI.

4 JUL 1941

0/25

0/25

RSB

See Minister's
N.S. Minute N:38
of 10.7.41

Secret:

Reference

0/25
80/85.

MINISTER:

Please see the attached copy of my letter of yesterday, to "C".

C.D and I raised the question with "C" this-afternoon of Communism; and he said that he would ask Colonel Vivian and M.1.5 whether they could produce any latest evidence as to the attitude of the Comintern in this country or in others. (He thought that 48000 ought to be able to send in something interesting.)

"C" also said that he, himself, was all in favour of using Communists in the present circumstances and would have no objection if we dropped a Communist in the occupied area whose function would be to get in touch with the Communist workers in Paris or elsewhere. He would still, however, be opposed to our getting Dolivet to visit this country, for instance, or making any approaches to him or to his political associates which might be likely to get to the ears of Vichy. Nobody really knew if any good would still come from the approaches which had been and still were being made to Vichy, but he was still working through two channels on the direct instructions of the Prime Minister.

"C" finally suggested that the question of our attitude towards Communism and the Comintern ought soon to be considered by the highest authorities and some decision, if possible, extracted from the War Cabinet.

11th July, 1941.

(1) I have never proposed that D should visit this country. I am only interested to know whether his alleged calls in France should be contacted;

(2) It is not our asking the War Cabinet for a "decision" until I can give some answer to my question in Minute N.S. No 38. Keep on asking for lead. 14.1941

P/2565/75
of 10.7.41

(1594) 58187(127)
2,009,090 4/40
JC 581.12. 648/23
(REGIMITE)
Code 5.85.2

No. 566.

To: the C.E.O.

From L/DI.

4 JUL 1941

ROB

MOST SECRET

4th July, 1941.

Reference 0/25

See Minis Ken's
N.S. Memoire N° 38
C.E.O. of 10.7.41.

If anything is to come of Communist contacts, dissident or 'orthodox', it will have to be taken up much more strongly and presumably at a higher level. "C" is evidently stalling; it took a month to get an opinion on the desirability of Communist contacts, and then another month to arrange this meeting which seems to have been entirely inconclusive.

ROB

It is not quite clear that the lack of response in the Committee, nor the fact that they are influenced by the Committee for the cause, I think there is certainly some points to be followed up.

4th July, 1941.

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No. 566.

To: the C.E.O.

From L/DI.

0/25
4 JUL 1941

ROB

MOST SECRET

4th July, 1941.

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ACT 1958

No. 566.

MOST SECRET

(Copy)

To. the C.S.O.

From I/DI.

4th July, 1941.

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ADZ/XX/512.

26.6.41.

1st July 1941.

Dear C/D,

Yours of June 30th re Communist Party.

I consulted Colonel Vivian on this, as he is the Communist expert here. He tells me that he is meeting one or more of your officers tomorrow, July 2nd on this very subject and will discuss it in detail.

In the meantime may I give you the following generalities. I have in the past frequently endeavoured to get some good (i.e. information) out of Communists. I have found them most ineffective, even when willing. It is chiefly because the information they produce contains some effort to prove their own case. Their promises - and there were many - never materialise.

At the time of the Munich crisis they were most prolific with promises, not only as regards information but even action in the event of war breaking out. Nothing happened. This covers Communists of all countries. The Germans, I found a long way the most ineffective.

Nevertheless, for your particular task, I cannot see why you should not try and use them, but (and I think it is a big "but") they need to be strictly insulated and not permitted in any way to penetrate your organisation.

Perhaps you will think this injunction rather a statement of the obvious, because of course it is just what they would like to do.

Yours ever,

KSS

ADZ/XX/512.

26.6.41.

0/25

Copy to CED.

SECRET.

30 JUN 1941

Mr. 3/11

R.B.
7/7

see the memo. 50 3/7
30th June 1941.

7 JUL 1941

Co. to CED.

Communist Party

Communist Party.

As instructed in
SO's comment on
attached - I
enclose herewith a
brief account of
a Meeting with
Calvician and
L.D., L.D., L.L.

nothing of a quandary as to how we stand
tackling the Communist Party qua the

very complex problem and I am being pressed
give some kind of a directive on the subject
endeavour to contact the "Communists" with
ing that they play at suborning Nazi seamen.

comes into this - and I am being pressed
s to whether we should not use the so-called
th and South America with a view to
activities.

First job as always is to keep in step with
you could give me a directive as to how S.I.S.
problems it might clear my mind as to the

It doesn't see
us very far!

at the moment spoken to Swinton direct - in
point of doing so this morning when I thought
ould more properly ask S.I.S. through you
they are taking vis-a-vis this problem.

By the time Calv.

Evolution his policy
he will probably be
overtaken by the course
of events!

(C.D.)

I am returning 7/17 to the attached

26.6.41.

Copy to CED.

*Mr. 3/11
M.*

SECRET.

30 JUN 1941

*a pertinent question
Let me see the answer. S-3/7*

30th June 1941.

CD

Dear A.C.S.S.,

Communist Party.

I am in something of a quandary as to how we stand in regard to contacting the Communist Party qua the Communist Party!

This is a very complex problem and I am being pressed by my people to give some kind of a directive on the subject i.e., should we endeavour to contact the "Communists" with a view to suggesting that they play at suborning Nazi seamen.

The U.S.A. comes into this - and I am being pressed for a directive as to whether we should not use the so-called Communists in North and South America with a view to countering Nazi activities.

I think my first job as always is to keep in step with S.I.S. - and if you could give me a directive as to how S.I.S. are viewing this problem it might clear my mind as to the immediate future.

I have not at the moment spoken to Swinton direct - in fact I was on the point of doing so this morning when I thought that perhaps I should more properly ask S.I.S. through you what action if any they are taking vis-a-vis this problem.

CD

ADZ/XX/512.

26.6.41.

TO: C.D.

FROM: AD/Z

With reference to the recent decision of the Prime Minister that distribution of I.S.O.S. intercepts of the German Secret Service should be circulated on such a limited scale that S.O.S. are now precluded from seeing them, I feel very strongly that it is a case for the C.E.C. to take up with General ISHAM direct, with a request that the Prime Minister should include S.O.S. on the distribution list. Our reason for this is that perhaps of all the Services, S.O.S. are the most directly interested in I.S.O.S. reports.

From these reports we occasionally get useful tips that the Germans are establishing counter-espionage posts in certain areas. Furthermore, through deduction, we get names of agents which, though they may not be directly imparted to our own agents for fear of compromising the system, we can at least give them an oblique hint that they should lie quiet for the moment.

It should also be realised that we are involved in counter-acting Axis subversive activities in neutral countries. Again, any approach to our representatives would be made in the most veiled terms, in order that no possibility of compromise could occur.

It should be further emphasised that we gain very valuable information through these intercepts regarding the manner in which the Germans operate their subversive organisation which, in turn, gives us hints as regards the running of our own organisation.

In order to allay the fears of M.I.6., or whoever is responsible for the administration of the intercept system, we would give a clear undertaking that no action would be taken, or information imparted, without prior consultation with them.

8th May 1941.



0/25

0/2225/25

AD/Z

Many thanks for your advice as to the reply which I should return to Arnold-Forster's complaint about the keeping of "C" reports. I duly got this off on the lines suggested.

Yesterday evening I had a telephone call on the subject from . He said that he understood that we were in the habit of making copies of these reports for circulation at Baker Street. I told him that I knew nothing of this, adding that I felt that the story was probably quite unfounded. I promised, however, to look into the matter.

said that "C" carefully numbers all the copies of the reports which he sends out, and for security reasons considers it generally unwise to allow any extra copies to be made, even for internal use in any particular organisation to whom the numbered copies may be sent. I told him that I thought we would be able to give him an assurance that we would strictly observe this condition, and that if by any chance, in any particular case, we wished an exception to be made, we would first refer the matter to him. I hope you will agree with this. In any case I have promised to telephone to again and should be glad if you would let me know what you think before I do so.

(Sgd) PHILIP BROAD

9th May 1941.

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ACT 1958

SECRET & URGENT

0/25

From C.D.

CD/OR/373

To C.E.O., AD/A, AD/Z, AD/1,

4th May 1941

0/2203/25

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ACT 1958

Liaison with G.

As a result of conversations which took place between C.E.O., G.S.B. and the writer last week - I had a long interview with the A.S.S.B. (Colonel Dansey) yesterday, and as a result I think we are well placed to discuss the future of the Liaison with G. for the future.

SECRET and PERSONAL

A. Liaison between C. and S.O.2 will be through the sole channel of Colonel Dansey (this is officially the channel of C.E.O.).
I am sorry that I have not been able to send an earlier reply to your letter of the 27th April (B/0969) about CX report No.24 addressed to the American Department of the Foreign Office.

I am afraid that I must plead guilty to leaving with the Foreign Office (actually in Hopkinson's room) a copy of this report, which had been handed to me at Baker Street to take down to the Foreign Office as a side-memoire for use in a conversation with them. I was not aware of the rule to which you refer in para.2., and am extremely sorry that it should have been broken.

I will do my best to ensure that we are not guilty of any repetition of this offence.

(Sgd) PHILIP BROAD

Commander C. Arnold-Forster, R.N., will act for all G. Sections, i.e. direct jurisdiction - and to make this perhaps clearer it should be added that Colonel Dansey's liaison will extend to and what may be called for want of a better term "shipping".

Colonel Dansey will be immediately given a room in this building which should be labelled "G" - and although he may not use it himself to any great extent, i.e. daily visits, it was his suggestion that the room should be large enough for a conference of five or six people when these were made necessary as between C. and S.O.2, either with or without his presence.

Colonel Dansey will handle his own Secretary who will sit permanently in the room and deal with telephone calls, appointments etc.

SECRET & URGENT

0/25

From C.D.

CD/OR/373

To C.E.O., AD/A, AD/Z, AD/1,
M, D/Fin, X, E, S, D/T.

4th May 1941

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ACT 1958

Liaison with C.

1. As a result of conversations which took place between C.E.O., C.S.S. and the writer last week - I had a long interview with the A.C.S.S. (Colonel Dansey) yesterday, and as a result I think we are entitled to assume that the following procedure will operate from now onwards for the future:-

A. Liaison between C. and S.O.2 will be through the sole channel of Colonel Dansey (this is officially agreed by C.S.S. and C.E.O.).

B. Initial liaison will be between Section Heads of S.O.2 and C. (and also of course by subordinates in the various Sections under authority of the relevant Section Heads).

C. Routine decisions of importance will be reported to or referred to Colonel Dansey, and in so far as S.O.2 Sections are concerned these will be referred to or reported to Regional Heads, viz. AD/A, AD/Z, X, S.

D. Where any difference of opinion arises between an S.O.2 Section and a C. Section, Colonel Dansey will arbitrate - and if his decision cannot be accepted by the Section Head or Regional Head of S.O.2 or C., as the case may be, such a decision goes up for discussion in the first instance between C.S.S. and C.D.

E. If C.S.S. and C.D. cannot arrive at a decision it then goes up to Higher Quarters through C.E.O. so far as S.O.2 is concerned.

F. Colonel Dansey will act for all C. Sections, i.e., even those over whom he has at the present time no direct jurisdiction - and to make this perhaps clearer it should be added that Colonel Dansey's liaison will extend to _____ and what may be called for want of a better term "shipping".

G. Colonel Dansey will be immediately given a room in this building which should be labelled "C" - and although he may not use it himself to any routine extent, i.e. daily visits, it was his suggestion that the room should be large enough for a conference of five or six people when these were made necessary as between C. and S.O.2, either with or without his presence.

H. Colonel Dansey will provide his own Secretary who will sit permanently in this room and deal with telephone calls, appointments etc.

2. During the course of my conference with Colonel Dansey an interview with _____ and Squadron-Leader Long was sandwiched, and as an initial effort I found Colonel Dansey's presence of the very greatest assistance. It was arranged at this interview that Squadron-Leader Long of C., _____ should have direct contact with Section Heads of S.O.2 so that he may be clearly informed on all details connected with S.O.2 wireless operators who are to be dropped or sent overseas; to elaborate this a little, Squadron-Leader Long explained that consistent with the necessary secrecy it will be of great assistance to him if he can be informed of the type of duty which each S.O.2 wireless operator will be expected to undertake, together with an idea of the territory from which he will send his messages, and so on and so forth.
3. E. of course will be present at any of these interviews between Squadron-Leader Long and S.O.2 Section Heads, should all three parties concerned desire this, but such interviews are not primarily intended to cover technical matters.
4. I also arranged - and I consider this very important - that provided S.O.2 can obtain from the Army two instructors, classed B.1. (if possible civilian operators before they joined up) _____ will train these instructors so that in due course S.O.2 can use them at any of S.O.2 stations for instructing S.O.2 wireless operators.
5. I hope that this suggestion of mine may do away to a large extent with the difficulties of sending fully trained agents for a course of wireless to _____ which is bad for their discipline and only gives them a few hours work each day.
6. I have promised _____ that as soon as possible this week a considered statement shall be given to them of:-
- a) Urgent requirements for the June moon in enemy occupied territory in Western Europe.
 - b) Pressing requirements elsewhere.
 - c) Long term requirements.
7. I would ask that this should be very carefully dealt with - by which I mean that whilst our original request for a comparatively large number of suitcase wireless sets etc. for the Far East is perfectly reasonable and was quite clearly stated - whatever the reason may be and whoever may be to blame in C., it is obvious that large blocks of wireless sets cannot be issued by C. in a hurry for the simple reason that they do not possess them.
8. In regard to the purchase and use of wireless sets elsewhere, I desire that this should be discussed in the first instance with Colonel Dansey, and I have reason to believe that there will be no difficulties over this if it goes through this channel.

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9. In regard to the requirements of our Far Eastern Mission in wireless, I wish this to be very carefully and tactfully handled and would suggest that in the first instance AD/Z and E. should have a quiet talk with Colonel Dansey so that he may get the complete picture in his head as to the long term basis upon which we have constructed and dispatched our Far Eastern Mission; it is completely misunderstood at present by the whole of the C. organisation.

10. Will AD/A, AD/Z, S, X, E and D/T please co-operate very fully on the basis of this memorandum so that all necessary details such as the immediate provision of a room for C. - the communication to Section Heads of the new liaison - consideration of the very important memorandum upon our present and future requirements in wireless sets etc. - should be dealt with with expedition and a great deal of tact. I think it would be an admirable thing if the officers above alluded to could entertain Colonel Dansey to a small dinner to initiate this new liaison and at the same time to discuss ways and means of smoothing out the wrinkles of the past and avoiding the wrinkles of the future.

11. It is hardly necessary to add that D/T's functions for the future will be even more important than in the past and I understand that it is Colonel Dansey's intention to have an early conversation with D/T on matters of routine and detail.

C. D.

25th April, 1941.

C.D. hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step towards regard to cooperation with C in common.

C.D. is

0/25

30 APR 1941

0/25

From C.D.

CD/OR/178

To C.E.O.

30th April 1941.

B. U. Fisher

Liaison with C.

1. The attached is copy of a memorandum sent to me by D.T. (our Liaison Officer with C.), which I think puts our case very fairly.
2. Perhaps you would consider whether on Friday afternoon - if and when we see C. - we might put this matter to him without specifically pointing out that the suggestion is nothing more nor less than the elimination of Arnold Foster and Vivian as the canalising officers through whom all S.O.2 matters pass at present at Broadway.
3. A.C.S.S. tells me very definitely (and this is confirmed by C.O.S.) that Heads of all Sections in C. are now more than prepared to play seriously with S.O.2 as between Section Heads, and that the elimination of Arnold Foster and Vivian would be welcomed by everybody at C.
4. I think it likely that C. may raise the point that matters of principle may be settled by the Section Heads in this way - which should ordinarily pass through some of the Executive Heads.
5. I think this can be answered by the statement that no matter of principle can be decided in C. unless it goes through the A.C.S.S., who is responsible for all the Sections with which we are primarily concerned i.e., France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Spain.

This closer liaison should have been possible from the beginning, but C's people have consistently opposed it. C.D. has some hope of an improvement, which he hopes to put forward at once, as a paper. The memorandum is at once, as CD.

DD. 3/25

W. 2/15

W. 2/15

25th April, 1941.

C/D hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation with C in communications matters.

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

X6.

COPYC.D.DT/CX/748

1. I discussed yesterday to some extent with C.S.S. and to a considerable extent with C.O.S. the need of increased liaison between S.O.2. sections and 'C' sections.

C.S.S. appears to have no fundamental objection to this and C.O.S. is ardently in favour of it, as I am myself.

2. It seems to me that it would be better if the move came from yourself. Would you have any objection either to writing to C.S.S. or speaking to him at your next meeting on Friday, May 2nd, on the following lines?

"In order to ensure full co-operation between S.I.S. and S.O.2. and to ensure that lines are not crossed, it seems of paramount importance that there should be direct liaison between the respective country sections of the two organisations.

"At the present moment there seems to be a certain amount of information available to one organisation which should be automatically available to the other.

"Also, there seems to be a need for closer co-operation regarding the actual handling of agents by one organisation or the other, all the more so now as the areas for recruiting agents become more limited. The ever increasing amount of work carried out by country sections in both organisations makes it almost impossible to canalize all liaison through single individuals."

3. A good case in point is the handling of new arrivals at the Royal Patriotic Schools. There, Major THORNTON does a quick preliminary interrogation and indicates whether a new arrival is likely to be of more value to S.O.2. or S.I.S.

Actually, of course, nobody can make a final decision of this nature until a most detailed interrogation has been carried out. This interrogation should be done by S.I.S. and S.O.2. in co-operation and even if it is decided that the man is of more value to S.O.2. he is bound to have a lot of information of value to S.I.S. Alternatively, a man earmarked for S.I.S. may have special information which might be invaluable for an S.O.2. project.

It is only by the two sections concerned working hand in hand that the best results can be obtained.

D/T
29.4.41.

E.E.C.

ly,

CD/OR/365.

C.E.O.

26 APR 1941

25th April, 1941.

C.D. hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to cooperation with C in communications matters.

0/25

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

At.

From C.D.

CD/OR/178

To C.E.O.

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C. D.

W.H.P.

ly,

26 APR 1941

25th April, 1941.

C.D. hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation with 'C' in communications matters.

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

X6.

COPYC.D.

MINISTRY DT/CX/748

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It is only by the two sections concerned working hand in hand that the best results can be obtained.

D/T
29.4.41.

E.E.C.

Over/-

ly,

CD/OR/365.

C. E. O.

26 APR 1941

25th April, 1941.

CPD hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation with C in communications matters.

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

xc.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE, W.1.

29th April, 1941.

AD/12 to Mr Brown

Am very difficult.

I think all

you should say

is that you had

no idea of such

rule but will

obscure it in the

future - ie

I should shut

it down!!

Ed
31/4/41

my,

I am afraid I have rather gone and put my foot
you will see from the attached letter from
d Arnold-Forster. The trouble is that,
ved your minute of the 16th April (marked
I went, after discussion with Jebb, to talk
n Office about this question of taking
ter certain German activities in South

r explaining the matter orally, I left,
as an aide-memoire, the copy which you had
of your minute and of its enclosure. You
horrid repercussions that have resulted
The point is to decide what to say in reply.

t of all I take it that I shall have to
bly and promise not to do anything of the
ut can I, without making things rather
ou, give the undertaking requested in
that in no circumstances will any of these
pied in future?

ould be grateful for your advice on the
d you also please be so good as to let me
er back as I have not kept a copy?

Yours ever,

Philip Brown.

over/-

ly,

CD/OR/365.

C. E. O.

26 APR 1941

25th April, 1941.

C.D. hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to cooperation with C in communications matters.

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

KC.

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. SC/2142/76

and address

~~and to whom personally name~~

The Director-General

TELEPHONE
GROSVENOR 4000.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE, W.1.

29th April, 1941.

PERSONAL

My dear Tommy,

.... I am afraid I have rather gone and put my foot in it, as you will see from the attached letter from our old friend Arnold-Forster. The trouble is that, when we received your minute of the 16th April (marked ADZ/US/115), I went, after discussion with Jebb, to talk to the Foreign Office about this question of taking steps to counter certain German activities in South America.

After explaining the matter orally, I left, more or less as an aide-memoire, the copy which you had sent me both of your minute and of its enclosure. You will see the horrid repercussions that have resulted from this. The point is to decide what to say in reply.

First of all I take it that I shall have to apologise humbly and promise not to do anything of the kind again, but can I, without making things rather awkward for you, give the undertaking requested in paragraph 2, that in no circumstances will any of these reports be copied in future?

I should be grateful for your advice on the above. Would you also please be so good as to let me have the letter back as I have not kept a copy?

Yours ever,

Philip Dawkins

Major F.T. Davies.

ava/-

ly,

CD/OR/365.

C. E. O.

26 APR 1941

25th April, 1941.

C/D hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to cooperation with C in communications matters.

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

Ku.

28 APR 1941

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STRICTLY PERSONAL.

B/0969

27th April 1941.

Dear Broad,

I have been asked to write to you on the following matter.

It appears that CX report No. 24, dated 3.4.41, in regard to the Inter-American Abstention Committee, and addressed to the American Department of the Foreign Office, was copied and sent by you to the Foreign Office with a request for action. It is considered here and at the Foreign Office that it is most dangerous to copy these secret reports and so to increase the numbers in issue. It is indeed only on the understanding that they are not so copied that these reports are issued from here. Each copy is numbered for the same reason. May I have your assurance that under no circumstances will any of our reports be copied in future, in order that I can reassure my Chief?

The Political Section here also pointed out that in fact it was stated on the copy sent to you that the original had been sent to the Foreign Office, as indeed is the case with all the Political CX reports that are sent to you.

It appears that in sending this report to the Foreign Office it was stated that "Broadway" had said that their source would not be compromised by the action that had been suggested to the Foreign Office. May I be told who it was in Broadway who was consulted on this point?

C.S.S. has informed S.O.2. that he objects to the phrase "Broadway" being used in inter-departmental correspondence.

Yours sincerely,

P. Broad Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

C. ARNOLD-FOSTER

Over/-

ly,

25th April, 1941.

C/D hopes that he is justified in regarding this interview as marking a distinct step forward in regard to cooperation with C in communications matters.

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

(This is being circulated to every Head of Section who is interested and C.D. expects him to take immediate action).

1. Fenwick of C would like to know immediately if there is any chance of our producing a Spaniard who is either a trained or semi-trained wireless operator, or, failing this, if amongst the Sconces - or perhaps even amongst the Pioneer Spanish Battalion - there is any intelligent Spaniard who could perhaps be put through a quick intensive course of wireless to make him available to be sent to Spain either with any of our lots, when and if they go, or separately.
2. There is, I understand, a specific reason for this but I am not sure whether I have the C.S.S.'s permission to broadcast it; it has, however, a connection with a transmitting set that is hidden somewhere in Spain but requires an operator.
3. If any Section Head has occasion to telegraph overseas for information as to any specific person or persons - I wish the name or names to be first of all referred to Cowgill of C, in case these people are already in his files, which will save time and trouble and line-crossing to all concerned.
4. Will AD/Z kindly see that a copy of the Far Eastern Charter is sent to C.S.S. - but still better would be if he could find the time to take it personally to the C.S.S. for a small chat over the whole project. This arises out of a request by E for a large number of wireless sets for the Far Eastern Mission, and this will have a far greater chance of being attended to as regards a proportion of what was asked for if C.S.S. and some of his people know what we are trying to do by means of this Far Eastern Mission.
5. Will the French, Belgian and Dutch Sections who purpose to drop wireless operators in any of their respective countries during the next few moons advise Colonel Dansey of C of their minimum requirements as far as wireless sets are concerned for the next two or three moons. This should be done as quickly as possible and I have every reason to believe that their demands will be met. In this connection it should be explained to each wireless operator going across that he should not expect daily contact, i.e., he should not expect to be listened for seven days in the week.
6. It should also be arranged with him that in cases where he can be heard here but he cannot hear us - a simple signal, such as the playing of a certain tune on the B.B.C. transmission for that country, could probably be arranged as an intimation that we have heard him although he has not been able to hear us.

Over/

ly,

7. All Sections who are sending or who purpose to drop people into Europe and who have any chance of transmitting information back from the country in which they have been dropped, should be supplied with a questionnaire from "C", which could be prepared by L. Department in conjunction with Colonel Dansey of C, or with whomever Colonel Dansey may depute in C.
8. This is designed so that the wireless sets from C. with which they equip our men may be used to a certain extent for bringing intelligence to C and no doubt L. Department could explain in a very short course to our own people how to identify troops by shoulder-straps and aeroplanes by numbers on the wings, etc., etc., which is the type of information which C would be very grateful to have.
9. I desire the fullest collaboration from all Section Heads on this matter, for it is obvious that if C. are interested in getting information for themselves we shall have a large degree of co-operation from them in equipping our people with wireless and giving them adequate reception from this end.

C. D.

MOST SECRET.THE PROSPECTS OF SUBVERSION.S U M M A R Y.

21st April, 1941.

1. Subversive operations are being conducted in three different groups of territories:-

- a). Countries defeated or occupied by the Axis powers, where the populations are almost all hostile to the invader and therefore provide the best material for subversion. Our objects here are (i) to prepare the populations and train the forces required for an eventual rising at the appropriate time against the enemy; (ii) meanwhile to organise sabotage and passive resistance, so as to harass and hinder the enemy in every possible way.
- b). Certain neutral countries at present threatened by the Axis. Activities here are limited by strategic and diplomatic considerations. Our objects are to combat the political pressure of the Axis powers, to encourage resistance to invasion so that enemy forces are held up and embarrassed as much as possible, and to lay the foundations of successful revolt should the territory in question be occupied by the enemy.
- c). Enemy countries. Here our final goal is internal disruption. But at present in this early stage of the war it is difficult to organise sabotage and impossible to provoke revolution. For the moment we have to be content with putting out secret propaganda, with making use of immigrant labour to act as a disruptive element and with training Italians and Germans for eventual action in their native territories.

2. Subversive warfare is by its very nature an offensive weapon. Moreover it can take many different forms; even if one line of action is checked, another can be developed. It is therefore unwise to think only in terms of eventual uprisings. The right policy is continual and increasing aggression. While all possible preparation must be made for general risings, it will not be in our interest that these should occur for a long time to come. Meanwhile we must press on with subversive activities and sabotage of every kind, including ca-canny methods of production, bad workmanship, administrative muddling, as well as more open and violent action. While taking care not to provoke the enemy into severely repressive measures, we must harass him to the maximum extent and over the widest possible area.

3. Among the countries occupied or defeated by the Axis powers, the existing situation and the future prospects of subversion differ considerably.

POLAND. Hatred of Germany is violent and universal and the whole population intensely patriotic. A military organisation to conduct subversion and sabotage in the event of defeat was established six months before the outbreak of war. Some arms have been obtained locally,

others,-

others, including explosives and sabotage devices, have been smuggled in with our assistance. As outbreaks of "open" sabotage on a large scale met with severe reprisals, orders were given to concentrate on 'undiscoverable' sabotage, and this is now being conducted with much success. At the same time secret propaganda work is carried on by a parallel civilian organisation.

For the eventual rising against the enemy ten Divisions have been organised of which four possess personal weapons.

There are direct W/T communications between London and Warsaw, and the whole movement in Poland is under the strict control of the Polish Government in this country, with whom we are in intimate contact.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Here too an underground military movement was established before the war. Its headquarters are now in England with the Czech Government, which exercises effective control from here. But owing to the fact that in Czechoslovakia there is surface collaboration with the Germans, subversive activity there is at present confined to propaganda and 'undiscoverable' sabotage. Meanwhile the preparation of the forces needed for an eventual rising continues. There are believed to exist about 100 battalions, grouped on a territorial basis, most of which have personal weapons of some kind.

ROUMANIA. There are many elements in the population which are hostile to Germany. With the more important of these, such as M. Maniu's Peasant Party, we have for long been in touch. Many acts of sabotage have occurred, and these would have been on a much larger scale had it been possible for the R.A.F. to bomb the oil fields. W/T communication between Istanbul and Bucharest has now been established and we hope that when the situation is more favourable our friends will be able to do much damage to the enemy.

BULGARIA. Sympathy with the Allies is much less widespread than in Roumania, but our supporters are more active and more violent. We have been working with several groups, of which the most important is Dimitroff's Agrarian Party. These have already conducted much sabotage and should be able to continue their activities.

YUGOSLAVIA. The opposition parties which backed the coup d'état had been working with us and we had supplied them with finance, arms and other materials. We hope to re-establish contact with these and other groups by means of W/T sets, which we have provided. Although widespread action will be difficult so long as the German garrison is large, the opportunities for sabotage should be considerable and the human material, on which we have to rely is excellent.

OCCUPIED FRANCE. The population here has undoubtedly become very hostile to the Germans, but they have not yet sufficient spirit for much subversive activity. Our immediate aim must be, by propaganda, to fan their hatred and turn it into action. We are training organisers, who, after being dropped by parachute, will create centres of disaffection; but it will be some time before important results are achieved.

LOW COUNTRIES

LOW COUNTRIES. In Holland subversive warfare is being conducted, but owing to difficulty of communication we are not yet in touch with the elements engaged upon it. In Belgium there is also evidence of resistance to Germany and although here too we have not yet established contact with dissident groups, we hope to do so before long. Organisers and W/T operators are in training and should be in the field shortly.

DENMARK. Although the Danes have been better treated than the peoples in other occupied territories, and hatred of the Germans is therefore less intense, the national spirit has recently improved and 'cold shoulder' tactics against the Germans are spreading rapidly. We are in touch with anti-German Danish groups and are encouraging passive resistance of every kind. Should military operations against Germany occur in Denmark, we could provide a number of saboteurs and Fifth Columnists.

NORWAY. This country is at present the most hopeful field for subversive warfare. Our difficulty is not to spur people on, but to hold them back. As in the case of Poland, our policy is to equip and train forces for an eventual rising, and, meanwhile, to encourage sabotage and passive resistance. Progress in both fields of activity is most satisfactory. Norwegian morale has been much encouraged by 'tip and run' raids, such as that on the Lofoten Islands and we hope to initiate more of these next winter.

4. The prospects in the various neutral countries, in which we operate, also differ very considerably from one another.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. Our activities here are subordinated to foreign policy. We are debarred from any action which might in the slightest degree affect the relations of H.M.G with the Franco and Salazar Governments. For this reason we are bound to rely on these Governments themselves putting up resistance of some kind to a German invasion. We have sent officers and materials to Gibraltar to aid such resistance by sabotage should an invasion occur and in Portugal we are encouraging a native organisation on the lines of our own Home Guard.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. For the moment, and in the absence of armed backing by H.M.G. our object is to counteract German infiltration by means of subversive propaganda. Our chief instrument will be the use of American observers, who we hope will be admitted in connection with a rationing scheme now being discussed between Vichy and Washington. Oral propaganda is also being directed from Tangier.

FRENCH WEST AFRICA. We have a strong mission, based on British and Free French Colonies, which is doing propaganda work in French West Africa. Should the opportunity arise it could also be used for more violent forms of subversion.

UNOCCUPIED FRANCE. Our activities are restricted by the peculiar diplomatic situation. Moreover, the morale of the population is low. We hope in the next

few months to improve our communications, to put in organisers from the Iberian Peninsula and, if we can obtain permission, to undertake some sabotage on communications.

SWEDEN. Our policy here is to bolster up Swedish resistance to German advances, but at the same time to avoid pushing Sweden into the war until we can give her military assistance. We are also making preparations to sabotage important objectives in the event of German invasion. Meanwhile, Sweden is vitally important for us as a centre of intelligence and communications with Norway, Denmark and Germany.

FINLAND. We are using our control over Finnish communications via Petsamo with the Western world as a lever to introduce subversive elements into the country. The Finns have agreed to allow H.M.G. to have 'trade inspectors' at important points. These men, we hope, will become the nucleus of an organisation to interfere with Finnish supplies to Germany, especially nickel from Petsamo, to make preparations for general subversion in the event of Germany occupying Finland and to act as a channel for organising subversion in North Norway.

5. Enemy countries.

ITALY. While the morale of the Italian people is notoriously bad, there is little prospect of any rising against the régime nor even of widespread sabotage. The population is apathetic, fears the might of Germany and, at the same time, feels that German victory would be better than defeat. We are in touch with certain small dissident groups, but the difficulty of communications is a serious handicap, and the problem has been made more difficult by the invasion of Yugoslavia.

GERMANY. This is our most difficult task. German morale is still good and the régime so powerful that organised subversion is at present hardly possible. Some sabotage has, in fact, been carried out in Austria from Slovenia, but our activity must for the most part and for the time being, be confined to secret propaganda. Meanwhile we shall select and train agents against the day when intensive bombing and perhaps military defeats undermine the German morale and so prepare the way for active subversion on the spot.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

Subversive activities against the Axis have developed considerably during the last six months and are now making an important contribution to the destruction of the enemy's war effort. Our most successful areas are Norway, Yugoslavia and Poland, and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia and the other Balkan countries.

We are still far from the stage when any general uprising in any occupied country - even if it were possible - would assist the allied cause. We must continue, therefore, while preparing for this day, to encourage the greatest degree of sabotage in the occupied territories, to exert Axis pressure and propaganda in neutral countries and to stimulate passive resistance in enemy countries. Subversion

can be used offensively and continuously, and although for ultimate success it requires the backing of armed forces, it exerts in the meanwhile a constant strain on the enemy's resources. Moreover in contrast to the Germans we have the great advantage that, in the occupied territories, we are working with natural allies. A Fifth Column of the Free is easier to organize than a Fifth Column of Fascists.

In promoting subversion against the enemy, S.O.E. is greatly handicapped by shortage of arms, aircraft and transport facilities. If it is to carry out its job successfully, to train and infiltrate large numbers of agents and to equip the forces needed for eventual national uprisings, it must have the backing of the Chiefs of Staff and the tools with which it can do the job. The S.O.E. would be grateful if the Chiefs of Staff would say whether they agree or not with the policy recommended here, and if so, whether they will make available the men and materials necessary for carrying it out.

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21st April, 1941.

THE PROSPECTS OF SUBVERSION

1. FIELDS OF ACTION

(a) An increasing weakness of the Axis, and more particularly of Germany, is the occupation of vast areas of Europe where the defeated population hates the invader, and where armed force is required not only to keep order but also to compel the peoples to work.

(b) Further, the Axis, having embarked on total warfare, is trying to make the greatest use even of those countries which are still neutral to further its policy and aid its war effort, materially or politically. Thus neutral countries have been brought within the scope of subversive warfare, and though on balance the Axis may there hold the initial advantage, our greater resources in raw materials, in facilities for trade, and in sea communications will enable us eventually to turn the scales. The further development of air transport facilities - which are most urgently required - will hasten this end.

(c) Even in the enemy countries themselves, where direct action by S.O.E. is obviously most difficult, the foundation of the existing régimes by means of unbridled violence, ferocity and injustice has, of necessity, entailed the creation of dissidence, discontent or disgust, however carefully concealed. These will in the final issue, and with proper encouragement, bring their own aftermath. Here the function of S.O.E. is to help the chickens to come home to roost.

2. Thus there are (in order of their present importance) three fields in which subversive warfare is now being conducted, viz:-

(a) Defeated and occupied territories, including Roumania, Bulgaria and others, where there was no organised armed resistance.

(b) Neutral countries, including Spain and others, where there is intense political pressure by the Axis, or where pressure is likely to become acute at some future date.

(c) The home lands of the Axis Powers.

3. AIMS AND METHODS OF SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

These vary widely, not only between the three broad groups above, but also in accordance with local conditions within the different groups. Each country concerned requires individual understanding and treatment.

In general terms, however, the following distinctions are made:-

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(a) In conquered and occupied territories the eventual aim is to provoke an armed rising against the invader at the appropriate moment. It cannot, however be made too clear that in total warfare a premature rising is not only foredoomed to failure but that the reprisals engendered will be of such a drastic, ferocious and all-embracing nature that the backbone of the movement will probably be broken beyond healing. A national uprising against the Axis is a card which usually can only be played once. As Hitler is reported to have said of the invasion of England, it is like firing a gun with only one shot. It is thus essential not only that these subterranean movements should be supported by us, but also that they should be sufficiently under our control to ensure that they do not explode prematurely.

Concurrently with the building up of a subversive movement towards its eventual goal, the task of creating an organisation for immediate sabotage and diversionary warfare of all kinds, is undertaken. Properly developed, the cumulative effect of these activities will have a serious influence on the Axis war effort, particularly as regards the administrative strain; properly conducted, they can be so cloaked as to evade heavy reprisals. Meanwhile, they act as a cover to any subversive military movement which may exist (though they may be part of it), and also provide for the oppressed populations the dual encouragements of immediate activity and of British support, so necessary to the maintenance of morale and to belief in our final victory.

(b) Neutral countries demand very diverse treatment. In some, such as Yugoslavia before the coup d'état, the aim may be to induce their adhesion as full allies in the military struggle; in others, such as Spain, we may have to content ourselves with the maintenance of neutrality. In all, however, which are under the threat of German occupation or domination, we are working to ensure that at least a portion of the people is prepared to resist by active measures, whether open or clandestine, so as to embarrass the invader and retard his progress. The cultivation and support of minority and opposition parties, the provision of money, arms and materials, etc., are being undertaken towards these ends as circumstances permit; and plans are in hand for the destruction of stocks and installations that would help the enemy. In other countries, such as Sweden, which though not immediately threatened are subject to political pressure by Germany, Axis policy is being combatted as vigorously as possible by clandestine methods, and this process is now being begun in neutral countries, such as South America, which are far removed from direct threat but are being exploited by the Axis.

(c) In the home lands of the Axis Powers the final goal is internal disruption. These countries are the hardest targets to engage directly in view of their efficient police systems, their tightly sealed frontiers, and the consequent difficulties of establishing communication with dissident elements therein. While these obstacles are being tackled, the work of subversion is being carried out by secret broadcast and printed propaganda, by the encouragement of immigrant forced labour (e.g. Polish and Danish) to begin sabotage on certain specific lines within Germany, and by the selection and training of emigrant natives for eventual employment in their proper territories.

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4. TIMING AND INTENSITY OF SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

The possible fields of action, the various aims, and the methods of attaining them have been outlined above. As regards the timing and the intensity of our activities, subversive warfare by its very nature has the inestimable advantage that it is always possible to be on the offensive, and to take the initiative in spite of the lead that the Axis has been allowed to gain. Indeed it may shortly, and for some considerable time, be the only field in which we are able to take any "military" initiative on land (as distinct, of course, from the initiative on sea or in the air). Subversion has the further advantage that, if countered in one direction, it can continue in another, or if checked in one form, i.e. overt sabotage, some other is possible, e.g. clandestine sabotage, etc. Even if all activity should be momentarily checked, secret propaganda is still possible, and needless to say propaganda and action - S.O.1 and S.O.2 - are closely co-ordinated and work hand in hand. Therefore our only policy for subversive warfare is constant and increasing aggression, in the forms dictated by particular circumstances and in keeping with the general situation.

It follows that a consideration at any given moment of the "probable state of readiness and ability of certain countries to rise against the Nazi regime" is not by itself a fruitful study. Sabotage and subversive warfare generally are, in the case of many countries, and for long will remain, much more to our advantage, both future and immediate, than a national rising. While keeping the eventual object in view and working towards that end, we are (within the limits of discretion and of general policy) in the meanwhile exploiting all immediate possibilities in order to attack our enemies now and maintain our offensive.

So, for the purpose of this paper, that is to say, for assessing the value of the factor of subversive warfare in the general appreciation of future strategy, we must take into our account for each country the situation regarding Subversion existing today and its future possibilities*. The countries concerned are dealt with seriatim below.

5. EXISTING SITUATION AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

(a) Occupied Territories

(1) POLAND

The whole Polish population is violently anti-German, and patriotic feeling is intense. No attempt has been or will be made to compromise with the enemy in any way.

Six months before the outbreak of war, i.e. in April 1939, the organisation of a secret military movement was

* N.B. No attempt is here made to deal with the nature of subversive propaganda, since that is the specific province of S.O.1. The latter are, however, in agreement with the general policy embodied in this memorandum.

undertaken whose role was sabotage and subversion in the event of defeat. On the occupation of Poland certain of the staff of that organisation were ordered to leave in order to assist the underground movement from outside and keep in touch with the emigré Polish Government; we have been in intimate contact with the Polish authorities ever since the formation of the S.O.E.

Thus contact and continuity have never been broken and the organisation has developed steadily. A certain amount of arms has been obtained locally, either from concealed Polish stocks or from the Germans, and further amounts, including explosives and sabotage devices, have been provided by us and have safely reached their destination. There is daily contact by W/T between here and Warsaw.

German reprisals against overt sabotage are very heavy; in spite of this the wrecking of trains and other violent sabotage continue sporadically, although orders have been sent from here that acts inviting severe reprisals should be slowed down. 'Undiscoverable' sabotage is, however, carried on systematically and continuously, e.g. spoiling of machine tools in armament factories, contamination of grain and foodstuffs destined for the Reich, destruction of grain stocks, and is directed mainly against all transport of oil, coal, foods, etc. as well as communications.

These activities are producing valuable results of which we have first-hand information. Not only has a large German force to be maintained in Poland to keep order, but the administration of the territory is causing severe strain to Germany. Parallel with this military movement, a civilian organisation is, with our support, maintaining a constant campaign against the invader by means of anti-German and pro-British propaganda and by encouraging passive resistance and preparation for the final German overthrow.

Under cover of these activities the organisation and armament of the military movement in Poland goes on. The present situation is that 10 divisions have been organised, of which the equivalent of 4 divisions are armed with personal weapons of some kind or another. The whole problem of the future is the arming of the remainder, it being understood that such arming can only be in personal weapons, i.e. revolvers, grenades, rifles and including sub-machine guns or Sten guns when they become available; no attempt is made to form other than infantry and guerilla units. Staff officers for these formations are being trained in this country under our aegis and despatched to Poland; some have already left.

The whole subversive movement in Poland, military and civil, is under the strict control of the Polish Government in this country, with whom we are in intimate touch on this very question. Orders and instructions have so far been obeyed implicitly and there is no reason to fear that control from here will break down or that premature developments will occur in Poland.

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(11) CZECHOSLOVAKIA

After Munich the organisation of an underground military movement was at once put in hand. Between that date and the outbreak of war a few selected staff officers of the organisation left Czechoslovakia for England and other countries in order to be prepared to carry on from outside; one or two more have since been smuggled out and have joined them. The headquarters abroad is now in England with the Czech Government.

Although we have been in contact with these Czech representatives both at home and abroad since July, 1939, political and departmental considerations prohibited intimate contact except in one or two foreign capitals, and only since December, 1940, have we been able to establish effective liaison. Up to the breakdown of France, however, we were supplying a steady dribble of explosives, devices and arms, the extent of which was limited by the necessarily clandestine nature of the means of transport.

The situation in Czechoslovakia differs markedly from that in Poland and emphasises the different characteristics of the two races. In Poland there is still continuous and unrelenting warfare against the aggressor; acts of violence occur daily and the struggle is unremitting. In Czechoslovakia (or rather Bohemia and Moravia) there is on the surface a degree of collaboration with the Germans, for, although President Hacha is directly under Dr. Benes's orders, yet he is in fact co-operating very largely with von Neurath. The Czechs have decided rightly or wrongly that the better course is to make an appearance of collaboration with the Germans until the final day when revolt becomes possible.

There are two factors which have strengthened this attitude. The first is that the abortive rising of September, 1939, so ferociously repressed was carried out, it is believed, at the instigation of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council; the second is that many Czechs have not forgotten Munich, for which they blame us. The Poles, on the other hand, feel that we honoured our word.

The result is that, while waiting and actively preparing for the day of liberation, the Czechs are anxious not to exacerbate their masters and bring on again the fierce oppression which was in the interval greatly relaxed. Therefore in their home land they are limiting their subversive warfare, except as regards organisation and propaganda, to sabotage of an undiscoverable nature; in enemy territory, i.e. Germany and Austria, their sabotage can be more overt without risking reprisals, but it is directed from their centres abroad and not from Prague.

Intense secrecy is maintained regarding the extent and equipment of the subversive military movement, both here and in the home land, on the principle, that no one authority should know more than the bare minimum necessary. We know, however, that the personnel are organised into a hundred or so battalions, grouped territorially, each battalion being subdivided into companies and sections. Most of these units have some personal arms. More detailed information is being obtained from the protectorate. In the meantime,

we are in the closest contact with those responsible, and with the Czech Government, in order to furnish assistance, and to encourage the continuance of resistance and of aggression.

Our information already makes it clear that the whole movement is under strict control by our collaborators here.

(iii) ROUMANIA

Before the German occupation there were in Roumania a number of political parties which sympathised with the Allied cause. With some of the more important of these we were in touch, and there was some reason to hope that, when the German occupation took place, these elements would succeed in fomenting a considerable campaign of passive resistance and also of active sabotage. There is little doubt that a bombing of the oil wells, even on a small scale, would have greatly encouraged such a campaign, as it would have been a direct token of British support; but our suggestion that such bombing should take place was rejected for general strategic and political reasons, and is even now not immediately practicable.

We are, however, still in touch to a limited degree with those elements, and it is still reasonable to expect that, if during the course of the next few months we are in a position to bomb the oilfields, subversion will become more active. The entry of Hungary into the war is likely to have, from this point of view, a favourable effect in Transylvania. Already some quite considerable acts of sabotage have taken place. These we are steadily trying to increase through our local representatives, although the position at the moment is difficult, owing to the limited facilities for communication. Two-way wireless traffic between Istanbul and Bucharest has, however, been established, and is now beginning to work well.

In Roumania it is unlikely that the country would ever rise in open revolt while there are German troops in the country, however bad the general German strategic situation might be. But if subversive warfare can be successfully encouraged and supported, it is certain that, as the German power weakens, sabotage will begin to strain German resources and the German hold over Roumania. The Peasant Party, for instance, still exists, and we have for some time past been trying to get its leader, Maniu, out of the country in order to preside over a "Free Roumania" Committee. Both the Peasant Party adherents and the Communists are likely to make considerable and organised trouble if opportunity offers; and if Russia's relations with Germany deteriorate we may also expect the Soviet to add fuel to the flames.

(iv) BULGARIA

Here the number of sympathisers with the Allies is small when compared to Roumania, but those sympathisers are more active and of a more violent type. Our policy in Bulgaria, now that war has broken out in the Balkans, is to continue, so far as we can, to interfere with German communications and instigate anti-German action. There are

several groups of desperate men in Bulgaria who are prepared to work for us, to carry out acts of sabotage in Bulgaria, and to incite their people to clandestine resistance against their German masters. We have been in touch with these groups (notably the Agrarian Party under Dimitroff) for some time past, and have supplied them with both money and materials for their purpose; some of the most prominent we have assisted to escape from Bulgaria in order to continue their work under our aegis from outside. But it must be remembered that Bulgarians as a whole are not a very fertile field and are chiefly disposed to pursue their own grievances against their neighbours. Here again, however, much will depend on the attitude of the Soviet Union.

(v) ALBANIA

We were in direct touch with a number of important chieftains who expressed their willingness to create a general rising in Northern Albania, provided that we could provide them with equipment, and would enter into some commitment as to the post-war future of Albania which they would regard as satisfactory. In December last the matter was referred to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, who decided that for the moment the necessary equipment could not be spared or transported, and that in any case a rising at that stage was undesirable.

Under that ruling, we restricted our active measures to the infiltration of small bands of Albanian saboteurs behind the Italian lines, with equipment we provided; some measure of success attended our efforts, but recent events have made the question of work in Albania rather academic.

(vi) YUGOSLAVIA

Among the Balkan States, Yugoslavia has provided the most fertile field for subversive activities. More than a year ago a beginning was made by establishing contact with certain dissident groups. Since then we have been extending and perfecting these contacts, which latterly embraced all the principal parties in opposition. The parties in question are strongest in Southern Serbia, in Slovenia, and in Montenegro, and the assistance with which we have provided them has consisted primarily of finance, but also of arms and other warlike supplies. Their strength may be gauged from the fact that the political backing for the recent coup d'état was largely provided by these elements. What we can expect from these Allied sympathisers during the next few months is now, of course, largely speculative. In Slovenia and Croatia subversive activities are likely to be more difficult than in Serbia, but at least some degree of passive resistance may be expected everywhere. In any case we hope to re-establish contact with the various groups after the occupation of the country by the Germans by means of W/T sets which we have provided. It is fairly certain that these groups will be more active than the equivalent groups in Roumania, but here again it is not likely that any widespread action will take place unless and until the German garrison is materially reduced.

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(vii) BALKANS (General)

S.O.E. have always contemplated the possibility of an occupation by Germany of the whole of the Balkans and recently made provision for the establishment, in Palestine, of a Centre for the direction of Subversion after the occupation has taken place. The functions of this centre would be:-

1. To communicate by W/T with the various organisations in Roumania, Yugoslavia, and probably Greece, who have pledged themselves to conduct post-occupational sabotage etc. and are provided with W/T sets.
2. To co-ordinate secret and subversive propaganda, possibly by the institution of Freedom Stations.

Exactly how this scheme will work out and exactly who will run the Centre remains to be decided in consultation with the Foreign Office. But there is no doubt that some kind of centre is wanted in order to fan the embers of revolt in the Balkans as a whole and to stimulate resistance to the Germans.

(viii) OCCUPIED FRANCE

France presents one of the hardest of the S.O. problems. It is true that according to all reports the population of the occupied area is becoming increasingly anti-German. This, however, does not mean that the French have the spirit to fight the Germans at all costs which animates the Poles, the Czechs, the Norwegians and even the Dutch - and which will probably animate the Serbs. There is still widespread apathy and disillusionment in France, and it is probable, for instance, that the French armament factories are working harder at producing arms under the Germans than they ever did under the many Governments of the Third Republic. To transform this spirit of resignation into hate, to stir up the population and to make them indulge first in passive resistance and then in more active forms of revolt, is the task of S.O.E. and principally, at the moment, of S.O.1. Already the secret radios and the leaflets seem to have had considerable effect. Soon we shall be in a position to drop "organisers" in considerable numbers, whose job will be to create centres of disaffection and to be in touch with us by wireless. Many of these agents will be caught, but we shall seek to discover and train many more. We are also working through the Poles and getting into touch with the large Polish communities in the north of France. In addition we are discovering lines of action through Switzerland. In general the pulse of the French patient is low. There is no question of provoking an untimely crisis. We must seek to stimulate the population to greater mental and moral fitness.

(ix) THE LOW COUNTRIES

In Holland hatred of the Germans seems to be considerable and, judging by recent trials, a certain amount of subversive warfare is being practised by the Dutch themselves. The difficulty here is to get in touch

with these elements amongst the Dutch since, for various reasons, the dropping of agents by parachute is not easy in that country. When we do establish contact we shall have to decide on the tempo of our operations. But the German grip on Holland is strong, and generally the prospects for subversive action this year may be said to be not very great.

There is little first-hand information about subversive activities in Belgium, but it is evident, from the press, that centres of resistance do exist and that anti-German feeling is gaining impetus. Contact has not yet been established, but organisers and W/T operators are under training and should be in the field shortly. Passive resistance will be encouraged in the first instance and acts of sabotage left for a later date. For the rapid growth of a passive resistance network, intensive propaganda will be necessary and it is hoped that S.O.1 will soon institute a Belgium Freedom Station.

As is probably the case with most countries, Belgian will to resist varies in accordance with reports of British victories or defeats. It is only the cream of the population who will maintain their faith in the face of British defeats. On the whole not a great deal can be expected in Belgium for some time and pending a considerable German defeat. Many Flemings are pro-German and many Walloons are defeatist. A national consciousness exists, but it will require great stimulation before it really counts as a factor in the struggle with Germany.

(x) DENMARK

The Danes, following the tame capitulation of their Government, have taken a long time to find their national consciousness, partly because the Germans have been less brutal to them than to the other peoples in occupied lands, and have bought their agricultural produce at good prices on paper in such a way as to make it hard for Danish agricultural interests to perceive that the whole thing is a gigantic swindle.

Nevertheless, the Danish national spirit is now growing satisfactorily, and "cold shoulder" tactics against the Germans (which the latter fortunately find extremely offensive) are spreading rapidly.

S.O.2 are in touch with Danish organisations and are fostering this spirit and teaching the art of passive resistance of every kind. It is perhaps unlikely that we shall be able to go much beyond this in Denmark unless we are prepared to give military and air support; but we are training Danes in this country as organisers and parachutists and, if ever there were a possibility of an offensive against the Germans in this country, we should have a number of saboteurs and Fifth Column men available with the necessary reception committees inside the country.

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(xi) NORWAY

Of all the countries with which we have to deal Norway, at the moment, is the most hopeful field for subversive warfare. This is partly due to the fact that, with her long indented coastline and its proximity to Great Britain, communications are comparatively easy, and partly to the fact that, according to all reports, Norwegian civilian morale, in spite of, or perhaps because of every kind of oppression and persecution by the Germans and the Norwegian Quislings, remains at the highest possible level. Our difficulty in fact (which is shared by the Royal Norwegian Government) is not to spur the people on but to hold them back.

As in Poland, with which country there are some points of resemblance from the S.O. point of view, the policy for subversive operations in Norway thus falls into two distinct parts, as follows:-

1. A long term policy of preparation for a simultaneous uprising all over Norway on the occasion of (but on no account in advance of) either a landing by an Allied expeditionary force, or an incipient German collapse. For these purposes the indigenous anti-Nazi organisations in Norway are being primarily reserved, and we are endeavouring so far as possible to equip, train and organise them to that end.
2. A short term policy of surreptitious sabotage, both active and passive, and for co-operation with and assistance for air raids, or "tip-and-run" landings on the Norwegian coast.

Surreptitious sabotage in Norway is well under way. Passive resistance to the Germans is in full swing and developing fast. To complete the short term portion of the policy it is hoped to organise as many air raids, and "tip-and-run" landings against important objectives on the Lofoten model, as may be practicable, although much of this activity must necessarily be postponed until the autumn owing to the short Norwegian summer nights. Large numbers of Norwegians are now under training for such raids (e.g. on fish factories) which will hit the Germans quite hard as well as encourage the morale of the local inhabitants.

It is assumed that the locking up of a number of German Divisions in Norway, which will be the result of this short term policy, will be desirable from the strategic point of view.

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(b) Neutral Countries

(i) SPAIN and PORTUGAL

In Spain all S.O. activities are at present subordinated to foreign policy. In other words, we have at the desire of His Majesty's Ambassador and the Foreign Office undertaken to do nothing that would in the slightest degree irritate or embarrass the Government of General Franco.

Within these limits we have carried out the plan approved by the Chiefs of Staff and already sent a party of trained officers to Gibraltar, together with a quantity of material. In the event of Spain resisting a German incursion, it is planned to send these officers to various centres, where they will be able to carry out acts of sabotage directed towards harassing the enemy's lines of communication.

In the event of Spain not resisting a German attack, it is not easy to see how these officers could be suitably employed, though in such circumstances it is possible that resistance might occur in isolated areas. To provide for this eventuality, S.O.2. have in reserve in England a number of trained Spaniards who might be infiltrated for anti-German work generally, if circumstances and transport permit. In general, however, it may be said that, so far as Spain is concerned, we are gambling on Spanish resistance and, therefore, not conducting anything which might properly be called subversion. The fundamental reason for this is obvious; there is not at present sufficient armed strength at the disposal of H.M.G. to permit us to pursue any other policy.

In Portugal, broadly speaking, the same applies. No attempt has been made to get in touch with opposition elements, though we are investigating the possibility of making preparation for a certain amount of precautionary sabotage in the event of a German attack. We are, however, encouraging a native organisation on the lines of our own Home Guard.

In both Spain and Portugal the situation may change. Possibly the Germans, owing to failure elsewhere, will be found in the long run to have neither the will nor the ability to invade the Iberian Peninsula. Again, with the development of our air power, the entry of America into the war and the availability of a British Expeditionary Force, the Spaniards and Portuguese may gradually become more afraid of us than they are at present afraid of the Germans. But that moment is still a long way off.

(ii) FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

In North Africa the S.O.E. has a very definite role. Here again the conditions which prevent any very active policy being pursued to some extent apply, namely the absence of armed backing. Yet there are certain cards which we can play, to wit, dislike of the Germans by most of the French and the large majority of the natives. At the moment it is next to impossible to stimulate these emotions by propaganda means, owing to the absence of facilities. But a plan has been elaborated for making use of the American observers and Consuls, whom it is hoped that Vichy will agree to admit

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as part of the proposed rationing scheme for North Africa. It is proposed that these observers and Consuls will be allowed to correspond in cypher with our representative in Gibraltar and organise a regular campaign in collaboration with him. Already, and independently, an American citizen has left for Casablanca and it is hoped that he will be able to bribe the editors of certain important papers. In the meantime rumours and whispers are being organised from Tangier.

(iii) FRENCH WEST AFRICA

S.O.E. have a strong mission in West Africa, whose task is to prepare the way for eventual action in the French West African colonies. Until such time as there is some prospect of armed forces at our disposal in that part of the world, it is evident that not very much can be done, but even without such force, circumstances may arise in which the weapons of propaganda and subversion might be used to great effect in that part of the world, e.g. bribery of officials, leaflets, rumours, agitation among African tribes, etc.

In the meantime, in addition to its legitimate activities, S.O. West African mission is performing very valuable work of a semi-economic nature for the Governors' Conference.

(iv) UNOCCUPIED FRANCE

Much of what has been said of Occupied France applies also to Unoccupied France. In some respects, however, the problem here is even more difficult. For subversive activities in occupied France are not restricted by diplomatic considerations, whereas in unoccupied France such work is largely conditioned by the unprecedented problems raised by the policy of H.M.G. towards the Vichy Government. Moreover, in occupied France, the resistance of the inhabitants is constantly stimulated by the physical presence of the occupying forces, a stimulus which is absent in the unoccupied area. These difficulties will of course disappear if the Germans decide to overrun unoccupied France; and our path would thereby be made so much the smoother. Otherwise, however, our work during the next four months will consist largely of the infiltration of organisers from the Iberian Peninsula, or along other channels, the testing of lines of communication already laid down, and the provision of further lines, provided always that the necessary co-operation from the Services is obtained. In this task it is reasonable to hope that we may obtain some assistance from the considerable number of British soldiers now more or less at large in unoccupied France. Meanwhile, we have enquired of the authorities here whether there would be any objection to our undertaking a certain amount of sabotage on communications in the Unoccupied Zone.

(v) SWITZERLAND

For various reasons there is at present little scope for direct subversive work in Switzerland. S.O.E. have studied many plans for action against the coal traffic between Germany and Italy which might most hopefully be carried out on Swiss soil by Swiss agents. Until now none of these plans has proved practicable.

On the other hand, Switzerland is of great importance as a centre from which to organise subversion in Italy, Germany and France, and our representative in Berne is at present in touch with organisations in the first two of these countries.

(vi) SWEDEN

The Swedes are fundamentally a free democracy, and so opposed to the Nazi creed. They are also, to an extent undreamed of in the last war, pro-ally rather than pro-German. This is particularly true of the Swedish working class.

On the other hand the Swedes have been at peace for a very long time and have an utterly unwarlike mentality. They regard the maintenance of their precious neutrality as an end in itself, are disinclined to fight for an ideal as such, believe that every dispute can be settled by a "business deal", and put their economic and trade interests before almost everything else. Still, they would almost certainly fight if attacked, and they are now better armed than they were, though they remain, of course, weak in the air.

An improvement in our own position in Sweden has occurred since last June. This is partly due to Allied successes and partly the result of small economic concessions to the Swedes. As a result of this policy we have obtained certain definite economic advantages, including Swedish co-operation in the successful running of the German blockade from the Skagerrak (operation "Rubble"). In addition, the advantage of Sweden as an intelligence centre needs no emphasis here.

Consequently S.O.E. hope that we shall continue to bolster up Swedish resistance to German advances by a blend of conciliation and firmness, always bearing in mind, however, that we should do nothing which might push Sweden into war until we are in a position to back her up, notably by supplying her with fighter aircraft and possibly by creating a diversion somewhere on the Norwegian coast.

Hence present subversive operations for Sweden must be strictly confined to making plans for the sabotage of important objectives in the event of German occupation of the country or part of it, and if possible should also include clandestine arrangements with the Swedish Government to assist their own subversive organisations in such an event.

But Sweden is also a very important vantage point for intelligence about and communication with Norway, Denmark, Poland and Germany herself. In fact, much of our subversive work in Norway and Denmark can only be directed from Sweden. For the immediate future, therefore, Swedish neutrality is important to us for this reason alone, although naturally this would not make us wish to postpone Sweden's entry into the war, if it could be brought about as soon as we are ready to take advantage of it.

The Swedish police have lately been inconveniently zealous in suppressing the activities of some of our agents engaged in communicating with the Norwegians; but it is hoped that we can, by the exercise of tact, and the dangling

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of judicious carrots, persuade the Swedish Government to wink at our efforts on behalf of their neighbours.

(vii) FINLAND

The issue regarding this small power is confused by consideration of sentiment aroused by her courageous resistance to Russian aggression during the recent war.

It is a truism that Finnish policy is conditioned by fear of Russia and this fact, coupled with Finland's geographical position and her difficulty in obtaining supplies during the postwar period, when they are particularly badly needed, accounts for her present close relations with our enemies. The desire for freedom in Finland is too strong for her friendship with Germany to be based upon an affinity of outlook. The Germans supply Finland with many of her necessities, including anti-tank guns and other armaments, and assiduously cultivate the notion in Finland that there will be an eventual armed conflict between Germany and the Soviets, from which, if Finland is friendly to Germany to-day, she is bound to benefit. They also cultivate the impression that if Russia should again attack Finland the Germans will no longer passively acquiesce, but will help the Finns to resist.

As a result of this policy, Germany is obtaining from Finland certain economic advantages, as well as valuable transit rights which simplify extremely her problem of reinforcing and relieving her garrisons in northern Norway.

On the other hand the Finns are able to import small quantities of goods and to keep a communication with the western world through Petsamo, and this communication is being used by us as a lever to obtain from them compensating economic advantages and (what is from the S.O. angle more important) the maintenance of the present system whereby the Finns allow us to have "Trade Inspectors" at important points throughout Finland.

Consequently S.O.E. desire to use the Trade Inspectors as the nucleus of a native organisation to be used for the following purposes:

- 1) To interfere by ca'canny and, so far as possible by "natural" means, with Finnish supplies for Germany, and notably nickel from Petsamo
- 2) To create dumps of explosives, arms and other equipment to be used, in the event of Finland becoming completely dominated by Germany, for a general sabotage campaign to be carried on with the assistance of Finnish anti-Nazi elements.
- 3) To gain detailed intelligence regarding the best methods of attacking important installations, so as to be completely prepared with plans for sabotage to be put into operation at the appropriate time.
- 4) To act as channels for the organisation of subversive operations in North Norway.

Generally speaking the maintenance of Finnish neutrality is not, from the S.O. point of view, quite so important as

the maintenance of Swedish neutrality. Moreover, it is submitted that the importance of certain Finnish supplies to Germany make it necessary to take some immediate measures in Finland to interrupt them as "naturally" as possible.

(viii) SOVIET UNION

For obvious reasons it is not possible for S.O.E. to operate at present within the Soviet Union, but we are, however, exploring the possibility of sending a representative who would be attached to the British Embassy in Moscow.

This officer would, in the initial stages, do nothing but keep his eyes open, but in the event of the Soviet authorities becoming well disposed towards us, he would endeavour to get in touch with the OGPU and to arrange joint action in the Middle-East and elsewhere. This is perhaps a faint hope, but provided we get hold of the right man, we think the idea is worth pursuing.

(c) Enemy Countries

(i) ITALY

British successes undoubtedly caused something like despair among the Italian population, but no active opposition to their régime or to their German allies is likely to result. Even before the German victories in North Africa and in the Balkans, despair in Italy was tending to fade into apathy; and Italians, however discontented, were looking to the Germans for salvation against their common foe. In fact, there is no doubt that Italians as a whole still see no alternative to the Fascist régime but chaos or Communism; they believe that the Germans alone will protect them against death and ruin; and, rightly or wrongly, they assume that a German victory would result in a better post-war position for Italy than a defeat inflicted by the British Empire.

These feelings have not been seriously weakened by internal conditions. The Fascist régime has been at great pains to provide that war restrictions are not too onerous, that there is sufficient food and even sufficient amusement. Special steps have been taken, for instance, to keep open Opera Houses and Cinemas so that the Italian may well say to himself that he is better placed than the Londoner. Hence it is not surprising that there is no sign of active disaffection, even among the working classes. Certainly, elements and organisations could be encouraged and strengthened for action in the future, but in order that such elements may act effectively, a first essential is that communication should be established with them. Various steps have already been taken to this end, and we are, for instance, encouraging small groups of workers to indulge in subversive activities. In addition, we hope shortly to get in touch with very high authorities in Italy in order to organise opposition to the Fascist régime and to the German occupation.

Since there is obviously at present no prospect of military operations against metropolitan Italy, three courses remain. They are:

- 1) Intensive propaganda,
- 2) The establishment of contacts and infiltration of agents,
- 3) Attacks on as large a scale as possible by the Navy and the R.A.F., with the object of changing the present apathy into fear.

There is no doubt that (3), if possible, would greatly assist (1) and (2), which S.O.E. are already pursuing to the best of their ability. In addition, volunteers have been recruited, and will shortly be under training, for counter-espionage or subversive activities either in Italy itself or in whatever still remains of the Italian Empire.

The occupation of Yugoslavia has, of course, hindered our work in Italy very considerably, and the occupation of Spain would be an even greater blow; but so long as we have our representative in Switzerland (q.v.) it should be possible for us to work certain lines, while actual infiltration from the air could always be carried out from Malta.

(11) GERMANY

Germany, hardest nut to crack from the military point of view, is also the hardest from the point of view of subversive warfare. At the moment probably not more than one German in ten has any suspicion that Germany may after all be going to lose the war. Listless and apathetic they well may be; but confidence in victory is only equalled by an acute appreciation of what is likely to happen to Germans in the event of defeat.

Given this outlook there is very little that can usefully be done in Germany, beyond propaganda, at the present time. A certain amount of sabotage has in fact been organised in Austria from Slovenia, but this must now necessarily cease. Apart from this, preparatory work is being undertaken to organise the various Socialist and Democratic Parties, and to prepare productive schemes for sabotaging the administration and for bribery. In addition, American business men are visiting Germany in order to report on various aspects interesting to us.

In such circumstances, however, it would be useless to drop agents or "organisers". Even if they were not caught, they could achieve little good. All this may well be possible later, when the absence of German victory, or even German defeats, have prepared the way for subversion, and when intensive bombing has undermined the rather brittle German morale. In the meantime we shall naturally select and train our "organisers", keep all possible lines open, and do such propaganda damage as we may.

CONCLUSION

Recent events have shown that in the last six months subversive action against the Axis has made considerable progress and is making a definite contribution towards the destruction of the war effort of our enemies. Progress is necessarily slow, as extreme care and circumspection has to be used in creating the organisations and establishing

the necessary communications. Immediate results should not be asked for or expected; where results of value are now being obtained, i.e. Norway, Yugoslavia, Poland, etc., these are the outcome of long patience, enabling the construction of an organisation which can operate effectively and is not easily disrupted.

There is still immense scope for development in this branch of warfare. The possibilities in all parts of the world are now being actively studied at the same time as existing fields are being further exploited, and all possible encouragement and support given.

Like the other Services, i.e. the Navy, Army and Air Force, S.O.2. are handicapped by the existing shortages of arms, of aircraft, of transport facilities, etc.; when these are made up, progress will quicken.

As explained in foregoing paragraphs, in some countries we are aiming at an eventual rising and in others at maintaining their neutrality, while in many countries we seek to make the utmost use of sabotage and propaganda as being the most effective immediate weapons. To effect this requires the fullest support that can be given in money, in materials, in wireless, in transport and communicational facilities generally; the more assistance we can give, the more control do we exert over all activities and their sponsors, be they emigré governments or opposition leaders.

We are still far from the stage when a general uprising in any occupied country would be the slightest use to the Allied cause; it would be the reverse. Our policy for the immediate future must, it is suggested, be as follows:

To assist by all means in our power the organisation and equipping of clandestine military forces in such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Norway.

To encourage in those and other occupied territories the greatest degree of sabotage, etc., that can be undertaken without inciting destructive reprisals.

In neutral countries to combat Axis interests, whether political or material, in every possible field, and in particular to combat "infiltration".

In enemy territory to instigate the highest degree of sabotage, ca'canny, propaganda, etc., that can be effective.

Subversion is a weapon which we can use offensively and continuously wherever the enemy's interests can be reached. Intangible and elusive, it is a form of attack which exerts a constant pressure and constitutes a continuous strain on his resources and his will. Ultimately, like subversion by the Germans, it depends for its success on the armed forces. But with us, and fortunately, this factor operates to a lesser degree. With some exceptions, the occupied nations did not want to be "subverted" by Hitler's tourists. When we are stronger

and can play the same game, it will be a very different thing. The Fifth Column of the Free should be easier to organise than the Fifth Column of Fascism, because its motive force will be superior in every way.

Yet if the S.O.E. is to be responsible for this work, provision must be made for their needs and intelligent, long-distance planning must take place here and now. Without the tools they cannot even begin, far less finish the job. For instance, it may well be desirable to allot a number of Sten guns for S.O. purposes. Further, the whole question of the relation of foreign forces in this country to S.O. activities has still to be thought out. Finally there is no doubt that, in the nature of things, there is often bound to be a conflict of view between S.O.E., who wish to "keep the pot boiling", and "C", who is above all interested to prevent any incident likely to result in Gestapo activity and hence unfavourably to affect his prospects of obtaining intelligence. This difficulty is real and cannot be burked. Minor differences of opinion can be, and are, successfully overcome, but differences of policy can only, in the last resort, be referred to the Chiefs of Staff for a ruling.

In any case, there is no doubt that S.O.E., unless they are to lose their whole raison d'être, will have to train and infiltrate large numbers of agents during the coming year (between 400 and 500 men are already in training.) If they are to do this successfully, suitable aeroplanes in sufficient numbers must be made available, and above all communications ensured. On both these points the Chiefs of Staff have recently been approached and it is hoped that their support will be forthcoming. In any case, it would be helpful to the S.O.E. if the Chiefs of Staff could say whether they agree with the general picture as outlined above; whether they consider that the policy recommended is the right one; and, if so, whether they are prepared to make available to the S.O.E. the men and materials necessary for carrying it out.

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Extract from Paper entitled "Subversion", printed
for the Foreign Office, October, 1940.

F/134.1

ANNEX II.

F/134.1

FOREIGN OFFICE,
S.W. 1.

16th August, 1940.

SECRET.

My Dear Dalton,

In accordance with a decision of the War Cabinet of July 23rd, I understand that you will co-ordinate the activities of what are known as "D" and M.I.(R), and R.H., though it was then agreed that provisionally the various parties and bodies taking part in underground activities would, for the time being, continue to be administered by the Ministers responsible for them.

I consider the time has come for you to take over control of these various activities and I therefore request that you will take over the "D" organisation which has hitherto been under my control.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed):- HALIFAX.

The Right Honourable
Hugh Dalton, M.P.

At the moment and in the immediate future it will be that "D" and "R" will be working for separate purposes. If there is a real clash of interests which cannot be solved by friendly agreement, here again the matter must be submitted by both sides to higher authority. At the same time it is hoped, in the near future, to establish a "Transport Pool"

consisting/-

ANNEX II.

September 15, 1940.

(Most Secret)

C and D have agreed as follows :-

1. D is a separate, secret organisation, forming part of a larger organisation under the control of Mr. Dalton. The function of this organisation is the promotion of subversion. For general purposes of administration and discipline, therefore, the D organisation comes under Mr. Dalton and not under the Foreign Secretary. The function of C, who operates under the control of the Foreign Secretary, is the collection, collation and distribution of secret information and intelligence.

2. At the same time D is intimately associated with C, both on historical and on practical grounds, and if he is to function efficiently, it must be with the friendly co-operation of C. There are three respects in which the interests of C and D may clash and the following measures have been agreed on in order to preserve harmony :-

(a) Projects

A project may quite possibly be good for purposes of Subversion, but bad for purposes of Intelligence.

If such a project comes before the D Board it will be the duty of the C representative on that Board to draw the attention of his Chief to any disadvantage in it which he may see. If C is then unable to reach an agreement with D on the point, it must be submitted to higher authority.

(b) Transport.

At the moment and in the immediate future it may well be that C and D will be competing for available transport. If there is a real clash of interests which it is impossible to solve by friendly agreement, here again the matter must be submitted by both sides to higher authority. At the same time it is hoped, in the near future, to establish a "Transport Pool"

consisting/-

consisting of both ships and aeroplanes which should suffice for the purposes of both C and D.

(a) Communications.

C will continue to afford D such facilities for the use of S.I.S cyphers and communications as the requirements and security of S.I.S permit, but these communications will remain under the control of C. Should, for any reason, a telegram submitted by D, for transmission by C, be rejected by the latter, CD will of course be informed, in which case he will endeavour to make other arrangements.

(d) Spheres of Interest.

These have already been defined in paragraph 1. It follows that, if D's agents collect intelligence other than that on specifically D affairs, it must be passed on to C before being circulated anywhere, even within the D organisation itself. Conversely, if any of C's men is in a position to perform or to recommend some act of subversion, C will get in touch with D before taking any action.

(e) Recruitment of Agents.

D is at liberty to take the initiative in recruiting agents but can only definitely engage them with the knowledge and (subject to appeal) the approval of C or of C's representative.

(f) Finance.

The exact method of financing the D organisation will be left for further discussion.

C and D have agreed as follows :-

1. D is a separate, secret organisation, forming part of a larger organisation under the control of Mr. Dalton. The function of this organisation is the promotion of Subversion. For general purposes of administration and discipline, therefore, the D organisation comes under Mr. Dalton and not under the Foreign Secretary. The function of C, who operates under the control of the Foreign Secretary, is the collection, collation and distribution of secret information and intelligence.

MOST SECRET.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE,
BERKELEY SQUARE, W.1.

TELEPHONE:
GROSVENOR 4500

0/1171/24.

12th September, 1940.

By des

I send you herewith a statement, based on the Meeting held yesterday afternoon, of what I hope can form the foundation of an agreement as to the division of functions between C and D.

Please let me know, as soon as possible, whether you concur or have any amendments to make.

is intimately associated with local grounds, and if he is to with the friendly co-operation which the interests of C measures have been agreed on

conveniently be good for purposes of intelligence.

once before the D Board it initiative on that Board to any disadvantage in it which to reach an agreement with D to higher authority.

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been defined in Para. 1. It et intelligence other than that t be passed on to C before being the D Organisation itself. Con- position to perform or to recon-

and some act of subversion, C will get in touch with D before taking any action.

e) Recruitment of Agents:

D is at liberty to take the initiative in recruiting agents but can only definitely engage them with the knowledge and (subject to appeal) the approval of C or of C's representative.

f) Finance:

The exact method of financing the D Organisation will be left for further discussion.

C and D have agreed as follows :-

1. D is a separate, secret organisation, forming part of a larger organisation under the control of Mr. Dalton. The function of this organisation is the promotion of Subversion. For general purposes of administration and discipline, therefore, the D organisation comes under Mr. Dalton and not under the Foreign Secretary. The function of C, who operates under the control of the Foreign Secretary, is the collection, collation and distribution of secret information and intelligence.

2. At the same time D is intimately associated with C, both on historical and on practical grounds, and if he is to function efficiently, it must be with the friendly co-operation of C. There are three respects in which the interests of C and D may clash and the following measures have been agreed on in order to preserve harmony.

a) Projects:

A project may quite conveniently be good for purposes of Subversion, but bad for purposes of Intelligence.

If such a project comes before the D Board it will be the duty of the C representative on that Board to draw the attention of his Chief to any disadvantage in it which he may see. If C is then unable to reach an agreement with D on the point, it must be submitted to higher authority.

b) Transport:

At the moment and in the immediate future it may well be that C and D will be competing for available transport. If there is a real clash of interests which it is impossible to solve by friendly agreement, here again the matter must be submitted by both sides to higher authority. At the same time, it is hoped in the near future, to establish a "Transport pool" consisting of both ships and aeroplanes which should suffice for the purposes of both C and D.

c) Communications:

All D's telegrams will continue to be sent by C, in his cypher: this will provide the latter with a further check since, if he considers that any particular telegram of D's is likely to cut across what he is doing, he is at liberty to hold it up, pending reference to C.D. and, if necessary, to higher authority.

d) Spheres of Interest:

These have already been defined in Para. 1. It follows that, if D's agents collect intelligence other than that on specifically D affairs, it must be passed on to C before being circulated anywhere, even within the D Organisation itself. Conversely, if any of C's men is in a position to perform or to recon- and some act of subversion, C will get in touch with D before taking any action.

e) Recruitment of Agents:

D is at liberty to take the initiative in recruiting agents but can only definitely engage them with the knowledge and (subject to appeal) the approval of C or of C's representative.

f) Finance:

The exact method of financing the D Organisation will be left for further discussion.

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WP(40) 271

19 July 1940

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Re. School

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D/I/c

Spain

G.S.S.

As you will remember, we were approached some time ago with a view to creating in the Middle East a service to counter enemy propaganda.

We have now discussed with matter with the Foreign Office, War Office and Sir Campbell Stuart's organisation with a view to making an arrangement which would fit in with the various interests concerned. The arrangement which has been agreed upon, subject to your approval, by the Foreign Office (Mr. Kelly), the War Office (Major General Beaumont Nesbitt) and Sir Campbell Stuart is that we should nominate an individual to General Wavell's staff who would be paid by the War Office and who would be entrusted with the task of dealing with counter propaganda.

A suitable individual, Lieut.-Colonel I. N. Clayton, has been discovered and General Wavell is prepared to accept him if he is appointed. Suggested instructions have been drafted and agreed by the three authorities above, subject to your confirmation.

The cost involved is difficult to estimate at this moment, as the expenditure will not be concerned with either staff or accommodation, but will be the cost of direct action of one sort and another. Owing to the outbreak of war and the changed position of Italy, it is possible that there will be some change in attitude of the Arab tribes and it may, therefore, be that the book for which we were allocated £5,000 by the Treasury will not now be required. This sum will probably be adequate for the activities suggested for some months unless, of course, on consideration on the spot, it is decided that the book is still essential.

It is, therefore, requested that the attached instructions

to/

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to Colonel Clayton may be approved and that authority may be given to allocate to him initially \$1,000 for use as may be required, with liberty to apply for further sums as may be necessary.

By agreement with the War Office, you will proceed to the Middle East, as a Special Representative.

21st September, 1939.

You will have to carry out all the work of the War Office funds which will be available for the propaganda of a character which will be decided by the War Office.

You will be responsible for the operations of the tribes bordering the Mediterranean, the operations of the Special Representative in the Middle East, the operations of the Special Representative in the Middle East, and the operations of the Special Representative in the Middle East. You will be responsible for the operations of the Special Representative in the Middle East, the operations of the Special Representative in the Middle East, the operations of the Special Representative in the Middle East, and the operations of the Special Representative in the Middle East.

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PROPAGANDA - EGYPT.

~~Deputy~~
spare

By agreement with the War Office, you will proceed to join G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East, as G.S.O.1, Publicity.

(2) You will be paid from War Office funds and your appointment will be gazetted shortly.

(3) You will have at your disposal a sum of money not from War Office funds which will be used under your direction for propaganda of a clandestine nature with the following objects:-

- (1) In general you will be responsible that the attitude of the tribes bordering on Libya is favourable to whatever operations may be contemplated by G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East.
- (11) As regards Transjordan and the desert tribes, you will be responsible for assisting, by means of clandestine propaganda, whatever policy may best assist operations contemplated by G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East. In Abyssinia you will be responsible for whatever work may be required among the natives of Abyssinia, as opposed to Italian tribes and garrisons.

(4) |

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(5) You are not responsible for and will not engage in propaganda dealing with the Italian garrisons in either Libya or Abyssinia. This work is being arranged separately, but in due course you should co-operate with Sir Campbell Stuart's representative () who will be stationed at

(6) You will work, by means of staff who will not be, as a rule, military, unless you so desire; and in that case you will arrange the details direct with G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East. You are not responsible for and will not engage in press propaganda amongst the Egyptian population other than tribes, as this is being done by the Foreign Office through the Embassy.

(7) Amongst other methods which may commend themselves to you, the following may be considered:-

- (a) Production and distribution of gramophone records suitable for use in coffee shops.
- (b) Production and distribution of leaflets as and when required.
- (c) Founting and support of howiyahs particularly amongst the Senussi.
- (d) Production and distribution of any literature that may seem advisable and, in this connexion, a book is now being prepared in Arabic giving, from German documents and speeches, their view of the Arab race. It is hoped that this will be ready for press in about a fortnight and can be printed either in London or in Egypt.
- (e) You may consider it desirable to recommend the distribution at cheap rates of radio sets designed to take one station only, e.g., Daventry short wave, or local Egyptian station. It is possible to produce such/

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...this can be made and ...
 ...to be put on as required, but it will
 ...a script for broadcasting, as ...
 ...document. The writer of which ...
 such a set around £3 and the exact rate at
 which they should be sold will, of course, be
 a matter for local consideration.

(8) As it is possible that the above activities, e.g.,
 gramophone records, wireless sets, etc., may tend to assume
 a commercial guise, you may consider it desirable to foster
 such a cover and to train a number of commercial travellers,
 who would be calling on coffee shops, etc., with records and
 wireless sets, to spread information and propaganda by word
 of mouth which, as you will be the first to appreciate, is
 a valuable medium among the Arab peoples. If suitable
 agencies, e.g., coffee, sugar, sweets, etc., etc., are
 required to give colour to these commercial activities, they
 will be provided.

(9) The possibility of the use of suitable films will
 be borne in mind. It would appear that there are two general
 lines on which action might be desirable in this connexion,
 (a) the standard film shown in the local cinemas, and (b)
 the sub-standard film which might possibly be of value if
 employed on a mobile van, possibly ostensibly engaged in
 selling requirements in the desert or visiting howiyahs.
 Should you require the development of this suggestion, you
 will inform us at the earliest possible date so that we may
 arrange for the production or selection of the necessary film,
 and, in this connexion, it should be noted that the methods
 by which films are shown in cinemas are extremely complicated
 and it will probably be necessary to send you out expert
 advice on this subject.

(10) In every case where you require material from this
 country you will give us, as far as possible, the general
 line underlying your requirement, in addition to any
 suggestions you may wish to make for the detailed method of
 its execution, e.g., if you wish a broadcast talk from the
 station/

station, this can be made and recorded in London and sent out to be put on as required, but it will be appreciated that a script for broadcasting, or indeed for films, is an expert document, the writer of which requires to know primarily the general policy at which he is aiming, e.g., a talk on the British Army and its task in the Middle East, might be done from the point of view of the might of Britain or the wealth of Britain, or war aims, or friendliness, and it will be important, even if a suggested script is produced by you, that there shall be a paragraph attached giving quite clearly (i) The audience which it is desired shall be mainly impressed, (ii) Their present feelings, (iii) The message which it is desired shall remain in their minds, and in this connexion it will be appreciated that not more than one simple message should be conveyed by one broadcast or one film.

Personnel.

(ii) The following individuals can be made available, some or all of whom may be of use:-

(i)

(ii)

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(iii) Wortham. Formerly Editor of one or more papers in Cairo. Now employed in Fleet Street on "The Daily Telegraph". Interviewed and would be prepared to accept suitable appointment. Arabic perfect/

perfect and knowledge of Egyptian extensive.

- (iv) Westbrook. Formerly Political Officer in the Western Desert (1919-20). This individual is very keen to do work for this Section, but it is not known at the moment on what he is employed. It is believed, however, that he can be obtained.

Finance.

- (12) As a preliminary a sum of £1,000 will be paid into any account which you may nominate in Egypt for use by you and this will be replaced as required. The only commitment at the present moment is £400 a month, which is being used for the foundation of howyahs in the Senussi areas bordering on Libya. In this connexion you should liase with Colonel W. G. Elphinston, who is on General Wavell's staff and will be cognisant of your activities.

D.

10.9.39.