

(g) The stay-behind network in Holland was handed over to FELDMANN and that was the last they heard of it.

(h) Stelle "P" files

These were kept by Frl. SKRODZKI in the apartment at Wassenaar, which served as their office and in which they also lived.

The files were burnt in September 1944 at Berg Endal near Nijmegen, assisted by FELDMANN.

9. Stelle "T"

Stelle "T" was considered to be a British set-up dating back to World War I.

10. Frl. SKRODZKI gave information on agents:-

P.E. ROBERTS

= GR 1 or CRITTER, agent employed against France.

On 15.9.38 FROTZE and Frl. SKRODZKI went to Holland and stayed at the house of P.E. ROBERTS, whose real name was Philip Sigismund RIFCZES - a Pole.

Frl. SKRODZKI gave an account of this man's career:- [ROBERTS] had been a Ilms Bureau agent and was sent to Berlin by LEMCINE, about 1935 under the name of Jacques de ROIZAN and as a French citizen. As such he was arrested. FROTZE got him out and turned him round. A month later he went back to Paris.

The Ilms Bureau then sent ROBERTS to America in connection with a communist affair involving LYDIA STAHL.

LYDIA STAHL was a Komintern agent in Berlin; she disappeared and ROBERTS reported to FROTZE he was going to the U.S.A. on this account.

ROBERTS travelled under the name of CRUET to the U.S.A. and turned up in Holland in 1937 (sic) - probably 1936 when FROTZE and Frl. SKRODZKI met him there - calling himself ROBERTS - with a Canadian passport. Frl. SKRODZKI stated that he had kept them informed of his movements using the cut-out address of Elisabeth OLDENBURG (a secretary in III F).

ROBERTS gave FROTZE such a fantastic picture of the U.S. Intelligence Service, that it could not possibly be true. FROTZE did not even show it to either RAMLER Chef III, or to the Amt Chef, as it was too stupid.

FROTZE continued to use him against the French but not against the British.

GV. FIEDE & SNEP

Frl. SKRODZKI stated that Alois SNEP knew his number, GV 88, as he signed his receipts in this way.

Through him via FIEDE came the contact with the French Intelligence Service. FIEDE always travelled on his own passport, as the French required to know that he really did live in Kiel and had the contact with the Navy that he claimed to have.

FIEDE was used for deception purposes, only against the French. His real name was: FRIEDRICH SELMER.

PF112398

STEPANEK.

Frl. SKRODEZKI remembered having seen this woman agent once in Berlin, after she had been badly beaten up by the Czechs and exchanged, and was then ordered a long holiday. STEPANEK was her right name.

VAN DEN BERG

A Swede. Recruited by Hptm. YENCKE of 1st Hanover for III F work in Sweden before 1938. He was not good; was given RM. 20,000 (a lot for German organization) and never brought anything. RAMLER wanted it, but PROTZE thought it a waste as the money was only spent on yachting on the lakes.

KRAUS

A Pole and an agent of Abwehr I Berlin, used against France for obtaining information from a French Artillery Officer in 1936 who was arrested. PROTZE, she stated, had been of the opinion that KRAUS may indirectly have betrayed the French officer. The contact was through a "baker" in Holland who often went to France to contact KRAUS. In 1943 GIESKES told them of a KRAUS (a Pole) who had connections to a niece of Churchill's in Paris.

(? baker)
or
(? one Baker)
the

FRAU RIEPHUHN

About 1937, living in France. Husband worked in a factory. She came in contact with the German I Dienst and offered her services. It began and finished in 1937, and did not last long, as she was not suitable for III F, nor was used by I. It is possible she may have offered her services again later.

FRITZ KRAMER

Director of Hotel Adlon, Berlin, who worked for III F (Nothing to do with WEHR contacts).

DEWITZ

Stelle "P". Frl. SKRODEZKI was not able to remember who this was.

760
130

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DATE 13 NOV 1945

SECRET

300 SOUTH HOLLAND
Report No R 032/3
Date of Inter 29.9.45

NAME NX LANGE Otto Heinrich
RANK Olt
UNIT FAT 303

PRELIMINARY

1. This report deals principally with subject's knowledge of GIS activities of Kapt z See PROTZE @ PASARMAN @ ONKEL RICHARD. Subject is willing to cooperate but his infm is rather limited.
2. Since Feb 13th 1944 LANGE has been attached to FAK 306 as adm and M/T offr. Early 1943 he moved to ENSCHEDE to Maj VON FELDMANN, OC FAK 306. At this time PROTZE had the disposal of a room in VON FELDMANN's office, from whom he also got his rations. He received his communications at the address "Orts-u Wehrm Ktrr Enschede - fuer FAK 306 Stelle P (Or: Kapt z See PROTZE)".

PERSONAL CONTACT

3. LANGE met PROTZE several times during this ENSCHEDE period, but his connections with PROTZE were of a strictly private character. PROTZE worked wholly on his own and NEVER told subject about his activities at this time. Neither did subject ever see any of PROTZE's agents though he knows that PROTZE had a "Gruppe SASSEN" working for him (See report No R 055/1). Nevertheless subject knew something of PROTZE's GIS activities as sometimes they had a party, LANGE procuring some of PROTZE's favourite "Rotwein". As PROTZE was very careful in his assertions and there were always some others present at these meetings, LANGE could merely give some general infm about PROTZE's activities in the past.
4. ONKEL RICHARD'S ACTIVITIES BEFORE MAY 1940
PROTZE was a very ancient Abwehr man, working in HOLLAND from about 1915. Subject does NOT know if PROTZE was active from 1918 till 1933. From 1933 on he most probably continued his Abwehr activities. Subject does NOT know if PROTZE had been in HOLLAND before May 1940.

Like Otto Heinrich continued.

CARL RICHARD'S ACTIVITIES AFTER MAY 1940

5. Immediately after the German occupation of HOLLAND (and later on of Belgium and France) PROTZE came shortly into the Abwehr picture. He had instructions to penetrate the Allied intelligence branches and especially their courier lines. He succeeded in tracing these lines as far as FRANCE, operating via BELGIUM. He was also very successful in overrunning several W/T stations operated by Allied agents. During this time PROTZE cooperated with Leitstelle III West fuer Frontaufklärung in PARIS, probably with Maj (later Oberst) REILE, OC III F.
6. PROTZE extended his activities to III C & work: the tracing of "Schleusungslinien". Dropped Allied pilots were sent along these lines to Neutral countries, mostly SPAIN and PORTUGAL. Subject does NOT know if PROTZE himself went to these countries and if he succeeded in capturing pilots. (over)
7. During the period at ENSCHEDE PROTZE must have been rather successful in his Abwehr activities, as Maj VON FELDMANN, at the time OC KIX 306, represented PROTZE as an example to his Kommando: "When an old man of 70 had so much success in operating into Belgium, why had all the pers of his Kommando NO results?" The Kommando and the Trupp felt this as rather unfair, as FAT 365 was newly established and had NONE such old relations as PROTZE had.
8. During his Abwehr activities in HOLLAND, PROTZE got his instructions direct from the OKW in Berlin. Some time after the retreat of the Germans, probably since Oct 44 PROTZE got his instructions from the Oberbefehlshaber West. In Mar/Apr 45 a newly assigned Oberbefehlshaber Nordwest sent instructions via Heeresgruppe "H" which was applicable for the HOLLAND area.
9. Subject could give NO names or descriptions of PROTZE's agents, but stated that Hptstuf KNOP, OC SD EK ENSCHEDE was on friendly terms with PROTZE.
10. Brigf SCHOENWARTH, B&S, was a close friend of PROTZE. On the 1st of Oct 44 PROTZE celebrated his 50th anniversary of entering the military service. Some days afterwards SCHOENWARTH visited him to offer his congratulations.

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LANGE etto Heinrich (continued)

11. FR.'s

Following miscellaneous FRN's were given by subject:

| | |
|---------|---------|
| FAK 306 | 01703 |
| FAT 350 | 05069 B |
| FAT 365 | 42197 |

ROTTERDAM, 2.10.1943.

Fr. van der Ploeg - ENV
for ASO SOUTH HOLLAND.

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W.R.C.3. Captain Ferguson.

PA PF 602,081

94

Please see the attached current report on Erwin KNOP.

W.R.N.E.
5.11.45.

J. Langley

WRH.

*PA as copy in PF for PROIZE
PF. 602,081
Destroy and copy
Done*

*Destroy this report. Adds nothing.
Done*

9961 AON 6

RESULT OF LOOK-UP.

- No Trace NT.
- No Lively Trace NLT.
- Cannot Identify To be written in full.
- Complete Information Card C.I. Card; every particular to be copied from card.
- Query connected with ? Coun's.
- Query identical with -

| NAME LOOKED UP. | RESULT OF LOOK-UP. | FILE Here with / or OUT to - |
|-----------------|--|------------------------------|
| KNOP Erwin | 1st result KNOPPE in ... Erwin or ... KNOPPE & KNOPPP KNOPPE & KNOP P.F. 600679 ... P.F. 600541 LAWRENCE P.F. 601132 HINTERMANN P.F. 325143 BOEN 11.2 300 P.F. 52-Holland-2 ... 200 33299 39441, 38799 3763 | |
| | Looked up by: <u>3763</u> Date: <u>5/11</u> Cont. by: _____ Date: _____ | |

(Continue overleaf if necessary.)

DAC via WHH

WRCS 13A

Subject:- Interrogation Reports

To:- See Distribution

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Date 30 6-4

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2. Any request for further interrogation should be forwarded to this Bureau and a brief supplied.

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o/c GSI(b)
Ext. 38

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Counter Intelligence Bureau.

CI Mr. Pen.

3 of each

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J. RICHARDSON) _____

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Hq BAOR: CS I(a) M11 _____

CS I(a) Pol _____

CS I(a) Pol for PID Liaison
(attn. Maj. PICKERING) _____

C.I.B. Internal:-

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- B 3 _____
- B 5 _____
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- ~~W.R. 100~~ ¹ ~~1~~ please return to WRS with this slip.

~~W.R. 100~~ ¹ ~~1~~ WRC

21 FEB 1946

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13A

INTERROGATION REPORT

DISTRIBUTED

NOV 1945

A.S.O. South Holland
Report No - R 052/1
Date of Interrogation: 29 Oct 45.

NAME
RANK
UNIT
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
NATIONALITY CLAIMED
PERMANENT ADDRESS
CIVILIAN PROFESSION

HMOP Erwin
SS Hauptsturmfuehrer
Sipo, EK ENSCHEDE
1b.6.05. ANNEN
German
ANNEN/WESTF Langestr 33.
Technician

1. PREAMBLE

This report deals only with subject's knowledge of OIS activities of Kapt z See PROTZE & PAARMANN & ONKEL RICHARD. Subject's willingness to "tell-all" was by no means matched in a like degree by his "know-all", as

yes

- a. PROTZE was an "alter Fuchs" too clever to give away much of his activities;
- b. PROTZE worked wholly independently.
- c. Subject saw PROTZE 7 or 8 times only. (contrary to Olt LANGE's statement. see Report No 032/3.)

2.

Since mid 43 subject was attached to the Stab of the Bds at The Hague as chief of Abt IV A 2, where he was in charge of the handling and administration of all captured enemy explosives and had to report on Allied sabotage attacks. He knows many particulars about "1" affairs "KORDPOL" (see Appx "B" Rep R 033 /1). During this "Funkspiel" which was operated by SCHREIEDER, PROTZE frequented The Hague office of the Bds very often. Conferences were held with both SCHREIEDER and DEFFNER.

3. STELLE "P"

Subject does NOT know, if PROTZE played a role in the over-running of Allied W/T stations. Probably PROTZE had been asked by Brigf SCHOENGARTH to put his Abwehr experiences at the disposal of SCHREIEDER, as this "Funkspiel" was rather difficult to "play". Often questions were asked by W/T stations in the UK which SCHREIEDER could not answer.

KNOP Erwin continued.

4. STELLE 'P'

Late 43 SCHREIEDER operated some ALLIED W/T stations. This lasted only a few weeks. Mid 44 once again an "Eisen-Verbindung" (contact between the ground and aeroplanes) was operated on a small scale, also only for a short time. Subject does NOT know if ONKEL RICHARD played a role in these stories. He can only remember that late summer 44 he drove either SCHREIEDER or DEPPNER, maybe both, in his car to ONKEL RICHARD who was at this time in NIJMEGEN.

5.

The 848. Brigf SCHOENGARTH, must have known PROTZE a long time before and subject had the impression that they were old friends. On the occasion of PROTZE's anniversary of his birthday in 1944 (end of July) subject (who was in Zeist) got orders from SCHOENGARTH to visit PROTZE at his address Villa "Aloha" Berg an Dal NIJMEGEN. He took with him a bunch of flowers from SCHOENGARTH

6.

After DEPPNER's return to BERLIN Mar 45 PROTZE sometimes visited his successor KOLITZ.

7.

Shortly after KNOP's posting to ENSCHEDE he had to contact ONKEL RICHARD to ask him to report to SCHREIEDER who was at that time in ZWOLLE.

8.

During subject's ENSCHEDE period KORVKAPT DR MEYER FROM AST WILHELM-SCHLAFER visited KNOP 3 or 4 times. MEYER told him he was operating a "Schleusungslinie" that was to be used by some dropped Allied pilots. On Saturday 31 Mar 45 MEYER once again visited KNOP and asked if he could get some men that night. The "Schleusungsgeschichte" had become acute and he had to arrest some people KNOP agreed. Later on MEYER returned and told KNOP he had to visit ONKEL RICHARD. Subject does not know if this visit to ONKEL RICHARD had something to do with the "Schleusung" but thinks it very probable.

9.

About PROTZE's activities in the past, subject does NOT know much. He was already an active Abwehr agent during World War 1.

13A

KNOF Erwin continued.

10. PROTZE is ^{STATED} ~~(with belief)~~ to have received his instructions via Sonderkommando III beim OKW in Berlin.

11. ^{CSM/100} Probably PROTZE worked also "II maszig" sabotage but subject is NOT able to mention any of PROTZE's II contacts.

Rotterdam 2.10.1945.

Fr. v.d. Ploeg - HWV

for A30 South Holland

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PC 60-081
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Dated 257245

on PC for PROIZE
up file to me please.
hws/waci (d)

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12A

OSDIO/TA
ROR

ROR ROR

IR 20

PERIODICAL REPORT

ON

Major Adolf von HELLER

Brief for this case was received with letter
HACR/LIN/RAAS (13) dated 17 Sep 45. This report deals with
Question 6.

QUESTION 6

'The exact functions of BELLER on the Western
Front with details of cases wherever possible'.

Prisoner has been interrogated at some length on
this subject, and has given the following information, which
has been divided into five sections:-

| Section A (Part 1 - 3) | PROIZE's act | dates prior to 1930 |
|------------------------|--------------|--------------------------|
| " B (" 1 - 14) | " " | 1938 - 40 |
| " C (" 12 - 15) | " " | Jan 40 - Oct 44 |
| " D (" 16 - 22) | " " | Sep 44 - Mar 45 |
| " E (" 23 - 28) | " " | Earl Mar 45 - Apr 45. |

1. PROIZE's Activities Prior to 1938

1. PROIZE was a naval officer who had risen from the
ranks in the last war, and was a close personal friend of
Admiral GANNIS. Up to 1938 Kap PROIZE was Leiter Abwehr III f,
and, in fact, had created this Abteilung.
2. During this time Prisoner was Leiter III f Ost
BERLIN, and directly subordinate to PROIZE. He states, how-
ever, that he received little or no guidance from PROIZE, and
had to go to BERLIN every time he wanted a decision on a
report.
3. Running of agents:

The circumstances through which Prisoner first became
aware that PROIZE was already at that time running his own
agents were as follows:

- (1) Meetings of Aston. Aston LINSNER, NIEL, BRENN,
COLOGNE, FRIEDRICH and WILHELM SEYER were all con-
cerned with same aspect of III f work in HOLLAND.
Owing to lack of guidance from higher authority
the III f Leiter of these Aston held informal
weekly meetings, where the problems arising
from their work in HOLLAND were discussed. At
one of these meetings Prisoner was told that
PROIZE was running his own agents in HOLLAND.

Lye/WRH
31/112-45

(ii) The Case of Klaus ROOGEVEEN. Prisoner was about to recruit for his III f service a man connected with the International Seaman's Club at THE HAGUE, name since forgotten; during the course of a conversation with PROTEZ in LADDIN, Prisoner mentioned the name of his prospective agent, and shortly afterwards learned that one Klaus ROOGEVEEN had contacted his man. The prospective agent explained at length to Prisoner that in Dutch circles ROOGEVEEN was known to be working for the Germans, and said that, if ROOGEVEEN were sent to him again, he would have to drop all relations with the Germans.

(iii) Almost immediately afterwards ROOGEVEEN again queried Prisoner's pitch in regard to a contact he was trying to work up with the FICO - unsuccessfully, as it later turned out - and which he had mentioned in his report to LADDIN. Prisoner explained personally to Chief AHW III, and was then told that ROOGEVEEN was one of PROTEZ's agents, and that the latter would be instructed to assist in future from exploiting on his own account contacts reported to him by the Aston.

B. STELLE P- 1938 - 40.

4. In 1938 PROTEZ was retired from his post as Leiter III f, but in view of his experience as an Abwehr officer and his friendship with Admiral CAJUMER, he was allowed to continue working for the Abwehr, in spite of his age. As he already had contacts with HOLLEND, he now built up his own independent III f organisation there, which was known as Stolle P.

5. Cover:

His cover was Reich Plenipotentiary for the German State Railways, and as such he was nominally part of the official German Tourist Agency in THE HAGUE, WASSERBUR, headed by one SPERLING. His cover-name was BLANKEN, but unofficially he was known as 'Onkel RICHARD' (his Christian name).

6. Staff

Stelle P's staff consisted of PROTEZ, 'Tante LENA' his niece, a woman in her fifties, who acted as the secretary, and a driver.

7. Activities

Prisoner states that he can give no details of the work of Stelle P during this period, since all official contact between PROTEZ and Prisoner had ceased. Prisoner himself was shortly afterwards transferred from Ast HILBURG. Prisoner states categorically that the III f section of Ast HILBURG had no contact with Stelle P or with KERNERLANDS. PROTEZ, furthermore, was extremely discreet, and never disclosed any information about his organisation.

12A

8. Stolle P's Connections with KO

When the KO (KIMMERLING) was set up under SO UTRECHT in 1943, Stolle P collaborated with it to the extent of handling their mail. In return KO placed at Stolle P's disposal its courier facilities via the diplomatic bag, and also kept Stolle P informed of its other activities, which would not have come to the knowledge of Stolle P...

9. Contacts with FICO

During the time when Prisoner was in contact with BROUKE, BROUKE was still Leiter III of BLAGIN, and was well aware, through Prisoner's reports, via Lt Col BURG, of what information he was receiving about the FICO at THE HAGUE. Much later BROUKE told Prisoner that whilst his information about the FICO had been good, he, BROUKE, had a much better source, but further details were not disclosed, except that BROUKE mentioned he had direct contact with a secretary there.

10. Other Agents

Prisoner is unable to give any particulars apart from the already mentioned Hans MOOSEVICH. Stolle P is believed to have built up a small but reliable network of agents.

11. About a week before the invasion of HOLLAND, in A. 40, BROUKE was 'recalled for consultations'. Prisoner is certain that the invasion came as a surprise to BROUKE, and that he prepared no Fifth Column activities of any kind.

C. Period, Apr 40 - Oct 44

12. Prisoner is unable to give an account of the activities of Stolle P during this period, but has given the following information:-

13. BROUKE returned to HOLLAND immediately after the occupation, and dropped his cover-name of BLAGIN, and worked under his own name.

14. Connections with Abraham III P. GISELS (later NK 307 (GISELS))

This organization replaced the KO after the German occupation, and Stolle P continued to work independently as before. Relations between GISELS and BROUKE were not good. Prisoner cites as an instance of this a report Stolle P had prepared on the penetration of an Allied escape route from HOLLAND via BLAGIN and BROUKE to SPAIN, which BROUKE sent to BLAGIN and to Prisoner in PARIS, but NOT to GISELS in HOLLAND, who should have been informed.

15. During this period BROUKE moved from WISSEVELD to UTRECHT, where he remained until the Allied advance into SEIZING, autumn 1944, when he went to NIEBEEK.

D. Period Sep 43 - Mar 44

16. When PAK 306 arrived in HOLLAND in Sep 43, Prisoner was PROBLE in WIERDEN, and it was arranged between them that Stolle P should be attached to PAK 306, as communications with HOLLAND had broken down. From then until Mar 44, Stolle P worked with PAK 306 from WIERDEN, although retaining its customary independence; PROBLE supplied intelligence reports to PAK 306, and forwarded them through the usual channels.

17. PAK 306 also supplied Stolle P with money funds, which, Prisoner remembers, came to about 5000 guilders a month.

18. Stolle P's activities

As Stolle P, unlike PAK 306, which had just arrived in HOLLAND, disposed of a well-established and reliable agent net centred around the LEEUE-UTRECHT district, it was asked by Army Gp II to concentrate on operational intelligence, and during this period Stolle P did little III F work, except in isolated instances, such as passing across the lines Spielmaterial received from PAK 306 (See Interim Report 14, para 10).

19. Information

Prisoner remembers receiving reports from Stolle P dealing with the following subjects:-

Northern HOLLAND: ANWERP: Effect of V-weapons; Shipping; Troop movements through LEEUE barracks; CAMP LEEFOLDSBOURG: Units stationed there; Troop movements towards the ROER Sector.

Southern HOLLAND: PLUS-ING: Landings of stores and equipment and transport routes to the front; AREDA: Location of reporting centre of SIS; HINDLOK: Troop movements; TILBURG: Location of HQ British Second Army; BIESSOCH: Route for route suitable for line-crossers and recon detachments; DENUE: Methods of flooding and flood-control; EINDHOVEN: Position of heavy arty NORTH of town; NUIJEN: Troop movements SE of town. Position of Dutch Legion (Princess Irene); VAS LIND: (Opposite HEIKENOLD Forest) Troop movements; HAREN nr ROER DIND: Details re HQ 21 Army Gp, located in cantonment there.

File of the line to BROUWER and HOLLAND

Spies Material: Stolle P was instructed to pass on Spies Material supplied by Amy Op via FAX 306.

Special Reports: FROTZE received from time to time comprehensive reports dealing with the general political and economic situation in Allied Occupied HOLLAND. Prisoner saw only one such report, which came from a well-informed source in Dutch government circles.

20. Agents

Prisoner states that his knowledge of Stolle P's agents is limited; FAX 306 merely received intelligence summaries from FROTZE, who did not divulge his sources. It was clear, however, that most of Stolle P's agents during this period were engaged in regular weekly line-crossings. Prisoner does not know of a single case of a Stolle P agent being caught. When FROTZE left HOLLAND in Jan 45, he gave the names of his agents in the UTRECHT-ENSCHEDE area to FAT 365, which had been instructed to form an R-Net. From this Prisoner can give the cover-names and approx locations of the chief agents of Stolle P in that area, who in turn had sub-agents or informants working for them (See Appendix A).

- (i) WILHELMSON: Dutch subject. Carried out regular line-crossing missions; in particular he had a good contact with one of the officers of the Princess Irene Regt. The officer was NOT aware that he was dealing with a German agent.
- (ii) BREY : Worked in the UTRECHT area. No further details.
- (iii) LANGE & LURE: One of FROTZE's main agents. He owned a restaurant in UTRECHT, and through some sort of part-time police duties had access to the military telephone line from the Kommandantur UTRECHT to ENSCHEDE. He acted as a clearing-house for all other agents' reports and either 'phoned them through' to Stolle P, or handed them to the Kommandantur for transmission to Stolle P.
- (iv) ONDERLJN &
(v) JONGERLJN: Two particularly reliable agents of Stolle P. Prisoner thinks that ONDERLJN was the cover-name for SASSEN, who was mayor of ONDERLJN, and therefore in an exceptionally good position to supply information. JONGERLJN was believed to be his son.
- (vi) LEHNIS : Dutch Police Officer (Lt?), who worked for the Sipo in THE HAGUE. This man was not an agent, but ran Stolle P's agents in THE HAGUE. LEHNIS may have been his real name. Age about 30, good figure, nondescript appearance, blue eyes, wore civilian clothes. Prisoner knows of only two agents run by LEHNIS. /6

(vii) Klass 0003V. Worked for many years for PROTEZ, see para 3 (ii).

(viii) 'KOMMUNIST'
(Cover-name
forgotten)

German agent who had penetrated the RVV, part of the Delta organization. This man was approached by 'WASSENAR' (cover-name for the leader of the RVV) and instructed to contact the British Intelligence Service which was supposed to have a reporting centre in the Military Academy in JERBA. This line-crossing mission was successful, but Prisoner cannot state what the subsequent developments were.

(ix) VOGEL-
SKORPION(?) :

Prisoner heard from occasional remarks by PROTEZ that VOGEL was the cover-name of a group of about ten young Dutchmen, recruited or controlled by JONKERLIN. Later he heard from PROTEZ that a group of agents for special tasks behind the Allied lines was to be formed, similar to the Allied SAS units, and that the name of this unit was SKORPION. Prisoner believes that SKORPION and VOGEL were the same group. When Prisoner asked PROTEZ what this had to do with III F work, PROTEZ said that he had his own ideas on the subject, and refused to give any more information. Prisoner thinks it unlikely that anything ever came of this project.

21. Communications

Owing to difficulties of transport and communications PROTEZ did not personally visit his agents. From time to time he went to the Hotel de Graaf, ENSCHEDE, to meet an agent there. Between Sep 44 and Mar 45 Prisoner is certain that PROTEZ left ENSCHEDE only once to see his agent LANGE in UTRECHT. His main channel of communication with his agents was through LANGE (see para 20 (iii)).

22. Net of Stay-behind agents

PROTEZ was trying to form a net of stay-behind agents in early spring 45. Prisoner states that from what little PROTEZ told him, he gained the impression that he had no conception of the difficulties involved, his plan being to pick six or seven of his older and reliable agents and to leave them to get the information across as best as they could, by means of line-crossers. Prisoner later refused PROTEZ's request for a WT transmitter and said that all WT equipment was needed for the R-Net which BAK 306 was then trying to form. Prisoner states that it is most unlikely that Stelle P's R-Net ever became operational.

12A

B. Period End of Mar 45 - Apr 45

- 23. At the end of Mar 45, Stelle P detached itself from PAK 306, and took up temporary quarters at HENGELO in HOLLAND. Meanwhile PAK 306 left HOLLAND with the Heeresgruppe-punktschwarm, and took up quarters in the Western part of the Province of LINGVIER. As far as Prisoner remembers, this was in the district of BALSCHEN and it was there that PROTZE, with his secretary and transport, again reported to PAK 306.
- 24. As Stelle P was not organized for mobile operations, and as it was considered that the unit would become a burden to PAK 306, particularly as Stelle P was no longer in touch with its agents, it was arranged with Army Gp for the unit to be taken out of the operational scene. PROTZE was therefore given orders to proceed to OSTFRIESLAND and prepare an R-Net there.
- 25. Before leaving, PROTZE gave the names of the agents listed in para 20. They were passed on by ST to PAK 365, which was then trying to form a net of stay-behind agents in HOLLAND.
- 26. At the beginning of Apr 45 PROTZE left for OSTFRIESLAND, but did not mention his future plans.
- 27. In mid-Apr, when PAK 306 was at BIESEDORF in SACHSEN-WEIM, a message was received via the Heeresgruppe to the effect that PROTZE was in KELLINGHUSEN (HOLSTEIN) and was trying to make contact with the PAK as he had run out of petrol. Prisoner met PROTZE shortly afterwards when PAK 306 moved SOUTH to RENDSBURG. PROTZE confirmed that he had been in OSTFRIESLAND, but said that he would shortly be moving his quarters. He told Prisoner he would inform him of his whereabouts in due course.
- 28. Later in Apr 45, a few days after their meeting, Prisoner received an urgent teleprint from PROTZE saying that he required petrol for his transport. It was NOT clear, however, from where the teleprint had been sent. OLLENBURG was mentioned as the point where the message had been handed in, but it was not clear whether it was OLLENBURG in OSTFRIESLAND or OLLENBURG in HOLSTEIN, though it was probably the latter. Since then Prisoner has heard nothing more of PROTZE.

OSD/C/WEA
22 Oct 45

[Signature]


 for Colonel GS
 Commanding OSD/C/WEA

DA

APPENDIX A

UNIT AGENTS OF STEELS 7th Oct '44 - Mar '45

NORTH
SEA



NOT TO SCALE

Legend

- Line
- - - x - - - Agents' front line
- - - Agents' Depart Centre
- Agents

EXTRACT.

REC'D 5/11/45
11A

Extract for File No. PF.602.081 Name PROTZE, Kpt. zur
 Original in File No. PF.600.048 FELDMANN, Serial 26a. Receipt Date 18.10.45.
 Original from OSDIC Under Ref. OIB/INT/2428(525)
 Extracted on 5.12.45. by O'B. Section H.I.

Extract taken from 2nd Interim Report on FELDMANN, Major Adolf von

(p.10)

10. Details of Irreführungsmaterial passed by FAK 305.

a) Towards the end of 1944 Heeresgruppe 16 A0 ordered FAK 306 to spread a false report to the effect that two Paratroop divisions were moving up from BREMEN/DELMENHORST and GELDERN towards UTRECHT/ARNHEM. As neither HQ FAK 306 nor its FATA had the necessary CV-Leute to pass messages of this nature, it was decided to enlist, with the consent of Heeresgruppe H, the assistance of the Sipo and Stella P.

Obst KISNER was sent by FAK 306 for discussions with Bds (SCHREIDER, Prisoner at OSDIC/WEA) at ZWOLLE and with the Sipo (Kima, Kdo DEN HAAG (FRANK)). These two units flatly refused to divulge information about the "turned" w/T agents.

11A

agents they were running, but agreed to pass appropriate messages, and the text of these was agreed upon between these units, and Obit HIRSH. In due course, PAK 306 was informed through the Sigs of the text, time and method of transmission of the message, and the exact procedure applied for replies received from the Allied station contacted.

Stella P was informed of the text of the whole order. Kap FROTZE composed his own texts for his agents. PAK 306 was later informed when the messages had been sent, but FROTZE failed to supply copies of the messages or disclose his channels of communication, and exact time when the messages were dispatched.

Prisoner states that, firstly, FROTZE was averse to showing his hand, and secondly, he was not informed by his Agents about their method of approach to the Allied Intelligence Services.

Heeresgruppe H was kept in the picture by PAK 306, and some of the responses from the Allied side were also answered by the Heeresgruppe, via PAK 306 and its channels of communication. Prisoner states that this Irrfuhrung-operation did not succeed, and it was obvious that the Allies had immediately spotted the false statements since they kept asking for checks.

b) In the same way, early in 1945, PAK 306 was ordered to spread a false report to the effect that a new SS Panzer Korps with two divisions was being sent to the area of UTRECHT, after the failure of the MAENDES offensive. This deception was to be carried out to counteract and allay suspicion concerning the false report issued about the two Paratroop divisions mentioned in para 10 a) above.

PAK 306 guessed that the Allies had seen through the first false report, and, in passing the second false report, the fact that the new arrivals were to take the place of the previous two (notional) paratroop divisions was added. The method of disseminating the false report was carried out in the way already described above, but in order to make this information appear more probable, special additional steps were taken to lend credence to the report. For example, the Feldkommandant in UTRECHT was given orders to provide quarters for the notional corps and two divisions. The transport Kommandantur was ordered to put through long-distance calls about the notional arrival of these troops, on telephone lines which were known to be sometimes tapped by the Allies. Similar discussions regarding the notional arrival of these troops took place with the local Dutch authorities, and, in addition, some troop movements and transfers by rail were in fact carried out to mislead them. Finally, various members of the Dienststelle des Reichskommandos were informed about this move, and of its secret nature, since it was felt that any information of this nature passed to them would in due course reach the Allies. All these subsidiary measures were undertaken directly between Heeresgruppe H and the respective services, while PAK 306 was merely put in the general picture.

PAK 306 was not informed about Allied reactions to this second Irrfuhrung mission.

~~SECRET~~
11/12/45

e) At the beginning of 1945, (PAT 359) also received orders from AOK 29 direct to spread misleading reports to the effect that the Germans were bringing up to the area of HERSFORD special units which had been specially trained to combat Allied airborne landing troops. PAT 359 was provided with a bogus written order by AOK 29 containing details of notional formations which were to be brought up for this anti-airborne task. The PAT "lost" the document by planting it at a spot where there was frequent movement between Allied and German troops, and, in such a way, that it would appear as though a despatch rider had left it behind in error. In addition, PAT 359 spread rumours through its own agents among the population.

Prisoner states that FAK 306 was not informed of any reaction by the Allies to this operation.

c) Between Feb and Mar 45, Gb West, via Heeresgruppe H, gave orders to FAK 306 and PAT 365 to create the impression that five new divisions had appeared in the so-called Festung HOLLAND area. The underlying principle of this deceptive operation was to upgrade each of the existing formations in the Festung HOLLAND by one step. Thus, regiments became divisions. New unit titles, flashes, etc were issued and had to be referred to in all communications between formation HQ, but not below divisional level, and strict orders were issued that nobody below divisional staff should hear about this re-naming. The whole system was, according to Prisoner, incredibly complicated and mistakes were often made, eg a division would address correspondence inadvertently to the subordinate regiments using their notional divisional titles.

FAK 306 employed the same method as used on former occasions for disseminating this false information. PAT 365 used its agents to spread rumours among the population. The whole operation was drawn out until the retreat from HOLLAND, and FAK 306 was not informed of any Allied reactions to this Irrofführungoperation.

QUESTION 4

D

11. Supply details about liaison between FAK and B&S agents.

Prisoner states that the only instance of liaison between FAK 306 and B&S agents known to him is provided in the case of the Irrofführungoperation, already described above. In any case, there was no contact with the agents themselves, since B&S invariably refused to disclose the names or any details of the two "turned" WT operators who were used to pass the messages.

FATs may possibly have liaised direct with B&S, but Prisoner considers this unlikely as relations between B&S and FA units were invariably strained, as has already been explained. In any case, FAT agents were not always known to HQ FAK 306, since FATs were not required to register names of their agents with HQs.

SUBJECT: Von FELDMANN

SECRET

TO: CE WAR ROOM, LONDON

100
CII/RY/2428(545)

13 Oct 45

Reference Special Interim Interrogation Report No 5 on Von FELDMANN

2. At a subsequent examination Von FELDMANN supplied the following further information about Stelle P, which it is felt supplements considerably the Interim Report referred to:-

(i) FELDMANN stated that up to 1938, ~~Karl~~ PROTZE was Leiter of the entire Abw III P organisation, and in fact he had created this Abt. In 1938, on account of his age, PROTZE was required to give up his position as Leiter III P, but in view of the fact that he was a man of some ability and had enterprise, he was not put on the retired list, but by arrangement with Admiral CAFFARI, he was sent to the HAGUE to set up his own independent organisation which became known as Stelle P. PROTZE had always interested himself in affairs concerning HOLLAND, particularly as regards espionage, and during his period as Leiter III P, he had personally run his own agents in HOLLAND.

(ii) FELDMANN explained that in 1938, there were three independent Abw organisations operating in HOLLAND. In the first place, there was the KD NEDERLAND, which was supervised by one SCHULTZE-BERGERDT, and came under direct control of Abt Abw. BERLIN. Secondly, there was Stelle P, also working direct to BERLIN, and thirdly, Abt-HAMBURG, which ran its own independent III P organisation under FELDMANN in HOLLAND. FELDMANN stated categorically that the III P section of Abt-HAMBURG had no contact whatsoever with Stelle P or with KD NEDERLAND. FELDMANN knew PROTZE personally, saw him frequently in HOLLAND, and states that PROTZE was extremely discreet, and never disclosed any information about his own organisation. FELDMANN claims that with one exception he never learnt about PROTZE's sources of information.

(iii) The one exception was Klass HOOGEVEEN, and FELDMANN came to hear about this man in the following manner: FELDMANN was about to recruit for his III P service a man, connected with the International Seamen's Club at the HAGUE, name since forgotten; during the course of a conversation with PROTZE, FELDMANN mentioned the name of his prospective agent, and shortly afterwards, learnt that PROTZE had sent one of his own agents, Klass HOOGEVEEN, to contact this man. The prospective agent was surprised that the Germans had sent HOOGEVEEN to see him, particularly as HOOGEVEEN was well known in Dutch circles to be working for the Germans, and the prospective agent complained at once to FELDMANN that if HOOGEVEEN were sent to him again, he would have to drop all relations at once with the Germans.

X. Received in War Room on
16.10.45.

CIB
/o CSI(b)
HQ BAOR
Phone: 2842/40
Regd ADLS
FM/MC

27 OCT 1945
J. Brigadier,
Counter Intelligence Bureau.

SECRET

H-Form 81b Jan 4 45

EXTRACT

104

Extract for File No. PP.602,081. Name: PROTZE.

Original in File No. Archive P.Y.22. Vol. 100a Serial 100a Receipt Date 16.10.45.

Original from Camp 020. Under Ref. 15.10.45. Dated: 15.10.45.

Extracted on 4.12.67. by SP Section: R5.

Extract from Camp 020 Interim Report on the case of Erich PROTZER, (1944: Member of the German Intelligence Service).

SOME GENERAL CONTACTS OF KORV, KPT. DR. ERICH PROTZER.

PROTZE, Pres. Kpt. @ "UNCLE RICHARD":

"If the original in the file of an individual includes the name of the CIA owner"

First met by PROTZER in Berlin in 1934; not then an officer, but a civilian employee of the Abwehr: "PROTZE had been a warrant officer in the former Imperial Marine and was demobilized after the first World War; later he was given a post as civilian assistant in the former Reichswehrministerium. I don't know when he entered the Abwehr, but it must have been very early on. In 1934 there was as yet no Referat III F in the Abwehr. It was PROTZE who introduced an early section of this nature; he was at once successful, for it was through his efforts that the Polish SOBNOWSKI espionage case was brought to light. Later, when he was taken over by the Abwehr as an officer, he formed the Referat III F proper. When this had been built up into a Gruppe and taken over by another officer, there was friction; "UNCLE RICHARD", as he was known, was transferred to the HAGUE to build up a small secret III F Stelle. He was there during the war; I saw him briefly during the advance in 1940 and later in Paris, when he took part in a conference. During the war years his work was said to have deteriorated badly."

SECRET

AR.B
24/12

EXTRACT

102

Extract for File No. PF. 602,081 Name PROTZE
 Original in File No. PF. 600,048 - FELDMANN Serial 25a Receipt Date 16.10.45
 Original from B.A.C.R. Under Ref. CSDIC/WEA Dated 16.9.45
 Extracted on 21.10.45 by BSV Section H.4.

Extract from Special Interim Report on interrogation of von
FELDMANN, Adolf, captured Abwehr III agent.

5. Kpt. PROTZE c
Onkol RICHARD.

Stelle P was attached to FAK 306 for a short time after the unit's transfer to Holland. Stelle P worked independently but supplied intelligence reports direct to FAK 306, who forwarded them through the usual channels.

At the end of Mar 45, Stelle P detached itself from FAK 306 and took up quarters temporarily at HEMELO in HOLLAND. Meanwhile FAK 306 evacuated HOLLAND with Heeresgruppenkommando and took up quarters in the WEST area of the Province of HANOVER. As far as FELDMANN remembers this was in the district of BRAMSCHEN and it was in this area that PROTZE, with his secretary and transport, again reported to FAK 306.

P.T.O.

[Handwritten signature and date]
 12/10
 12/10/45

7. WEIMANN states that a Stelle P was not organized for mobile operations and as it was considered that the unit would become a burden to FAK 306, particularly since Stelle P was no longer in touch with any of its agents, it was arranged with Heeresgruppe for the unit to be taken out of the operational zone. PROTZE, before leaving, supplied one or two names to FAK 306, which were passed on by W/T to FAT 365, with instructions to find out whether any of these agents of PROTZE's were likely to be of any use. However, the FAK received no reply from FAT 365.

8. At the beginning of Apr 45, PROTZE left with his unit for Ost FRIESLAND but did not mention his units future plans.

9. Mid-April, when FAK 306 was at BERGSDORF in SACHSENWALD, a message was received via Heeresgruppe to the effect that PROTZE was in KNELDINGHUSEN (HOLSTEIN) and was trying to make contact with the FAK as he had run out of petrol. WEIMANN met PROTZE shortly afterwards when FAK 306 moved SOUTH to RENDSBURG. PROTZE confirmed that he had been in OST FRIESLAND but said that he would shortly be moving his quarters; he told WEIMANN he would inform him of his whereabouts in due course.

10. Later again in Apr 45, and a few days after their meeting, WEIMANN received an urgent teletype from PROTZE saying that he required petrol for his transport. It was not clear, however, from where the teletype had been sent. OLDENBURG had been mentioned as the point where the message had been handed in, but it was not clear whether it was OLDENBURG in OST FRIESLAND or OLDENBURG in HOLSTEIN. Since then WEIMANN claimed he has heard nothing more of PROTZE.

PA in FF 602,081 PROTZE
197 - PF 602,152 LEEHUIS

95

SECRET

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT.

A.S.O., South Holland
Report No: RC53/1
Date of Interrogation: 28 Aug 45.

NAME: LEEHUIS, Cornelis
ALIASES: WINGEN KEES
DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH: 11 April 1907, AMSTERDAM
NATIONALITY CLAIMED: Dutch
LAST PERMANENT ADDRESS: THE HAGUE, Valkenboschkade 655
PROFESSION: Police-Inspector 2nd class
RANK SD: Sturmscharführer

1. The marginally named was interrogated in connection with a statement by SCHREIEDER during one of his recent interrogations that LEEHUIS was a pre-war agent of PROTZE and therefore of the Abwehr.

2. HISTORY PRIOR to 1940.

Subject was born in AMSTERDAM and attended the Grammar-school there till 1919. Then his family moved to ALMELO where he attended the secondary school for one year and the mechanical school for 3 years. Obtained certificate in 1923. Returned to AMSTERDAM and was employed there by the Nederlandsche Dok Maatschappij as electrician from 1923-1925. From April 1925 - April 1927 employed by MIJNSEN engineering office, Keizersgracht AMSTERDAM. In April 1927 departed for a 3 months' trip to TEXAS U.S.A. aboard the ss "Woensdrecht" of van Ommen Shipping Co as assistant-engineer. July 1927 - early 1930 employed by Twentsche Bank, Spuistraat, AMSTERDAM as doorkeeper. 9 February 1930 appointed policeman, member of municipal police corps at THE HAGUE. Early 1932 - March 1938 on active service with Motor-police. March 1938 - 15 June 1939 Traffic control. 15 June 1939 Detective in photographic dept. of THE HAGUE pol.

3. HISTORY

W/MSH
18 AUG 45

LEENHUIS 2

3. HISTORY FROM 1940.

1940 - May 1943 Detective of the photographic department.

1943 May, transferred to Documentation Department, which was taken over by the SD in August 1944.

4. LEENHUIS stated that he met PROTZE & PAARMAN for the first time in early 1943 and was introduced to him by KROM F.O. member of the auxiliary police THE HAGUE, working also for SD and acquainted with PROTZE. He had not known KROM for a very long time, but had been put to work with him for the investigation of the murdercase of the WA member Van der SANDE. As a result of this investigation a smuggling affair of jewels from Belgium to Holland was discovered. The jewels referred to were Jewish property and as this had nothing to do with the original investigation into the murder of the WA member the case was handed over to the Devisen Schutz Kdo THE HAGUE.
5. A short time after this investigation was finished subject was put to work again together with KROM, who had received the particulars of an espionage affair in WINTERSWIJK. They went there together in order to find out what had happened to the principal person in the plot, a wholesale-dealer in sugar (name not remembered by subject) reported to have crossed the Dutch-German border regularly before the war in order to gather information for Allied intelligence. The investigation had no actual results because through police records it appeared that the principal person concerned had committed suicide in THE HAGUE when the Germans invaded HOLLAND May 1940.
6. Following the report they made out concerning this case PROTZE asked KROM whether he would request LEENHUIS to come and see him personally. Early 1943 subject met PROTZE for the first time in his private house Lassusweg 99, BILTHOVEN. On this occasion PROTZE inquired whether LEENHUIS would be willing to work for the ABWEHR. He would be especially entrusted with the clearing of old cases. His work for the Abwehr was done with the full knowledge and consent of the HAGUE chief of police HANER.
7. The first order he received from PROTZE was to find out the possible whereabouts and activities of an engineer named FISCHER, who was supposed to have worked for Allied Intelligence before the war. This engineer was a German national and originated from HAMBURG.

The investigation

LEENHUIS 2

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The investigation

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The investigation made by LEENHUIS established that on the 13th May 1940 FISCHER and his wife tried to flee from THE HAGUE to the HOOK OF HOLLAND by motorcar in order to escape to the UK, when they were stopped by a Dutch patrol.

Following their identification as German subjects they were taken prisoner and detained in the police station at POELDIJK. When this place was occupied by a group of German paratroopers, they were released, but when the Germans had to evacuate the place again, the couple was evacuated with the troops and the police from POELDIJK found their corpses in a field on the following morning. They were buried in POELDIJK. This fact is substantiated in local police records.

8. At the same time around February 1943 KROM asked him for assistance at a house search at VIERBERGEN's, Jan Hendrikstraat 5, THE HAGUE, at which address weapons were supposed to be hidden. It appeared however that there were not any weapons in the house, only a family of three Jews in hiding were discovered, living on the top-floor of the house. The family consisted of father, mother and a son, the latter called Jacob Leo MENDELS, former secretary of the radical socialist labour party (RSAP) in Holland.

This Jacob Leo MENDELS requested to be used for Abwehr-activities in order to get his parents and himself released.

The request was granted and MENDELS was sent to NIJMEGEN, shortly after his arrest, with the order to contact a R.Cath. priest by the name of Pater TEN BERGE who was suspected of pro-allied espionage activity. MENDELS had to go there acting to be a Jew who wants to find a good hide-out. He thus stayed for some time in NIJMEGEN, then was sent to ARNHEM, UTRECHT and finally to AMSTERDAM. There he got in touch with a student by the name of WINTERS who was supposed to be working with a W/T operator, passing information to the UK. MENDELS saw to it that LEENHUIS then working under the cover of underground worker by the name of KEES, made the acquaintance of WINTERS. In that way they hoped to find out where the W/T set was and who its operator. The result was that LEENHUIS got in touch with a man named BRAVE who was supposed to be the operator, but just when he found that out, this man was arrested by the SD in AMSTERDAM, so that his contact was spoiled. The case of BRAVE was handled by Sachbearbeiter BARTELS of the SD.

9. In the summer of 1943 LEENHUIS received the order from FROTZE to make a survey of the possibilities for illegal border-crossings between Holland and Belgium.

When going so

When doing so he often had the occasion to go to BRUSSELS where he became acquainted with two Dutch students who were trying to buy francs on the black market in a cafe near the Stock-Exchange in BRUSSELS. During their conversation he found out that they were both members of the resistance in Holland and that it would be quite easy for them to show him a way of getting to Spain.

It was then arranged that subject and a certain VIETOR (under arrest SCHEVENINGEN) actually working for SD would be provided with false identity-papers, passports and other documents for the journey. LEEMHUIS went on his own to PARIS where the meeting point would be Hotel MONTELLON, Rue de Montellon. VIETOR should go from there together with several other persons eager to get to Spain, to MADRID where he would deliver some fake messages for the UK.

In that way they would be able to find out the whole system used by the escape-line organisation. At the Spanish frontier however, VIETOR decided to return to PARIS and handed the messages to someone else from the group he was travelling with. He found out the leader of the escape-line for France, a certain GEORGES DU NORD at LOURDES, but otherwise the whole investigation had no results whatever to the knowledge of subject.

Still PROTZ seemed to be satisfied with the report and both were put to work again on another escape-line organisation just discovered.

10. They were informed by PROTZ that the interrogations of BRAVE (viz para 9) had lead to the discovery of a certain Van GHEEL GILDEMEESTER who was supposed to be the chief of an organisation using planes starting from LILLE (France) to the UK. They contacted him and around December 1943 it was decided that a Dutch student KES VAN DEN BERG would be allowed to make use of the plane to escape to the UK. LEEMHUIS explained to this man how to get to BRUSSELS without much trouble, where he would join him to await GILDEMEESTER to go to LILLE together. When LEEMHUIS arrived in BRUSSELS, however, the student had been picked up by the Feldgendarmorie meanwhile, and on the other hand GILDEMEESTER did not turn up and was never heard of again.

11. After this (end 43) he did not receive any more orders from PROTZ in this line. The only work he did from then on for the ABWEER was making regular reports about the effects on the Dutch public opinion of German measures and British propaganda.

12. In May 1944

96

12. In May 1944 SCHRIEDER heard about the Abwehr activities of subject and had him called into his office together with his Dutch boss, police officer FEGELS. On the occasion he told them that he was not at all pleased with the fact that a member of the police was involved in Abwehr-activities as RAUTER had strictly forbidden that persons employed by the police worked for any organisation NOT controlled by him. PROTZE upon hearing this interfered, however, and informed LEEMHUIS after seeing SCHRIEDER personally to carry on as usual.
13. The last time subject went to see PROTZE personally was in November 1944 in ENSCHEDE. After that date PROTZE was only seen once or twice in THE HAGUE at the police-office. Subject received at the end of 1944 a list of persons supposedly working for Allied Intelligence before the war, of whom he had to find out the activities during the German occupation and their whereabouts. The list consisted of 10 names, amongst which several British, Dutch and German nationals. Subject only remembered one, a British national by the name of CLIVE(?) at THE HAGUE. The situation, however, was such that little or no action could be taken. Moreover since August 1944 the Documents Department of the Dutch police was taken over completely by the SD, Edo KUNT, for whom he had much to do.
14. Re MENDEL (viz para 8) subject stated that this man was more and more involved in activities with a communist underground organisation and the publication of an illegal paper. He did not pass any valuable information to LEEMHUIS. One day at the end of 1943 or early 1944 he was arrested together with other members of the group by SL AMSTERDAM, who informed subject of the arrest because of the fact that MENDEL referred to LEEMHUIS. He did not want to interfere, however, so that MENDEL and his family were sent to Poland.
15. Subject was able to give the following particulars about PROTZE:

Description:

| | |
|----------|--|
| Age | appr 64 years |
| Height | 1.65 M. |
| Hair | grey, growing very thin |
| Eyes | grey |
| Nose | broad, protruding, somewhat reddish |
| Forehead | high, wrinkled skin |
| Mouth | broad, full lips |
| Teeth | apparently artificial denture with some gold teeth |

Complexion

1588815 3

9-5

Complexion reddish, clean shaven
Stature rather thick-set, broad shoulders
Walk somewhat stooping
Disposition very calm
Impression well-adjusted. Speaks and Dutch. Knows French. Has slight Berlin accent. Uses very often the words "Kleene" or "Kleener" when addressing people, especially subordinates.

15. CONCLUSION:

Subject makes the impression of an intelligent man, who knows what he is up to. He states he is an idealist and that now, after the German defeat, he believes in the Nazi-doctrine as the only salvation. He is willing, however, to give any information wanted, especially as he seems to be under the impression that sooner or later he will be released in order to be used against the communists. Repeatedly questioned in connection with possible pre-war activities for the Abwehr, he quite definitely stated that he never worked for the Abwehr or even was acquainted with FRITZE before the war. The first time he met the latter was when introduced by KROM (now in THE HAGUE local jail) at the end of 1942 (viz para 6). It is felt that KROM would be the only one to clear this question completely.

J.A. Enchrach Sgt.
Interrogation Det.
A.S.C., South Holland.

5 Sep 45.

Distr: 1 & stencil
OSLI(H) o/s Int b HQ OFN 1
File 1
Spares 2

SECRET.

Copies filed in PP 66932 Penetration of Allied
Services in Holland.
and PP 448.6 PUTLITZ

CAMP 020.

REPORT dated 30.8.45

To: Major A. F. Elant, B.I.B

SCHULZE-BENNETT

Further to the Y.P. dated 20.8.45, SCHULZE-BENNETT has been interrogated further on certain points, with the following results:-

Van der WILTING

After SCHULZE-BENNETT and PROTZER had returned to Holland from the visit to CANALIS, they met some days later and the VENLO affair was mentioned. PROTZER recalled that Van der WILTING was involved in it, and SCHULZE-BENNETT had the definite impression that he meant that Van der WILTING had taken part on the German side, and that his function was that of agent provocateur. SCHULZE-BENNETT seems quite certain of these last two points.

Von PUTLITZ

After the second leakage concerning an applicant for work with the Germans, PROTZER told SCHULZE-BENNETT that he had information that the traitor in the German Embassy was the "Erster Sekretar". As the only person who could be described in that way was an old spinster who was quite harmless and above suspicion, they thought the traitor must be amongst the subordinate personnel, and suspected some of the clerks.

Actually, of course, the information was correct in English, PUTLITZ being "First Secretary", but incorrect in German, the German designation of PUTLITZ's rank being Legationsrat.

It appears, therefore, that PROTZER's information was given him by somebody who wrongly translated the English term "First Secretary."

Carl DEICHLING

Regarding the question raised by Mr. Noble as to whether SCHULZE-BENNETT knows DEICHLING, he states that DEICHLING was secretary to Von COLSONEN and was a member of the DEICHLING family who were bankers and one of the best known families in Cologne. SCHULZE-BENNETT was not aware of any connection between DEICHLING and German Intelligence. He only knows that he worked in the Legation and later went to Switzerland on business.

Von PUTLITZ's disappearance

SCHULZE-BENNETT states definitely that he was not visiting Von PUTLITZ's house on the night of the latter's disappearance. He did not suspect him and was amazed when he learned of Von PUTLITZ's duplicity. Von PUTLITZ had a dinner engagement with the Ambassador on the evening of his disappearance, and did not turn up. It was the next morning when the Ambassador asked SCHULZE-BENNETT if he knew what had happened to Von PUTLITZ that SCHULZE-BENNETT first knew that there was anything amiss concerning him.

/JEH

For Protsy file

Per Lt. Col. Stinson

EXTRACT FOR P.F. 602,081/PROTZE
ORIGINAL IN P.F. 601,998/REINE 40a.

92

C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) report dated 29.8.44. Ref: S.I.R. 1719.

Report on information obtained from PW CG/2245 Obstlt REINE
Comdt Leitstelle III Westfr Frontaufklarung, surrendered
TRIEN, 31.5.45.

.....

DIEBST-
SHELLS "P"

- 26. This centre consisted of Kapitän zur See PROTZE, who was generally known as "Onkel Richard", and his assistant Präfeklein SORODSKI, generally known as "Tante Lena".
- 27. PROTZE was an old friend of Admiral GEMARIS, whom he met during the 1914-18 war. In the 1920's PROTZE was employed by German Intelligence, and when GEMARIS became Chief of Abwehr, PROTZE became his right hand man in the field of counter-espionage and was the first Chief of Gruppe IIIIF; this post he held until 1938/39. PROTZE, who was by no means a young man, was not equal to the work that this position entailed and was therefore succeeded in 1939 by Oberst ROEHLER.
- 28. PW heard that PROTZE, in appreciation of his past services and because of his popularity, was given the opportunity after 1939 of establishing a centre in accordance with his own ideas; he was to run this centre with such energy as remained to him. This centre was connected with IIIIF HOLLAND. It was not controlled by IIIIF, but directly by Abwehr HQ, to which PROTZE sent his reports. During the occupation of HOLLAND the centre remained independent, under ROEHLER's immediate control.

/5

TELEPHONE
RESULT OF LOOK-UP. B.I.B. Major Blunt

| NAME LOOKED UP | RESULT OF LOOK-UP | FILE Here with # of DUT |
|------------------|--|-------------------------|
| CHARMAN, G. D. | 2 - Red and J.A. | |
| PROTZE, R.F. DE1 | SP-7410 (10) v. 2 SP-114412 Linnis F-207 | |
| | Looked up by OS/AH Date 1/5 Conn. by Date | |

(Continue serial if necessary.)
Filed by Date

5, FORM 14A

40

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EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
.....

Was discharged because he was extremely nervous and
quarrelled with everybody. It was intended that he should join
B'S HOLD, but PW does not know whether this took effect.

18. PIEPE

Was relieved of his oral and discharged on account of
heart trouble.

19. SAIZEN

Had never been of any use to III. PW believes that he had
been Mayer of BLITZEN before his release, which was made on his
own request and granted with pleasure.

Dienst-
Stelle "P"
(contd)

29. This state of affairs continued until autumn 44, when PROTZE's centre was placed under command of Leitstelle III West, and ROHLER was posted to Abt IV of RS W. It was considered desirable that Dienststelle "P" should in future cooperate more closely with Frontaufklärung III West. Henceforth Leitstelle III West was the recipient of PROTZE's reports and results, but the channel used both for despatches and WF traffic was the FAX located in HOLLAND, which during the last phase of the war was FAX 306. This resulted in the closest cooperation between PROTZE and Major von FELDMANN.
30. PROTZE would have preferred to work in close cooperation with PW but the distance between their respective locations and the pressure of work of a more important kind on which PW was engaged, made this impossible. PW never found time to visit PROTZE and states that he does not even know how Dienststelle "P" was organised, nor exactly where in HOLLAND it was located.
31. Dienststelle "P" was given the same tasks as FAXs and FAXs, i.e.
 - (a) The obtaining of information through counter-espionage about Allied military plans
 - (b) The establishing of contacts for the purpose of passing deceptive information
 - (c) Penetration, through agents, of Allied intelligence organisations and groups of agents.
32. The results obtained by PROTZE were, in view of his age and lack of staff, considered good. They were naturally much smaller than those achieved by FAXs. As far as PW knows PROTZE succeeded only on one or two occasions in penetrating groups of Allied agents in HOLLAND. He had several agents who, when the front was in SOUTHERN HOLLAND, penetrated the Allied lines for the purpose of obtaining military information for Abwehr I, or for passing deceptive information to the Allies. PW is unable to give details of these operations.
33. One of PROTZE's agents was a man of Polish descent who had a Polish name which PW cannot remember. He lived in PARIS during the German occupation and ran an antique or picture shop with his wife. His cover name was LARI. He is about 41 yrs old, medium height, dark. PW cannot state whether or not he stayed behind in FRANCE when the Germans retreated. He never heard of him again.

5/11/45
15/11/45

PERSONALITIES
(contd)

36. Obstlt MIERA, PAK 314

Regular officer, aged 48 - 49 years. Had formerly worked in counter-espionage in the EAST. Joined Abwehr in 1941 or 1942, where he was WOLLEDER's first assistant. Transferred to Leitstelle III West in spring 44. Was PW's deputy until Sep 44. Then took command of PAK 314 when BINGER was transferred to RSHA VI Z. In this position MIERA worked excellently. He was particularly good at cooperating with armies, corps and divisions and in carrying out Frontaufklärung in the main line of defence. He was also excellent at evaluating information and had considerable knowledge of Allied Intelligence Services, including the Russian.

37. Major v FELDMANN, PAK 306

Had formerly been a regular officer. Was available for employment again since 1942. Had been in Abwehr since about 1935. Worked for Ast HAMBURG before the war in HOLLAND with the task of obtaining information about the British Intelligence Service. During the first few years of the war he was employed in many different ways. In Mar 43 he joined IILF in Abwehr Leitst 11e, PARIS. He became commander of PAK 306 in PARIS in Mar 44.

He was a good soldier, energetic and experienced in counter-espionage. A good organizer and leader of men. His PAK was therefore successful. He personally, according to PW, rarely ran agents or spoke to them. He had good and quick judgment and his evaluation of information was sound.

Von FELDMANN was a distant relation of Admiral CANARIS. This fact may explain why v FELDMANN was often in conflict with the local Sipe, who tended to interfere with his work. Von FELDMANN, on the orders of Admiral CANARIS, insisted on the correct treatment of all prisoners of war and agents, and imposed severe punishment in cases where this order was not carried out.

38. Obstlt DERNBACH, PAK 313

Regular officer, about 46 years old, joined Abwehr in 1938. Was previously with the Police. DERNBACH was extremely good at handling agents. He was, however, handicapped by his excessive love of detail and his lack of power of delegation. He tended to want to do everything important himself. He was successful as leader of his PAK but failed to get the best out of his unit and the PAKs under his command. He permitted only a very small

SECRET.

TOP SECRET

CAMP 020.

8B
On file in P. U. L. I. T. Z.
P. 6692 Penetration of Allied
Services in Holland.

REPORT dated.....

26th August, 1945.

To: Major A. P. Hunt, B. I. B.

SCHULZE-BENNETT

With reference to your memorandum of 20.8.45. SCHULZE-BENNETT denies any knowledge of the details of the leakage from the P.C.O.'s office in Holland, stating that this was the province of Fregattenkapitän PROTZE & PAARMANN, the Abw. III man in Holland who was an old hand and kept his sources very secret: he was entirely independent of SCHULZE-BENNETT.

As to how it was discovered that PUTLITZ was working for the British, SCHULZE-BENNETT states that this was as follows:

Persons wishing to work for German Intelligence wrote to the German Embassy which passed the applications to SCHULZE-BENNETT. On one occasion such an application was received from a Dutchman (name forgotten, referred to hereafter as A). SCHULZE-BENNETT forwarded A's letter to the Abwehrstelle in Berlin. A few days later he was informed by PROTZE that the British P.C.O. was aware of A's application. SCHULZE-BENNETT deduced that the leakage must have occurred (1) in the post, (2) in his own office or (3) in the Embassy.

A week later another man, B, visited the Embassy with a view to working for the Germans and was interviewed by PUTLITZ: he left his card and this was passed to SCHULZE-BENNETT. Again shortly afterwards PROTZE informed SCHULZE-BENNETT that the British P.C.O. knew of B's application. This eliminated (1). SCHULZE-BENNETT informed the German Ambassador, warning him not to mention the matter to anyone else: the Ambassador, however, told PUTLITZ.

A little later SCHULZE-BENNETT was again approached by PROTZE, who told him that the P.C.O. had heard of a third man (C) who had volunteered to work for the Germans. SCHULZE-BENNETT had no record of C in his office, and went to the Embassy, where he found there had been correspondence with C. Thus (2) was eliminated and he knew the leakage must be from the Embassy: he informed the Ambassador of this.

The following day PUTLITZ had disappeared.

SCHULZE-BENNETT maintains that he personally never suspected PUTLITZ until his disappearance, and he does not think anyone in the Embassy did so. Kapitän BENTON, the Naval Attaché, remarked after PUTLITZ's disappearance that he must have been the person responsible for leakage of information concerning the sailings of German coastal vessels.

Referring to question 3 on your memorandum, SCHULZE-BENNETT says he knows little about the persons mentioned and never met any of them. He thinks PROTZE mentioned that VILHELM was one of the most important agents of Major STEVEN of the B.P.C.O. working at 'The Hague', that HILMARICHS 'worked for the Abw. III department of the British Intelligence Service' and that he also mentioned the name BOONER.

As regards question 4, SCHULZE-BENNETT had only heard that Dr. ASCHER was arrested as a British agent, but knows no details.

SECRET.

CAMP 020.

REPORT dated

28th August, 1965.

...../continued

Regarding the Venlo incident, SCHULZ-BENNETT denies having had any knowledge of the plan beforehand. He first heard of it when he and PROTAS were on a visit to GULARS on the day of, or the day following, the incident; GULARS told them that the Gestejo had captured STEVENS, M&SI and the driver, and that a Dutch officer had been shot. All that he heard of the episode which was not common knowledge was from PROTAS, who said that a certain Van der WILLEN was involved in the affair.

A description of PROTAS by SCHULZ-BENNETT is attached.

JS.

Eric Stinson

for Lt. Col. Stinson

Description submitted by SCHILLEN-BENNETT

Richard PROTZE & PAFFMANN

Nationality: German.
Age: Between 60 and 65 years.
Build: Strong, robust, slim.
Height: About 1.80m.
Weight: About 170lb.
Hair: White scanty hair, parted in the middle.
Eyes: Blue.
Face: Oblong.
Complexion: Careworn, haggard, looks as though he lives well.
Nose: Thick and reddish, rather alcoholic.
Cleanshaven: Yes.
Hands: Large strong hands, left hand apparently a bit disabled.
Appearance: Slightly bent, otherwise appearance of a naval man in good health.
Clothes: Good and solid.
Peculiarities: PROTZE was the Head of Abwehr III, Holland, one of the oldest members of the Corps of Abwehr officers. Has a great reputation. Very able and clever man at his job.
Languages: German and Dutch.
Addresses: From September 1938, lived in Wassenaar near the Hague, later Bilthoven and Nijmegen.
Employment: German Naval Officer, Kapitän zur See O.K.W. Abwehr.

Camp 020
20.9.45
/JHI

W.R.H. & D. Miss Horrocks.

Report now
filed at 3B
4/9

The identity of PROTZE and PAARMAN has just been established by the interrogation of SCHULZE-REHMERT, the report of which has not yet come in. The information was sent specially to me by telephone because I am working on the case actively and it was for that reason that I sent these papers down to have them put into order immediately. I should be very grateful if you would carry out this request as soon as possible and return the PROTZE file. The SCHULZE-REHMERT papers will be put into the file as soon as they are available.

The W.R.C.4 folder is needed by that section and I will return it to them.

B.I.B./AFB
30.8.45.

Andrew
A.P. Blunt.

B.I.B. Major Blunt.

With reference to the attached instructions re PROTZE & PAARMAN. It is not quite clear from the file why PROTZE P.F.602,081 is identical with PAARMAN of the S.P. traces although the paper at 8a obviously refers to PAARMAN.

PROTZE is an Abwehr III F official and as far as one can tell at the moment PAARMAN appears to be Abwehr I.

May we have your views on this, please ?

The attached papers which were sent to us to be filed in the P.F. are duplicates of the ones already there and were originally in the W.R.C.4 folder. If you do not need them for you folder they can be destroyed.

W.R.H. & D.
29.8.45

D.J. Horrocks

~~W.R.H.~~

These papers were given to us yesterday by the War Room. Could you please file them in the PROTZE file attached, and also make extracts from the two SP.'s attached for PAARMAN, who it is now known is an alias for PROTZE. In the SP.52/Holland/2, 1a, page 5, would you extract the little paragraph about Fraulein Helene K. SCHEIDER, and add her in the PROTZE file as you will see she was connected with him. I should be awfully grateful if you could do this as soon as possible and return to B.I.B Major Blunt as the case is very much in action, but he wants the file completed.

C. Anthonisz

B.I.B.
28.8.45.

ju

I told PADGHAM that SCHULTZ-BERNEIT had said that he had no idea what actual methods were used for penetrating P.C.O.'s office as he merely received information from PROTZE @ PAARMANN, who never told him anything about his methods or agents. PADGHAM did not re-act to the name of PROTZE, but did so sharply to that of PAARMANN. He said that there was a character who was occasionally heard of at the Embassy in an atmosphere of great mystery and was given the name of PAARMANN. He was a friend of SCHULTZ-BERNEIT, but no one else in the Embassy was allowed to know his name or anything about his activities. He was known at the Embassy as Herr SCHALL und RAUCH!

PADGHAM was on one occasion introduced to him. He cannot for the moment remember why, but thinks it may have been when he was under suspicion and that PROTZE wanted to have a look at him.

This general account rather confirms what SCHULTZ-BERNEIT says and leads me to feel that perhaps we shan't get much more out of him about the penetration of P.C.O.'s office. PROTZE has unfortunately gone to ground.

B.LB/AFB
27.8.45.

A.F. Blunt.

Copy filed in PP. 48846 (PADGHAM)