

42. Furthermore subject received a letter from RIFCZES containing the info that a certain Mrs KURCZINSKI was on her way to Europe with destination POLAND. Ship and cabinnumber were exactly stated. This woman was said to be a spy and had to be arrested immediately.
43. As subject had, however, no indications against this woman whatsoever, he did NOT take RIFCZES' lead in this matter. RIFCZES now supposes that Mrs KURCZINSKI was somewhat too well infmd of RIFCZES' and SCHWARZ's activities and that RIFCZES' wanted to try to get rid of this troublesome witness in this way.
44. After a stay of appr nine months, RIFCZES returned to EUROPE and following up prisoner's advice, came to live in the NETHERLANDS, as he did NOT want to return to France. With the assistance of ELAIS HOOGENVELD, a house was found at Calcarlaan, WASSENAAR, where RIFCZES took up residence under the name Paul Edmond ROBERTS.
45. Then prisoner once more opened up personal relations with RIFCZES and had several interviews with him in the Netherlands. Prisoner then found out that RIFCZES was wanted by the American Authica. RIFCZES' explanation of this fact was, that he had caused a road-accident in America through his own fault.
46. During his stay in America or soon after he took up residence in the Netherlands, the exact date is NOT remembered by subject, RIFCZES produced a report on what the American Intelligence Service showed him.
47. This report caused a detrimental critic from BERLIN. Prisoner is of opinion that the facts reported by RIFCZES as successes on behalf of the American Intelligence Service, could never have been shown to a member of the Intelligence Service of a foreign power. Prisoner does NOT believe either that it was possible for the American Intelligence Service to obtain sketches and plans as reported by RIFCZES.
48. During the occupation of the Rhineland by German troops, however, RIFCZES procured very good info on the reaction brought about with the French General Staff and the state of feeling amongst the French troops. From this info appr that France did not intend to take active reprisals against Germany. Also at the time of the occupation of Austria RIFCZES provided valuable info.
49. RIFCZES was on good terms with Mlle CLAIRE, who was empld in LEMOLLE's office, 27, Rue de MADRID in PARIS. Subject was infmd by LEMOLLE that this woman was charged with the reception of visitors. He also claimed to be in contact with a Major GROUB, empld at the War Office in PARIS and with Inspector GOULIS of the Sareté. The achievements of this Group were NOT very important, but the relationship was maintained in the hope of bigger future successes.

50. In order to maintain these relations RIFCZES alias ROBERTIS opened an office at BRUSSELS under supervision of his brother LADISLAUS RIFCZES. This brother was formerly attd to the Polish legation at VIENNA as Intelligence Officer. The purpose of this office was only to pass on infm from PARIS and subject earmarked a certain amount in various currencies, which was handed to Sigismund RIFCZES for the entertainment of this office. Later on LADISLAUS RIFCZES once stated to PROZES that the whole work was done by him, but that he never received any pay.
51. In BRUSSELS, LADISLAUS RIFCZES alias LADY was connected with ROBERT, a police-employee. Together with this man LADY worked against a consul DRILSEN, who was emp'd by Brit Intelligence and had his residence on Belgian territory in the neighbourhood of MAASTRICHT.
52. With a view to his reaching the age-limit (62 years) subject had to dismiss as leader of III F in 1938 and was succeeded by his 2 i/c for the Western theater Oberst ROHEBDER. As CANARIS, the CO of the Abwehramt at that time, and a personal friend of subject, wanted to continue to make use of his great experience in the field counter-espionage, it was decided upon to have prisoner establish an independent counter-espionage service in the NETHERLANDS. Subject received orders to find out which agents in HOLLAND were active against Germany and which German agents eventually entertained undesirable relations with foreign services. On these items subject had to report per courier to the Abwehramt Gruppe III. Important infm was then brought to the attention of Admiral CANARIS by the Chief III (originally BAISLER and afterwards BENTIVEGNY).

RESIDENCE IN THE NETHERLANDS:

53. Upon arrival in the Netherlands in September 1938 subject and his secretary HELENA SKRODZKY temporarily took up residence at the home of Sigismund RIFCZES/ROBERTIS at WASSENAAR, 36, Bloemcampaan, to which address RIFCZES moved meanwhile. After some months elapsed, prisoner moved into a house at the Wittenburgerweg no 22.
54. With a view to camouflage the reason of his presence in the Netherlands, subject went to see priorly Staatssekretär KIEHNHORN of the Deutsche Reichsbahn, through whose intermediary he obtained jobs with the Deutsche Verkehrsbüro at AMSTERDAM, 111 Kalverstraat, for himself under the name of RICHARD PAARMANN and for his secretary under the name of HELENE SCHNEIDER.
55. The manager of the Deutsche Verkehrsbüro, Hans SPERLING, was NOT infmd about the nature of subject's activities. Prisoner stated emphatically, that SPERLING was in no way connected with the GIS. This was the case, however, with his cooperater and successor MAX GERISCH, who was emp'd as agent for the "Geheime Meldedienst" by SCHULZE-BERNETT the leader of the K.O. in the Netherlands. Only once SPERLING produced a report the state of the roads,

of the roads, which were used by him on business-trip, upon orders from SCHULZE-BERBERT.

56. By his curious behaviour - he always acted as the wealthy Canadian - RIFCES/ROBERTS must have drawn the attention of the Passport Control Office. Anyway he was summoned to report there upon presentation and surrender of his passport. As RIFCES/ROBERTS infad subject, that he received this passport through the intermediary of a Brit I/O called WILSON to whom he was allowed to address himself when in trouble, he ordered RIFCES/ROBERTS to comply with the summons of the P.P.C.-O. This order, however, was NOT followed up by RIFCES/ROBERTS and thus he and his acquaintances were due to draw the attention of the British Intelligence personnel attd to P.P.C.-O.

57. At the end of September or early October 1938, PROTZE discovered that the house of RIFCES/ROBERTS at WASSENAAAR, in which he had taken up residence, was being watched continuously in an obvious and provocative manner.

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58. Subject then ordered HOOGEVEEN (para 36) to contact the person in question, who then introduced himself as KOUTERIK and volunteered the infm that VRLINTEN, who was empd by Brit Intelligence under supervision of the P.P.C.-O. at THE HAGUE received orders to keep an eye on the house. P 603 28

59. KOUTERIK, however, offered immediately and without hesitation to go over into German service against a good pay. Prisoner infmd him, however, through intermediary of HOOGEVEEN that he had first to pass on infm and that these would be paid according to their value.

60. Since then KOUTERIK, who received the alias WALBACH, passed on to subject through intermediary of HOOGEVEEN, all infm which came to his knowledge and all the orders he received. Prisoner remembers the following cases reported by KOUTERIK.

This is important in relation to K. Hooper's work? (15/1/46)

61. Dr KRUEGER, living at GODESBERG and empd with the "Luftaufklärung" worked for HENDRICKS of the P.P.C.-O. As KOUTERIK received orders from HENDRICKS to watch for the security of Dr KRUEGER, he was exactly infmd of all his movements. Subject passed the infm received from KOUTERIK on to BERLIN. Then KRUEGER was arrested in Germany and confessed to have worked for Brit Int during 21 years. KRUEGER committed suicide in jail.

62. Dr GORDEEL of BERLIN offered his services to the Brit Int Service. He negotiated with HENDRICKS of the P.P.C.-O. at THE HAGUE, and obtained from him unknown orders. This infm of KOUTERIK was passed on to BERLIN by prisoner.

63. X LEON, a newspaperman of THE HAGUE, was a notorious agent of Ast HALBURG, who attended many meetings of leading Officers of the Abwehrstellen HALBURG, WILHELMSHAVEN and MÜNSTER. LEON offered his services to VRLINTEN, which fact was reported to prisoner by KOUTERIK and subsequently passed on by him to the Abwehrant BERLIN.

64. VINZENZ MAIST, a V-man of the Abwehramt at BERLIN, offered also his services to the P.P.C.-O. at THE HAGUE. This case too was denounced by KOUTERIK and passed on to BLANK by subject.

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65. According to info from [KOUTERIK] the senior secretary at the German Embassy of THE HAGUE, VON PUTTLITZ, passed on info, concerning German ships leaving Dutch ports, to the P.P.C.-O. PACOLE was not able to convince the Ambassador GRAF VON ZECH of this fact. The latter pointed out to subject that the name SANZEBELLEN VON PUTTLITZ was amongst the oldest in Germany and occurred in the Almanach de Gotha and that in case spying was done at the Embassy, this ought be done by the Hand-porter. When, however, VON PUTTLITZ also found the P.P.C.-O. of names of persons who offered their services to the German Embassy for espionage-purposes and this too was reported by KOUTERIK, the Ambassador started to doubt. He uttered in presence of VON PUTTLITZ the supposition that a spy might be employed at the Embassy. After this incident VON PUTTLITZ deemed it wiser to escape to America together with his bosom friend and butler SCHNEIDER. Subject interrogated STEVENS, after the latter's kidnapping to Germany, during which STEVENS admitted to have received info on navigation from VON PUTTLITZ.

66. KOUTERIK also informed on a certain KRUEZKAMP, a designer of ROTTERDAM. KRUEZKAMP was involved in the swindling of forged Dutch passports which were brought upon order of SCHÜLER-BERNHART, leader of the K.O. This case was cleared by SPILLENNAAR (para 37) agent of HOOGEVEEN.

67. Still many more cases were passed on to subject by KOUTERIK, but he can NOT remember particulars of those at present. Prisoner points out, however, that NOT only he worked against WILHELM and the P.P.C.-O., but that also the Abwehrstellen HAMBURG, WILHELMSHAVEN and MÜNSTER received orders from Abwehramt BERLIN to do so.

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68. Friedrich GÜNTHER, an agent of Ast HAMBURG, now residing at HAMBURG, Am Ströndach, was very successful in this respect. He succeeded in buying an employee of the P.P.C.-O. called HOOPER. HOOPER had a meeting with members of Ast HAMBURG in Southern-Germany, during which he delivered documents originating from the P.P.C.-O. against payment.

69. A similar meeting HOOPER had in BERLIN too and later on together with his colleague TAYLOR in SWITZERLAND.

70. Their info were well paid by Ast HAMBURG. In this respect the attention is drawn, however, to the fact that the money originated from British Intelligence. This service paid so generously for the "Spielmaterial" (forged info) which was handed by the Abwehramt; to GÜNTHER for the

for the purpose, that Asst HAMBURG was able to lay aside enough money not only to pay HOOPER and TAYLOR, but to give ~~WAGNER~~ a good recompense at the same time. As prisoner had a look into all docs furnished by HOOPER and TAYLOR at the time, he is aware of all particulars concerning this affair.

71. Soon after the abduction of STEVENS and PAYNEBEST prisoner attended a meeting at the HQ of General VON REICHERNAU at ~~WAGNER~~. Admiral CANARIS then put the question where Major STEVENS from THE HAGUE was. PRISONER answered that to his knowledge STEVENS was in THE HAGUE, anyhow that this still was the case some days before. CANARIS' reply to this was that STEVENS was in any case NO longer in the Netherlands and that at once an investigation had to be made of the occurrences in the NETHERLANDS, the results of which had to be reported to him in full detail.
72. The investigation brought to light that the SD under supervision of SCHEFFENBERG, put out their feelers for PAYNEBEST. He was infmd that in Germany existed a group of dissatisfied Officers, who wanted to bring about a revolution and therefore looked for assistance from England. PAYNEBEST believed the veracity of this story and was in touch with SCHEFFENBERG by W/T. Besides SCHEFFENBERG came to see PAYNEBEST in the Netherlands on several occasions.
73. At last things came to a point when the German officers wanted to have a conference with PAYNEBEST on German territory. Then PAYNEBEST contacted STEVENS and requested him to take part in these meetings. STEVENS objected against this and wanted first to receive orders from LONDON, as this was a matter of politics. These orders were given to him by the British Ambassador at THE HAGUE.
74. From one side or the other objections were raised against this and in accordance herewith Lt Col ROOZEBOOM was contacted first and infmd of the whole affair. Then Lt Col ROOZEBOOM put at their disposal Lt KLOP with six privates for the security of this enterprise.
75. The conference would take place in the so-called no-men's land between the barriers. The German cars were parked near the barrier of the German side. When STEVENS and PAYNEBEST arrived, Lt KLOP and his men were not yet present. STEVENS and PAYNEBEST were dragged by force to the German cars. That very moment KLOP appeared on the spot and tried to interfere. He arrived too late, however, and was shot.
76. STEVENS and PAYNEBEST were finally sent to a concentration-camp. According to subject, STEVENS who was once interrogated on special points by him, gave any infm asked for, whereas PAYNEBEST was said to have become very enthusiastic about HITLER's "Mein Kampf" and offered to work for Germany on condition he obtained his release. Subject was NOT able to give any infm on the further fate of STEVENS and PAYNEBEST.

77. On or about the 6th of May 1940 subject received orders from BERLIN via SCHULZE-BERNETT to leave the Netherlands and report at BERLIN. As subject had an office in the premises, 6, Johan de Wittlaan, at THE HAGUE, where he kept all his documents, he handed the keys of his room to SCHULZE-BERNETT. For the latter there was no reason to leave the Netherlands with a view to the war-menace as he was under diplomatic inviolability.
78. Arrived in BERLIN, prisoner and Helene SKRODZKI reported to the Abwehramt at BERLIN and received orders to await further instructions. After the invasion of the Netherlands was published, prisoner reported for a second time to the Abwehramt, where he was infmd that the intention was to establish a Abwehrstelle in the Netherlands under supervision of Oberst HAUSWALD, whereas Major HEMPEL was apptd "Leiter III". PROTZ, however, received orders to continue his activities independently <sup>from</sup> Abt NIEDERLANDE.
79. In accordance with instructions subject and HELENA SKRODZKI then went to LUENEN, where they joined the Abwehrkommando VON FELDMANN. Via ULEN (N.Br.) they reached THE HAGUE on 15 May 1940 and took up residence again at their former address in WASSENAAR, 22 Wittenburgerweg.
80. The Abwehrkommando VON FELDMANN, whose task consisted in the detection of documents, which were eventually left behind by enemy intelligence, discovered important infm at the P.P.C.O. at THE HAGUE. The same applied to docs of the agent VRINTEN.

ACTIVITIES DURING THE OCCUPATION:

81. On his return in the Netherlands PROTZ was infmd by SCHULZE-BERNETT that he destroyed the complete documentation of subject with a view to the war operations. This put subject in a difficult situation, but fortunately HOOGEVEEN, who prior to the war liaised between KOUTERIK and prisoner, was able to save copies of the latter's reports, by burying these. All other material was burnt.
82. Another source for eventual completion of his documentation subject saw in a former infm of (KOUTERIK) according to which VRINTEN should have hidden his docs somewhere in the neighbourhood of WAALWIJK. After some investigations made at WAALWIJK a certain Frans HENSEN was arrested by GPP. HENSEN a relative of VRINTEN, who acted as agent to him before the war and worked against Germany from ARNHEM, was able to procure the address of the pension in the neighbourhood of WAALWIJK, where VRINTEN passed his holidays. At a housesearch at this address two trunks with documents were discovered, which VRINTEN left behind.
83. Amongst these docs were two thick books compiled by VRINTEN and his former cooperator SAL (stepfather of KOUTERIK), in which appeared the names of all agents of foreign powers.

POWERS working in the Netherlands as far as known to him. Furthermore a very exact bookkeeping of all expenses and payments made by VRINTEN to his agents mentioned by name. These docs were all - except the two above books - sent to COLOGNE, following orders received from Stapo-Leitstelle COLOGNE (Kriminalrat ALERBOHE).

84. The whole remaining part of 1940 was used to work out both this material and the one procured by HOOGEVEEN.
85. Meanwhile HOOGEVEEN was charged with the tracing of the remainders of allied espionage services. He had no success with these attempts. An effort made to induce VAN ZANTEN, one time agent of VRINTEN, to work for subject, would have been perhaps successful if the SD had not arrested this man and protected him from treachery.
86. As subject intended to continue his investigations in the affair STEVENS and PAYNEBEST, a relation of HOOGEVEEN, a certain Mrs PIERERSE was taken on as agent. This woman contacted the driver of PAYNEBEST. Mrs PIERERSE was only emp'd as agent for PROTZ during a very short period as she got a job as secretary through intermediary of Prof WESSTRA, then burgomaster of THE HAGUE.
87. Since the capitulation of France and the arrest of LE-MOINE, the relations of RIFCES alias ROBERTS were no longer of value. Subject also lacked the two most important of his sources, namely SNIP, who escaped to SWITZERLAND and KOUZERIK who together with VRINTEN left for the U.K. Therefore subject was compelled to recruit new agents.
88. Through intermediary of HOOGEVEEN prisoner got in touch with Charley STOCK a café-owner of American nationality at ROTTERDAM, Mathenesseplein 14. HOOGEVEEN worked already during World War I with Charley STOCK as agent for the German Intelligence. Meanwhile STOCK had got on in age and his café was not of the kind, that prisoner in case STOCK would have agreed to cooperate (which was NOT the case), could have expected any good results. Subject only met STOCK twice, but for the above reasons he was Not taken on as agent.
89. However, SCHULZE-BENNETT, who meanwhile was appt'd Leiter I Ast NIEDERLANDE with the rank of Oberstlt, recommended to subject BLUME, an ex-policeman from THE HAGUE. This man was emp'd before the war as V-man by the German Embassy at THE HAGUE, and received ~~for~~ a German decoration for his services in this capacity. Subject supposes that BLUME mainly worked for the Consul WUCHERPFENNIG, but states NOT to know which docs of his former service were originally delivered to the Embassy by BLUME.
90. As BLUME was NOT an extraordinarily intelligent man, subject is of opinion that the infn and docs he received

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91. RIPCZES alias ROBERTS requested subject to have investigations made in Belgium to find out the whereabouts of his brother LADISLAW, who was found out in a BRUSSELS prison. As one prevented a journey to PARIS, LADISLAW was transported to WASSENAR for the recovery of his health.
92. At the first occasion (Appr Aug 1940) LADISLAW RIPCZES was, however, transported to PARIS, where after a few months' stay he was emp'd in counter-intelligence, without making use of his brother SIGISMUND alias ROBERTS as intermediary. The latter was especially very much offended when subject refused to employ him any longer as agent. Later on RIPCZES alias ROBERTS wrote a letter to his brother in PARIS with injurious contents on PROTZE and his secretary Helena SIRODZKY. This letter which was handed to subject by the censorship station via Abwehrstelle Niederlande, caused him to break off all his relations with Sigismund RIPCZES alias ROBERTS.
93. In PARIS LADISLAW RIPCZES contacted the French Resistance Movement. For this reason he was able to report the names of so-called leading personalities from all over France, however, without furnishing any further particulars on these persons. Owing to this fact, these reports were practically useless and caused ever repeated requests for more detailed info from the Abwehr at BERLIN and ASE PARIS. Moreover he reported on an Allied spy-ring at the Riviera and one in a Paris-hotel, where the KRIEGSMARINE took up residence.
94. During a visit of subject to PARIS, LADISLAW RIPCZES proposed to establish a picture-shop on his behalf, in order to camouflage the realnature of his activities. The Abwehr at BERLIN agreed to this and supplied the necessary capital. The shop was opened in PARIS, Au Vieux Montmartre, Rue le Pique.
95. From that moment, LADISLAW RIPCZES, however, occupied himself chiefly with the picture-shop and the organisation of exhibitions. His reports lost more and more their value, whereas his financial claims increased gradually. For these reasons subject transferred him to Alst PARIS approx Jul 41.
96. In the autumn of 1941 at Mrs SCHULZE-BERNETT's, whose husband was meanwhile trans'd to the German Embassy at ANKARA, PROTZE met Mr J. HAMER, Chief-Commissioner of police at THE HAGUE. HAMER, who was apparently inf'd by Mrs SCHULZE-BERNETT about subject's activities, offered in the course of the conversation to put an employee of the Documentation Service at PROTZE's disposal and mentioned in this respect the police-detective Abraham van DIJK.

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97. Subject had later on a meeting with VAN DIJK, at which BLUME (para 89) was present. From this meeting resulted that the infm which subject formerly received from BLUME was from then supplied by VAN DIJK.
98. Approx Christmas 1941 VAN DIJK fell seriously ill, but did not reappear even after complete recovery. During a meeting which subject then arranged, it appeared that VAN DIJK had objections of religious nature against the work and wanted to discontinue his activities. At the same occasion BLUME too dismissed. Subject did NOT make any objections against their withdrawals. BLUME and VAN DIJK did NOT receive a fixed pay, but their expenses were indemnified for, together with a recompense from time to time.
99. Subject is convinced that HAMER, who frequented the circle of SCHULZE-BERNETT very much, played a certain part in the K.O. He volunteered to supply PROTZE with photocopies of docs at his disposal in his capacity of Commissioned Officer of the Court-martial. Amongst these were docs containing infm on the mobilisation in the Netherlands, a report on the General Staff, a report on the defences of the MERDIJK bridge and on the way in which General WINKELMAN was infmd on the 10th of May 1940 of the German invasion in the Netherlands.
100. These photocopies were passed on to BERLIN together with a translation. The Abwehramt infmd him, however, that HAMER had previously already handed these photocopies to GIESKES (III F Ast Niederlande) and to SCHREIBER (SD IV B).
101. HAMER also supplied infm on a certain <sup>-Pr. 38951</sup> TESTER, who prior to the war worked for the British Intelligence. During a conversation with VON ROSENBERG (III F BERLIN) the latter infmd subject, that TESTER reported already to BERLIN and offered his services to the Abwehramt. TESTER was accepted and sent on to Greece by the Abwehramt.
102. In 1942 subject came into touch with the policeman J.H.C. KROM, THE HAGUE through intermediary of HAMER. The motive of this introduction was the fact, that KROM through intermediary of one of his informants had taken up contact with a group of three Germans, of whom one in uniform, who transported illegally two boxes and a big roll across the border near DENKERAMP.
103. PROTZE who supposed these people to belong to the illegal group "S.A. Mann MAYER", instructed KROM to catch this group in MÜNSTER, to which place they intended to go. These instructions were given with full knowledge and approval of HAMER. However, KROM did NOT succeed in tracing these people again.
104. During their first meeting KROM infmd subject to be one of the former cooperators of GS III. As PROTZE was very much interested to find out from which source the Netherlands Military Attaché in BERLIN received his infm about date

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date and hour of the invasion in the Netherlands, he supposed that KROM would be able to inform him about the Staff of the Military Attaché's Office in BRUSSELS.

105. KROM thereupon supplied subject with the address in the Netherlands of the Military Attaché's secretary. During a visit of subject to this secretary and that the latter was not at all inclined to supply info.
106. Without previous instructions from subject, KROM undertook a burglary into the building of the H.B.S.-school BLEYENBURG at THE HAGUE, in which building Netherlands military records were stored.
107. KROM carried out this burglary, which was repeated several times, together with LEBEDEVIC, who was also put at subject's disposal by HANSEN. The stolen docs were photographed by them and the photocopies passed on to subject.
108. Subject remembers to have received the following docs in this way:
  - Two docs re GS III, from which occurred that this service had the disposal of an amount of glds 36.000.- per annum; together with correspondence with several Ministries showing that increase of this amount would seem desirable.
  - A document with which the transfer to GS IV of officers mentioned by name was ordered.
  - Several reports from the Netherlands' Military Attaché in PARIS, VOORST-EVERING re consults with the Deuxième Bureau about the military situation.
  - Observations made by VOORST-EVERING on the call-up of reserve-troops in France.
  - Report of VOORST-EVERING on the fact that the German Military Attaché in PARIS was NOT invited to attend the manoeuvres.
  - Extensive report of VOORST-EVERING on a meeting he attended of the House of Commons. According to this report the public opinion in France was against making war.
  - Report concerning the number of divs which would be empld by the U.K. on the European continent.
  - A survey of newly formed divisions in the U.K.
  - An extensive report on Japanese policy and the far from bellicose spirit in Japanese Officers'-circles. Only a very small group of young officers wanted war. Prince KONOIE warned seriously against making war.
  - Report on the airplane industry and training of flying-officers in Australia.
  - Report on the Italian foreign minister Count CIANO, who, as opponent of the war, was in touch with Brit circles in RCMB.

Report on the visit of CIANO to Poland. CIANO was celebrated as opponent to the German invasion-war policy and the windows of the German Embassy were smashed.

Reports from Poland after the German invasion.

Report on the Roumenian military attaché in PARIS, who opposed the pro-HITLER attitude of his government.

Report of the Netherlands commissioner in BERLIN re infm received from a Roumenian Nazi about HITLER's war projects against the Netherlands.

British proposal to put the Dutch Airfields at the disposal of the Allies.

Report according to which a British cruiser which was attacked by German planes and reported destroyed, was not hit at all. (The German crew received already decorations!)

109. These docs for the greater part originating from Netherland's Military Attachés were a rich source of infm for PROTZ. They were translated by subject and sent on to the Abwehrant in BERLIN.
110. GIESKES, Referatsleiter III P Ast Niederlande, who was in touch with the U.K. by wireless (Nordpoolspiel), sent rather alarming infm to BERLIN, as if a British invasion on the Netherlands' coast was to be expected any moment. In accordance herewith subject received orders from BERLIN to move more Eastward. Early December 1942 subject moved to BILT-HOVEN, where he took up residence at the address: 99, Las-suslaan.
111. In February 1943 J.H. VIETOR, also empld at the Documentation Service, was put at his disposal by HAMER. VIETOR also took an active part in the above burglaries and embezzlement of docs.
112. HAMER was aware of all these manipulations. All the reports which his subordinates handed to PROTZ were first submitted to him for his approval.
113. In March 1943 the Jew Jacob Lion MENDELS, who together with his parents was in hiding with a district commander of the resistance in THE HAGUE, was arrested by VIETOR. Reason for this arrest was a tip received by an anonymous letter.
114. MENDELS, who feared the worst for his parents, offered his services and was used under supervision of VIETOR for counter-espionage work under the alias BRUKELAAR.
115. Through his relations with the resistance movement he was able to penetrate this movement. In that way he came in touch with PATER TEN BERGE at NIJMEGEN, who worked for Allied Intelligence. From this circle MENDELS reported many names. This was also the case with the fathers VROOM in AMSTERDAM and GRONINGEN. Also the Oxford-group at ARNHEM, which entertained relations with British Intelligence, was

was penetrated by MENDELS on behalf of subject. He especially succeeded in penetrating the communist resistance movement in AMSTERDAM.

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115. In this way MENDELS became acquainted with a certain POOTERS and was able to be taken into his confidence. Subject is sure that POOTERS was the leader of Russian Military espionage in the Netherlands. He was in possession of W.T.'s and passed on info to the U.K., without knowledge of subject POOTERS was arrested by the SD and sentenced to death. His execution came to the attention of subject from the newspapers. According to info given to subject, POOTERS should have stated during interrogation that Germany would lose this war but, would obtain the victory over the Western capitalist powers together with Russia.

117. POOTERS lived in concubinate with a woman who kept the bookstore L.I.N.S.A. in AMSTERDAM. All info for POOTERS reached him via this bookstore. Subject is convinced of the fact that the group POOTERS is still active at present for Russian Intelligence.

118. In May 1943 HAMER put PEGELS in charge of LEEMHUIS, VICTOR and KROM, owing to difficulties which had arisen among these three. The reports containing results of investigation made by LEEMHUIS, VICTOR and KROM were sent to subject via PEGELS. The latter too, however, kept close contact with HAMER to whom he submitted all reports before sending them on to prisoner.

119. PEGELS also acted as paymaster to LEEMHUIS, VICTOR and KROM as prisoner preferred to avoid personal contact as much as possible. Soon after accepting his new appointment PEGELS introduced LEEMHUIS to PROTZE. Before LEEMHUIS never entertained direct relations with subject.

120. During the summer of 1943 PISK was introduced to subject by HAMER. PISK who returned from France and intended to leave for that country again in order to take up the position of Netherlands consul, was refused permission to leave the country by the "Ausreisestelle" as Capt WILHELMUS-HAVEN suspected him of espionage. Prisoner gave any instruction to PISK and states never to have intended to do so either.

121. HAMER introduced PROTZE also to Mrs PEEKEMA with whom HAMER entertained intimate relations, which was stopped by SCHREIBER. Mrs PEEKEMA indeed subject that she worked for Capt BRUSSELS in Spain. According to her statements she was acquainted with an American Military Attaché and was able to supply her boss in BRUSSELS with the plans for an American invasion with exact statement of the date. Prisoner never again met Mrs PEEKEMA.

121a. Afterwards, having reported this case to BERLIN, subject received orders by phone to change this case immediately into a "Geheime Kommandosache" and NOT to drop the matter from then on. Subject concluded from this that Mrs PERKEMA was indeed an important agent. Some time afterwards he was infmd that Mrs PERKEMA was empld by KRATZER, Leiter I BRUSSELS. She addressed her infm to her daughter in THE HAGUE, who prob passed it on to Sonderführer GRONE or anyway to Ast Niederlande, who in turn passed it to BRUSSELS.

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122. LEEHUIS, who through his relations with the resistance became acquainted with a certain Wouter BRAVE in THE HAGUE, was given the opportunity to send so-called "Spielematerial" (forged info) to England via a short-wave W/T. This "Spielematerial" was supplied by GIESKES, but with a view to the very antiquated particulars it contained, was NOT very suitable for the purpose.
123. This contact, however, which showed promises of important results, was broken through the arrest of Wouter BRAVE by SCHREIBER.
124. BRAVE cooperated with a certain GHEEL GILDEMEESTER. Subject's attention was drawn to this man alternatively by RAMER and PEGELS. GHEELGILDEMEESTER visited both a/m persons and tried to pump them. When subject made inquiries after this man with subject, he was infmd that GHEELGILDEMEESTER was already empd as agent by SCHREIBER at the time he was stationed in INSBRUCK. Therefore prisoner supposes that the arrest of BRAVE was due to GHEEL GILDEMEESTER's activities.
125. Afterwards, however, LEEHUIS contacted a certain <sup>PUNT</sup> in AMSTERDAM. PUNT apprd to be in possession of the exact plans of "Radarstellung HASB" which he wanted to pass on to the U.K. These plans apparently originated from a certain VOORTHUIZEN, who was empd at the construction of the airfield DEN DOLDER and who was also in possession of plans of same intended for transmission to the U.K.
126. As VOORTHUIZEN was just then unemployed ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ subject gave him a monthly support of Dglds 100.-, which support was supposed to originate from the resistance movement.
127. Because of the fact that LEEHUIS was able to obtain the confidence of VOORTHUIZEN, he succeeded in getting in touch with a surgeon of ROTTERDAM, who infmd him of the route to be followed by PUNT for his intended journey to the U.K.
128. All these relations were carefully maintained on orders from subject. When however, LEEHUIS was seen by VOORTHUIZEN in the company of a Dutch policeman, VOORTHUIZEN had to be arrested in order to withdraw him from his resistance relations, so that the game would NOT be spoiled.
129. In September 1943 VICTOR, who worked already for apprx 6 months for subject under supervision of PEGELS was introduced to him.
130. Prisoner then decided to have LEEHUIS under the alias of BEEKHUIS and VICTOR under the alias of VAN DRUNEN, leave the Netherlands together with a group of resistance members, amongst whom PUNT, in order to become acquainted with the escape-route.



131. Whereas LEBMUIS made the trip to PARIS on his own account, in order to liaise with the Abwehrstelle and make preparations for the arrival of the group, VICTOR travelled to BRUSSELS in their company.
132. During the trip and in BRUSSELS VICTOR obtained many connections with the Belgian Maquis in the Ardennes. Some days afterwards the group proceeded via REANDEIN and met LEBMUIS in a PARIS hotel according to plan. LEBMUIS pretended to proceed to Spain on his own but in fact returned to the Netherlands.
133. VICTOR was to proceed to Spain together with the group, to which a number of persons had been added meanwhile, who awaited their arrival in the PARIS-hotel. However, he did not go any farther than St JEAN de LUZ and returned from there to the Netherlands. FUNT did NOT succeed to cross the Spanish border, but was arrested by a German patrol. According to subject, this was NOT due to a denunciation from VICTOR.
134. Amongst the contacts of KROM was a certain BOLLAND. BOLLAND worked during some months for prisoner, but soon he was dismissed as an agent, with a view to the fact that he worked mainly for SD IV B 4 (Judenreferat), which did not stroke with subject's convictions. KROM too worked for this department of the SD in which capacity he extorted money from Jews to the prisoner's great indignation.
135. KROM also maintained relations with a Jewish family at THE HAGUE. From this source prisoner learned the names of messengers for the Allied Intelligence to FRANCE and SWITZERLAND. As subject was always somewhat suspicious of info received from KROM, he first inquired after those persons in BERLIN and PARIS. When news was received from PARIS that the names given were partly known and this case of interest to them, it apprd that the Jewish family from THE HAGUE had left without leaving any trace.
136. When in the midst of September 1943 RAUTER dismissed HAMER as police-president, subject contacted his successor CLASIE. CLASIE continued HAMER's agreement with PROTZE and visited him in his BILTHOVEN-home. From then on the reports intended to subject were submitted for approval to CLASIE by PEGELS.
137. In the autumn of 1943 prisoner was ordered by BERLIN to dismiss all Jewish agents and that moreover the use of Jewish agents for espionage and counter-espionage services was henceforth prohibited. This caused subject to transfer MENDELS, who in fact was a prisoner to the SD. Upon recommendation of subject MENDELS was transported to THERESIEN-STADT.

131. Whereas LEDERHUIS made the trip to PARIS on his own account, in order to liaise with the Abwehrstelle and make preparations for the arrival of the group, VIETOR travelled to BRUSSELS in their company.
132. During the trip and in BRUSSELS VIETOR obtained many connections with the Belgian Maquis in the Ardennes. Some days afterwards the group proceeded via BLANDEIN and met LEDERHUIS in a PARIS hotel according to plan. LEDERHUIS pretended to proceed to Spain on his own but in fact returned to the Netherlands.
133. VIETOR was to proceed to Spain together with the group, to which a number of persons had been added meanwhile, who awaited their arrival in the PARIS-hotel. However, he did not go any farther than St JEAN de LUZ and returned from there to the Netherlands. JUNIP did NOT succeed to cross the Spanish border, but was arrested by a German patrol. According to subject, this was NOT due to a denunciation from VIETOR.
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136. When in the midst of September 1943 RAUTER dismissed HAMER as police-president, subject contacted his successor CLASIE. CLASIE continued HAMER's agreement with PROTZE and visited him in his BILTHOVEN-home. From then on the reports intended to subject were submitted for approval to CLASIE by FEGELS.
137. In the autumn of 1943 prisoner was ordered by BERLIN to dismiss all Jewish agents and that moreover the use of Jewish agents for espionage and counter-espionage services was henceforth prohibited. This caused subject to transfer MENDELS, who in fact was a prisoner to the SD. Upon recommendation of subject MENDELS was transported to THERESIEN-STEADT.

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132. During the trip and in BRUSSELS VICTOR obtained many connections with the Belgian Maquis in the Ardennes. Some days afterwards the group proceeded via BIANDEIN and met LEMERTUIS in a PARIS hotel according to plan. LEMERTUIS pretended to proceed to Spain on his own but in fact returned to the Netherlands.
133. VICTOR was to proceed to Spain together with the group, to which a number of persons had been added meanwhile, who awaited their arrival in the PARIS-hotel. However, he did not go any farther than St JEAN de LUZ and returned from there to the Netherlands. FURT did NOT succeed to cross the Spanish border, but was arrested by a German patrol. According to subject, this was NOT due to a denunciation from VICTOR.
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138. From info gathered by VIETOR during his stay in BRUSSELS, it was learned that there was a possibility of a direct route to the U.K. by air from LILLE. Early December 1943 subject therefore, ordered VIETOR to investigate this possibility.
139. In BRUSSELS VIETOR was acquainted with MARIE FLORINS, a young female member of the Brigade Blanche. VIETOR fell in love with her and when she was arrested upon denunciation of a Brussels SD agent, he so emphatically claimed her release that the SD BRUSSELS complained about this fact to subject. The only result prisoner obtained in this case was an extremely high amount for expenses made by VIETOR. Thereafter he interdicted VIETOR to cross the Belgian territory ever again, threatening with an arrest.
140. Oberst BECKER, "Kommandeur des Wehrmacht Streifendienstes" with whom prisoner was on friendly terms, put the Uffz LANGE and Zugwachmeister NOLTEN at his disposal.
141. In MAASTRICHT NOLTEN got in touch with MARSMAN who recruited workmen for the firm WIJNBORGEN at AMSTERDAM to be employed at the "Atlanticwall". Soon NOLTEN discovered that MARSMAN received blank forms from the German Authorities on which he only had to fill in the names of the workmen who then could cross the border without difficulty.
142. MARSMAN forged these forms and in this way was able to smuggle several people across the border against payment. MARSMAN's income from these activities amounted to approx. fl. 3000.- a month. Early 1944 MARSMAN was arrested, but as he offered to work for subject, was placed under the supervision of VIETOR.
143. As traffic was very limited in BILTHOVEN and Military Authorities on high level intimated the intention of a general evacuation of the town, prisoner decided to take up residence in NIJMEGEN, BERG EN DAL, where he was able to move into the villa "Aloha".
144. From a tactical point of view this was a big mistake as BERG EN DAL was NOT situated in the centre but in the outskirts of the area in which prisoner's relations resided. The frequency of his agents' reports was affected very much hereby.
145. Through HOOGEVEEN subject came in touch with a former officer of the Netherlands East Indian Army, living in THE HAGUE, in a side street of the Benoordenhoutscheweg. Subject does NOT remember the name of this person at present. The person in question, member of the NSB, was a personal friend of General VAN TRICHT, the Netherlands Military Attaché in SWITZERLAND. Subject visited this man in THE HAGUE with a view to penetration of Allied Intelligence in Switzerland via General VAN TRICHT. Abwehrant BERLIN agreed to the plan but the Swiss Government refused the issue of a visa.

146. A second meeting with the above officer took place in the Restaurant HANER at BERG EN DAL, during which this man proposed to be sent on a duty-trip to a German office in SWITZERLAND. Once there he would take up contact with VAN TRIJCHT and await further developments. This proposal was quite ridiculous as VAN TRIJCHT would at once become suspicious of a Netherlander, turning up in Switzerland unexpectedly, who moreover had contact with a German office.
147. MARSMAN was ordered by VICTOR to penetrate the resistance movement and thus contacted the K.P.-movement in THE HAGUE. He informed on this group and passed on names of members. When this K.P.-group, however, was known to prepare an assault against PEGEIS, arrests had to be made. Without subject's knowledge MARSMAN took part in the actions taken by the SD. The part the latter played in this case was consequently discovered by the K.P., resulting in the murder of MARSMAN by unknown authors.
148. In September 1944 subject accepted Major von FELDMANN's offer to join his unit, FAK 306, VON FELDMANN, a pupil of PROTZE, just then arrived from NIJMEGEN from France but intended to establish his HQ somewhere else. The departure from NIJMEGEN was hastened by the news that Allied tank formations had forced their way to BRBDA. VON FELDMANN moved to DE LUTTE, where FAK 306 was provisionally billeted, whereas prisoner took up residence in a hotel at OLDEENZAAL.
149. PROTZE expected to be called back to Germany any moment. The unsurveyable situation, which resulted from the reorganisation of the Abwehr, became more and more mixed up. The Southern front remained quiet, however, as the inundations interfered with the advance of MONTGOMERY's armies. Then VON FELDMANN transferred his unit to BOEKWEL where they stayed in billets till the end of October. PROTZE too went to stay with them.
150. During a visit of Egels to subject in BOEKWEL, PEGEIS recommended the police-commissioner BEHENDS of ENSCHDE as willing to give every possible help and assistance.
151. At the end of October 1944 FAK 306 moved to "Holterhof" at GLANERBUIG near ENSCHDE. Since then Uffz LANGE at UTRECHT acted as liaison for subject.
152. Since a long time LEEMHUIS worked together with an agent called WIELAARD. This man offered to cross the lines, which offer was transmitted by LEEMHUIS to subject, who accepted the proposal and put the necessary amount of Dglds 1500.- at his disposal.
153. In the evening of 12 Dec 44 Eplm MULLER/NEDELBROCK 2nd Lt of Heeresgruppe H, arrived at HOLTERHOF. That day the last

- last German offensive started. In accordance herewith  
KUNNING-BROCK transmitted the order, that all units,  
"Sonderstelle P" included, had to gather military intelli-  
gence, especially infm re strength of Allied Armies and  
troopmovements.
154. Subject then approached BERENDS, police-commissioner at  
ENSCHEDE, with the request to introduce to him persons  
willing to cross the lines to gather infm.
  155. BERENDS offered to go personally if prisoner would supply  
him with a certificate, which permitted him to fetch for  
a relative cattle, which stood in the neighbourhood of the  
frontlines. Subject did NOT accept the offer. Next day  
BERENDS sent two policemen of his station, who were willing  
to make the trip but missed all qualities necessary for  
such an enterprise. Subject sent those people back.
  156. After this incident prisoner expected NOT to hear anymore  
from BERENDS, but three days later BERENDS infm'd him by  
phone that he had discovered two suitable people for the  
target aimed at. These persons were already on their way  
to his house.
  157. These persons apprd to be SASSEN, the burgomaster of OUDEN-  
RHEIJN and STARKENBURG, burgomaster of WADDINKVEEN, who both  
proved to be fascist Nazis. They were prepared to accept  
the order to penetrate Allied Intelligence, the passing  
back of "Spielmaterial" and the collecting of infm on  
Allied troops. From the conversation it was to be concluded  
that they were previously infmd about the intended mission  
by BERENDS.
  158. SASSEN received the alias OUDENRHEIJN and STARKENBURG the  
alias WADDINKVEEN. On his request SASSEN received an amount  
of Dglds 2500.- for the purchase of a car. SASSEN was taken  
on as paid agent, this in contradiction to STARKENBURG alias  
WADDINKVEEN.
  159. STARKENBURG alias WADDINKVEEN hardly ever worked for subject  
as his activities for the Ortskommandantur at WADDINKVEEN  
did NOT leave him enough spare time to work for prisoner.
  160. Upon SASSEN's request prisoner had a certain WAGEMANS  
released from the Labour service. According to SASSEN, WAGE-  
MANS was very suitable and willing to cooperate. In the be-  
ginning WAGEMANS accepted the proposals of subject. He was  
already on his way, when all at once he changed his mind and  
refused further cooperation. Subject's contact with WAGEMANS  
did only last one week.
  161. SASSEN, STARKENBURG and WAGEMANS had instructions to report  
the results of their work to Uffz LANGE in UTRECHT, of whom  
they also received further directions.

162. End Dec 44 subject got in touch with BREEDVELD through Uffa LANGE. This man was introduced to LANGE by the former alderman QUERUS at UTRECHT. Subject received from BREEDVELD a report on his observations during a bicycle trip through BRABANT.
163. After all prisoner doubts very much whether the trip of which BREEDVELD had drawn a map, was in fact made. BREEDVELD was pointed out to him by the "Bevollmachtigter des Reichskommissars" at UTRECHT as a cheat, who when still a teacher, forgot himself on a pupil, for which he was dismissed.
164. KIEVIET alias VOGLI was also introduced to Uffa LANGE by QUERUS. Through this man prisoner received infm on the resistance movement and the dropping of arms in OUDSWATER, where already several razzias had taken place before subject received any particulars. KIEVIET was ordered to penetrate escape-lines, but this instruction was NOT carried out.
165. Early January 1945 WIEELAARD (para 150) who meanwhile returned from his mission, submitted a report via BEEMHUIS. It apprd that in BRUGDA and TILBURG he had contacted Netherlands Officers and in that way was able to gather important infm. The report showed that it was NOT MONTGOMERY's intention to lance an offensive across the rivers, but that the troopmovements in Eastern direction permitted to draw the conclusion that mil ops were to be expected in other areas.
166. WIEELAARD's infm re the military situation on the front, were passed on to the C.O. of "Meerogruppe K" and soon afterwards troops were withdrawn from the area Rhine, Meuse and Waal.
167. WIEELAARD indicated exactly the route he followed on his trip. This route led through the BIESBOSCH and was used as escape-line by the resistance movement. He also reported the names of everybody who assisted at the crossing. Subject passed the particulars concerning this line to VON FEILDMANN, which might prove useful for the sluicing of agents.
168. The second trip of WIEELAARD was postponed as his wife was going to give birth to a child and WIEELAARD wished to stay at home for some time. However, he received an amount of Dglds 1000.-, but owing to subject's departure for Germany, he never was infmd whether this second trip ever was undertaken.
169. From BREEDVELD, who went to Friesland, prisoner received a useless report re the resistance movement in the neighbourhood of SMOOKA and BOLSWARD. This orgn of about 10.000 members was said to be charged with the security

security of the Ysselmeer. He mentioned the names of the leaders and infed on weapon dumps, ammunition, motorcars, etc. Soon afterwards (Jan 45) prisoner discovered that BREEDVELD, who frequented a girl, suspected of being member of the Communist party, was arrested by the SD at UTRECHT. It was also discovered that he illegally drew electric currents.

170. At a birthday-party in the house of Staf ERWIN KNOP at ENSCHDE, subject met a.o. Mrs VAN POSTVOORDE. Later on he was infed that this woman acted as agent to SCHREIBER. When the latter did NOT wish to make use of her services any longer, he gave her a last pay amounting to Dgldr. 5.000.--. Then Mrs VAN POSTVOORDE got in touch with VON FELDMANN, but prisoner does NOT know whether she has been empld as an agent with VON FELDMANN.
171. Prisoner received SASSEN's infm, which was partly good, via Uffe LANGE. SASSEN reported the location of MONTGOMERY's HQ and infed re amphibian tanks. He also reported on try movements and concentrations in the neighbourhood of HEINSBERG. From these reports could be concluded that an offensive in the sector of HEINSBERG was to be expected. PROEZE supposes that SASSEN received the infm from line-crossers, but prob chiefly from his son Alphons SASSEN.
172. SASSEN Sr assisted a certain SMIT, supposedly a priest, to cross the lines. This man never returned. Prisoner received from SASSEN Sr reports on the defence of GEENTRUINDENBERG, by way of inundation, and directions for the piercing of the dykes, by which means an Allied advance could be prevented. This infm, however, was drawn from historical books on strategics.
173. <sup>From</sup> The Oberbefehlshaber West originated an order to distribute misleading infm on the strength of the German Army. Such infm was supplied by Heeresgruppe H and passed by prisoner to his agents.
174. Subject supposes that STAKENBORG handed this infm to a Father, who was in contact with BREDA. BREEDVELD's infm was passed on to the other side of the frontlines by way of a communist resistance movement. SASSEN and his son too were active in this field.
175. Alphons SASSEN was a member of SS Standarte KURT EGGERS. In his rank of SS-Kriegsberichter he was certainly in a position to supply his father with some interesting news. The infm was obtained by Alphons SASSEN from other members of the Standarte KURT EGGERS, who were sent across the lines. To subject's knowledge ALPHONS SASSEN never crossed the lines personally.



176. Early March 45 ALPHONS SASSEN was also recruited as agent upon instigation of SASSEN Sr. ALPHONS SASSEN apprd to be a very well-educated person who had many contacts in the resistance movements. Notwithstanding his youth he had a clear insight of the situation and was able to support his assertions with maps. He proposed to establish a trg-school for agents, but PROTZ was of opinion that it was already too late.
177. As HOLZEM (para 138) fell ill meanwhile, he was replaced by Uffz BRAUCH, also of the Wehrmacht Streifendienst. BRAUCH introduced subject to the son of a Jesuit-manufacturer of ALMBLO, who was empld as cardriver at a field-hospital there.
178. This man formerly was empld with the SD. He contacted the Wehrmacht Streifendienst to report on the presence in a certain farmhouse of a Brit Int officer and of several other persons who cooperated with him. He also mentioned names and addresses of leading personalities from the resistance movement.
179. During a meeting at Hotel "DE GRAPP" ENSCHEDE, between subject and the above mentioned person from ALMBLO, the latter requested him not to effect arrests as he then feared for his life. Subject claims to have kept his promise, also when afterwards infm reached him about distribution of uniforms and food to the resistance.
180. Subject's opinion was that at that time it was useless to arrest a Brit Officer and assistants as they would only be able to report on the complete crash of the German Army. This fact could NOT be prevented by effecting an arrest. The same applied to the large number of persons whose names and addresses had been reported as of resistance members.
181. The contact with this V-man at ALMBLO was maintained by an unknown messenger who delivered the reports to Uffz BRAUCH, via whom they were submitted to subject. The man from ALMBLO did NOT want to be paid for his services.
182. Kapt Lt Dr MEYER of Aussenstelle HENGLO infmd subject that by illegal W/T the infm was passed to U.K. that "ROLDANHOFF" had to be turned into a target for Allied bombardments. MEYER offered to let subject stay with him, which prisoner accepted. The 28th March 1945 he moved to HENGLO. With a view to the military situation it became necessary to retreat to Germany. Subject and HEBIENS SKRODZKI left the Netherlands on 31 March 1945.

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CONCLUSION:

PROZEL promised complete cooperation at the start of the interrogation, which promise he kept. His statements defer on minor points only with those made by his secretary Helene SKRODZKI.

Notwithstanding this fact, it is quite probable that certain persons with whom in the course of their long career they maintained friendly relations, were NOT mentioned as agents but as mere friends.

As PROZEL and HELENE SKRODZKI had time enough to agree on these points beforehand, it will prove rather difficult to break them in this respect.

RECOMMENDATION:

As the time of interrogation was very limited, this report should be considered as a base for further interrogations. We therefore emphatically advise to further the retransfer of PROZEL to the Netherlands as soon as possible.

The interrogators:

(sgd) H.P. DRELMAN, Chief Inspector of Police.

(sgd) W. CH. D. HOOGENDIJK, Chief Case-Work Dept.

JAB/HH.

TRANSLATED EXTRACTS from  
REPORT "HOMEBODIES"

The establishment of a V.O. in Sweden was found desirable. The Swedish authorities had certainly no objection to this plan, at any rate not from their military side. For a considerable time a Swedish officer in Berlin was kept conversant with the workings of the German C.E., so that it can be assumed that the Swedish C.E. was organized on the German model.

The German military and naval commands were perforce interested in the absolute security of the Baltic basin. Therefore, the traffic of enemy agents to and from Germany had to be kept under observation.

The Abwehr knew for certain that in the Russian Embassy in Stockholm, Comrade KOLANTZ (pseudonym), there was a Russian espionage headquarters against which precautionary measures had to be taken from the German side. So action was taken against this headquarters with repeated success. Before the war there were six leading persons active there. The most important was a Russian who in conversation displayed an extraordinary knowledge of armaments industries throughout the Continent. This man firmly believed that a Russian general was in the pay of the German secret service. In actual fact for some time Russians employed by the Abwehr sent in reports which suggested that their source was a high Russian military personality.

But the Russian intelligence service in Sweden was also a danger for Germany because German deserters, escaping from Norway to Sweden, were certainly contacted by the Russian Intelligence, questioned and recruited.

\* Believed to be Vladimir Kollontay, Russian  
Ambassador.

MANIPULATED CONTRACTS

PROVER "HAMBURG"

Copies in # 48890, Y Box 332, Hootch

# 48895, Y Box 6217, van Tolville, KUTNIK.

In the German Abwehrdienst an organization was created with the description "Counter-Espionage". Under the heading of Counter-Espionage the following must be understood: the misleading of one's opponent with information in which he has expressed an interest. In this connection the questionnaires which the enemy's general staff gave their agents were learned from trials of various German agents, in which these agents described their missions.

In Germany it gradually became clear that the Wehrmacht was being spied upon by agents of practically all countries. The springboard for the whole Intelligence Service of our opponent was the Netherlands. This had already been the case in the first World War, and it continued in the interim from 1918 onwards until the invasion of the Low Countries by German troops.

It must be mentioned here that the Netherlands Intelligence Service never employed agents collecting information for their Government.

Of particular importance and intensity was the work of the English Intelligence Service in The Hague, its headquarters being at the Passport Control Office. The following were known as heads of the office:

Dalton.  
Chilton.  
Stevens.

A special outpost of the English Intelligence Service in The Hague was WRIJZEN who lately lived in Rotterdam.

When the danger of WRIJZEN was recognized as becoming more and more threatening to the German Intelligence Service, the order was given to proceed with all means against WRIJZEN, to supply him with misleading, forged and falsified material, and thus bring WRIJZEN's sub-agents to light so that action could be taken against them should they ever cross the German frontier.

The order for this action was given to the following Abwehrstellen:

- 1) Abwehr Abteilung IIIIF
- 2) Abwehrstelle Munster IIIIF
- 3) Abwehrstelle Hamburg IIIIF
- 4) Abwehrstelle Wilhelmshaven IIIIF.

Thus work against the Netherlands was directed from these Stellen, but other Abwehrstelle also were active in penetrating the area of the Netherlands, but under the condition that they had to report all their contacts to the Abwehr, which for its part passed the information on to the Stellen listed under 1 to 4 above. Thus was assured a closely knit plan of campaign, conducted by the Central Stelle, and this led finally to very considerable successes.

In the offensive against WRIJZEN it was naturally impossible to avoid also conducting an offensive against the Passport Control Office itself. In fact a German V-Mann named Friedrich Jansen (living until recently in Hamburg as Strohdach) insinuated himself with great success into STEVENS's office.

The success of this work was thanks to the P.C.O. employee HOOPER who turned traitor to the English Intelligence Service, and in particular to his own office, namely the P.C.O. in The Hague. HOOPER had met representatives of A-2 Hamburg in South Germany there, in return for payment, he handed over files which he had removed from the P.C.O. These files contained agents' reports and accounts of the payment of these agents. The papers composed a fairly large volume. They bore pencil notes representing the assessment of the chief official of the P.C.O. Apart from these papers HOOPER delivered during his period of activity other reports which I personally can no longer remember; I would not like to put anything incorrect into this report.

A further role was played by TAYLOR. TAYLOR and HOOPER belong together. HOOPER was also in Berlin, but I am not sure whether he was at that time in the company of TAYLOR. However, a further meeting took place in Switzerland

whose representatives of the Abwehr met both KOPFER and TAYLOR. The information which was supplied at this meeting was well paid for by the Germans. However, it should be remarked here that the money originated from the English Intelligence Service, for the English Service paid very highly for the reports brought by GUNTER. That as a result Ast Hansen always had a balance in hand, from which GUNTER received his own high wages.

Further, a man named <sup>PP 437</sup> Gordon PERRY was recruited. He must have occupied a peculiar position in Passport Control Office. He had a psychological weakness which was exploited. PERRY worked for us so long as was possible. Through some accident which we have never discovered to this day, he was snooked by the P.C.O. After that he spent a great deal of his time in the Horse Bar in The Hague and here he was one day picked up by members of the P.C.O. This accident was a signal to the Abwehr to infiltrate PERRY to Germany. In view of his intimate knowledge of past events, he was then employed in the German Foreign Office.

Now for VRIJNEN. VRIJNEN was the most unfortunate man whom P.C.O. ever employed. As is known, he was a former Dutch Customs official who was dismissed from this work for some reason or other. However, even during the first World War he was employed on some sort of Counter-Espionage job by the Government and in this capacity had an extensive knowledge of people engaged in espionage at the time.

VRIJNEN possessed two thick volumes in which were recorded the espionage agents of all countries, including Germany, England, Russia, Italy, France, as well as the agents of lesser countries. Whether VRIJNEN ever misused his knowledge of these names was never discovered. At the time in question he was collaborating with one ZAU who is still living in Rotterdam and who might be described as the foster-father of KOUTRIK. KOUTRIK's mother lived with ZAU, at any rate that was the case until <sup>PP 60328</sup> about two years ago.

Through ZAU, KOUTRIK came into contact with VRIJNEN.

KOUTRIK was used by VRIJNEN rather as a scout or investigator. Like VRIJNEN, he lived in Rotterdam and he had a German wife. KOUTRIK was at home in all the dives on the Schiedamschedijk, was fond of women, and spent an amount of money that was far in excess of the payment which he received from VRIJNEN.

<sup>PP 4319</sup> In Wassenaar, at Bloemkruislaan 36, lived an ostensible Canadian named ROBERTS. ROBERTS had in fact come from Canada, possessed a Canadian passport and was registered at the Aliens Office in Wassenaar. According to his own account, ROBERTS possessed a large fortune and to all outward appearances he created the impression of a very rich man. ROBERTS was very garrulous, spoke perfect German, and had a woman with him who came from Berlin; and it was through his garrulosity and ostentation that he originally attracted attention. VRIJNEN, who had his contacts everywhere, smelt a German agent in ROBERTS and entrusted KOUTRIK with keeping ROBERTS and his activities under constant observation. The afore-going took place in about October 1938.

At this time KOUTRIK appeared, in an absolutely provocative manner, perpetually in front of ROBERTS' house or in the immediate neighbourhood of the house. It was obvious that observation was taking place, and it was also clear that this observation was not being carried out by representatives of the Dutch police as it was done in such an inept, childish and challenging manner.

It was therefore, decided to confront the watcher and to ask him <sup>PP 26120</sup> what he was doing. For this purpose the former Dutch police official ~~Class HOOGVEEN~~ was brought in, who at that time was living in The Hague at Laan van Mieuw Cost Inde.

On being questioned, KOUTRIK immediately explained and without hesitation volunteered that he had been employed to watch ROBERTS by SWART (SWART was VRIJNEN) whom HOOGVEEN already knew. However, he, KOUTRIK, would not carry out this observation if he were paid a sufficient sum of money. HOOGVEEN then bargained for a while with KOUTRIK in the street, and himself became rather suspicious of KOUTRIK. KOUTRIK immediately offered HOOGVEEN his services for the Germans, already knowing from VRIJNEN that HOOGVEEN was in German employ.

Next HOOGVEEN was directed to ask KOUTRIK to supply reports, telling him

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that he would be remunerated according to the value of these reports. The first rendezvous took place in a little cafe on the viaduct in The Hague at the Wassenaar Dock. The success of this was quite staggering. It was quite clear that the Abwehrdienst has never before been so well supplied with names of a foreign intelligence service as through KOUTRIK. The following is a resume of the most important cases:

T 47298

1) The German Intelligence Service had been approached by an English Artillery officer named Burton KELLY who had delivered most valuable material on English armaments and on the subject of English arsenals. The rendezvous in this case was Holland, where KELLY met a representative of the G.I.S. This representative was Dr. LOCH. Later there was a meeting in Berlin where MOOP and KELLY met in the Hotel Stadt Viel in the Mittelstrasse.

In order to reduce the length of the journey and to avoid possible danger through KELLY making many journeys between England and Holland, a cover address was established in Holland. This was a man named BARENBRUCH from Sassenheim. The developments in this case became known to the G.I.S. through KOUTRIK. It appeared that the English Intelligence Service in London had discovered KELLY's activities and was seeking for the people behind them. At the same time BARENBRUCH had become suspicious and had opened a letter which he was supposed to post to London. The text of the letter made it clear that it concerned espionage and he immediately took the letter to the British Consulate. The whole case eventually became known to VRIJTEN and thus through KOUTRIK to the Abwehr.

VRIJTEN, CRONDEL, and WOOMING now considered how they could entice the Abwehr officer concerned into Holland in order to arrest him there (Ant Cologne had meanwhile been established).

T 663, 129

Through the work of KOUTRIK this attempted arrest was rendered unsuccessful but since the English Intelligence Service only used cover names, we never discovered who was behind the whole case.

2) One day, KOUTRIK reported through HOOGEVEEN that a German holding the academic degree of Doctor was working for the British Intelligence Service. This man was said to come at irregular intervals to the Netherlands where he delivered his reports to the P.C.O. KOUTRIK at first said that the man was in direct contact with STEVENS, but this later proved inaccurate for the out-out was HENDRIKS. Whenever this doctor reached Dutch territory he immediately telephoned the P.C.O. and received further instructions. KOUTRIK added to his report that the doctor on his last visit had been in Utrecht and that the conversations had taken place in a hotel. The doctor had handed over his report and had received a new questionnaire which he had studied thoroughly in the hotel. He had then burnt the questionnaire in the lavatory. KOUTRIK was then asked how he knew this, and he explained that he had been entrusted by the British with guarding this man and had naturally followed him also to the lavatory and had smelt the burning paper.

The Abwehr had naturally now to discover the name of this doctor for if a man with a doctor's degree hands over reports to the P.C.O. these reports must have considerable value for the P.C.O.

Berlin then ordered the inquiry to be pursued with all energy in order to discover the name of this man, and KOUTRIK was, therefore, instructed accordingly with the promise that he would be particularly well paid for this work. Thus, one day KOUTRIK reported that this doctor was called KRÜGER and came from Gottesberg on the Rhine. KOUTRIK was not able to find out what KRÜGER's work in Gottesberg was. It must be remarked in passing that formerly Dr. KRÜGER had always travelled via Holland to England and handed over his reports, but after the introduction of visas these journeys were no longer possible and thus he was run by P.C.O. Holland.

The last time Dr. KRÜGER was in Holland the meeting took place in VRIJTEN's house where HENDRIKS was also present. After the meeting KRÜGER travelled by train to the Coornmans Hotel, once more accompanied by KOUTRIK who was responsible for his safety. KOUTRIK was quite sure that he was in the presence of KRÜGER, for he had heard the man ask for a train ticket in German, and when the conductor asked him whether he was a German, he said "yes", he was from Gottesberg and in the iron industry.

But before this meeting KRÜGER had left the train at Amsterdam and at that time was under observation by German policemen from Cologne as well as by

4  
representatives of the Abwehr who had followed him from Germany. In the waiting room of the station at Amsterdam he was observed to be in possession of fifty photographs and he also wrote out a report himself. After that his watchers lost him.

PC 60228  
[KOUTRIK] however, remained the chief witness, and when KROGER was arrested in Germany he had to admit that everything had happened just as KOUTRIK had reported. KROGER later committed suicide. He had, however, already confessed that he had worked for the British Intelligence for twenty-one years.

3) One day, when the war with Poland had already broken out, KOUTRIK had his usual meeting with HOOGEVEEN and reported that the First Secretary of the German Embassy in The Hague was employed by the British Intelligence Service. This report was immediately doubted, as no one could believe that the First Secretary of a German Embassy would engage in espionage. The German Ambassador himself, on being informed, sharply rejected such a suggestion and replied that if there was any espionage going on in the Embassy, this could only be being carried out by some employee. The Ambassador demanded proof of the allegations.

KOUTRIK was then set collecting these proofs. He actually procured proof in two cases. The proof concerned people who had offered their services at the German Embassy for espionage against England. The names of these people were checked with the Embassy and corresponded exactly with particulars given by KOUTRIK, and it emerged that PULLITZ knew these offers of service. VERBEEK had got KOUTRIK to ask one of these people whether he was willing to work against Holland also. The question was answered in the affirmative and the man signed a statement to that effect.

In spite of a specific veto, the German Ambassador confronted PULLITZ with the facts and PULLITZ immediately fled with his servant. The name of PULLITZ was never mentioned by KOUTRIK, perhaps he himself never knew the name.

#### The Venlo Case.

Immediately after the kidnapping of Major STEVENS and BEST, a conversation took place in the headquarters of General von REICHENAU in Dusseldorf. The head of Amt Ausland Abwehr asked where Major STEVENS from The Hague was at the moment. The answer was given that as far as one knew STEVENS was still in The Hague, at any rate this had been the case a few days before. The chief replied that STEVENS could not possibly still be in Holland and immediate investigations were to be made as to what had happened in Holland what the STEVENS case was all about.

Inquiries that were immediately made in Holland revealed that STEVENS and BEST had been pushed into a car at the frontier near Venlo by certain Germans and that they were probably in the custody of the SIPO. Lt. KLOPP, a Dutch officer, had been shot during the incident and was probably dead.

In this case the following was later discovered:

Under the direction of SCHELENBURG of the S.D. feelers were put out to BEST in Holland and BEST was told that there was a group of dissident officers in Germany who wished to overthrow the Government and were seeking the help of the English in this. BEST had believed this and eventually a W/T transmitter was handed over and the group, led by SCHELENBURG, established communication with the Netherlands. SCHELENBURG went several times to Holland and discussed matters with BEST. In fact BEST invited him to stay with him during his visits, but this invitation was refused.

Finally, matters came to a point when this ostensible group of officers were to conduct negotiations in ~~the~~ territory and for these negotiations BEST had to appear personally. BEST had then got into touch with STEVENS who was asked to accompany him. However, since this was a political matter STEVENS hesitated and demanded authorisation from London. He visited the English Ambassador and was told by the latter to take part in the trip.

Someone, however, seemed to have had suspicions and Colonel ROOZBOOM was informed of the matter and delegated Lt. KLOPP and six men to safeguard the meeting.

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The negotiations were to take place in No-Man's-Land between the frontier posts. Near the German frontier post a German car was standing. When STEVENS and BEST arrived Lt. KLOPP had not yet turned up, and so the whole kidnapping of STEVENS and BEST took place so rapidly that KLOPP, arriving later, could no longer interfere, and when he attempted to do so, was shot down.

Subsequently in a concentration camp STEVENS gave all the information that he was asked, and BEST, who had had Mein Kampf pressed into his hand, ~~immediately~~ became enthusiastic and said that if he were released he would work for Germany for he had never read Mein Kampf in this light before. The further fate of these two men is not known to me.



20A

On Her Majesty's Service

PHOTOSTATS OF "WRITE-UPS" BY  
PROTZE

Received from BAOR

*(There is extra information in these write-ups)*

Somit sollen die beiden wichtigsten Abteilungen behandelt werden:

1. Abteilung III Abwehr.
2. Abteilung I, Gehörlicher Meldedienst.

Leiter der Abteilungen zu A. u. B. war immer ein Generalleutnant-Offizier.

- A. Leiter.
- Adjutant.
- Personalreferent.
- Registrator.

hinaus kamen die erforderlichen weiblichen Hilfskräfte für Vorzimmer des Leiters und zur Erledigung der Schreibarbeiten.

#### Gliederung.

1. III H = Heer
2. III N = Marine
3. III L = Luftwaffe
4. III W = Rüstungswirtschaft
5. III O = Bearbeitung der Spionagefälle und Zusammenarbeit mit der Polizei und den Gerichten
6. III F = Gegenspionage
7. III G = Gutachten für die Gerichte
8. III D = Desinformation

Die Abteilung III war der eigentliche Träger des Abwehrdienstes. Im Frieden hatte die Abteilung III nur Aufgaben in Deutschland selbst zu erfüllen, wie es die folgenden Ausführungen erklären werden.

Eine einzige Ausnahme machte die Gruppe III F, "Gegenspionage" die auch bereits im Frieden in das Ausland hinein arbeitete und auch im Ausland im Frieden tätig war. Hierzu werden längere Ausführungen gemacht werden, die um so notwendiger werden, als es sich bei III F um die wichtigste Gruppe der Abteilung II handelt. Zur Erklärung der unartig unter A 1-7 genannten Gruppen und Referate ist auszuführen, dass sich bei jedem Armee-Korps, und zwar beim Sitz des Komps die gleiche Organisation befand, die ganz selbstverständlich dem Amt "Ausl/Abw." unterstand. Alle Stellen waren mit vorgebildeten Kräften besetzt. Hierzu fanden sogenannte "Abwehrlehrgänge" beim Amt "Ausl/Abw." statt, die immer mehrere Tage dauerten. Es wurden Vorträge gehalten über Spionagesetzgebung, Beurteilung von Gutachten, Urteilsbegründungen, Fortschritte in der Bekämpfung der Spionage. Besonders wichtige und interessante Fälle wurden zur Sprache gebracht. Fehler und Mängel in der Organisation besprochen und möglichst sofort abgestellt.

An Hand von Karten und Plänen wurden Statistiken gezeigt, die interessanten Einblick gewährten.

An Hand von Übersichten bekamen die Teilnehmer an den Vorträgen Einblick, welche militärischen und Rüstungstechnischen Fragen den ausländischen Nachrichtendienst und damit den ausländischen Generalstab interessierten.

Ein Fehler lag in folgendem: Die Abwehr-Offiziere waren mit der Zeit überaltert, vielen fehlte der Auftrieb, neue Gedanken um sich heraus zu schaffen. Im Frieden war es verhängt worden junge aktive Offiziere der Nachwecke heranzubilden, sodass man im Kriege auf Reserve-Offiziere zurückgreifen musste, die teilweise versagten.

Viele Offiziere versagten, weil ihnen die wichtigsten Überlagen fehlte. Es musste zu viel geschrieben werden und um die Schreibarbeit bewichtigen zu können musste immer neues Personal als Hilfskräfte eingestellt werden.

#### Organisation in den Referaten A 1-4.

Die Referenten zu A 1-4 bei den Abwehrstellen der Armee-Korps hatten durch die Organisationsbefehle des Amtes Ausl/Abw. den strengen Befehl, alle in ihrem Bereich auftretenden Spionagefälle

oder auch Verdachtsfälle sofort auf dem kürzesten Wege möglichst bei wichtigen Fällen durch Fernschreiber an den Amt Anal/Abw. Abteilung III zu melden. Von hier aus wurden dann, wenn nötig, weitere Verhaltensmaßnahmen befohlen. Beim Amt Anal/Abw. III gingen die Meldungen der Abwehrstellen an den zuständigen Fachreferenten. N. Beispiel: Handelte es sich um einen Spionage- oder Verdachtsfall bei der Luftwaffe, an III 2. war die Marine angegriffen, ging der Vorgang an III 3. Alle beim Amt Anal/Abw. III so eingehenden Vorgänge wurden falls sie eine Bedeutung hatten, beim Chef des Stabes des betreffenden Wehrmachtsteils zum Vortrag gebracht. Die Abwehrstelle des Armeekorps bei der der Fall aufgetreten war, hatte selbstverständlich die Pflicht, ihrerseits dem I 3 des Generalstabes des betreffenden Armeekorps Vortrag zu halten. Die Art dieses Verfahrens hat sich durchaus bewährt, es wurde so verhindert dass übereifrige und ehrsüchtige Offiziere durch vorseitiges und einsichtsloses vorgehen Spuren verschütteten, die später nicht mehr aufzufinden waren.

Festnahmen von Zivilpersonen konnten nur durch die zuständige Polizeistelle erfolgen. Militärpersonen wurden durch militärische Dienststellen festgenommen.

Bei Vernehmungen in Spionagefällen hatte der Fachbearbeiter als u. III H, III M, III L. das Recht an den Vernehmungen teil zu nehmen, ein Recht der Mitvernehmung hatte er nicht, wohl aber war in vielen Fällen von seiten der Polizei eine Teilnahme zur Unterstützung in militärischen Dingen durchaus erwünscht. Dieses Verfahren hat sich durchaus bewährt.

Die Anwesenheit des militärischen Fachbearbeiters bei Vernehmungen gab diesen auch gleichzeitig einen Einblick in die Schwere des Falles, so dass Massnahmen zur Verhütung weiterer Fälle sofort getroffen werden konnten.

#### Aufgaben der III H, III M, III L Innerhalb der Armeekorps

Die Hauptaufgabe der oben genannten Referenten (Offiziere) lag in der ständigen Belehrung der Truppen durch Vorträge über das Wesen der Spionage. Der Soldat wurde belehrt, wie er sich ausserhalb seines Dienstes zu verhalten hat. Ihm wurde klar gemacht, wieder ausländische Agent arbeitet, wie er versucht sich an Soldaten heranzumachen und zwar in Eisenbahnen, in Lokalen, auf Urlaub in der Heimat. Besondere Vorsicht wurde beim Verkehr mit Frauen empfohlen. Gewarnt wurde vor Einladungen Lokalen mit Fremden zu besuchen und vor Alkoholgenuß in grösseren Mengen. Es kam hier immer auf die Gabe des Vortragenden an, dem Soldaten die schwierige Materie näher zu bringen.

Die Vorträge wurden an Hand von Beispielen an Hand von Kartenmaterial u. a. an den Soldaten herangebracht.

Die Vortragende musste sich darüber klar sein, dass durch falsche Art des Vortragens, das Gegenteil erreicht werden konnte. Spionage ist für viele Menschen, die die nüchternen Sachlichkeit dieses Gebietes nicht kennen, immer mit Abenteuern verknüpft, die unerfahrene leichtsinnige Menschen anreizen. Deshalb hat die Vorführung von Filmen in dieser Sache, zwei Seiten. Im Film elegante Frauen und Männer, Luxusflug und Flugzeuge, elegante Lokale und schliesslich Geld verdienen.

Die Wirklichkeit sieht anders aus. Der Verfasser hat den Film als Anschauungsunterricht und Abschreckungsmittel abgelehrt.

Vor Offizieren musste der Unterricht natürlich ein anderer Plattform bekommen. In der Wehrmacht gab er eine Vorschrift, sie hies H, Dm 99 (Heeres Druckschrift 99) diese Vorschrift die des gesamten Geheim Schriftverkehrs im ganzen Reich und auch innerhalb der Behörde selbst. Es waren in diesem Buch Vorschriften über Aufbewahrung der Geheimschrankschlüssel niedergelegt und Bestimmungen über das Aufbewahren der Reserveschlüssel gegeben. Waren darin Bestimmungen enthalten über sichere Aufbewahrung der Geheimbücher. Kein Offizier durfte das Zimmer, auch nur auf kurze Zeit verlassen, ohne dass vorher der Schreibtisch leer gemacht wurde.

Die Durchschlagskarten keine Entwurfe oder gezeichnete Bogen von Durchschlagspapier liegen.

Die Vorschrift bestätigte besonders zugelassene Personen für das Öffnen der Post.  
Die Anzahl der gefertigten Durchschläge von Befehlen und musste registriert werden. Trotz der strengen Vorschrift wurde gegen diese Befehle verfahren.

Die Referenten III M, III N, III L kontrollierten überwachend die Vollständigkeit der Geheim-Bücher und Vorschriften und die Büros. Viele Verstöße wurden immer wieder festgestellt und streng, meist durch die Gerichte, bestraft.

Was den Unterricht für Offiziere anbelangt, so wurde auch diesem, genau wie den Mannschaften die dauernde Gefahr der Spionage vor Augen geführt, wofür wurden sie auf die der Mannschaften hingewiesen.

Der Soldat wurde im Laufe der Zeit dann erzogen, jeden verdachtsfall sofort zu melden. Von dem zuständigen Vorgesetzten wurden diese Meldungen niedergelegt und gingen so an die zuständige Abwehrstelle, die dann alles weitere veranlasste.

Wenn nötig wurde dann von der Abwehrstelle die Polizei unterrichtet (über III C) und es folgte eine eingehende Beobachtung von Personen und Sachen ein.

Die Durchführung dieser Massnahmen hat in sehr vielen Fällen zum Erfolg geführt Soldaten, die so ihre Pflicht getan hatten, konnten mit Beförderung am höchsten Dienstgrad rechnen, oder sie bekamen sonstige Anerkennungen.

Oft ergaben die Beobachtungen Leichtigkeit, Laßtun, oder Unaufmerksamkeit, dann konnte aber immerhin Abhilfe geschaffen werden.

Alle Fälle, die in irgend einer Form bei den Abwehrstellen eingingen, ganz gleich ob vollendeter, geplanter, oder leichtfertiger Landesverrat vorlag, oder ob er sich um ein vielleicht entschuldbares Versehen handelte gelangten unter genannter Darstellung des Falles und wenn Aktenmaterial vorlag unter Beifügung des Aktenmaterials an das Amt Ausl/Abw Abt III.

Die zuständigen Referenten bearbeiteten jeden einzelnen Fall eingehend.

Fälle ausländischer Agenten oder bereits vorliegende Fälle vollendeten Landesverrats vorz wurden alle Abwehrstellen durch Runddruck in Kenntnis gesetzt, um ihrerseits ihre Abwehrmassnahmen zu überprüfen.

Alle Fragen die ausländische Agenten an Deutsche gestellt hatten interessierten:

a) Den Generalstab des Heeres, Abteilung fremde Heere, der aus der Fragestellung Schlüsse über die Absichten anderer Staaten zog. Ebenso interessierten bestimmte Fragen auch die Operationsabteilung des Generalstabes.

b) Abteilung III F. für das Ansetzen von Agenten der Gegenespionage.

In den meisten Fällen konnte bei versuchten, oder vollendetem Verrat, durch die polizeiliche, oder gerichtliche Voruntersuchung Klarheit über den Auftraggeber einer fremden Mächte geschaffen werden. Es würden so Anschriften führender Agenten ausländischer Staaten bekannt. Diese Kenntnisse wurden von III F ausgenutzt. Über III F wird später in diesem Bericht noch berichtet werden.

Alle Referenten bei den Abwehrstellen der Armee Korps hatten täglich dem Leiter der Stelle Tagesmeldungen einsureichen, aus denen am Monatsende der Monatsbericht zusammengestellt wurde. Die Monatsberichte waren zu einem bestimmten Termin dem Amt Ausl/Abw. vorzuliegen.

Im Kriege wurde ausserdem das "Kriegstagebuch" geführt.

Aus den Monatsberichten und aus allen Vorkommnissen beim Amt Ausl/Abw. wurde der Jahresbericht zusammengestellt, an dem alle Gruppen und Referate der Abteilung III arbeiteten. Der Monatsbericht ging allen Abwehrstellen in Reichweite zu, ausserdem wurde er den verschiedensten Reichsstellen zugeleitet.

Den Bericht enthielt wertvolle Statistiken, die Abwehrstellen wurden so über die umfangreiche Materie genauestens unterrichtet. Fehler wurden rückichtslos aufgedeckt. Andererseits waren alle Leistungen ersichtlich, es war festzustellen, welche ausländische

Stellen ihre Agenten auf Reichsgebiet eingesetzt hatten, welche Landesteile Angriffen am meisten ausgesetzt waren.

Der Wert der Fahrerberichte, soll und darf nicht verkannt werden, aber die Ausdehnung der Kenntnis auf die verschiedensten Reichsteile war zu gross, der Kreis der Mitwisser hätte stark eingeschränkt werden können und hätte m.E. eingeschränkt werden müssen.

#### Zu A. 4. III VI.

III VI. hatte die Aufgabe die Wirtschaft somit diese abt. Rüstungswirtschaft zu sein, gegen Ausspähung zu sichern. Es war besonders schwierig, die in Frage kommenden Reichsministerien und später auch die Firmen selbst, von der Notwendigkeit, der Sicherung gegen Ausspähung durch das Ausland zu überzeugen, nachdem die Grundlagen geschaffen waren, wurde für jeden in Frage kommenden Rüstungsbetrieb ein "Abwehrbeauftragter" eingesetzt. Es waren dies meist verabschiedete Offiziere, oder auch sonstige Kenner wirtschaftlicher Verhältnisse.

Der "Abwehrbeauftragte" war in die Direction mit eingebaut, von dort aus organisierte er den sogenannten "Vorsorglichen Geheimschutz". Der Abwehrbeauftragte hatte Zutritt zu allen Einrichtungen des Betriebes und veranlasste Abstellung vorgefundener Mängel, er arbeitete zusammen mit dem Werkschutz, der eine gewisse Art von Werkpolizei herstellte. Alle Angestellten oder Arbeiter die neu in den Betrieb kamen, unterlagen einer polizeilichen Prüfung, das heisst, dass bei den örtlichen Polizeistellen das Vorleben des Einstellenden überprüft wurde.

Für manchen Menschen deshalb unangenehm, weil der Werkschutz meist aus Angehörigen der SS bestand und deshalb das Parteibuch, vor allem für das weitere Fortkommen, eine Rolle spielte.

Die "Abwehrbeauftragten" meldeten über Vorkommnisse und über von ihnen getroffene Massnahmen an den III VI Offizier der ihnen vorgesetzten Abwehrstelle ihres Armeekorps-Bereichs. Der III VI der Abwehrstelle des Armeekorps-Bereichs hatte denselben Meldeweg und dieselbe Meldepflicht, wie die III H, III E, III L Offiziere der Abwehrstellen.

Wichtig blieb immer die Meldung über Verbesserung und über Vorkommnisse an das Amt Ausl/Abw. Abt. III. Falls Verbesserungen für andere Betriebe wichtig erschienen, bekamen diese sofort Kenntnis.

Dieser Abt. III VI Offiziere nur solche Offiziere in Frage kamen, die mit den Verhältnissen der Wirtschaft vertraut waren, wird nur zur Kenntnisaufnahme berichtet, es ist eigentlich selbstverständlich.

#### Zu A. 5. III C

III C war eine durchaus unwichtige Stelle, sie war lediglich Aktendurchgänger und Studienstelle. Jedenfalls war eine so starke Besetzung nicht erforderlich. Eine weniger starke Verbindungsstelle und dann besetzt mit erfahrenen Kriminal Kommissaren, die ihrerseits über beste Beziehungen zur Polizei verfügten, wäre der Sache dienlicher gewesen. Offizierbesetzung war falsch und hat oft zu Reibereien geführt.

Eine Zeit lang fiel III C ein Aufgabe zu, Agentenpläne auf, bei der Passstelle der Polizei zu beschaffen, diese Arbeit wurde von III C, für das gesamte Amt Ausl/Abw. geleistet. In dem grossen Umfang der Beschaffung wurde dann aber ein besonderes Referat geschaffen, dem auch seit Beginn des Krieges die "Passierscheinstelle" angegliedert wurde. Ohne einen Passierschein dieser Stelle konnten im Kriegs die Grenzen der besetzten Gebiete nicht überschritten werden.

Die Fertigung eines Passes, grün, oder Braun dauerte nur ganz kurze Zeit. Der ausgestellte Pass was auf jeden Fall einwandfrei. Auffallen konnte nur wer sich ungeschickt benahm.

Es ist kein Fall bekannt geworden, dass ein falsch ausgestellter Pass beanstandet worden wäre.

#### Zu A. III 6. Gegenspionage.

Die Anfänge der Organisation "Gegenspionage" reichen zurück bis in die Zeit der Rheinlandbesetzung. Es ist bis zum Schluss dieses Krieges nicht festgestellt worden, dass es ausser Deutschland ein Land mit "organisierter" Gegenspionage bei irgend einem Nachrichtendienst gab. Deutschland ist zur Gegenspionage übergegangen aus folgenden Überlegungen:

Der französische Nachrichtendienst hatte während der Rheinland-  
besetzung seine Kontrolle in Koblenz und setzte von dort aus gegen  
den Rest der deutschen Marine an.

Ehemalige Angehörige der deutschen Marine, die in besetzten  
Rheinland beheimatet waren, bekamen unter bestimmten Androhungen  
den Auftrag, nach Kiel oder Wilhelmshaven zu gehen, um dort Er-  
kundungsaufträge auszuführen.

Auftraggeber war damals in der Hauptsache der Kapitän Rubian,  
sein Hilfsoffizier war der spätere Kapitän Trautmann, der noch bis  
kurz vor diesem Kriege seine Agenten in Amsterdam abfertigte.

In einigen Fällen hatte Rubian Erfolge, die Agenten, meist  
deutsche Marine-Angehörige die Angehörige in besetzten Rheinland  
hatten, konnten gefasst werden. Dies war der Unvernünftigkeit der  
französischen Nachrichtenspezialisten zu verdanken und

Einige der zur Spionage angehaltenen Personen meldeten ihren  
Auftrag deutschen militärischen Stellen, sie wurden vernommen und  
nahmen ihre Aufträge.

Die Ansatzpunkte gegen den Nachrichtendienst ausser deutschen  
Stellen wurden so gefunden. Nach Überlegungen, die sich in den  
weiter vorn gemachten Ausführungen finden, beschloss man die ge-  
stellten Fragen zu beantworten und den Erfolg abzuwarten. Die  
Beantwortung erfolgte zunächst noch mündlich. Der angesetzte Agent

berichtete wahrheitsgemäss was er gesehen hatten und was jeder  
Spaziergänger in Kiel wahrnehmen konnte. Die Angaben hielten also  
jeder nachprüfung stand.

Der franz. Nachrichtendienst war zufrieden und steigerte seine  
Forderungen, indem er verlangte der Agent solle versuchen, alte  
Kameraden zu finden, und sollte sich mit diesen über die gestellten  
Fragen unterhalten.

Auch diese Forderung wurde erfüllt, indem der alte "Kamerad"  
beim Stationskommando oder Unteroffizier gefunden wurde.

Man wurde das Spiel fortgesetzt. Der franz. Nachrichtenspe-  
zialist nannte einige Male namen von tatsächlichen Agenten mit  
der Aufforderung, eine diese Leute zu intensivieren Arbeit anzuhalten.

In der Folgezeit wurden in diesen Kanal weitere deutsche Agenten  
hineingeschoben, so dass mit der Zeit der franz. Nachrichtendienst  
in Koblenz mit den Nachrichtendienst versorgt wurde, die von  
deutschen Stellen hierfür freigegeben wurden.

Diese Art den Herangehens war aber nicht der Hauptzweck. In der  
Hauptsache sollte versucht werden eine Persönlichkeit aus dem  
franz. Nachrichtendienst zu gewinnen, so dass man deutscherseits  
einen tieferen Einblick in die Arbeitsweise des franz. Nachrichten-  
dienstes bekam.

Diese Bemühungen hatten grössten Erfolg. Der Dolmetscher der  
franz. Stelle wurde bei guter Gelegenheit für Deutschland gewonnen.  
In der Folgezeit lieferte er alle Dinge aus an die er auf Grund  
seiner dienstlichen Tätigkeit herankommen konnte

Funkchlüssel namen  
Sitzungsberichte  
Stärke und Bewaffnung franz. Schiffe  
Neubaupläne frz. U. Boote  
und weitere Dinge, die in Vergessenheit geraten sind.

Das Spiel wurde durchgespielt, bis das besetzte Gebiet von den  
franz. Truppen geräumt wurde.

Dieser Vorgang ist deshalb so weit ausgeführt, weil er der An-  
lass war, die Gegenspionage zu organisieren. Bis zum Ende des  
Krieges ist bei richtiger Arbeit wohl kaum ein Versager eingetreten.

### Organisation

Bei allen Abwehrstellen in der Heimat, also auch später in den  
besetzten Gebieten waren III P. Offiziere mit ihren Hilfsorganisa-  
tionen eingesetzt, um die Gegenspionage durchzuführen. Dazu ge-  
hörte selbstverständlich immer ein gewisser Stab von Vertrauens-  
leuten, der sich bis zum gegnerischen Nachrichtendienst vorfuhlte,  
um dann die Nachrichten abzusetzen. Diese Leute sind bestimmt  
immer gefunden worden. Friedensmässig waren genügend Erfahrungen  
gesammelt worden auf die eigene Seite zu bekommen, und ihn so  
lahm zu legen, oder zum mindesten tieferen Einblick in die Arbeits-  
weise des Gegners zu bekommen.

Die Gegenspionage könnte so in langer Arbeit in den Dienst fast aller Staaten hineinkommen, es waren ja bei allen Abwehrstellen Spionagenkräfte vorhanden.

Welche Nachrichten kamen für die Weiterleitung in Frage?

Die Abgabe der Nachrichten richtete sich ganz nach den Fragen, die vom Beger gestellt wurden.

Zur Bearbeitung in der Beantwortung bestand bei der Abteilung III ein besonderes Referat, das die Bezeichnung III D. trug.

Arbeitsweise und Aufgaben des Referates III D.

Das Referat III D hatte für die rechtzeitige und nachgemessene Beschaffung des Nachrichtenmaterials zu sorgen, welches durch deutsche Agenten der Gegenspionage III F. in die Kanäle des Nachrichtendienstes ausserdeutscher Staaten geleitet werden sollte.

Die Nachrichten wurden von III D bei den Abteilungen des Heeres, der Marine und der Luftwaffe, ebenso bei den Waffenkammern oder der Rüstungsindustrie beschafft, über deren Einrichtungen der oder die ausserdeutschen Staaten unterrichtet werden wollten.

Kam ein deutscher Agent von einer Besprechung mit einem Beauftragten einer ausserdeutschen Macht zurück, so wurde zuerst der Reisebericht gefertigt. Der deutsche Agent musste alle Einzelheiten der Reise schriftlich niederlegen, Schwierigkeiten beim Überschreiten der Grenze, bei Zoll- und Passrevisionen mussten niedergelegt werden. Es waren die Übernachtungsgaststätten anzugeben, und dabei ev. Hotelkontrollen und die Art ihrer Durchführung.

Über das Zusammensein mit dem Beauftragten eines anderen Landes, war sehr genau zu berichten. Es war genau niederzulegen:

1. Wo fand die Zusammenkunft statt? Hotel? Zimmer des Hotels? Im freien, z.B. gelegentlich eines Ausfluges.
2. Welches war der Unterhaltungstafel? Welche militär-politischen, oder welche politischen Themen wurden berührt?
3. Wie lange hat das Zusammensein gedauert?
4. Wie wurden die dem fremden Agenten übergebenen Nachrichten beurteilt?
5. Hat sich der fremde Agent mit den Nachrichten entfernt, so dass anzunehmen ist, dass sich in den besuchten Lande (Ausland) eine militärische Führungsstelle befindet?
6. Wenn ja, welchen Weg ging der fremde Agent?
7. Zum Schluss wurde dem Bericht der Fragebogen beigelegt. Das heisst, es wurden die neuen Fragen festgelegt, die der ausländische Nachrichtendienst durch den deutschen Agenten erledigt haben wollten.

Der Bericht selbst ging an III F. der Fragebogen wurde in einem Durchschlag an III D. geleitet, von dort aus erfolgte dann die Bearbeitung zusammen mit den zuständigen Dienststellen.

Bei III D wurde das Nachrichtenmaterial für den Agentendienst wie folgt unterschieden:

1. Falschmaterial
2. Gefälschtes Material
3. Verfälschtes Material

Der Begriff Falschmaterial ist ohne Weiteres klar.

Unter "Gefälschtes Material" verstand man z.B. bei der Angabe der Leistungen von Waffen und Munition, Leistungsangaben, die entweder über den Tatsachen, oder wesentlich darunter lagen, je nachdem die Waffenkammern sich ihre Überlegungen gemacht hatten.

Verfälschtes Material entstand durch von Berichten, Manoveraufgaben, Kritiken bei Lagebesprechungen, u.s.w.

Ein Hauptziel der Gegenspionage für den Kriegsfall war es, wenn nötig unrichtige operative Aufgaben, oder unrichtige Angaben über Stärkeverhältnisse über bestimmte Agenten in den Nachrichtendienst des Gegners hineinzulassen.

Das vorbereitete Nachrichtenmaterial welches auf Veranlassung einer Abwehrstelle hergestellt worden war, durfte nur an Agenten abgegeben werden, wenn hierzu die Genehmigung der Abwehr Abteilung III, III D eingeholt war III D. führte sehr genau Listen, in denen das verausgabte Material unter Angabe des Landes, des Agenten, Tag der Abgabe, Hersteller des Materials, Abwehrstelle, die das Material angefordert hatte; So konnten die verschiedenen Antworten an verschiedenen Länder gehen. Die Unterschriften unter dem Agentenmaterial waren immer richtig, so hielt natürlich das

Material jeder Nachprüfung stand, falls beim ausländischen Nachrichtendienst Dokumenten durch tatsächlichen Verkehr vorhanden gewesen wären an einer Abteilung eines Ministeriums oder eines Armeekorps, das sich an der Fertigstellung von Falsch- oder anderen Material beteiligt hatte.

Irgend ein Recht Agenten auszuweisen, sie zu führen, sie zu unterweisen, oder zu vernehmen, hatte III D nicht. Aus den Ausführungen ist ersichtlich, dass III D eine Notwendigkeit zu Entlastung von III F war. Die Beschaffung des gefälschten Nachrichtenmaterials verursachte sehr viel Arbeit.

#### Noch einmal III F.

Die Einschaltung über die Arbeitsweise von III D musste gemacht werden im III F in seinen Arbeitsvorgängen begreifen zu können. III F selbst war während des Krieges und durch den Krieg eine besonders starke Gruppe in der Abteilung III geworden. Die Ausdehnung des Kriegsschauplatzes über fast ganz Europa brachte Zweifellos eine starke Arbeitsbelastung die noch wesentlich erhöht wurde, weil III F, neben den geschilderten Grundaufgaben, noch den Kampf gegen Sabotage und Terror mit übernommen hatte. Hier lag ein grosser Fehler, III F. hatte mit Sabotage und Terrororganisatorisch nichts zu tun, es waren völlig auseinanderstrebende Gebiete, die neue Arbeitskräfte forderten und die Offiziere an den Fronten ihren eigentlichen Aufgaben entzog. III F hatte eigene Auswertungsoffiziere innerhalb der Gruppe im Amt Ausl/Abw, diese Offiziere studierten die Gerichtsakten und stellten so bei Beständen Festgenommenen sehr bald, sowohl die Arbeitsweise und auch die Tätigkeitsgebiete des ausländischen Nachrichtendienstes fest.

Im Jahre 1938 beginnend wurden in die verschiedensten Länder A.O. III s, das heisst, Abwehroffiziere der Abteilung III vorgeschoben, weil festgestellt werden konnte, dass der Nachrichtendienst gegen Deutschland zunahm, dies war durch die deutsche Aufrüstung bedingt, nicht weiterverwunderlich. Die A.O. III s hatten festzustellen wie in den Ländern, die ihnen zugewiesen waren, der Nachrichtendienst ausserdeutscher Staaten gegen Deutschland organisiert war.

#### Zu A III 7 Gutachten vor Gericht.

Dieses Referat war sehr wichtig. Es konnte wegen Landes verrats niemand vom Gericht verurteilt werden, wenn nicht ein militärisches Gutachten vorlag.

Das Gutachten musste u.a. enthalten:

- a. Liegt ein objektives oder subjektives Vergehen vor.
- b. Ist durch den Verrat ein dauernder Schaden entstanden.
- c. Im Kriege: Ist der entstandene Schaden Kriegswichtiger, oder Kriegsentscheidender Art.

Die Bearbeitung dieser Punkte zu A - 1 sieht auf den ersten Blick einfach aus, aber die Offiziere, die mit der Bearbeitung des Gutachtens betraut waren, das sie auch vor Gericht vertreten mussten und für das sie auch den Eid nahmen ihre Aufgabe sehr ernst und mancher verirrte verdankt diesen Offizieren oft die baldige Freiheit und oft das Leben.

#### Der Chef der Abteilung III.

Der Chef der Abteilung III im Amt Ausl/Abw war immer ein Generalstabsoffizier, dies war bei den Abwehrstellen nicht der Fall, dort hatten ein Truppenoffizier die Stellung als Leiter III inne.

Der Chef der Abteilung III beim Amt Ausl/Abw, war in seiner Dienststellung der eigentliche Träger des Abwehrdienstes.

Der Chef der Abteilung III nahm an allen Besprechungen mit Reichsbehörden teil, er trat Entscheidungen wenn diese nicht grundsätzlicher Art waren. Alle grundsätzlichen Verfügungen zur Durchführung eines geordneten Abwehrdienstes im Reich und später in den besetzten Gebieten sind zum mindesten im Entwurf beim Chef der Abteilung III entstanden.

Die einzige aktivtätige Gruppe der Abteilung III, war III F. Gegenspionage. Schon immer aber vor allem, als die Gegenspionage ihre Erfolge steigern konnte, versuchte der Chef der Abteilung I, die Gegenspionage seiner Abteilung anzugliedern.

Der Chef der Abteilung III wehrte sich mit allen Mitteln gegen die Binnmischung der Abt. I, vom Standpunkt des III Chefs, war diese



... zu verstehen. Die Gegenespionage war der einzige  
Aktivposten der Abteilung III, wäre dieser Posten verloren gegangen  
so wäre die Abteilung III nur noch ein Sammelpackchen von Leistungen  
unrentabler Dienststellen im Reich und später in den besetzten  
Gebieten geworden. Eine Dienststelle zur Fabrikation von Verfü-  
gungen und Verordnungen. Und doch wäre es organisatorisch bestimmt  
richtiger gewesen, die Gegenespionage der Abt I anzugliedern.

Nicht unvorbereitet für Kenner der Bestrebungen des S.D.  
erreichte es der damalige Obergruppenführer Heydrich, dass auch der  
S.D. in seinen Nachrichtenorganisationen Gegenespionage durchführen  
durfte. Die zur Durchführung erforderlichen Falsch-pp Dokumente  
mussten aber nach wie vor bei den betreffenden Wehrmachtadient-  
stellen hergestellt werden. Es setzte damit eine Geheimnistuerei  
von seiten des S.D. ein, die nicht in Interesse der Sache lag.  
Der S.D. hat geglaubt, Canarias war unterlagen, dies war der Anfang  
vom Ende. Kenner der Dinge sahen dieses Ende kommen. Canarias  
musste eine Position nach der anderen räumen. Heydrich hat noch in  
all den Dingen seine Finger gehabt, obwohl er seinen Sitz in Prag  
hatte, ohne Heydrich wäre wohl überhaupt manches anders gewesen.  
Dieser Mann war brutal, rücksichtslos und hatte seine Rückanfertigung  
bei Hitler und Kimmeler, war nicht gehorchte der verschwand.

Zu 3. Organisation der Abteilung I des Amts Ausl/Abw.  
Geheime Meldedienst.

Hierunter ist zu verstehen, der Versuch in die Organisationen  
der Wehrmacht subzerdeutscher Staaten einzudringen. Hierzu, nämlich,  
um das Ziel möglichst tief gehend zu erreichen bediente sich die  
Abteilung I der Organisation, Huber die in folgendem berichtet  
werden soll.

Chef und damit Leiter der Abteilung:  
ein Generalstabsoffizier

Adjutant  
Personalreferent  
Registratur

Weibliches Personal und Zivilangestellte zur Erledigung der Schreib-  
arbeiten und sonstigen untergeordneten Arbeiten.

Gliederung:  
Die Gliederung der Abteilung I ist mit kleineren Abweichungen die  
gleiche, wie dies bei der Abteil. III bereits berichtet ist.  
Der Arbeitsgang ist schon wegen der anders gearteten Aufgaben  
naturgemäss ein anderer:

1. I Heer = I H.
2. I Luft = I L
3. I Marine. Die Marine mit ihren ganz anders gearteten Aufträgen  
nahm in der Organisation der Abteilung I, eine gewisse Sonderstel-  
lung ein. Die Besetzung mit Offizieren war stärker.
4. I Wirtschaft = I Wi.

Die Abteilung I arbeitete sehr eng zusammen mit den verschiede-  
sten Abteilungen des Generalstabes und besonders stark mit der Ab-  
teilung "Fremde Heere".  
Gleichermassen wird es so verständlich, dass die Marine mit dem  
Admiralstab und die Luftwaffe also die Gruppen I M und I L mit ihren  
Fachstäben zusammenarbeiteten.

Die Generalstäbe, Heer und Luft und der Admiralstab, Marine  
waren die Auftraggeber für die Arbeiten der Abteilung I.  
Zur Erledigung bestimmter Fragen und zur Schaffung von Agenten-  
verbindungen bestand seitens der Abteilung I enge Verbindung zur  
Attachés-Gruppe und damit natürlich auch zu den einzelnen Attachés.  
Es besteht für alle Staaten das gleiche, ungeschriebene Gesetz,  
dass der Militär-Luft- oder Marineattachés der Träger eines gewissen  
Nachrichtendienstes ist. Die Attachés berichten selbstverständlich  
nur über Dinge, die ihnen auf Grund ihrer dienstlichen Tätigkeit  
zugänglich sind; aber schon hierin lag ganz nach Rignung und gesell-  
schaftlichen Umgangsformen eine Fundgrube für den geheimen Melde-  
dienst.

Die Teilnahme an grossen Manövern, Teilnahme an Parlamentssitzun-  
gen und der gesellschaftliche Verkehr geben Anlass zu interessanten  
und aufschlussreichen Berichten.  
Der Verkehr aller in einem Lande beglaubigten Militär-, Luft- oder  
Marine-Attachés war durchaus swanglos und meist auch durchaus

kameradschaftlich, dies war besonders im Verkehr mit verbündeten, oder befreundeten Attaches der Fall.

Man betrieb eigentlich untereinander ganz offiziell "Spionage" dies beleuchteten besonders Berichte, die nach Besuchen, oder nach gesellschaftlichen Veranstaltungen abgefasst wurden.

Der Attache durfte sich seinerseits aber nicht herausstellen, und so musste von seiten der Abteilung I der organisierte "Geheim Meldedienst" oder wenn man es so nennen will, die Spionage eingesetzt werden.

Da den Aufgabenkreis klarer und übersichtlicher gestalten zu können, waren die Gruppen der Abteilung I entsprechend in "West", "Ost", "Südost" bearbeitet eingeteilt.

Die Abteilung I führte entsprechend der Unterteilung in West, Ost, Südost von den auch eigene Agenten, meist hervorragende Persönlichkeiten.

Ebenso, wie dies bei der Abteilung III der Fall war, gab er auch Leitstellen der Abteilung I bei den Abwehrstellen der verschiedenen Armeekorps. Aus der Lage des Armeekorps zu den Grenzen benachbarten Staaten ergab sich von selbst der Arbeitsbereich und die Bestrehung in den benachbarten Ländern Agenten und Stützpunkte für den geheimen Meldedienst zu schaffen.

Welfach wurden Deutsche herangezogen, die schon längere Zeit in den betreffenden Lande ansässig waren und die ihrerseits über weitere Verbindungen zu Eingeborenen suchten und fanden.

In Jahre 1938 wurde von der Abteilung I die Organisation der K.O.'s geschaffen.

K.O. heisst "Kriegsorganisation".

Hierzu ist folgendes zu sagen:

Nach dem Zusammenbruch im Jahre 1918 mussten auf Grund des Friedensvertrages viele Offiziere entlassen werden, von denen zahlreiche im Ausland neue Erwerbsmöglichkeiten suchten und auch fanden.

Als dann nach Hitler ein erneute Aufrüstung erfolgte kehrten viele dieser Offiziere aus dem Ausland zurück und wurden also sogenannte "R" Offiziere, d.h. Ergänzungsoffiziere wieder in die Wehrmacht eingestellt.

Aus dem Kreis dieser Offiziere wurden dann geeignete Offiziere für den geheimen Meldedienst herausgesucht und zunächst einen Abwehrstelle bei einem Armeekorps zugeteilt, immer einem solchen Armeekorps das dem Lande am nächsten lag, in dem der Offizier als Zivilperson tätig gewesen war.

Aus dieser Zeit stammten natürlich viele Verbindungen, so dass sofort Erfolgsmöglichkeiten vorhanden waren. Meist handelte es sich um Auslandsdeutsche, die auch in der N.S.D.A.P. organisiert waren.

Gesignate Offiziere, die Erfolge zu verzeichnen hatten und die neben dem gesellschaftlich einwandfreien Auftreten auch über ausreichende Sprachkenntnise verfügten, wurden nun in das betreffende Land als K.O.'s kommandiert.

Die K.O.'s wurden in die Gesandtschaften, oder Botschaften eingebaut, sie genossen den vorteil der Exterritorialität und hatten Diplomatenschutz, auch die zur Verfügung stehenden Personenkraftwagen führten das diplomatische Kennzeichen.

Wenn also dieser Offizier, oder seine Agenten sich nicht ganz auffällig benahmen, konnten Spannungen nicht ausbleiben. In einigen Fällen durften auch die Frauen dieser Offiziere mit ihren Männern zusammen sein.

Die Erfolge waren nicht gering. Neben den K.O.'s war bei den Gesandtschaften auch der Leiter der Auslandsorganisation der N.S.D.A.P. eingebaut, der neben seiner organisatorischen Tätigkeit selbstverständlich auch in der Lage war, nachrichten zusammen zu stellen und diese den interessierten militärischen Stellen zur Verfügung zu stellen.

Der Leiter der Auslandsorganisation eines Landes hatte bekanntlich in allen Städten seine Ortsgruppenleiter, die durchaus zuverlässig waren.

Der K.O. hatte weiter den vorzoll für sich dass er seine Geheimpost durch Kurier befördern konnte. Weiter verfügte er über Funkverbindungen.

Der K.O. war ein absoluter Organ des Amtes Ausl/Abw. Abteilung I, er unterstand in seinem Dienst keinesfalls einem Attache, er hatte auch keine Verpflichtung Nachrichtenmaterial mit dem Attache auszutauschen, es sei denn, dass dies auf kameradschaftlicher Basis

erfolgte, wie es der Fall war.  
 Die Agenten-namen wurden von den K.O.'s geheim gehalten, wo  
 Namen bekannt geworden sind, nur durch Dumheiten, oder durch Wich-  
 tigkeiten während der Besatzungszeit.  
 Die tätigen Agenten wurden nie in den Gesandtschaften oder in  
 der Wohnung der K.O. empfangen, vielmehr wurden hierfür in bestimmten  
 Städten sogenannte Stadtbüros unterhalten.

Diese Stadtbüros unterhielten auch alle Abwehrstellen in der  
 Heimat und zwar für Abteilung I und Gegenspionage getrennt.  
 Die Organisation der Abteilung I hat sich für die Kriegführung  
 durchaus bewährt. Gelegentlich einer Lagebesprechung im Führer-  
 Hauptquartier im Osten erklärte ein hoher Offizier aus dem General-  
 stab der Ostarmeen dem Admiral Canaris wörtlich:  
 "Noch nie ist eine Armee mit so vorzüglichen Nachrichten zum Vor-  
 marsch angetreten!"

Die Post an Agenten wurde auf bestimmten Postämtern nach beson-  
 deren Abmachungen behandelt, nämlich:  
 Schon die absendende Stelle schnitt den Brief so auf, wie dies  
 die amtliche Postprüfstelle auch tat, im übrigen wurde aber der  
 Briefschloß verschlossen. Die beim Amt Ausl/Abw. so vorbereiteten  
 Briefe wurden von einer mit Sonderausweis der Post ausgestatteten  
 Person auf ein bestimmtes Postamt, zu ganz bestimmten Personen ge-  
 bracht, hier bekamen die Briefe dann den bekannten Kontrollstreifen  
 und gingen dann in den bevorzugten Abfertigungsverkehr. Diese  
 Regelung galt für Abteilung I und für III P.

Für den laufenden Verkehr mit dem Auswärtigen Amt war der Ver-  
 bindungsbeamter ein höherer Beamter eingesetzt, der alle Unstimmig-  
 keiten im Verkehr zwischen dem Amt Ausl/Abw. dem Auswärtigen Amt an  
 sich und dem von vertretenen im Ausland beseitigte, oder  
 zum mindesten auf ein erträglicher Mass brachte.

Der Abteilung I war noch anzugliedert ein Laboratorium, hier  
 wurden Geheintinten entwickelt. Mit Geheintint geschriebene Agenten-  
 bewachte Briefe lesbar gemacht u.s.w. Weiter verwaltete das Labo-  
 ratorium die Photographischen Mittel und versuchte gemeinsam mit der  
 entsprechenden Industrie Apparate zu entwickeln die den Bedürfnissen  
 des geheimen Meldedienstes entsprachen.

Der Siemens Verfielfältigungsapparat unterstand ebenfalls dem  
 Laboratorium.

## Kinsets gegen Russland.

Für den Kinsets gegen Russland wurde in den Randstaaten ein besonderer Militärattaché geschaffen. Bisher hatte der Attaché für Finnland die Randstaaten mitbearbeitet.

Sowohl der neue Attaché für die Randstaaten, als auch der Attaché für Finnland waren aus der Abteilung II des Amtes Ausl/Abw. hervorgegangen. Namentlich der neue Attaché für die Randstaaten war langjähriger, verantwortlicher Russland- und Polen-bearbeiter für den geheimen Meldedienst.

Von den Randstaaten und von Polen aus, wurde mit besonderer Hilfe von Ukrainern Russland bearbeitet. Bei geschickten Herangehen an die Ukrainer ist es nicht immer schwer gewesen, diese zur Mitarbeit für den geheimen Meldedienst zu gewinnen.

Es dürfte noch in der Erinnerung sein, dass gerade die Ukrainer bei einem siegreichen Ausgang des Krieges 1914-1918 mit der Errichtung einer freien Ukraine unter einem eigenen Katmann fest rechneten. In Perlin war auch 1917 bereits eine Ukrainische diplomatische Vertretung errichtet, die deutscherseits unter Führung des Staatssekretärs Schubert stand.

Als aber der Bolschewismus über Russland hinweg raste, flohen viele Ukrainer nach Deutschland, wo sie mit der Zeit Arbeit und Brot fanden.

Der Traum dieser Ukrainer war nicht ausgeträumt, sie behielten ihre Sehnsucht nach der heiligen russischen Erde. Der Katmann für diese heimatlos gewordenen Menschen war der Katmann Ikuropatski, der bei der Firma Siemens untergekommen war.

Noch unter Grüner als Reichswehrminister bezogen die Ukrainer für ihre Organisation geldliche Unterstützung. Viele der in Deutschland lebenden Russen wählten, namentlich in Berlin, zusammen mit anderen Weissrussen, die dem Bolschewismus entronnen waren, erfasst. Diese Leute schufen dann Verbindungen zu den noch in Russland lebenden Bekannten u.s.w. so dass ein dichtes Agentennetz für den geheimen Meldedienst entstand.

Als Anlaufstellen dienten Polen und die Randstaaten. Der Hass der Polen und ebenso der Angehörigen der Randstaaten ist bekant und so ist es erklärlich, dass der geheime Meldedienst in diesen Ländern größte Unterstützung fand. In den Randstaaten war diese Unterstützung besonders in militärkreisen zu finden, denn dort gab es in den Stäben keine Anhänger des Bolschewismus.

In Polen wurden die Bemühungen des "geheimen Meldedienstes" nicht durch militärische Stellen unterstützt, der genannte Dienst hatte aber von Polen aus gegen Russland seine Erfolge, dies ist bei der uralten Feindschaft zwischen Polen und Russland nicht gerade verwunderlich. Wie sich die Verhältnisse zwischen diesen Staaten gestalten werden, bleibt abzuwarten.

Die anstrengende, unermüdlche, sachliche, Arbeit des Amtes Ausl/Abw. Abteilung I hatte die ungeheure Stärke des russischen Heeres mit seinen Kraftreserven einwandfrei erkannt, klar und eindeutig gingen über K.W. die Berichte an dienpolitische Führung. Der Militärattaché in Moskau hat vor jeder Angriffsarsicht gegen Russland gewarnt, auch er hat auf die ungeheure Kraft der russischen Kolossen hingewiesen, der nicht ins Rollen kommen darf.

Umsonst, als gelegentlich einer Abendtafel bei Hitler, ein genauer Kenner russischer Verhältnisse seinen Platz neben Hitler erhielt und dieser Herr die Sprache auf die Stärke Russlands brachte, hat Hitler mit diesem Herrn kein Wort mehr gewechselt.

Um noch einmal auf Nachrichten zurückzukommen, die aus Russland kamen, war in sehr vielen Fällen Vorsicht am Platze. Es ist vorgekommen, dass angeblich aus Russland stammende Berichte einwandfrei in Berlin hergestellt worden waren.

Die ...

Die Erklärung ist nicht schwer. Unter den aus Russland geflohenen Offizieren befanden sich auch Offiziere des alten russischen Generalstabes. Auch hier war der geheime Meldedienst natürlich erschienen. Da diese Russen keinerlei Verbindungen nach Russland mehr hatten, aber hier Verdienstmöglichkeiten sahen, folbten sie, als alte Berufsoffiziere mit fachmännischer Vorbildung war es vielleicht nicht so schwer. Gegen Polen war der geheime Meldedienst ebenfalls tätig. Bis zum Kriege gegen Polen war der Militärattaché ein früherer Offizier der Abteilung III des Amtes Ausl/Abw., er ist in Russland gefallen.

Nach Polen hinzukommen war nicht schwer, weil an der ganzen polnischen Westgrenze das deutsche Element vorherrschte und auch Danzig in seiner ganzen Haltung deutsch war. Die Russen haben mit einem ungeheuren Kräfteaufwand und mit grosstem Erfolg gegen Polen gearbeitet, wie sie ja überhaupt mit aller Rücksichtslosigkeit den Nachrichtendienst und ebenso den politischen Dienst betrieben haben. Agentenverluste spielten für den russischen Nachrichtendienst keine Rolle.

### Tschecho-Slowakei.

Die Abteilung I hat gegen die Tschecho-Slowakei mit unerhörtem Erfolg gearbeitet, es war in der Hauptsache die Abwehrstelle Dresden, die mit diesen Erfolgen aufwerben konnte.

Der Erfolg lag in der geringen Besoldung der tschechischen Armee und in der Tatsache, dass den Offizieren die Mittel für einen Lebenswandel fehlten, den sie glaubten führen zu müssen.

Aber auch die Abteilung III musste gegen die Tschechoslowakei mit grossen Mitteln eingesetzt werden, da von dort aus sehr stark in der Spionage gearbeitet wurde.

In der Hauptsache arbeitete der frühere Deutsche Dobianer aus Tetschen-Bodenbach gegen Deutschland.

Dobianer fiel dadurch auf, dass er in deutschen Zeitungen Darlehen zu mässigen Zinsen anbot. Dieses Verfahren hat sich überlebt und war sehr bald erkannt worden, so dass Dobianer eingekreist werden konnte.

Dobianer arbeitete auch nebenbei für Russland.

Weiter war Agent des Tschechischen Hauptstabes der Major Pokorny, der zu Spionagezwecken seine eigene Frau, die Deutsche war, und Tochter eines früheren Stabsarztes, zur Spionage nach Deutschland schickte. Die Frau war denkbar ungeschickt, sie verriet sich dann selbst, ausserdem ihre Begleiterin, und einen deutschen Hauptmann der Luftwaffe. Pokorny hat dann gegen Russland gearbeitet, ist aber von den Russen bald erkannt worden.

### Ungarn.

Mit dem ungarischen Nachrichten- und Abwehrdienst hielten dem entsprechenden deutschen Stellen des Amtes Ausl/Abw. gute Freundschaft. Es wurden gegenseitig Besuche ausgetauscht und später wurde auch ein deutscher Verbindungsoffizier in Budapest in den ungarischen Nachrichtendienst eingebaut.

Die Ungarn hatten den besten Willen. Mit einigen Erfolgen glaubten sie aber schlafen zu können und so nahmen sie sehr gern deutsche Belehrungen und Erfahrungen an. Später wurden terminmässig Erfahrungen ausgetauscht und Besuche wiederholt.

Die Ungarn, einmal auf die richtige Spur gesetzt, arbeiteten mit Eifer gegen Rumänien und auch gegen Jugoslawien. Dass ein besonderer Hass den Russen galt, ist nur zu verständlich.

Die Einrichtung war sehr gut, nur es war zu viel Theorie in Allem.

Der Chef des Generalstabes war überaltert und konnte eine neue Zeit mit technischen und sonstigen militärischen Fortschritten nicht begreifen.

Das Land selbst war arm. Die Kameradschaft ausserordentlich gut.

Ungarn hat sich auch deshalb für Deutschland zum zweiten Male ausgeblutet.

Mit Ungarn wurde auf den Gebieten der Abteilung III und I zusammen gearbeitet.

### Balkan.

Bei den deutschen diplomatischen Vertretungen auf dem Balkan wurden nach und nach ebenfalls K.O.'s eingebaut. A.O.III waren nicht erforderlich da ja die Balkanstaaten keinen Grund hatten, gegen Deutschland Spionage zu treiben. Etwas militärische Wünsche würden von den Militär-Attachés aus gern erfüllt.

Als die Absichten Hitlers, Russland anzugreifen Tatsache wurde, und der Krieg Polen bevorstand, wurde der bisherige Militärattaché aus den Randstaaten abkommandiert und nach Bukarest versetzt, da jetzt auch vom Balkan aus gegen Russland gearbeitet werden sollte.

Dass nach dem Einmarsch in Rumänien, Jugoslawien und Griechenland in diesen Ländern Abwehrstellen mit einem dazugehörigen I, II und III Personal eingerichtet wurden, versteht sich von selbst.

Die Türkei hatte einen K.O. der anscheinend dort auf das secret service gestossen war.

### Italien.

Bis zum Jahre 1935 arbeiteten Deutschland und Italien mit allen Mitteln gegeneinander. Deutschland beobachtete mit Besorgnis die Aufrüstung Italiens zu Wasser, zu Lande und in der Luft. Umgekehrt ging es Italien. Der Misstrauen schwand, als sich in Krieg gegen Abessinien, Deutschland offen auf die Seite Italiens stellte.

Hitler und Mussolini befahlen neben anderen militärischen Massnahmen eine enge Fühlungnahme der beiderseitigen Abwehrdienste und des "geheimen Meldedienstes". Es fanden die üblichen Höflichkeitsbesuche statt.

Zuerst stattete der General Roatta dem Admiral Canaris seinen Besuch ab, das Zusammentreffen fand mit Deman in München statt.

Es wurde festgelegt, dass jede Tätigkeit gegeneinander aufzuhören habe.

Deutschland hat sich dann auf Befehl des Admirals Canaris an diese Abmachungen streng gehalten. Italien nicht, dies konnte damals von der Abwehrstelle München einwandfrei geklärt werden.

Es kam zu ersten Auseinandersetzungen. In der Folgezeit besuchten wiederholt Offiziere des Amts Ausl/Abw. Rom und italienische Offiziere ebenso Berlin.

Es wurden immer grössere Programme durchgeführt, aber im Inneren des Herzens blieb man sich doch fremd. Für Deutschland war hier der Beweis angetreten, dass es meist gefährlich ist derartigen Abmachungen unbedingt zu trauen, aber Hitler hatte befohlen.

Im Laufe der Zeit wurden Erfahrungen ausgetauscht, dabei konnte einwandfrei festgestellt werden, dass die Italiener so gut wie nichts über ihren Nachbarstaat Frankreich wussten, was sie aber wussten war absolut veraltet.

Das Italiener hatten sich lediglich auf ihren Attachés verlassen, der aber anscheinend, jedenfalls damals, nicht sehr tüchtig war.

Der Abwehroffizier war damals ein Faschist, Oberstleutnant, sein Hilfsoffizier ein Oberleutnant.

Die Offiziere ..