

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
COS(41) 142nd meeting	21 April 1941

The above-listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.

For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed _____ Date _____

... (or some other ... Eastern operations.)

CDPY

20th September 1941.

/ F/3520/115/145.1.

Would you kindly pass the two cheques enclosed to Mr. Sherwood on our behalf?

The larger cheque is in settlement of \$102,202 drawn in New York: the smaller cheque is to repay advances from H.M. Ambassador at Lisbon, referred to in your telegram No. 470 of the 20th March.

I take it you will forward us the official receipts in due course?

(Signed) R.E. Brook

J.M. Addis, Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

G., G.C.V.O.,

COPY

20th September 1941.

CD/XX/806

F/5245/115.

20th January 1942.
3rd February, 1942.

REF: CD/FD/556/FIN.

8th April 1942.

TO: C.E.O.

SECRET

FROM: D/FIN.

B-1 F/115
R.S.
14/4/42

Issued to
20. 9/4
R.B.

Will you kindly have the attached cheque for £25,391. 16. 0.
(Twenty-five thousand three hundred & ninety-one pounds sixteen shillings)
forwarded to Mr. Sherwood at the Foreign Office and obtain for me his
receipt.

This, so far as Sherwood is concerned, who is expecting my cheque,
is in settlement of £102,202 drawn from YP New York on YPX account.

For your information, it is a further payment in respect of
"Aspidistra" which P.W.E. and Gambier Parry asked me to effect for them
through the Foreign Office - see Foreign Office telegram to Washington
No.1951 of the 26th March 1942.

I, of course, have received a corresponding amount from Gambier Parry.

Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
Privy Council Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

... (or some other...)
Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

F/3245/115.

3rd February, 1942.

I understand, from Cairncross, that you have very kindly agreed to sponsor our organisation with Mr. McQueen of the General Electric Company. As you know, it is not easy for us to introduce ourselves and we are very glad that you can vouch for us.

The request we have to put before him is an urgent one concerning the secondment of a radio supplies officer. If we come to McQueen under your auspices, he, as chairman of the Radio Manufacturers' Association, is the most likely person to find us a suitable man in the trade.

(Sgd:-) GLADWYN JEBB.

Rt. Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
Privy Council Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

CDPY

20th September 1941.

From: C. D. *Noted*

CD/XX/806

26th January 1942.

F/145

4.2.42.

From: D/YB.A.

DYB/OR/566.

To: AD/2.

C.O.S.

R. J. [Signature]

The Cabinet Report on skilled radio personnel scarcely seems to affect us, since our demands for the type of men discussed is very small, and our staff has so far been obtained mainly from sources other than those mentioned.

We may, however, be indirectly affected, by the pressure on our sources of supply being less in future.

Exam for A.M.W.

Personnel.

Fourth Progress Report by which as you will see by S.O.

if some one on your h this to see if we are y which I mean whether a means of pressing our and when required.

s anything it infers that skilled personnel for the ch we were told so much ts!

C. D.

do the necessary

200 3/1

Eastern operations.

COPY

20th September 1941.

From C.D.

Noted

CD/XX/806

To ~~M~~ and AD/Z.

26th January 1942.

Skilled Radio Personnel.

1. I attach herewith Fourth Progress Report by Lord Hankey on the above, which as you will see has been sent down to us by S.O.
2. It might be as well if some one on your staff were to read through this to see if we are in any way interested - by which I mean whether we could not use this as a means of pressing our demands for personnel if and when required.
3. If paragraph 32 means anything it infers that the enormous shortage of skilled personnel for the fighting services, of which we were told so much last year, no longer exists!

C. D.

do the necessary

... (or some other ...)
Eastern operations.)

CDPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

URGENT.

ADZ/OR/763

30.1.42.

TO: C.E.O.

FROM: AD/Z

1. As you are seeing Lord HANKEY this morning, I wondered whether you could possibly ask him to tell Mr. MCQUEEN of the General Electric Co., who is on Lord HANKEY's Wireless Committee and Chairman of the Radio Manufacturers Association, that the Department represented by me is a respectable one and that Mr. MCQUEEN should give us all the assistance he can.
2. The point at issue is actually the acquirement of a radio supplies officer for my department, who can negotiate supplies of radio equipment and generally act for me on matters concerning the Wireless Section of Station IX.
3. Mr. MCQUEEN, with his position as Chairman of the Radio Manufacturers Association, is supposed to be the most likely person to find a man out of the trade who will be suitable for our work.
4. The requirement is an urgent one and I should be glad if you would impress this on Lord HANKEY.

Mr Brook

spoke 2/2
I failed to pass this on to Lord H. when I saw him last week.
Could you please get in touch with Mr. Cairncross (Lord H's secretary) + get him to do the necessary?
C.D. 31/1

CDFY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

With reference to our talk yesterday

20 SEP 1941

WED's copy
W/- R/S
R/S

From C.D.

file

To C.E.O.

20th September 1941.

Communications.

I enclose herewith copy of a letter from Gambier-Parry to AD/P, with attachment.

I have not yet studied it very closely, but AD/P, A.D. and I, after cursory examination, are all inclined to feel that there is very little to cavil at, so far as one can view the situation at present.

C. D.

S.O. to see

*Request for Card to be
true!*

S. 24/9

Wonderful!

S.O. 26/9

a fair
request
ning
to all
but
t you
Planning
in any
AD/2 and
circumstances

COPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

With reference to our talk yesterday evening I have, for some considerable time, felt that many of the misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with my liaison work with S.O.2 have been due to the difficulty

CED's copy -

28 SEP 1941

WJ-ROB

COPY

C.D. to AD/P

22.9.41.

Yes - "further outlook settled weather" is a fair description at present.

We must certainly meet him half way in his request for a meeting with C.S. heads etc.

I'm a little afraid of inviting him to Planning Meetings - he would hear so much which would go to all sorts of quarters!

Afraid it means another "special" meeting, but please discuss with relevant parties and do what you think best.

C. D.

COPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

With reference to our talk yesterday evening I have, for some considerable time, felt that many of the misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with my liaison work with S.O.2 have been due to the difficulty of my not having closer contact with the heads of country sections, as a whole, and that just meeting them individually, as I have done from time to time, has not

COPY

ADP/XX/155

22.9.41.

To C.D.

From AD/P

The attached note from Long who is looking after part of Gambier-Parry's show during the latter's absence in U.S.A., is satisfactory and I hope you will agree with me that it will be of considerable value if I can arrange for a weekly meeting with Long. I wonder whether it would be possible to have him to our weekly Planning Meeting which is held normally on Thursdays but in any case, if you agree, I will go ahead and inform AD/Z and E who are naturally interested.

I think we can say in this part of our sphere, at least, there are reasonably good prospects of continuance of fine weather.

A.B.

Air Commodore A. Boyle,
C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.

Singapore (for some time past
Eastern operations.)

COPY

20th September 1941.

My dear Air Commodore,

With reference to our talk yesterday evening I have, for some considerable time, felt that many of the misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with my liaison work with S.O.2 have been due to the difficulty of my not having closer contact with the heads of country sections, as a whole, and that just meeting them individually, as I have done from time to time, has not made it possible to get down to a defined general policy.

As I told you some six months ago, when I first took on the liaison with S.I.S., equivalent of your country sections, much the same difficulties prevailed. A.C.S.S. has now been for some time prepared to work closely with me and deal with the problems which arise and questions of major policy with the sections which come under his control.

I feel sure that if you could see your way to arranging for, at present, a weekly meeting with yourself in the chair and the heads of your country sections which I could attend, much progress would be made in solving the many little problems which they have in regard to W/T communication. It would also give me the opportunity of meeting them and working more closely with them for I can assure you that it is only by this means that I feel I can be of real service.

At present I am in London every Tuesday and then later in the week, usually Friday, dealing with S.I.S. communications. If neither of these days are suitable to you I shall be only too glad to attend on some other day of the week, except Thursdays which is the day I have allotted to your school at Grandon Underwood.

I can assure you that I am more than anxious to try and get your communication problem running as smoothly and establish as friendly relations with your country sections as those which now exist with myself and the S.I.S. Sections.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) C.H. LONG

Squadron Leader.

Air Commodore A. Boyle,
C.M.G., O.B.E., M.C.

18th September 1941.

My dear Archie,

I am sorry I did not keep my promise in writing to you yesterday, but I ran into a pretty considerable jam with our American friends who are over here.

The three matters we discussed are summarised below. These seem to resolve the principle outstanding problems relating to S.O.2 communications policy.

1. We are arranging for the installation by our engineering staff of a transmitting and receiving station in the Shetlands. This station will not be used until operational requirements dictate. It will be tested with a low-powered station being operated by an agent from Norway, and it will also be tested for communications with my base headquarters.

The operators for this station will be ear-marked and kept in reserve in the event that it is likely to be required for operational purposes.

2. Increased base station facilities. At a meeting last Friday C.D. expressed the doubt whether facilities at my base station were sufficient to safeguard the interests of S.O.2 in the event that the whole, or part, of their major plans came to maturity and a large numbers of organisers and operators were parachuted, or otherwise delivered, in an area of practical operations. I explained to C.D. that an additional station duplicating that which is now used for the reception of radio equipped agents was in effect in the course of preparation, and assured him that this station and its appropriate personnel would be ready to deal with any operational situation by the time it would arise.

My yard-stick on base station requirements is essentially the number of agents under training for S.I.S. operations which is always known to us, plus the number of agents under final W/T training for S.O.2 at their establishment at Grendon Underwood. At the present moment these two requirements are about equal and are quite modest.

It is realised however that there must be a considerable increase in the number of trained W/T agents operating for S.O.2 if the plans submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee mature. I have, therefore, agreed that the duplicate station referred to above shall be used exclusively for communication between my base station and S.O.2 agents so long as the number of agents justifies.

3. Foreign Communications controlled by S.O.2. At last Friday's meeting, and previously at other meetings, C.D. and Lt.Colonel Taylor have pressed C.S.S. for his agreement with the policy that S.O.2 should conduct their own communication systems between base stations working with secret agents situated at the following four points:-

- 1) North Eastern Indian Frontier for operations into Afghanistan, Waziristan and Persia.
- 2) Lagos for operations in West Africa.
- 3) Cairo for operations in the Middle and Near East and the Balkan countries.
- 4) Singapore (or some other suitable point for Far Eastern operations.)

17 SEP 1941
16.9.41.

003

-2-

The implied arrangement is that S.O.2 base stations at these four points should receive communications from secret agents and transmit messages to them, but that the resultant intelligence should follow the normal procedure and be transmitted home on existing S.I.S. main line channels.

C.S.S. sent me this proposal for observations. I have observed to him and at the meeting last Friday that I am in perfect agreement with the proposals with the following qualifications:-

- 1) That S.O.2 provide the personnel and equipment of the base stations at all four points.
- 2) That S.O.2 undertake the training and equipping of the secret agents.
- 3) That S.O.2 undertake the provision of suitable sets for use by the agents.
- 4) That the local S.I.S. representative will co-operate in every way possible and provide full information to the local S.O.2 representative of our experience and knowledge of operating secret communication channels, but his responsibilities end with the provision of such advice and he has no responsibility whatsoever that the resultant communications operate.
- 5) That before allocating frequencies for use by either a base station or secret agents, the S.O.2 representative will consult the local S.I.S. signals representative to ensure that there is no mutual interference and that the best frequencies are chosen to ensure satisfactory results.

With regard to (4) a telegram, of which I attach a copy, has been received from our representative at Singapore, which appears to make a counter proposal to the suggestion of your London Head Office for independent communications in the Far East.

I consider that the proposal in this telegram is the ideal solution to the problem; but if the principal Executives of your organisation consider that despite this joint recommendation of their representative and ours, an entirely independent organisation should be set up in the Far East, I am still only too ready to co-operate and afford every possible assistance.

Yours ever,

(Signed) GAMBIER .

COPY

ABR/XV/134.

TO: G.D.

Copy in C.E.D.

17 SEP 1941
18.9.41.

003

FROM: AD/P.

Gambier-Parry came to see me this morning with Squadron Leader Long. He was in a very much better frame of mind and confessed that his nerves were very much less troublesome. He recapitulated his version of various talks he had had with C. and gave a somewhat fantastic picture of the meeting at which he was present last week. I told him that that was dead history and that everything was going very smoothly at present and all we wanted was his help whenever we asked for it.

He referred to the Shetlands question and said that I had agreed with him some time ago that the Shetlands Station was unnecessary. This was, of course, completely untrue and I told him so. Actually, Long stated that he had had a note from this organisation but had never replied to it as he felt that a reply was not called for and in any case he did not think there was any great need for a station. Gambier-Parry, however, is proceeding at a maximum rate to erect a station of 120 watts capacity operating 20, 40 and 80 metre wave bands with two channels in and out, but I am afraid this does not convey very much to me.

We discussed, or rather I listened to, his description of the training at Brendon Underwood and he said that training was going very well and did not think that there was any contention there.

We discussed the Middle East station. I told him we were perfectly happy with the way things were going and would naturally rely on him for help and for advice. He said that he would write to make a formal disclaimer of any operational responsibility and I said that that would obviously be satisfactory but repeated that provided we all work together, our results and his would probably be improved.

He referred to the S-phone and I told him generally that I was most anxious we should not claim anything outstanding for this until we had proved it operationally. He agreed entirely and said that he was not interested in the least and was making good progress with his ideas of communication which would give a bigger range and reasonable security which he thought in the S-phone might be somewhat difficult to attain without further experiments.

He emphasised the desirability of having regular fortnightly meetings at which all problems could be discussed in a most frank and open way and asked whether we were interested in further demands likely to be made on him by P.W.E., to which I replied negatively. He stated that he was working very closely and happily with Lywood of Air Ministry Signals in connection with Aspidistra and had a very suitable new site in Sussex and threatened to see the Minister some time today. He was going to America on Saturday and would be there a short time and wanted to know whether there was anything he could do for us there. I said that so far as I knew there was nothing, but that he would see 48000 and AD/Z who could put him fully into the picture and begged him to help as much as possible and not to cross any lines though I added that I felt sure that Donovan and 48000 must be careful not to run counter to the Army and Navy Intelligence Bureaux which seemed probable at present in that the Bureaux were jealous of Donovan. I emphasised the need for discretion in the States. Gambier-Parry said that he would write a letter giving an outline of his talk on various points which may or may not conform with the above impressions of the interview about which I kept very careful notes as we went along.

In short, I found him most friendly and helpful and I think your meeting last week has anyhow brought him back to realities.

/I explained

18 SEP 54
WJ

7.33

I explained categorically to him that I was not in any way responsible for our communications and only saw him in order to try to bridge a very obvious gap and felt that our mutual efforts were tending in that direction provided he would not go off the handle.

MOST SECRET
A.B.

SECRET

The same time past it has been obvious that the S.I.S. War Station (27) in Cairo has been loaded to capacity and frequently overloaded with secret communications.

In connection with S.I.S. plans for introducing signals and equipment into the Egyptian Station complex and other stations in the Middle East and East Africa which are being developed by the Army, a vital factor in that of maintaining rapid and secure communication with each other and their staff members in the Egyptian Subcontinent.

The extreme importance of the increasing difficulties of secret communications in connection with S.I.S. activities has been stressed by the Director of S.I.S. in Cairo and our chief representative there.

It is apparent, and I have agreed, that the present S.I.S. Cairo War Station will not be able to cope with the secret communications which are envisaged in the very near future and which, as stated, are vital to the success of our operations in the present and future stages of the war. It is necessary to construct new stations of Cairo and others for the present and future secret communications. This would relieve the present S.I.S. Station of the excessive pressure and overloading under which it is working at the present time, thus facilitating and expediting reception and dispatch of S.I.S. communications and those which I handle for other departments.

The estimated cost of purchasing the necessary materials for the two stations referred to above of which one is required in this country and another amounting to \$10,000 and it is estimated that Treasury estimates be given to the Department of the Army.

The working costs of such stations will not be heavy and it is suggested that they may be met out of our general communications budget for the Middle East.

SECRET

16 SEP 1941

W

P.59

MOST SECRET

MR. BRITAIN.

For some time past it has been obvious that the S.I.S. War Station (W/T) in Cairo has been loaded to capacity and frequently overloaded with secret communications.

In connection with S.O.E.'s plans for introducing agents and organisers into the occupied Balkan countries and other countries in the Middle and Near East which may become occupied by the enemy, a vital factor is that of establishing rapid and sound communication with such agents and their collaborators in the countries concerned.

The extreme importance and the increasing difficulties of secret communications in connection with S.O.E. activities has been stressed by the Minister of State in Cairo and our chief representative there.

It is apparent, and C has agreed, that the present S.I.S. Cairo War Station will not be able to cope with the secret communications which are envisaged in the very near future and which, as stated, are vital to the success of our operations and, subject to the necessary Treasury sanction, it is desired to construct w/t stations at Cairo and Quetta for our present and future secret communications. This would relieve the present S.I.S. Station of the extreme pressure and overloading under which it is working at the present time, thus facilitating and expediting reception and despatch of C's communications and those which C handles for other Departments.

The estimated cost of purchasing the necessary materials for the two stations referred to (most of which can be acquired in this country) and erection amounts to £10,000 and it is requested that Treasury sanction be given to expenditure up to this figure.

The running costs of such stations will not be heavy and it is suggested that they may be met out of our general Sanction (Sanction 1V) for the Balkans & Mid-East.

S. O. 2.
12/9/41.

17 AUG 1941

COPY

FROM SINGAPORE GLOW. 15.9.41.

CXG 43.

Addressed London 43

Following for C.S.S. from [redacted]

- A. O.M. and myself propose to pool our communications in Far East, in British territory, and in non British territory whenever practicable.
- B. Priority of operations will be decided at joint meetings.
- C. I proposed that ROSHER be put in charge of S.O.2 as well as operate S.I.S. communications out here, and that KNOTT should be his assistant. O.M. approves.
- D. ROSHER would therefore in future put up to for approval both S.O.2 and S.I.S. equipment requirements.
- E. S.O.2 would bear their proportion of communications expenses.
- F. I strongly recommend your approval which is requested urgently in view of pending joint equipment estimates.

THIS IS A COPY
 ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
 IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
 3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
 ACT 1958

MOST SECRET.

File 17 AUG 1940
W/-
Copy No. 2.

ADZ/WT/580.

9.8.41.

S.O.2. COMMUNICATIONS

and

THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH S.I.S.

- (1) Our relationship with the "C" Organisation as regards Communications is defined in Annex II of a paper dated October, 1940, entitled "Subversion". The relevant passage reads:-

"C will continue to afford to D such facilities for the use of S.I.S. ciphers and communications as the requirements and security of S.I.S. permit, but these communications will remain under the control of C. Should, for any reason, a telegram submitted by D, for transmission by C, be rejected by the latter, C.D. will, of course, be informed, in which case he will endeavour to make other arrangements."

- (2) The PRESENT POSITION is as follows:-

(a) Agents in the Field.

All communications with single agents operating illicit W/T are catered for by S.I.S. In practice, this confines itself almost entirely to Western Europe, with one exception - an agent in Roumania.

(b) Communications between British Territories and Neutral Countries to and from U.K.

S.O.2. have recently instituted their own Coding Department and are gradually switching over from S.I.S. channels to commercial or Service channels. They do, however, rely on S.I.S. for certain countries and would always like to have the use of S.I.S. main channel communications in an emergency. S.I.S. are in agreement with this arrangement, as it relieves them of a great deal of routine traffic.

- (3) S.O.2. feel that as regards communications based on U.K. (i.e. France to U.K., Norway to U.K., etc.) all illicit traffic from Occupied Countries should be handled by S.I.S.

Micro-wave communication will, however, be handled by S.O.2. and the R.A.F. jointly. Naturally, S.I.S. can be a party to any organisation set up to exploit this system of communication, should they so wish it.

- (4) S.O.2. would maintain the right to continue their own research department, and S.I.S. would, not unreasonably, refuse to operate the products of S.O.2.'s research department.

- (5) As regards communications to and from British territories into enemy territories, S.O.2. would have the right to set up their own channels of communication, naturally keeping Col. GAMBIRN PARRY fully informed of their intentions and progress. This will also apply to intercommunications between S.O.2. main line channels, i.e. Cairo to Singapore, etc.

- (6) As regards communication back to U.K. from S.O.2. main line stations, S.O.2. will continue to use commercial and Service lines (see para. (2)(b)) and will not set up a station

/in U.K.

in U.K. for transmission or reception to S.O.S. main line stations, without the approval of S.I.S.

(7) Col. GAMBIER PARRY will act as supervisor of security for S.O.S. and S.I.S. and as general adviser to S.O.S. on all matters concerning W/T communications. To this end, it is hoped that he will appoint a permanent liaison officer at S.O.S. H.Q., London, to see that proper co-ordination is ensured.

(8) In the event of disagreement between S.I.S. and S.O.S. on matters arising out of the above agreement, reference will be made to 'C' and G.D., who will act as joint arbitrators.

MOST SECRET.

Copy No 9.

ADZ/WT/560.

31.7.41.

W/T COMMUNICATIONS IN OCCUPIED AREAS

W/2640.

6th August, 1941.

Many thanks for your letter of the 1st August, together with which you returned my set of papers on S.O.2 long-term objectives.

I should have replied before, but I had rather hoped to see you last week-end in the country and was sorry to hear that you were feeling bad; I hope you are better now.

I am afraid it is a bit difficult for me to let you have copies of the documents concerned. Nobody else has them (outside the Organisation) except the Chiefs of Staff, and if it got out that I had given them to you I am afraid that there might be awkwardness in other quarters!

I am really glad that your meeting with the Planners the other day was a success, and it looks as if we were beginning to see daylight at the end of the tunnel.

for the reception of the resulting traffic, is likely to be the thing which is the most difficult to overcome; and I suggested that whatever the Chiefs of Staff Committee decide with regard to the above, a strong recommendation should be made now that if it is to be supported by the proper proportion of communications, the question of power should come under consideration immediately.

(Sed:-) GLADWIN JERR

Davis of course admitted, and quite rightly, that the requirements, as tabled, were something of a mess, and that the number might vary in the near future. But if done, at any rate, give us some yard-stick to work on. We are having a further meeting of Boyle, Davis, myself and others concerned to study other requirements elsewhere. I think the right approach, now if we have this matter, really to the S.O.2, is for us to have an agreed

Colonel Gambier-Parry.

... or even to pinpoint the W/T Stations within a zone of 50 miles. This will have to be left to the discretion of the operator, as, of necessity, he has to provide himself with suitable cover, which is virtually impossible to

/arrange

MOST SECRET.

ADZ/WT/560.

Copy No 9.

31.7.41.

W/T COMMUNICATIONS IN OCCUPIED AREAS

1st August, 1941.

My dear Jebb,

not filed

I am very much obliged to you for letting me have the enclosed papers. I am sending them back to you by the hand of Squadron Leader Long who I think you know. He is the liaison officer on communications matters between my organisation and S.O.2.

I am very glad to have had this opportunity to study, for the first time, the long term objectives of S.O.2., and it has helped me immensely in getting a focus on what may be their communication requirements. I am sure you will not mind my remarking that some of the references to existing communications in the paper "S.C. 882" of the 21st April, are a little optimistic in fact!

We had a satisfactory meeting in the Cabinet Offices yesterday at which Davis tabled some requirements for sets which are in themselves perfectly easy to realise in terms of equipment. The old problem of highly expert personnel at this end for the reception of the resulting traffic, is likely to be the thing which is the most difficult to overcome; and I suggested that whatever the Chiefs of Staff Committee may decide with regard to the whole project, a strong recommendation should be made now that if it is to be supported by the proper proportion of communications, the question of expert man-power should come under examination immediately.

Davis of course admitted, and quite rightly, that the requirements, as tabled, were something of a shot in the dark, and that each number might vary in the different countries plus or minus. But it does, at any rate, give us some yard-stick to work on. We are having a further meeting of Boyle, Davis, myself and others concerned to study other requirements elsewhere, but I think the right approach, now that we have this yard-stick, would be for S.O.2. to let us have an abridged

/over

- B. At the present stage, it is virtually impossible, except in special cases, to state exactly the town or village where the W/T operator will work - or even to pinpoint the W/T Stations within a zone of 50 miles. This will have to be left to the discretion of the operator, as, of necessity, he has to provide himself with suitable cover, which is virtually impossible to

/arrange

Gladwyn Jebb, Esq.,
Ministry of Economic Warfare.

W. L. Jones

Yours sincerely,

If it were possible for me to have a copy to retain of each of these three documents I would be very grateful, and give you my assurance that they would not depart from my personal safe.

or the experts in parachute dropping and air transport. the plan in the same way as do the explosive experts communication experts contribute to the formation of should best be conducted. In other words let the to make the operations successful, and how these *Communication* and recommend what communications should be provided we can apply to it our trained communication brains version of the operational plans envisaged, so that



MOST SECRET.

Copy No 9.

ADZ/WT/566.

31.7.41.

W/T COMMUNICATIONS IN OCCUPIED AREAS
WESTERN EUROPE
(Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France -
Czechoslovakia and Poland are excluded, as
they have their own sets and means of
communication)

GENERAL.

2 - AUG 1941 *W/-*

Tid

52.7/8

ADZ/WT/575

1.8.41.

To: The C.E.O.

FROM: AD/Z

I attach copy of the paper which was submitted to the meeting of the F.O.P.S. yesterday afternoon.

Wh

This involves both the Sabotage Organisations and the Secret Armies; and if these are to be properly directed from London, the time on the air is likely to be almost continuous over a period up to say, one month, naturally dependent on the progress of the operations.

- B. At the present stage, it is virtually impossible, except in special cases, to state exactly the town or village where the W/T operator will work - or even to pinpoint the W/T Stations within a zone of 50 miles. This will have to be left to the discretion of the operator, as, of necessity, he has to provide himself with suitable cover, which is virtually impossible to

/errance

31.7.41.

W/T COMMUNICATIONS IN OCCUPIED AREAS
WESTERN EUROPE
(Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France -
Czechoslovakia and Poland are excluded, as
they have their own sets and means of
communication)

GENERAL.

A. S.O.2. work, as elaborated in our policy paper which is now under discussion, deals with two aspects:-

- (a) Sabotage and propaganda Organisations
- (b) Secret Armies.

The operational processes leading up to the point when (a) and (b) will operate at their maximum are, roughly, as follows:-

- (1) Organisers are infiltrated into the countries in question, also stores and equipment.

From a W/T point of view, the chief role of the operator is to indicate to London and receive information as to where and when the organisers in the first instance, and stores in the second, should be dropped; it should not involve the operators in sending lengthy messages imparting intelligence. As a consequence thereof, the communication will be only periodic and should not involve much commitment as far as London is concerned.

This first phase of S.O.2. work should take something between six months and a year.

- (2) The second phase, which will overlap the first phase, will involve operations in an ever increasing tempo on the part of the Sabotage Groups, i.e. day to day sabotage. This, in terms of time on the air, will mean a considerable increase over the first phase, as intelligence will be forthcoming from operators, as to likely targets; decisions will have to be given by London and directives issued as to how sabotage should be effected. Also, by this time, the propaganda machine should be under way and this, again, will require directives from London.
- (3) The third phase is the putting into operation of the entire S.O.2 machine in the Occupied Country in question, in conjunction with a combined attack from U.K.

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arrange at this end.

- C. In this survey, we have omitted the question of internal W/T communication within the countries themselves. At the present moment, this is almost impossible to forecast, until we have some more concrete data from our organisers in the countries in question.
- D. The following is a preliminary assessment of S.O.2. requirements as regards W/T channels and sets in the under-mentioned countries.

1. NORWAY: As far as Norway is concerned, six channels are envisaged, to be situated, roughly speaking, in the Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim and Narvik areas.

Each station should have one set operational and one stand-by.

The sets, therefore, required for Norway, amount to TWELVE.

2. DENMARK. Three channels will be required for Denmark, situated in the Copenhagen, Aarhus and Jutland areas. Again, each station will require one operational and one stand-by.

The sets, therefore, required for Denmark, are SIX.

3. HOLLAND. Nine channels will be required for Holland in the following areas:-

Groningen (2)
Leeuwarden
Amsterdam (2)
Rotterdam
Hague
N. Brabant (2)

The total number of sets required for Holland is EIGHTEEN (Again one operational and one stand-by).

4. BELGIUM. Nine channels will be required for Belgium at the following centres:-

Bruges
Ghent
Antwerp
Bassalt
Brussels
Mons
Nemur
Liege
Arlan

With one set operational and one stand-by, the number of sets required for Belgium is EIGHTEEN.

5. FRANCE. France is split up into twenty areas. It is intended that each area should have a W/T channel.

Again, one set operational and one stand-by are required for each channel i.e. FORTY sets.

... ..

Therefore, in the countries above-mentioned, there will be 47 channels of communication and 94 sets in all (See attached table)

6 JUL 1941
W/-

ADZ/CC/568

5.7.41.

COUNTRY	No. of CHANNELS	No of SETS	REMARKS
France	20	40	20 Zones
Norway	6	12	6 zones
Denmark	3	6	3 Zones
Holland	9	18	9 Zones
Belgium	9	18	9 Zones
Total	47	94	

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should administer the Station.

/they wish

6 JUL 1941
W/-

ADZ/CC/568

5.7.41.

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR S.O.

COMMUNICATIONS:

*G.D. [unclear] ADZ [unclear]
This has been lying
in [unclear] [unclear]*

ATTENTION.

For a Shetlands W/T Station can be
S:-

E.

Ref: W/2616

As reported to you on the telephone, it has
come to my knowledge that M.I.5. (W section) have
full manufacturing drawings of the small portable
wireless as used by the Germans to-day.

Our source is particularly anxious that we
should not reveal that we know this for a fact,
but if you wish to pursue this line, you should
merely ask if they happen to have any information
on the topic.

REB.

28th July 1941.

Perhaps you will pass this on to D.S.R. if you
think suitable.

without reference to London, and if
to come through London, or through the S.I.S.
Southern England, it will not make for efficiency
tion, which are so essential for S.O.2. type
the parties are brought over there and sent back
notice.

therefore, be stated on grounds of utility
ess station in the Shetlands is desirable for

tion:

The position at present is that 'C' have gone back on
every point of the agreement to establish a Station in the
Shetlands, which agreement was reached between S.O.2. and
'C' as far back as 21.5.41.

In the first instance, it was agreed by 'C' that we
should administer the Station. 'C' have now stated that

/they wish

6 JUL 1941
W/-

ADZ/CC/568

5.7.41.

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR S.O.

COMMUNICATIONS:

W/T
G.D. Upon ADZ arrangements
This has been lying
Government, as I intend
yet tackled further
Party.
Perhaps you would
discuss the details
with me?
H.D.
1577

STATION.

For a Shetlands W/T Station can be
:-

D/W have had protracted conversations
Dan Government, who are most anxious to
own W/T Station, plus Norwegian operators
is - which, as you know, is used as a
base for S.O.2. and S.I.S. work in Norway.

In accordance with the wishes of 'C', we have
demanded by the Norwegian Government.
to maintain our goodwill vis a vis the
Government, it has been agreed that a Station
be established in the Shetlands, but which would
be under British control, and used exclusively for
communications.

It is deemed, therefore, on political grounds, that
the Station, in fact, be a Station in the Shetlands
for Norwegian communications.

Where S.O.2. is concerned, the relationship of
the Station in the Shetlands to S.O.2. Headquarters,
should be likened to Divisional Headquarters to an
Army Headquarters.

The 2. branch in the Shetlands should operate to
act without reference to London; and if
communications are to come through London, or through the S.I.S.
in Southern England, it will not make for efficiency
communications, which are so essential for S.O.2. type
communications, if the parties are brought over there and sent back
on notice.

It is therefore, be stated on grounds of utility
that the establishment of a station in the Shetlands is desirable for

Conclusion:

The position at present is that 'C' have gone back on
every point of the agreement to establish a Station in the
Shetlands, which agreement was reached between S.O.2. and
'C' as far back as 21.5.41.

In the first instance, it was agreed by 'C' that we
should administer the Station. 'C' have now stated that

/they wish

6 JUL 1941
W/-AIDE MEMOIRE FOR S.O.COMMUNICATIONS:A. SHETLAND WIRELESS STATION.

The S.O.2. case for a Shetlands W/T Station can be summarised as follows:-

(1) Political:

AD/A and AD/W have had protracted conversations with the Norwegian Government, who are most anxious to establish their own W/T Station, plus Norwegian operators in the Shetlands - which, as you know, is used as a jumping off base for S.O.2. and S.I.S. work in Norway.

In accordance with the wishes of 'C', we have resisted this demand by the Norwegian Government. But in order to maintain our goodwill vis a vis the Norwegian Government, it has been agreed that a Station should be established in the Shetlands, but which would be under British control, and used exclusively for Norwegian communications.

It is deemed, therefore, on political grounds, that there should, in fact, be a Station in the Shetlands used for Norwegian communications.

(2) Utility:

As far as S.O.2. is concerned, the relationship of our forward base in the Shetlands to S.O.2. Headquarters, London, could be likened to Divisional Headquarters to an Army Command Headquarters.

The S.O.2. branch in the Shetlands should operate to a great extent without reference to London; and if telegrams have to come through London, or through the S.I.S. Station in Southern England, it will not make for efficiency and quick action, which are so essential for S.O.2. type of work, where parties are brought over there and sent back at a moment's notice.

It can, therefore, be stated on grounds of utility that a wireless station in the Shetlands is desirable for S.O.2.

(3) Present Position:

The position at present is that 'C' have gone back on every point of the agreement to establish a Station in the Shetlands, which agreement was reached between S.O.2. and 'C' as far back as 21.5.41.

In the first instance, it was agreed by 'C' that we should administer the Station. 'C' have now stated that

/they wish

they wish to administer the Station. We have conceded this to Gambier Parry, provided that the general direction and control of the suggested Station should be under Captain MITCHELL, the joint S.I.S. and S.O.2. representative in the Shetlands. We have also agreed to finance the Station and provide the transmitter.

GAMBIER PARRY has now, at the eleventh hour, stated that he does not wish a Station in the Shetlands at all, putting forward technical reasons which, in our opinion, cannot be wholly substantiated. We are convinced that if GAMBIER PARRY was really friendly disposed to S.O.2., he would find no difficulty in carrying through this Shetlands project and we should have our Station properly installed for the autumn "yachting season".

B. GENERAL COMMUNICATIONS.

Experience has taught us that GAMBIER PARRY does not live up to his promises in regard to the deliveries of W/T sets for agents. Our requirements are likely to be great in the future. He has specifically asked us not to manufacture sets ourselves, though this could be quite easily done, as the sets are nothing out of the ordinary technically. We have grave reasons to doubt that his attitude will be very much changed as regards the future.

C. PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP.

GAMBIER PARRY frequently makes personal attacks on our staff, both in London and at Station IX, which are totally unjustified and greatly resented by us at Headquarters.

2/1

ADZ/XX/s10.

26 JUN 1941

26.6.41.

TO: The C.E.O.

FROM: AD/Z

I am afraid I must ask your assistance in regard to a reinforcement to the staff of Station IX Wireless Section.

As you are aware, we are concentrating on the research and development of the following:-

(1) Micro-wave telephonic duplex communication - ground to air; the ground set being designed for the use of agents. This is of paramount importance to S.O.2, as it will enable untrained operators to communicate with us through this medium. One of the major difficulties confronting us at the present moment is the acquirement of trained operators of foreign nationality, who are prepared to be dropped in enemy-occupied territory and thereby constitute our lines of communication. At the present moment, we only have one man in Norway and one in France, and we are endeavouring to drop two men in France during the July moon. The prospect of acquiring further operators can hardly be described as bright.

This programme is, of course, entirely inadequate for our future requirements. You will see, therefore, how important the micro-wave ground to air transmission, if successful, may be for this organisation.

(2) The D-Phone: - A scrambling device which the Ministry of Air Production and The Post Office have inspected and which the M.A.P. considered sufficiently interesting to order six sets for trial purposes and, if proved successful, would require considerable quantities.

This scrambling device is actually from one ground station to another and is of great importance to the Air Force and, in fact, all the Services, as it will eliminate the necessity for cipher tables and consequently save considerable time in the transmission of secret messages.

(3) A modification of this D-Phone has been urgently required from us by the M.A.P. which can be used in aircraft too. Our wireless expert is in the process of evolving this contrivance, although actually we have not reached the development stage.

The chief interest in aircraft scramblers is that the ground stations can communicate with aircraft by telephonic means, without divulging to the enemy, as they do at the moment, what their orders might be. It is also interesting to S.O.2. in that such an appliance might be so small that it could be attached to a micro-wave set and thus eliminate the use of codes by our agents.

To carry out all these experiments, it is necessary to increase the staff at Station IX, particularly in respect of mechanics; and I was wondering whether it would be possible for you to approach Lord HANKEY, with a view to obtaining three electrical mechanics capable of handling precision bench machinery and who could work to drawings and specifications. I think he has produced 18 for the S.I.S. and our requirements are so very small that I can hardly think he would refuse to help us.

I shall be grateful for any help you can give me in this direction.

Davies - Pyle going
to see Lord H. at 12.00

2/7

✓
4/7/41

Cop sent to
S/leader Pyle 23/v

REF: CN/XX/295/FIH.

May 23rd 1941.

MOST SECRET.

24th May, 1941.

W/2346.

I send you herewith copies of two minutes by VENNER, dated 22nd and 23rd May respectively, regarding a new transmitter, together with a draft telegram to Washington prepared by SHERWOOD after discussion with Venner.

You will see what the proposal is and you will also see that it has received the sanction of the Prime Minister. The whole matter is still very secret indeed and neither the B.B.C., nor the Ministry of information at present knows anything about it.

In point of fact, the whole affair will be worked by S.O.1 since the interruptions by the new "Great Voice" will take place at times which will have to be kept secret, and its function will be definitely "subversive" - so please keep the whole thing very much to yourself. The B.B.C. will only come into it so far as the enemy may try to indulge in jamming.

ROBIN is going off in the Clipper very shortly so we should be extremely grateful if the telegram to Washington could be sent without delay.

((Sgt)) GLADWIN JEEK

H.L. d'A. Hopkinson Esq.,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL ON FILE IN THE
SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE
ACT 1958

S. V. E.
22/5/41.

Copy sent to
S/leader Pyle 23/4

REF: CD/XX/295/FIN.

May 23rd 1941.

TO: C.E.O.

FROM: D/FIN.

MOST SECRET.

Herewith copy of my Minute to the Treasury dated 22nd May relative to financial sanction for the purchase and erection of a special "all-powerful" wireless transmitter and the subsequent running costs. Mr. Brittain's agreement which he gave at an interview I had with him to-day is duly signified thereon.

Subsequent to my interview at the Treasury I met at Mr. Gaitskell's request Mr. R. E. Robin who is proceeding to New York by Clipper this week-end to effect the purchase from R.C.A.

In view of the necessity of making the dollar funds available in as secret a fashion as possible, I then called on Mr. Sherwood at the Foreign Office and, subject to Mr. Hopkinson's approval, it has been arranged that a telegram to H. Ambassador, Washington, shall be sent on the lines of the enclosed draft, from which you will see that the Ambassador is requested to make available to New York, funds in such form as he may request not exceeding £450,000. If this telegram is approved and sent, the Bank of England will be instructed to remit £450,000 to the Embassy next week and I will refund the Foreign Office in sterling.

I have also seen C and explained the financial side and he quite approves of the matter being handled through 48,000 on the suggested lines.

In this connection a telegram will be sent to 48,000 advising him very briefly of Robin's mission and Robin will explain in detail the financial aspect when he arrives.

Would you therefore, if you approve, forward the attached draft telegram (which has been initialled by Mr. Sherwood) to Mr. Hopkinson requesting him, if he approves, to arrange for its despatch.

JH

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

Cop sent to
S/Head Pyle 23/5

F. 36.

MOST SECRET.

MR. BRITAIN.

Technicians have for some time been considering the possibility of erecting in this country a medium wave wireless transmitter of enormous power to broadcast in appropriate languages on the wave lengths of enemy or enemy-controlled transmitters. By reason of the territory he occupies the enemy possesses complete numerical superiority in transmitters for home and foreign propaganda and the object of the proposed all-powerful transmitter is to "sabotage" the enemy's wireless and so offset his numerical advantage.

AGREED.

H.B.

23/5/41.

The apparatus would virtually be a raiding dreadnought of the ether, firing broadsides at unpredictable times at the enemy's radio propaganda machine.

The transmissions could be effected by a 500-KW medium wave transmitter and such exists in the U.S.A. An option has been taken on it. It has also been found possible to have an aerial design which, using low masts, avoids all Air Ministry objections, obviates delay in choosing a site and makes for maximum secrecy.

The whole proposition has been put before the Prime Minister and on the 17th May his minute was that the proposal should be proceeded with.

Treasury sanction is therefore now requested to cover the estimated expenditure which is as follows :-

INITIAL OUTLAY.

Transmitter (payable in £).....	£110,000
Erection costs.....	30,000
Independent power supply.....	10,000
Remaining equipment.....	4,000
	<u>£154,000</u>
Running costs.....	£20,000 per annum.

With regard to the purchase of the transmitter it will be necessary to explore whether this can be effected within the Lence & Land Bill, but it is thought from previous experience that for purposes of secrecy it will probably have to be a cash transaction.



Copy sent to
S/leader Pyle 23/4

Registry
No.

MEMO.

23rd May 1941

MOST SECRET.

Draft. Telegram.
H.M. Ambassador.
Washington.

Please make available to
New York

funds in such form and of such
amounts as he may request not ex-
ceeding \$450,000, and charge in
accounts with F.O. as on YPX account;

No.
(Cypher)

Telegraph transfer of
above amount is being made.

Dept. No. 1.

(Signed) SHERWOOD.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

THIS IS A COPY
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS
ACT 1958

Copy sent to
S/Head Pyle 23/5

[Cypher].

PRIPER.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Acting British Consul-General.

No: 487.

D: 12.02 a.m. 23rd May, 1941.

R: 8.00 a.m. 23rd May, 1941.

22nd May, 1941.

FORWARD TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE.

Following for Mr. Broad M.E.W. from B.P.C.

Your No: 460 of May 20th.

McElroy is shipping the following valves to us tonight and we will despatch to you by air tomorrow six of each Nos: 954, 955, 956, six J 7, six H 6, also twelve No: 7 0 7 - 1252, also 18 each Nos: 1851, 1852, also 24 each Nos: 958, 1959, 5 A 8 GT, 1 D8, also 48 each Nos: 487, I T 4, 1 T 4, 1 R 8. Foregoing quantities and types differ slightly from those quoted in your telegram but McElroy definitely identifies your requirements as being the same as those covered by Christopher Webb order No: R E S 3 - 274 and so we are shipping to you by air accordingly.

Leave you to despatch the foregoing message with any alterations you deem proper. We will confirm to you tomorrow when shipment has been turned over to Air Transport for [? them to] despatch so that a follow up message may be sent them if you so desire.

[Copies sent to Mr. Broad].

ku. 2/2
O.D.

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

24/-

To: AD/A & CD.
COB. O E.

W. 2/5
C.E.O. for information

26.4.41.

From: S.

CO. 2/4

Secret

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

*P. Broad, Esq.,
Min. of Economic Warfare*

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be

kept under Lock and Key.]

Copied W.C.O.

W6152/55/49

22 MAY 1941

[Cypher].

DEPARTMENTAL NO. I.

With the Compliments

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

of the
Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs

No. 460.
20th May, 1941.

D. 5.30 p.m., 20th May, 1941.

21 MAY 1941

hhh

Ref: F.O. Letter

No. W3343/55/49

of 24th March.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

MOST SECRET.

Following for Purvis from Brand.

[Begins:]

Referring to Foreign Office telegram No. 30 of the 11th January, would appreciate your assistance in following matter:-

Following radio valves have been ordered from Messrs. Webb's Radio Limited whose representative in the United States is T.R. McElroy of 100 Brookline Avenue Boston:-

Six 954, six 955, eighteen 1851, six 6J5, six 6H8, six 956, eighteen 1852, twentyfour 958, twentyfour 959, twentyfour 3A8 (G.T.), twentyfour 1R5, twelve 7G7/1252.

Can you arrange for the above to be sent by first air opportunity and delivery personally to Mr. Broad Ministry of Economic Warfare.

W/-

W. 2/5

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

24/-

To: AD/A & C. COVA 20 E.

C.E.O. for information

26.4.41.

From: S.

CO. 24/4

W/-

Copy for Major Johnston W/-

P.P. are on on
-Written- file

MOST SECRET.
AD/141/9.

20th May, 1941.

Dear Gambier Parry,

I enclose (1) a copy of Major Horton's letter to the Minister, (2) copy of my reply to Major Horton, and (3) a short aide memoire for purposes of record on the meeting this afternoon.

I have asked S.O.1. to let you have their copy of the Minister's Minute to the Prime Minister and the memorandum on the "Grande Voce".

Yours sincerely,

P.S. The Minister has decided to ask S.O.2. to fix things with the Treasury. I have seen Venner and explained things to him. He will get into direct touch with you. Please keep this entirely to yourself. I must forestall any possible resentment on the part of Stewart Roberts.

Colonel R. Gambier Parry.

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

W/-

To: AD/A & C.
COPD 20 E.

C.E.O. for information

26.4.41.

From: S.

CO. 20/4

W/-

W/-

AIDE MEMOIRE.

At a Meeting with the Minister on May 20th it was decided -

1. that Colonel Parry should see Major Morton and reassure him orally about the B.B.C. stations;
2. that Colonel Parry should see Professor Lindemann and invite him to attend a Meeting to be arranged, at which there should be present, in addition to the Professor and Colonel Parry, the Minister, the Secretary of State for Air and a representative of the Air Ministry to be chosen by the Secretary of State;
3. that Colonel Parry should inform Mr. Gaitskell of the results of his talks with Major Morton and Professor Lindemann.
4. that the Minister would himself take steps to secure Treasury sanction for the expenditure of the necessary funds for purchasing the apparatus.

P.S. This was dictated before your second visit.

I understand that you will get Murray to find out all about the B.B.C. stations and how Air Ministry consent to them was secured. When we know this, the Minister will reconsider the question of getting A.M. agreement.

20th May, 1941.

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

W/-

To: AD/A & C.
COPY TO R.

W. 2/5
C.E.O. for information

26.4.41.

From: S.

Copy for Mr. Jebb.

W/-

MOST SECRET.
23/1379.

20th May, 1941.

I tried to get you on the phone yesterday and to-day in order to thank you on behalf of my Minister for your Most Secret (and most helpful) letter of the 19th May.

Colonel Parry came up to London to-day and discussed with the Minister the next steps to be taken. It was decided to follow your advice and buy the apparatus at once, so as to reduce delay as much as possible. It was also decided to approach the Air Ministry and later, after their agreement has been secured, the Ministry of Information.

Colonel Parry, who has been asked by the Minister to keep in constant touch with you, will be explaining to you orally the position with regard to the B.B.C. Station.

Sgd. H.T.N. Gaitkell.

Major Desmond Norton,
C.M.G.

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

W/-

To: AD/A & C.
COA Co E.

W. 2/2
C.E.O. for information
Co. 2/2

26.4.41.

From: S.

W/2239.

17th May, 1941.

You have been good enough to help us in the past in connection with the shipping of various articles, supplied to us from the United States, to this country. I wonder whether you would mind my bothering you again in a matter of this kind.

The goods this time have been ordered from Messrs. Webb's Radio, whose representative in the States is T.R. McElroy, of 100, Brookline Avenue, Boston. The goods consist of the following radio valves:-

Six 954, six 955, eighteen 1851, six 6J5,
six 6H6, six 956, eighteen 1852, twentyfour
958, twentyfour 959, twentyfour 3AB (G.T.),
twentyfour 1R5, twelve 7G7/1232.

Could you possibly ask your people (by telegraph) if they can get this order shipped to me by Clipper or by a bomber.

W.L. Gorell-Barnes, Esq.,
Offices of the War Cabinet,
Great George Street,
S.W.1.

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

W/-

To: AD/A & C.
COA & E.

CEO. for information

26.4.41.

From: S.

CO. 2/7/4

W/2266.

A.D./A:

(CXG.775
Jerusalem
12.5.41.)

With reference to the attached telegram I should like to record the tentative arrangement which I came to some time ago with "C", who raised with me the question of S.O. communications. The proposal was as follows :-

ADZ/US/427.

16 MAY 1941

16.5.41.

TO: MR. BROAD

Byk as before.
ADZ/US

FROM: AD/Z

I should be most grateful if you could through your usual channels secure priority on the Clipper for valves which are most urgently required by our Wireless Department.

The goods in question have been ordered from Messrs. Webb's Radio, whose representative in 48-land is T.R. McElroy, 100 Brookline Avenue, Boston, and are as follows:-

I Six 954, six 955, eighteen 1851 six 6H6, six 6J5, six 956
eighteen 1852, twentyfour 958, twentyfour 959, twentyfour
3A8 (G.T.) twentyfour 1R5, twelve 7G7/1232.

End

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

W/-

To: AD/A & CD.
COMA SO E.

C.E.O. for information

26.4.41.

From: S.

Ca. 2/4

W/-
W/2266.

A.D./A:

(CXG.775
Jerusalem
12.5.41.)

With reference to the attached telegram I should like to record the tentative arrangement which I came to some time ago with "C", who raised with me the question of S.O. communications. The proposal was as follows :-

That S.O.2 should have their own ciphering department and their own ciphers, but they should only correspond by this means with their representatives at Gibraltar, Cairo and Singapore. This means would be reserved for all telegrams which, for one reason or another, S.O.2 did not want to go through the ordinary "C" machine. The bulk of traffic, even to the posts mentioned above would, however, continue to be handled by "C". Further, the S.O. representatives in Gibraltar, Cairo and Singapore should only have 'individual' tables. In the rare event of their wishing to correspond between themselves, they could only use "C", or send the telegram here for repetition by us.

I think that this proposal is sensible for a number of reasons. In the first place, to establish our right to correspond with our own people unbeknownst to anybody else (though, as a matter of fact, we should normally keep "C" himself informed of such correspondence). In the second place it seems to me to be both wasteful and rather difficult for us to set up a communications department of our own, to handle all our communications. In the third place, the problem of dealing generally with security ciphers is a very difficult one, demanding long experience. Lastly, I am anxious to work in with "C" as much as we can do so, without sacrificing our own interests.

(Sgd:-) GLADWYN JEBB.

14th May, 1941.

The Right Hon. Lord Horder
Minister of the Navy & Air
55, Whitehall, S.W.1.

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

544-

To: AD/A & CD.
CODA S.O.E.

CEO. for informⁿ

26.4.41.

From: S.

CA 2074

... this morning at Broadway, and by proceeding

Seen by P.B. 4/5 Copy sent to Miniver.

Secret & Personal.

W/-

W/2195. 6th May, 1941.

I should have reported to you before I wrote the letter of the 5th May, but I had to wait until I had had a week's leave and in the meantime the work was progressing.

I was delighted to receive your letter of the 5th May, saying that you had been able to provide "C" with the necessary operators, and I send you the warmest thanks of S.O.2 for your powerful and successful intervention.

I must protest, however, that I do not think I ever said that you did not appreciate our organisation! All I went so far as to suggest was that you might, not unnaturally, give preference to the Service Departments over S.O.E.

As it is, we are really beginning to see a ray of light at the end of our tunnel and we shall always remember that this ray was, in fact, provided by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

(Sgd:-) GLADWIN JEBB.

The Right Hon. Lord Hankey, G.C.B.,
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,
55, Whitehall, S.W.1.

P.S./-

48. ANTHONY J. P. I.
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

48.4

(-128)

of personal
to your
and as your
to see a
to be
to be

be
to be
to be
to be
to be
to be

of personal
to your
and as your
to see a
to be
to be

I should have replied in any
case before now to your most secret letter
of the 22nd April, on the same subject: it
only came in, however, just after I had left
on a week's leave and, in the meantime, I had
heard unofficially that things were progressing
satisfactorily.

P.S.

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

244-

To: AD/A & CD.
COPY TO E.

W. 2/5
C.E.O. for information
CO. 26/4

26.4.41.
From: S.

I saw A.C.S.S. this morning at Broadway, and by proceeding carefully on the lines followed by CD yesterday and asking for his views, I got him to put forward himself the suggestion that

6 MAY 1941

SECRET

Reference W/1826

THE MINISTER

Sir Campbell-Stuart went out to America on his own business, but he told us of his intention, if possible, to get in touch with influential people there who would be prepared, on their own initiative and at their own expense, to arrange for some form of short-wave transmission to German-occupied Europe. Sir Campbell-Stuart thought that this might be very valuable as likely to get the American point of view across to the people in the occupied areas.

Though this project was not strictly speaking within our province, you nevertheless agreed to pay a sum towards Sir Campbell's expenses. It was, however, impressed on him that we could certainly, as S.O.E., take no official countenance of his action.

Sir Campbell has now returned and has apparently fixed up something with prominent Americans in America. It occurs to me (and C.D. agrees) that, if he has, it might be possible, through Stevenson in New York, to arrange for Sir Campbell's station to be supplied with the same "directives" as S.O.1 are now sending to WRUL.

If this were done, however, it would have to be without the knowledge of S.O.1, or indeed of anybody save you, me, C.D., Campbell-Stuart and Stevenson.

A slightly awkward situation will arise if the people Sir Campbell has been playing with are, in fact, WRUL! In that case we can only temporise, since I do not think we should reveal it to Sir Campbell-Stuart if we are, in fact, subsidising WRUL.

19th March, 1941.

F.S.

(1584) 53157/1273
2,000,000 4/40
JCS/L11. 044/230
(REGIMITE)
Code 5.85.0

He said he was most discreet & never mentioned me, but he saw a lot of Stevenson & got on well with him, but he made plans for financing, with William, and starting up a short wave station which, he felt, he could control. He gave me particulars & I didn't press - history. He will

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l.
im,
ld
on.
on
id
proach
ld
ships

C-2
C-3

3/4

I saw her near Agave yesterday.
The sign says "shrub" 15. Pressed plants.
He asked to talk to Jimmie with C.D. 2 m.
He asked C.E.O. He agreed to
come over to his room to see laboratory
Washington. He gave, looking on and that
The ship about N. toward, I bring in
and 2 others in my view. 12.33 week to see.
L can see how this
H.D.

10/3

Will go back to V.S.H. early in month. He will be on
front. He has very sharp about 1000 2-C-D. (10)
new station will be ready 2- start work with
a photograph by his return. He is 1 week, taking
also in existing station. I will find out more
soon I see the signs. You, 1 & C.D. can
connect on radio before then.
H.D.

also

the sign is 500
spec. from on

9-1

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

W4-

To: AD/A & CD.
CDX to E.

C.E.O. for information

26.4.41.

From: S.

Co. 26/4

I saw A.C.S.S. this morning at Broadway, and by proceeding carefully on the lines followed by CD yesterday and asking for his views, I got him to put forward himself the suggestion that there should be in the Shetland Islands a separate radio station for communication with Norway.

G.J. (on return)

Your last poke has stirred him a bit! Do it again.

But does he realize his difference between us & C?

H.D.

23/4

Satisfactory copies sent.
D.D. v.

... he was sure that this was the proper way that such a station should be built by ... and that it should be run on the lines as the base is at ... would be strenuously opposed ... our plans to meet and over- ... ns: ... be put up in concrete form ... ay, 1941. ... accompanied by a technical ... which would accrue from ... station in the Shetlands, ... he would need to draw upon ... the equipment necessary to ... position up as one which would ... se burden, and that in doing ... ver the objection by ... that ... save him anything as the ... ould all have to be transmitted ... ion in any event, so that he ... ct from Norway. ... to counteract ...'s obvious ... ssible to find the necessary ... endent station of this kind. ... ints are as follows: ... nformation required from him, ... S.S. suggested that it should ... discussion with me he was ... of establishing such a station. ... ese questions with E in the ... e have an immediate discussion ... ds further.

... this point with A.C.S.S. at some length and ... nally suggested to him that the best way would be to approach the Norwegian Foreign Minister with a request that he should obtain say two wireless operators from Norwegian merchant ships

which/

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

24

To: AD/A & CD.
Copy to E.

C.E.O. for information

26.4.41.

From: S.

Co. 26/4

I saw A.C.S.S. this morning at Broadway, and by proceeding carefully on the lines followed by CD yesterday and asking for his views, I got him to put forward himself the suggestion that there should be in the Shetland Islands a separate radio station for communication with Norway.

He told me that he was sure that this was the proper way out of our difficulty, that such a station should be built by *lines as the base is at*

WHITEHALL 3400.

5 MAY 1941

FROM THE

CHANCELLOR OF THE
DUCHY OF LANCASTER.



~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
55, WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

SECRET.

5th May, 1941.

My dear Gladwyn,

You will be pleased to hear that the General Post Office have found the operators required by Menzies and Gambier-Parry. Never say again that I do not appreciate your organisation!

Yours ever,

Hankey

*This is indeed satisfactory.
SP: to thank, copies comm.
to C.P.D. D.D. v. 5*

J.M. Gladwyn Jebb, Esq.,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

would be strenuously opposed
lay our plans to meet and over-

ons:

be put up in concrete form

accompanied by a technical
es which would accrue from
e station in the Shetlands,
he would need to draw upon
the equipment necessary to

position up as one which would
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ect from Norway.

Gambier Parry's
to counteract *X*'s obvious
ossible to find the necessary
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I discussed this point with A.C.S.S. at some length and finally suggested to him that the best way would be to approach the Norwegian Foreign Minister with a request that he should obtain say two wireless operators from Norwegian merchant ships

which/

This is quite hopeful.

28 APR 1941

26.4.41.

To: AD/A & CD.
CERN to E.

From: S.

C.E.O. for in form^m

CO. 26/4

I saw A.C.S.S. this morning at Broadway, and by proceeding carefully on the lines followed by CD yesterday and asking for his views, I got him to put forward himself the suggestion that there should be in the Shetland Islands a separate radio station for communication with Norway.

He told me that he was sure that this was the proper way out of our difficulty, that such a station should be built by E, if he was able to take on the job, and that it should be run jointly for C and S.O.2. on the same lines as the base is at present.

He warned me that the proposal would be strenuously opposed by Gambier Parry, and said we must lay our plans to meet and overcome opposition from this quarter.

He made the following suggestions:

- (a) That the suggestion should be put up in concrete form in a letter from CD to C.S.S.
- (b) That the letter should be accompanied by a technical note from E as to the advantages which would accrue from the establishment of a separate station in the Shetlands, and as to the extent to which he would need to draw upon C or other outside sources for the equipment necessary to build such a station.
- (c) That we should put the proposition up as one which would assist C to deal with his immense burden, and that in doing so we should be prepared to answer the objection by *Gambier Parry* that such a station would not really save him anything as the messages which were received would all have to be transmitted to London through his organisation in any event, so that he might as well take them in direct from Norway.
- (d) That we should be prepared to counteract *Gambier Parry's* objection that it would be impossible to find the necessary wireless operators for an independent station of this kind.

My comments on these various points are as follows:

- (a) If E will let me have the information required from him, I will draft the letter. A.C.S.S. suggested that it should contain a statement that after discussion with me he was personally strongly in favour of establishing such a station.
- (b) I should like to discuss these questions with E in the immediate future.
- (c) Here again I should like to have an immediate discussion with E before the matter proceeds further.
- (d) I discussed this point with A.C.S.S. at some length and finally suggested to him that the best way would be to approach the Norwegian Foreign Minister with a request that he should obtain say two wireless operators from Norwegian merchant ships

which/

which had been sunk or damaged, to do the work. A.C.S.S. and I considered carefully the objections on security grounds which gambler party would be likely to put forward in opposition to such an arrangement, and we felt that these objections could be overcome with careful handling. May I please have authority to proceed on the lines that I have indicated?

MS

18

Geo. So might check with E + Gook

Sunk

can

26.7.41

2

Infected group of staff

5th April 1941

WHITEHALL 3400

FROM THE

CHANCELLOR OF THE
DUCHY OF LANCASTER.



MOST SECRET.

23 APR 1941

W

*This is a request
Hayning's talk
with Lord Hankey
Not unhelpful.
DPT C/W*

So. G. C. W.

23/4

████████████████████
55, WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

22nd April, 1941.

My dear Gladwyn.

The Chiefs of Staff have passed your W. of 1st April (W.1941) of the 12th April asking for more additional operators for S.O.S. to me.

C/D

I am not at all unhelpful about the operators. I hope that the demand for radio mechanics will be limited as much as possible. I do not endorse your view.

... The letter from Lord Hankey, of which I additionally enclose a copy herein, must be the result of General Hayning's conversation with him yesterday.

It is at least encouraging that Lord Hankey should say that he is not at all unhelpful about the operators. However, I have written to Hankey and asked him to let me know in detail the (Sgd) PHILIP BROAD requires, and I will certainly do my utmost to find them for him. I will keep you in touch with the result.

23rd April, 1941.

Yours ever,

Hankey

H.M. Gladwyn Jebb, Esq.,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.

5th April 1941

WHITEHALL 3400

FROM THE

CHANCELLOR OF THE
DUCHY OF LANCASTER.



MOST SECRET.

23 APR 1941

W

*This is a small
training batch
with the
N/A
SPT C/W.*

S.O. W.S.U.

23/41

████████████████████
55, WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

22nd April, 1941.

My dear Gladwyn,

The Chiefs of Staff have passed your most secret letter (W.1951) of the 12th April asking for some additional operators for S.O.E. to me.

I am not at all unhopeful about the operators, though I hope that the demand for radio mechanics will be limited as much as possible. I do not endorse your view that "there is little, if any, hope of obtaining additional men through him" particularly as the number is so small. I think you do me an injustice in saying that I put "the needs of the Service Departments first and those of the S.O.E. second!" *I put you very high!*

However, I have written to Menzies and asked him to let me know in detail the sort of men he requires, and I shall certainly do my utmost to find them for him. I will keep you in touch with the result of my inquiries.

Yours ever,

Hankey

H.M. Gladwyn Jebb, Esq.,
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE.