

Vol 1 closed at serial 31a dated 22.6.45.

Register No. FF.601,712.

Minute Sheet No. 3

	32.		
5.6.45.	Telegram from Field re HOLLER.	32a	52a
	33.		
27.6.45.	War Room note to Section V. re interrogation of GISKES and HUNTERMANN	33a	
	34.		53a
28.6.45.	Camp 020 Progress Report on GISKES.	34a	
	35.		
28.6.45.	Joint Statement by HUNTEMANN and GISKES	35a	
	36.		54a
28.6.45.	From S.O.E. giving list of aliases of COMETE	36a	
28.6.45.	To the Field in reply to 32a.	36b	
	37.		
29.6.45.	From War Room to V.D.5. enclosing copies of 35a	37a	
	38.		
29.6.45.	To S.O.E. enclosing copy of 35a	38a	55a
	39.		
29.6.45.	TO Camp 020 forwarding photograph of COMETE and list of aliases.	39a	
	40.		56a
			57a
29.6.45.	From Camp 020 with ref. to 39a re photograph of COMETE.	40a	57a
	41.		
29.6.45.	To S.O.E. in reply to 36a enclosing copy of 40a.	41a	
	42.		58a
29.6.45.	From S.I.S. forwarding a comment by their Dutch country section on the Camp 020 Rpts on HUNTEMANN and GISKES.	42a.	
	43.		
29.6.45.	To Camp 020 forwarding comments at 42a.	43a.	

W/ 29145/352 200M 9/43 K11/1191/8 Gp 31/3  
W/ 4809/492 200M 2/44 K17/12376/3 Gp 38/3

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44.

11.7.45. To Camp 020 enclosing a French Report with reference to a Truppe 310.

45.

11.7.45. 12th A.G. cable re interrogation of GIBKES.

46.

12.7.45. To 12th in reply to 45.a.

47.

14.7.45. Camp 020 forwarding information given by GIBKES on Ast Arras.

48.

14.7.45. Camp 020 forwarding further information on GIBKES case.

49.

18.7.45. To Camp 020 re GIBKES information on Van der REYDEN.

50.

18.7.45. To Officer of A.C. of B. G-2, 12th A.G. re GIBKES property.

51.

18.7.45. To Camp 020 further to GIBKES property.

52a

53a

53a

54a

54a

55a

55a

56a

56a

57a

57a

50a.

51a.

58a

MINUTE SHEET.

Reference P.F. 601,712.

52

18.7.45 To S.O.E. re information given by GISKES on STAHLIE. 52a

53

18.7.45 To V.D. re information given by GISKES on STAHLIE. 53a

54

19.7.45 Camp 020 forwarding information given by GISKES on Dr. FRAHMHEIM. 54a

55

19.7.45 From Camp 020 with information supplied by GISKES and HUNTERMAN 55a

56

7.45 To V.D. with copy of 55a 56a

57

23.7.45 From S.O.E. in reply to 52a. 57z

25.7.45 From Camp 020 enclosing interim report on GISKES. 57a

58

25.7.45 From Camp 020 enclosing report on investigation of Nordpol affair. 58a

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S.F. 52 | Holland

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE  
"INCIDPOL" AFFAIR

(To be read in conjunction with Interim  
Reports on GISELES and HUNTEMAN.)

Camp 020.  
July, 1945.

TOP SECRET

PAN

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE

"KORROOL" AFFAIR

Based on the interrogations of

FRANKS and HINTERMANN

(To be read in conjunction with further  
Reports numbered 1 and 2)

Investigated by:

*J. H. H. H.*

Major.

TOP SECRET



NORDE-CL INVESTIGATION.

1. General Situation in Ast-Niederlande.

In August 1941, GISKES was transferred from Ast-Paris to Ast-Niederlande, with the rank of Oberstleutnant, and appointment of Leiter Referat III F. On taking up his new appointment he found that the entire section needed reorganisation, as many of the officers were quite incapable and, in addition, many of the NSB members of the section were using their positions merely to terrorize their own nationals; moreover, GISKES had to reckon with the hostile attitude of the Sipo and the SD towards the Abwehr. This hostility became more acute every year until, as will be seen later, GISKES' life was even in danger.

As there was a German civil administration in Holland as opposed to a Wehrmacht administration in the other occupied countries, internal security was completely in the hands of the Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer, and, theoretically at least, the work of III F was confined entirely to military matters and was not executive. The Abwehr had no powers of arrest, and so in all cases where action was necessary it was taken by the Sipo.

For purely disciplinary matters GISKES found that he was subordinated to the Leiter of Ast-Niederlande, but, as regards his own activities, he was responsible to a certain Oberst ROHLEDER, Stg III, Berlin. While GISKES was still at Paris ROHLEDER had painted a gloomy picture of the unsatisfactory state of affairs of III F at The Hague, and had charged him with the task of reorganising the Referat.

On arrival GISKES made sweeping changes and restaffed his section with men recommended to him for their capabilities, amongst these being a certain Gerhard HUNTEMANN.

2. British Activity in Holland in summer 1941.

It was known through RDF, operated at that time by the Funk-Abw., that two enemy transmitting stations were active and there were constant rumours about sea communications between Holland and the U.K. Prior to GISKES' arrival, a seaplane had endeavoured to land off the Dutch coast and, in a brush with the German police, several of the latter had been killed. It is thus evident that at this stage British espionage and resistance activities in Holland were on a small scale, at least as far as III F were aware.

3. Arrest of W/T Operators.

At the beginning of September 1941, as a result of RDF, a W/T operator was arrested in the Bilthoven district and on him was found a series of messages, signed AG. The messages were of a purely intelligence nature. This matter was handled entirely by the SD, and III F were not told of the identity of the arrested agent, but GISKES thinks that he was a Dutch Naval cadet, whose name may have been TER HAAR or LAAR. A second operator, whose name GISKES believes was Van der REYDEN, was arrested probably in January 1942. This man agreed to act as a double agent, but the attempt by the SD to play him back proved abortive. This case also was handled exclusively by the Sipo, and the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, who had replaced the Funk-Abwehr towards the end of 1941.

Arrest of EBENESER.

Extract in  
PP for  
Ridderhof @  
Van Vliet

Amongst those handling counter-espionage and counter resistance agents in III F, was a certain Uffz. KUP, who had been employed by the Referat since the German occupation of Holland in 1940. Sometime in the late summer or early autumn of 1941 a certain George RIDDERHOF, VAN VLIET, an agent of KUP, had been imprisoned in Amsterdam for illicit dealings in gold and diamonds. Whilst serving his term of imprisonment RIDDERHOF made the acquaintance of a man, name unknown to GISKES or HUNTEMANN, who was apparently a member of an indigenous resistance group. When RIDDERHOF was released he was asked by the unknown to make contact with his wife and visit certain friends, whose addresses would be given by the wife. RIDDERHOF reported this to KUP who in turn informed GISKES. The latter then gave instructions that RIDDERHOF was to attempt to penetrate this group by contacting the addresses. In due course reports came in from RIDDERHOF as follows:-

P.F. 600.479

- a) About the beginning of December 1941, RIDDERHOF reported that a man with a motor-boat intended to make an escape to the U.K. and that he required petrol for the journey. RIDDERHOF was given 25 litres of petrol from III F and the Sipo had the starting point watched. But nothing transpired and RIDDERHOF later reported that the man had departed from a point other than the one which had previously been decided upon. Enquiries were made at the man's home address, near the Abw-Stelle Scheveningen, on the corner of Parkweg and Hoogeweg, and it was established that the man's name was MAAS and that he had been absent from home for three months.
- b) In January 1942 the broadcasting by London of the Wilhelminalied was to be the signal that a motor-boat would be arriving at Scheveningen to pick up certain members of the Dutch Resistance Movement, to take them to the U.K. On the appointed day, plain-clothes police were on the beach and arrested Dutch patriots who were awaiting the motor-boat, which however failed to arrive.
- c) Later in January 1942, RIDDERHOF reported that he was in touch with a certain Capt. VAN DEN BERG, a Dutch Army reserve officer, living at The Hague, who was connected with a resistance organisation at Vierlingsbeek, near Nijmegen. Reports on this organisation were to the effect that arms and explosives were hidden in churches and monasteries in the neighbourhood. A sub-agent, GRAAN, was charged with the surveillance of this group.

Again, later, RIDDERHOF reported that the organisation expected an aeroplane to arrive from the U.K. to drop sabotage material, and gave the locality but not the exact location of the dropping ground. Upon hearing this, GISKES, who at this time was sceptical, said to KUP: "Gehen Sie zum Nordpol mit solchen Geschichten". (It is for this reason that the code name NORDPOL was given by III F to cover the subsequent turning and playing back of S.O.E. agents.

HUNTEMANN, who had recently been discharged from hospital, was accordingly sent to Assen to keep observation. Towards the end of February 1942 a British 'plane was seen one night, during the full-moon period, circling in the vicinity, and later it was learnt that

4. Arrest of EBENEZER (contd.)

in fact two containers had been dropped. On this occasion there was a genuine Dutch resistance reception committee headed by Capt. VAN DEN BERG, and a certain Sgt. BIERMANN. Only one container was found by the committee, which was taken to a warehouse nearby; VAN DEN BERG then went to RIDDERHOF, living at that time in The Hague, and asked him to arrange for the transport of the material to his (RIDDERHOF's) flat for safe keeping; RIDDERHOF obliged. This incident, when reported to GISKES, convinced him that there was a W/T operator in direct touch with the U.K., especially as prior to this date the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo had intercepted, but not deciphered, signals in The Hague area. Furthermore, RIDDERHOF had also given information, gleaned from VAN DEN BERG, to the effect that two British agents had been dropped, at the end of November 1941, in the area of Assen. It was therefore decided by GISKES that intensive efforts would have to be made to locate and arrest the operator. Accordingly, the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo was given this task as a first priority, and the area in which the operator was working was finally narrowed down to the vicinity of Laan Van Meerdevort, The Hague. A raid was organised in the district and one Hubertus Mattheus Gerardus LAUNERS & EBENEZER was arrested on the 6th March 1942. He had evidently become aware that a raid was in progress and after throwing the W/T set into the garden, left the house with TELLER, the proprietor.

KUL, who was taking part in the raid, had been furnished by RIDDERHOF with a personal description of EBENEZER, which had been obtained from Capt. VAN DEN BERG, and apprehended him in the street. Both men were conducted to TELLER's house where the W/T set was found in the garden, and GISKES had a short interview with EBENEZER. The latter was then conveyed to the so-called Oranje Hotel, where Dutch patriots were imprisoned. At first he was confined in the SD section of the prison, but about a month afterwards, on GISKES representation, he was transferred to the Wehrmacht section where conditions were better.

5. Implications of EBENEZER's arrest.

Interrogation of EBENEZER by Krimrat, SCHREIBER, and to a lesser extent by GISKES himself, convinced the latter that if British intentions were realised and numerous well equipped sabotage and resistance groups were created, an extremely dangerous military situation would arise, particularly if these measures succeeded simultaneously in all the Western occupied countries. For this reason, therefore, GISKES decided to concentrate the activities of his Referat on the hindering or prevention of any such plans.

6. Employment of Double Agents.

An Abwehr Abtg. III Directive from Berlin, circulated during the early part of the war, laid down the objects to be achieved in playing back captured agents, as follows:-

- a) To maintain contact with Allied espionage agents and their H.Q.'s in order to ascertain missions, and enemy intentions.
- b) Deception (Procedure is given in Annexure I).
- c) To control any Allied organisation and thus prevent the growth of a sister organisation unknown to the Germans.
- d) To penetrate organised escape routes. (III F were not interested in individuals who escaped haphazardly as these matters were handled by the Sipo.

P.F.600.479



7. The 'turning' of EBENEZER.

Shortly after EBENEZER's arrest, KUP asked permission to visit him in prison, and on his return informed GISKES that EBENEZER was prepared to work for the Germans. GISKES maintains that no physical force was used to turn him. GISKES also personally visited him in prison, and with SCHREIBER guaranteed his life as well as the lives of any subsequent Allied agents, who might fall into German hands through his treachery. EBENEZER, on accepting the proposal to work for the Germans, told both GISKES and SCHREIBER that he had been assured by a certain Colonel BLUNT, before leaving the U.K., that in the event of his arrest he was at liberty to accept any proposal put forward by the Germans to save his life; for, at the most, it would be discovered within three weeks if he were working under control. EBENEZER accordingly accepted the German proposal and, on the 18.3.42, sent his first message of German origin. This message requested further supplies and stated that the location of a previously agreed dropping point was too dangerous. (EBENEZER CXG 18.3.42. refers). Three further messages, all dated 15.3.42 - CXG 14, containing information about a ship's crew, money and a reference to BRANDY, CXG 15 dealing with political and industrial information, and CXG 16 containing information about the position of the Prinz Eugen - all of which had been previously composed by EBENEZER and found on him after arrest, were allowed to go forward by the Germans.

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The information as to the locality of the Prinz Eugen was found on reference to Referat III M to be false, but GISKES denies that prior to this date false information had been passed to Resistance Groups for onward transmission. He declares that as far as he can remember EBENEZER had received the information from his organizer, Thjs FACONIS & CATARRH, who in turn probably obtained it from VAN DEN BERG as the latter was believed to have certain sources among the Port Authorities and dockyard workers in Rotterdam.

B. Distribution of Functions.

GISKES was responsible for the general policy of playing back EBENEZER and subsequent w/T operators captured, but the non-technical, detailed conduct of the traffic, i.e. preparing drafts of messages, seeing London signals received answers, keeping traffic on the right lines, and when necessary the notional killing of operators, etc., was the sole responsibility of HUNTEMANN, who was struck off all other duties until the termination of the traffic on 1st April 1944. The messages were drafted by HUNTEMANN and then taken to the Pu-B Stelle of the Orpo which was always in close proximity to III F. The B Stelle was solely responsible for the encyphering and decyphering of all signals and for the actual transmission. In this connection it is interesting to note that only 2 B.O.R. w/T operators ever actually transmitted, namely EBENEZER for about 3 months after capture, and FRUMSE (see below). All traffic with these exceptions was conducted by trained operators of the B Stelle.

The actual arrest and custody of the agents were entirely Sipo responsibilities, but of course both GISKES and HUNTEMANN had access to them when necessary.

An account of the procedure and the division of responsibility during a Dropping Operation is given at Annexure II.

9. Arrest of CATARRH

About the 15th March 1942, THijs TACONIS J. CATARRH was arrested by the Sipo at Arnhem whilst trying to effect the rescue of a member of his group who had been taken prisoner by the Germans. Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN know much about the circumstances of the arrest as the entire affair was handled by the Sipo, but it appears that at the time of his arrest the Germans were unaware of his identity, and it was only at a later date that they realised the importance of their capture. GISKES had an interview with him at the prison at Scheveningen the day after he had tried to escape, but CATARRH refused to give details about himself, and it was only at a later date, when he had been convinced that the whole organisation had been 'blown', that he could be induced to give details of his mission. As he was not a w/T operator he was not of much interest to GISKES and HUNTEMANN, but GISKES expresses considerable respect for his steadfast and soldierly behaviour.

10. Arrest of WATERCRESS

*WAT and N.T.X*

On the 19th March 1942, S.O.E. signal CXP 21 to BREKNER advised that an independent agent was to be expected from the 24th March 1942 onward, together with 3 containers, with the result that Albert Arnoldus BAATSEN & ABON & WATERCRESS was received on the 27th March near Steenwijk by a Dutch reception committee working under SD control. Among those taking part in the reception were the Dutch subjects SCHLAGTER, POGG and HIDEHRAF; the latter was drunk and his behaviour was such that his attendance on future occasions of this nature was forbidden by the Germans. The "safe" arrival of WATERCRESS was acknowledge in BREKNER's CXP 24 of the 26th March 1942 to London.

WATERCRESS voluntarily offered his services to the Germans and was even prepared to undertake a mission abroad for the SD. He was used, however, by the Sipo for spying on his fellow prisoners at Heeren to which all captured agents were sent after a short stay at Scheveningen prison.

11. Arrest of LETTUCE, TRUMPET and TURNIP.

Early in April 1942 III F was informed by the Feldgendarmarie that a dead parachutist had been found in a field N.W. of Holten; it appeared that he had hit his head on a stone water-trough on landing. From tracks in the neighbourhood of the body there were grounds for believing that other agents had landed at the same time. Early in May the Sipo, on information received from a certain Dr. STEMKEL of the Inkasso and Hypotheek Bank, Utrecht, arrested Gouwigen Hendrik Gerard RAS & LETTUCE and John JORDAN & TRUMPET. The arrests were effected by the Sipo, and GISKES thinks that the informant acted unwittingly. About the same time the Sipo also arrested Leonardus ANDEINGA & TURNIP on information supplied by a woman (name unknown) in Utrecht. The informant is thought by GISKES to have acted unwittingly.

Interrogation of the three agents produced the full story of the Drooping Operation on the 28th March and established the identity of the Dead man, a w/T operator named JOHN J. SWEDE. The latter's signal plan was found on TURNIP which enabled the Germans at a later date to operate a regional, locally recruited operator named SWEDE.

11. Arrest of LETTUCE, TRULPET and TURNIP (contd.)

Moreover, under interrogation the three captured men gave the numbers of Dutch S.O.E. agents who had completed their training and who could therefore be expected to be arriving in the not distant future. In addition, personal descriptions, aliases, an estimate of the capabilities, together with a description of their future roles, i.e. W/T operator, saboteur, clandestine press, organiser etc. were obtained. Thence-forward the Germans devoted a good part of the interrogation of captured agents to the obtaining of this type of information, with the result that they generally knew whom to expect in the future; the information obtained enabled them to impress captured agents during interrogation with their seeming omniscience.

It must be remembered that towards the end of April, B-Stelle had been aware that clandestine transmissions were taking place, but they had been unable to decipher the messages.

The first controlled message on the TRULPET link was transmitted on the 5th May 1942 (CGX 14) proposing a new Dropping Point.

12. LEEK and W/T Operator.

On the 5th April 1942 Barend KLOOS @ LEEK was dropped blind with his W/T operator Hendrik SEBES @ HECK @ LEEK. It appears that during the drop the W/T set was damaged and although these two agents were not, like the others, apprehended immediately, they were never able to get in touch with the U.K. They were eventually arrested at a date unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN. HUNTEMANN recalls that after the arrest, London was asked for a replacement of the W/T set on another link, and this was furnished. The HECK transmitter was first operated on the 22nd August 1942 by the Germans, but HECK himself never operated.

13. Arrest of POTATO

On the 19th April Johannes Henricus Marie De HAAS @ PYL @ POTATO arrived in Holland by a sea-operation. On the 24th April TRULPET in CGX 7 reported to London that he was in touch with POTATO, contact having been established through TURNIP, but that he could not contact EBENEZER. At this date TRULPET had not been arrested although his signals had been intercepted by the B-Stelle. On TRULPET's arrest, in early May, the Germans were able to decipher the TRULPET messages that they had intercepted, and it is probable, according to GISKES and HUNTEMANN, that POTATO's arrest by the Sipo was due to information furnished by TRULPET. The first POTATO message sent, CGX 14 on the 5th May 1942, refers to a dropping point.

14. Meeting of CARLOT and TURNIP

On the 15th May London, in CGX 17, advised TRULPET of a meeting place where he was to contact GEORGE @ CARLOT who had arrived in Holland on the 27th February 1942. The name of the rendezvous was sent in an elaborately coded message, but was decoded by the B-Stelle and found to be The Bodega, Leidsche Poort, Leidsche Plein, Amsterdam.

For some reason unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN, the Sipo decided to send TURNIP, not TRULPET, to the rendezvous and TURNIP was able to warn CARLOT that his two companions were members of the Sipo. CARLOT thus succeeded in escaping through a lavatory, eventually arriving in the U.K. on the 2nd September 1943.

15. The Situation in May 1942.

It had, at this period, become evident to GISKES from interrogations of captured agents that S.O.B. was trying to build up a well organised sabotage organisation capable of operating throughout Holland. Groups were to be formed by the various organisers by recruitment among N.G.Os. of the Dutch Army, railwaymen and dockyard hands, for sabotage of railways, harbour installations, dockyards, shipbuilding yards, locks and bridges; in addition instruction had been given in "sabotage insaisissable". Regions and missions had been allotted as follows:-

- CATARRH Provinces of N. and S. Holland and Gelderland.
- WATERBRESS Special mission not divulged by S.D. to III B.
- LETTUCE Utrecht area.
- LEEK Cberjeessel area
- POTATO Establishment of sea communication between Holland and U.K. Suitable landing places were to be reconnoitred in the area of Katwijk and later Egmond-aan-See.

GISKES gave consideration to the possibility of using the organisers, already arrested, for forming German controlled Resistance Groups; this would have ensured that the best and most resistant elements in the population would be known and could, therefore, be arrested at any time when it was thought necessary, but he decided that such action was too great a risk to the security of his controlled W/T links.

16. EBENEZER and W/T Operation

On the 1st May 1942 London advised EBENEZER in Message No. 16 of the impending arrival of two agents, and on the 29th May Herman HARLEVLIST & BEEROLF, and his W/T operator Antonio VANFESTI were both dropped to the customary S.D. reception near Steinwijk.

GISKES describes these two men as being excellent agents and it was not until a much later stage that they divulged, under interrogation, that they were Bureau instructors; in addition they were to be assistants to WATERBRESS.

17. PARNIP and SPINACH

On the 15th June 1942 London advised TRUMST (Message No. 28) of the impending arrival of two further agents and accordingly on the 22nd June, John Jacob VAN KLETSCHOTEN & PARNIP and his W/T operator Johannes Jan BUIJZER & SPINACH were dropped to a German reception near Holten. Interrogations showed that PARNIP had an independent mission in N. Holland whilst SPINACH was to act as W/T operator, not only to PARNIP, but also to POTATO, who had notionally been using EBENEZER, as London apparently feared that too much traffic on the EBENEZER link might endanger the latter who, of course, had been arrested on the 6th March 1942.

ROUDELAND deduced from this that London regarded EBENEZER as being the best operator.

The "Safe" arrival of PARNIP and SPINACH was notified to London on the 24th June 1942 in TRUMST 77.



18. HARKOW and W/T Operator.

On the 19th June London, in No. 61 to EBENEZER, advised the field to stand by from the night of the 24th June onwards to receive two bodies with the result that, on the night of the 26th June, George Louis CALBERTON & HARKOW and his W/T operator Joseph BURKENS (BARAKES) & ERIC G LARKIN were duly arrested, near Wexep. EBENEZER acknowledged the "success" of the operation on the 27th June 1942, adding "GITT staying with us some time".

19. The six main links.

Although during the Nordpol affair the Germans operated many links, (at one time they were operating 15) the 6 main links over which fresh arrivals were advised were as follows:- EBENEZER, HARKOW, TRUBERT, HOOK, WEDE, SPINACH, accounts of whose arrests have been given above.

An account of the APOLLO and BRUTUS affair advised over GOLD is given in Annexure V.

At a conference at which S.O.E. and MI.5 were represented it was decided that it was unnecessary to give an account of the arrests of subsequent agents as they present little interest, the procedure being essentially identical with that already described, i.e., London advising departure to the Germans with the resultant S.D. reception.

S.O.E. however put forward a written questionnaire and, at a subsequent conference, a verbal questionnaire to fix a basis for future interrogations, Annexure IX.

20. Reasons for closing the "Nordpol".

At the end of August 1943, two of the captured S.O.E. agents, Pieter DAARLEIN & SPRUIT, and Johan Bernard HEBBINK & CHIVE, escaped from Haarlem and eventually reached the U.K. via Switzerland.

When in October 1943, London intimated that Holland could expect no further deliveries owing to commitments elsewhere, GIBBS was certain that these two men had either reached the U.K. or had in some way conveyed to London the information that the entire S.O.E. organisation in Holland was German-controlled. During the next two months, the traffic from London was of a non-committal character and GIBBS concluded that the "Nordpol" possibilities were at an end. Confirmation that S.O.E. was aware of what had happened came through the arrest, at the beginning of 1944, of the HEINTJE Group which took place in Amsterdam through R.D.F. of one of the W/T operators. (It is interesting to note that at this period relations between the S.D. and Abwehr were so strained that III F were only informed of this group after its arrest, and the subsequent attempt to play it back was entirely handed by the S.D.).

The HEINTJE Group had been sent by the Dutch S.I.S. in London and had been briefed for an espionage mission by Major COMDEN. According to GIBBS and BUTLAND, this group had received, towards the end of November 1943, a W/T signal from London that the sister organisation, the S.O.E. Resistance Movement, was completely under German control and further, that two agents who had been in Haarlem had reached London. This information of course only became available in early 1944 when the group was arrested and the intercepted traffic could be deciphered. GIBBS noted to close the "Nordpol" affair immediately, with a message to London, giving the news that all those agents who had been notionally killed were in reality still alive. However, Abt. III F Berlin refused permission for this and sent orders that the closing message must breathe a spirit of confidence in the final victory for German arms, and in the certitude of repelling any Allied invasion of Holland. Accordingly, the closing signal to this effect was transmitted to London, not unappropriately, on the 1st April 1944, thus ending the "Nordpol" affair which had lasted a little over two years.

ANNEXURES

1) Deception and Policy of XX agents:	Pages: II - III
2) Account of Reception Committee:	IV - VI
3) Staged sabotage:	VII - VIII
4) LINDEGANS:	IX - XV
5) APOLLO and PHOTUS:	XVI - XVII
6) Attempted release of EBERKER & TRUMPT:	XVIII - XIX
7) Statement on escape of CABBAGE, PARENIP and LACHUSSE:	XX
8) Account of KUNTSMAN's visit to Oranienburg:	XXI - XXII
9) S.D.E. Questionnaire:	XXIII - XXV
10) Allied agents arrested in Holland not known to have been connected with "Nordpol":	XXVI-XXXII.
11) Captain ABEN and GEEVERS-BETHROOD:	XXXIII.
12) Miscellaneous Points.	XXXIV.
13) Descriptions of misc. officials.	XXXV.

ANNEXURE IDeception and Policy of XX AgentsGerman Policy and Procedure.

The passing of 'Spiekmaterial' to enemy intelligence services was a regular part of the functions of the Abwehr. All Dienststellen carrying out this work kept on hand a regular stock of such material in order to be able to comply, within a reasonable time, with any request for information that might be made by W/T by the Allies.

For deception purposes, prepared material was distributed to higher authority (i.e. C-in-C West, Io Army Groups, OKW, Seekriegsleitung) to the III P. Referats concerned for passing on to the Allies, now possible through several independent channels.

Each time contact was made with the Allies, no matter in what manner, Abt. III had to be informed and authority obtained for maintaining this contact. All enemy requests for information had to be reported immediately to Abt. III together with suggested replies. Material for drafting replies was collated by III P with the help of other branches of the Ast, and had then to be submitted for approval to the relevant military authority, e.g. Luftgaukommando Holland. When this approval had been obtained, the suggested answer was telephoned to Abt. III D in Berlin for approval. If, however, time pressed, the information was often supplied and III D's authority obtained afterwards. All material regarding economic or political conditions in Germany, or the sphere of activity of another Ast, was supplied by III D.

When information on any specific target was required, a member of III P had to assume the role of an agent in order that only such information should be sent as could normally be procured by a real agent.

Deception.

The intelligence branches of the highest military authorities in the occupied countries could give information to the relevant Ast for passing to the Allies, but in such cases the onus of informing III D lay with the originator, e.g. the intelligence branch of the service concerned.

Referat III D.

This was a small section in the OKW at Berlin (Tirpitzerufer) consisting of the Leiter, Oberst SCHAFER, one technical assistant and a female secretary. With the gradual eclipse of the Abwehr this section lost its importance and its role in the RSHA as III D was only a small one. From 1941/42 onwards 'Spiekmaterial' was distributed entirely by the Io branch of the higher Wehrmacht H.Q. e.g., C-in-C West, Army Group B, etc.

There was apparently however no very fixed policy after the eclipse of III D with regard to 'Spiekmaterial' and some very curious incidents occurred; for example in January/February 1944 GISKES heard that films seized in Brussels were forwarded through G.I.S. channels by mistake immediately after they had been developed.

One Source of 'Spiekmaterial'.

In this connection GISKES states that genuine seized espionage material was always a good source of 'Spiekmaterial'. The Dutch and Belgian I.S. were in the habit of forwarding material in triplicate by three different means and, if it was established that copies of the seized material had already been sent through other channels it was then forwarded in order to inspire confidence in the German-controlled channel.

218 receipts

SF 52/4/25/6

III

Nordpol 'Spislatariet'.

During the Nordpol affair, GIBBS states, that at various dates which he exact remember, information was passed about the position of German warships, coastal batteries on the island of Beveland, the positions of H.Q. of divisions alleged to be in Holland; in addition reports on the Dutch armaments industries were also sent.

These reports were, of course, additional to the normal current traffic which was being sent over the various S.O.M. links. For such routine traffic GIBBS gave HIGHTON a free hand and, unless it was necessary to forward answers to questions on specific military targets or troop movements etc., no other authority was required; but as has been stated above this latter type of message had to be referred to the relevant authority and III D for their approval.

Copies of all signals sent or received had to be sent monthly to Abw. Abt III.

SF 52/4/25/6



Extract into P.F. for  
Hampton

ANNEXURE II

Statement by WUSI

Preparations for and description of a Dropping Operation.

During no period in the morning and afternoon London broadcast warning signals as to whether an operation was to take place. The times were given by certain figures. Three different messages, of fifteen figures each, indicated the dropping of agents, the dropping of stores, or scrubbing.

If in the morning a signal was given announcing the dropping of stores or agents, the actual confirmation came through late in the afternoon. If, however, the morning's signal was negative, no further signal was sent and the operation was scrubbed.

As soon as a positive warning order came through in the morning it was the duty of Hauptmann WUSI to warn the relevant branches of the impending operation, namely the 1st itself (III F was always located at some distance from the other sections of the 1st), S.D. The Hagud, the Orpo, and at a later period, any army units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground.

At the beginning when it was only a question of one operation during a single night, the necessary action was taken by III F and S.D. alone, and the following procedure was adopted. The four lights were held by members of the III F (the senior officer present holding the white light at the apex of the triangle) whilst the S.D. waited at a certain distance from the dropping ground and only intervened if complications arose. As soon as agents left the plane, members of III F who were holding the lamps withdrew, and S.D., using Dutch men in its service, occupied the dropping ground and arrested the agents. It was an unwritten law that whoever was in charge of the lighting arrangements, was also in charge of the operation, and for this reason it never happened that the S.D. ever got hold of a lamp even to help out temporarily.

P.F. 602, 269

When dropping operations increased and, when often 4 - 6 took place during a single night, the problem of occupying all the dropping grounds became a difficult one, since there were only 56 officers on the strength of III F, who were often not all available. Recourse was then had to other officers employed in the 1st who were then used for this purpose. As also there were not enough of these, at a later date, members of the B-stelle Orpo were used, who often came to the scene in all available strength. It was so arranged that on only one occasion was the S.D. in charge of the operation.

When in the morning an operation was signalled, Hauptmann WUSI warned the 1st so that they could make available the necessary number of officers and also the S.D. so that they could do the same.

The passing of his information to the two interested branches was done by telephone in a disguised form. The dropping grounds which had already been selected by WUSI were given cover names such as "Hoevragen", "Brandheid", "Wochenrhythmus", etc. These cover names, together with a detailed description of the dropping ground and route of approach, were notified in writing to these branches concerned.

The word "Damen" was used to indicate agents. Thus a telephone warning to the S.D. of an impending operation would be something like this:

v

Preparations for and description of a dropping operation (contd.)

"I would like to invite you this evening to a little party at Wochenendhaus. We shall have some guests and would be delighted if you could come. A couple of 'Barren' are also coming. Bring a couple of partners for them or they may be bored". The B-Stelle Orgo was not warned by telephone, but orally, as they were always close to where III F was located. They of course knew that an operation was planned before III F, as it was they who operated the W/T sets but consultations had to take place with them over the availability of their men.

As the lack of personnel became more and more acute (the same men could not be out three nights running, especially as their normal daily duties remained to be carried out which would have meant that they got no sleep) Hauptmann WURR, on choosing a new landing ground approached units in the neighbourhood and asked for the loan of 1/2 officers for the nights when an operation was planned. This request was always gladly granted and we got the greatest support from those units in Steenwijk, Vezep etc. and before returning in the morning were well looked after. For these army officers a parachute operation was a new and unheard of thing and a very pleasant break in the dull daily routine. But for another reason also, units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground had to be warned, namely on account of the experience gained in France and Belgium when receptions not under direct control took place, it had been ordered that all units were to send out strong bicycle patrols at night especially in lonely heath country to look for suspicious lights and people wandering about, and to search for reception committees and if necessary shoot immediately. After such a patrol had almost attacked a reception committee under Major KILSMÖSTER at Rolde near Assen, it was decided that, in future, all units near a dropping ground must be warned of the operation, although such a measure was obviously undesirable on security grounds.

At first, night-fighter units, i.e., III Fliegerkorps, were warned of impending dropping operations in order to obviate the possibility of any aeroplane destined for us being shot down. Later this fighter "protection" was dropped, as it would have become noticeable, if these 'planes were never attacked. Later they were again reported to the night-fighters, but no longer protected and were treated in the same way as other 'planes. In one instance a 'plane was shot down immediately over the dropping ground by a night-fighter, so that the reception committee only just managed to get to safety in time, and on one occasion a 'plane crashed on its right wing whilst coming in to drop. Evidently it was too slow and low. Two of the pilots were saved from the burning 'plane by Hauptmann WURR, and his men, and brought to the Luftwaffe hospital in Amsterdam. A W/T operator (Punker) was also employed on the dropping ground after representations had been made by the Luftwaffe, and he kept in contact with the night-fighter organisation, signalling as soon as the 'plane had dropped its load and was making off, the idea being that the 'plane should then be chased by night-fighters which were then taking off. However, this produced no results and this arrangement was dropped. III F, in any case was against it, as we feared that W/T signalling in the immediate neighbourhood of the dropping ground might endanger matters.

After all sections concerned had been advised by Hauptmann WURR to the effect that one or several droppings were to be expected for the following night, the places were notified within III F. O.C. on the dropping point was a member of III F section, even if, in addition, a higher ranking officer was ordered from Lt. J. Iversum to act as his assistant. Only if nobody from III F could be allocated to the job, the command of the party on the spot was taken over by an officer from Hilversum.

because

N.F. 602269

"Preparations for and Description of a Dropping Operation (contd.)"

AF 6082459

If toward the late afternoon it was established through a repetition by London of the definite signals, that a parachutage would take place during the course of the evening, Hptm. WURR again notified the sections concerned, and after this there was nothing more to do. In the written description of the dropping point, which the Stellen concerned received from us, the approach route, its duration, time of the rendezvous, camouflaged parking place, were accurately stated. When the parachutages took place at dropping points north of Amersfoort - this was nearly always the place - the RV for III F Driebergen, Ast-Hilversum, SD-The Hague was nearly always the Hoovlaanen crossroads, about 5 km. behind Amersfoort. Generally speaking, the Orpo B-Stelle travelled in III F transport, as both sections lay close to one another.

On arrival in the vicinity of the dropping ground, which had to be approached without lights, the transport was parked and camouflaged with parachutes, at pre-determined points underneath trees. The SD personnel generally selected a position for themselves in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground, and the members of III F took up their positions on the ground, according to the direction of the wind. If the plane was to be expected after midnight everybody had to be ready in their positions by 2330 hours, after lamps had been given a brief test.

Lights had to be extinguished immediately after the drop had occurred in order to make observation difficult for the plane in case it made a second flight over the ground. At the beginning of the Nordpol affair it was up to the Abwehr to attend to the carting away of the material, whilst the SD were responsible for the collection of the agents. However, the SD attempted systematically, and with success, to take the matter out of Abwehr hands. Whilst at first all the material was put at Abwehr disposal, later this was reduced to half, again later this was whittled down to half of the weapons, and ultimately this was reduced to what the SD considered it good for the Abwehr to have. About the end of 1942 the SD took over the carting away of the containers, and from then onwards the Abwehr had to be satisfied with what the SD permitted them to have. The Orpo B-Stelle in Driebergen wanted to participate in the distribution of the weapons and they were catered for by the SD in this respect.

The return journey from the dropping ground had to take place at the earliest possible moment and the transport had to disappear before the farm workers went out to the fields.

The arresting of the agents generally occurred after a short greeting at the exact moment when they were endeavouring to release themselves from their parachute harness. Later the SD decided to conduct the agents to specially reserved houses in the vicinity of the landing ground where they arranged a large reception party celebration with the supposed chiefs of the organisation. During the course of these celebrations the agents generally became fairly loquacious and were interrogated by Dutchmen who were in the employ of the SD service. When the agents eventually became tired and turned in for the night they were arrested. This new procedure may have been motivated by the reaction on the part of the agent ARIE, who maintained after his arrest, that the reception committee was supposed to send a W/T message to London, composed in the terms which follow, at the earliest opportunity, to indicate that he had arrived safely - "ELVIRA arrived at station 57 minutes late".

This message was not despatched, because I had the instinctive feeling that there was something not quite in order with it. I therefore created the story about ARIE's brainstorm which notionally led to his ultimate death. Later it transpired that the message with "ELVIRA" really was a warning and there was something about it not in order. I assure that SCHNEIDER introduced the variation in arresting the agents on account of this incident. In other words, they were only arrested after they had told everything to the supposedly genuine reception committee."

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Extract ink  
from reception SF,  
unless this is a more  
specific lead for this

SF 52/4/25(6)

VII

ANNEXURE III.

Staged Sabotage.

During the early part of 1942, the Resistance groups in Holland had been instructed by London to refrain from any act of sabotage which might draw the attention of the Germans to the existence of an organisation in Holland. Only "sabotage insaisissable" was to be carried out. At this time, therefore, no such actions were required on the part of III F.

Some time in July 1942, however, CAIARRHI, through BRUNZERI, was asked for the fullest possible information about the W/T station Koozwick, and was instructed to make plans for its destruction at a date to be notified. Shortly afterwards, this date was notified from London in a complicated code message which, however, was broken by the B-Staff.

As London appeared to attach considerable importance to the secrecy of this date, the Germans deduced that, on the day mentioned, operations of some importance would take place, and special precautions were taken by the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Holland, and the SD, but nothing eventuated. It was then arranged, however, to stage an attack on the wireless station, and it was proposed that a mock battle should take place with troops and 'thunder flashes' in order to evoke amongst the civilian population the impression that an attack had really taken place, in view of the fact that it was feared that London might be independently controlling the existence of this attack. However, the staging of the mock battle was turned down on security grounds, as it was desired to keep the circle of people aware of the double-play as small as possible. It was, however, reported to London that the attack had failed as the groups had unexpectedly come upon anti-personnel mines and had incurred certain losses. The next day a notice from the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber, Holland, appeared in all the Dutch newspapers reporting an attack by criminal elements on the station, which however, thanks to the watchfulness of the guards and the excellence of the security measures, had been frustrated, and that on account of the active assistance rendered by sections of the Dutch population during the defeat of the attack, General CHRISTIANSEN would refrain from taking hostages.

S.F. 52/4/25(6)

After this attack, it was decided to mount a 'successful' operation. An old hulk of about 1,000 tons was procured through Referat III M, and loaded with wrecks of old and damaged aeroplanes. The planes were painted up and covered with tarpaulins so that from a distance it was impossible to recognise their true nature. A charge was loaded in the hold of the ship by a certain lieutenant KLINGENBERG of Ast-Belgien and Eftz. BODENS, who at that time was with Abt. II, Ast-Belgien, but was loaned for the occasion. It was arranged so that the charge could be initiated from the deck of the hulk. A naval tug was ordered to take the ship from Amsterdam to Doordrecht via Rotterdam. Apart from KLINGENBERG and BODENS and two sailors on board the ship, no one knew what had been planned.

When one morning the tug and its tow were in the vicinity of the Maas bridges in Rotterdam, the charge was ignited and the ship began to sink. The tug cut its tow and tried to push the damaged ship towards the shore, whereby another ship was rammed and badly damaged. The ship with the "planes" on board sank amidst cries of jubilation from the hundreds of Dutch people on the banks who believed it was an act of sabotage by Resistance organisations. KLINGENBERG and BODENS were actually arrested by the captain of the tug who suspected them of being saboteurs.



Staged Sabotage (contd.)

From then onwards, from time to time, railway demolitions were carried out by Uffs. BOLINS who in most cases took care to leave at the scene of the incident material obviously of British origin. The purpose of these demolitions was to create amongst Dutch railway employees the idea that a British-controlled sabotage organisation was actively operating. Later, however, IIP were forced to stop these acts of sabotage as the SD had decided to take hostages when any act of sabotage had taken place, and it would have been noticed if in such cases hostages were not made.

In addition, it had become clear to GISKES that there was no sister organisation in Holland controlled from London which was supervising such activities independently.

From then onwards, all acts of sabotage which took place in Holland and which were undertaken by small indigenous groups with home-made materials, were attributed to the London organisation and S.O.E. was notified of them. On one occasion a munition train from Belgium consisting of 25 trucks was probably sabotaged by an unknown Belgian group, but in any case a report of the incident was passed to London as being the act of one of the S.O.E. organisers. In addition sabotage in dockyards and factories was freely invented and passed to London, and London expressed considerable satisfaction with the results obtained.

S. F 82 / 4/25/6

Staged Sabotage (contd.)

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S. F. 82 / 4/25/6

## ANNEXURE IV.

Christian LINDEMANS

An account of LINDEMANS' activities is not strictly relative to the XORDOL affair, but has been included for convenience.

GISKES' first meeting with LINDEMANS.

In February 1944, whilst GISKES was in Brussels in connection with the formation of PAK 307, he learned from KUP that NELIS (Camp 020 case) had made the acquaintance of a man who had previously worked for the Belgian Intelligence Service and who was now prepared to change sides in exchange for the release of his brother imprisoned by the Germans in Rotterdam. GISKES instructed KUP to go further into this matter, and as a result GISKES decided to see this man (Christian LINDEMANS) himself.

The first meeting took place in a house near the Jardins Botaniques, Brussels, which was the billet of some of the Abwehr Hilfsoffiziere of III P, Brussels. Those present at the meeting were GISKES, using the name of Dr. GERMAN, his Adjutant Hptm. WURR (WALTER), KUP (WILLI) and NELIS who brought LINDEMANS to the house. The meeting lasted about two hours, during which time LINDEMANS gave an account of his past activities with the Belgian and French Resistance and escape organizations. In addition he produced for inspection various papers and documents including Grenzverkehrscheine for Holland, Germany and France, made out in a false name which GISKES no longer remembers. LINDEMANS also showed a large quantity of blank documents which he used in his role as passeur, and various German Dienststellen stamps. LINDEMANS explained that in the autumn of 1943 he had enlisted the aid of his brother Hendrick LINDEMANS for his escape routes. The latter, however, had been caught by the Gigo and was now in Rotterdam prison awaiting death. Christian LINDEMANS thereupon told GISKES that if his brother Hendrick were to be released he would give the Germans whole-hearted co-operation.

At the conclusion of the meeting GISKES told KUP to verify the facts about Hendrick LINDEMANS and, at a further meeting which took place in the same house about 8 days later, GISKES was able to tell Christian LINDEMANS that Hendrick would be released in return for his services. Accordingly Hendrick was released very shortly afterwards and Christian LINDEMANS started work for the G.I.S.

During the period February to August 1944, while LINDEMANS was working for PAK 307, GISKES had occasion to see him only about five times. LINDEMANS was handled exclusively by KUP, GISKES merely giving the general directions to the latter and leaving to LINDEMANS and KUP the ways and means of fulfilling the orders.

Three Main Tasks given to LINDEMANS.

- 1) To give to Hptm. WURR the names and details of all Resistance and espionage movements with which he had come into contact, in France, Holland and Belgium. GISKES states that the mass of material supplied was so great that it took WURR two or three weeks to sort it out.
- 2) To go to Holland and make contact with his Dutch Resistance friends and ascertain their future activities. It is possible that the organisation CS. VI was penetrated by LINDEMANS.
- 3) To make contact with the Belgian Resistance movement and to find out details about the missions that they were receiving from London.

Copy in Extrait  
in Lwoen  
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to  
Kitschewitz's  
PP  
Museum

P.F. 600.513  
3 P.F. 600.804

Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)

Shooting of LINDEMANS.

About the end of April 1944, LINDEMANS happened to be in the Devissenschutskde. office in Rotterdam and apparently aroused the suspicion of a girl employee who called the police. On their arrival, LINDEMANS was asked to produce his papers and as he put his hand into his pocket he was shot by the police who thought that he was about to produce a revolver.

LINDEMANS was taken to hospital and on arrival there, the police were dismayed to find a document showing him to be an employee of the Abwehr. The matter was reported through Sipo channels to GISKES who instructed KUP to get LINDEMANS out of hospital without letting the Dutch hospital staff know that it was the Germans who were engineering the removal. KUP did this in such a way that the Dutch believed LINDEMANS to be a member of a Resistance movement who was being freed by his friends. GISKES then decided that it was impossible for LINDEMANS to continue working in Holland as his Resistance friends would think it very suspicious if once having been in the hands of the police he were still able to move about freely without danger of arrest. GISKES therefore decided that LINDEMANS must now work only in Belgium.

Resistance in Belgium.

LINDEMANS had good Resistance contacts in Antwerp and Malines and he frequently reported on the activities of these groups to GISKES who, however, decided to take no action, as he wished to build up and maintain LINDEMANS' contacts so that at the proper moment LINDEMANS would have received the full confidence of the Resistance and so be able to give really important strategic information, such as the date of the Allied invasion. GISKES had received from Leitstelle-III-West, and Io Militaersbefehlshaber Belgium, a directive to find out the intentions of the Armee Blanche and the instructions that they were receiving from London in connection with the Allied invasion. GISKES' policy was apparently justified as, about the 25th August, LINDEMANS reported that the main Allied thrust would be directed against the Charleroi area and then northwards along the Maas; LINDEMANS also reported that on a date which GISKES cannot remember, Resistance in the Lille and Charleroi district were to come out into the open. LINDEMANS further declared about the end of August that the Allies would be in Brussels about the morning of 4th September. It is interesting to note that German estimates of resistance strength in Belgium varied between 15,000 and 50,000, and the German General Staff were never able to evaluate satisfactorily the potential danger of Resistance.

GISKES' last meeting with LINDEMANS.

GISKES last saw LINDEMANS on the 2nd September 1944, at his office in Brussels, and gave him the mission to stay behind in Belgium and try to penetrate the British L.S., with the idea of finding out their plans for the placing of Allied agents behind the German lines in Holland. The same day, GISKES went to the Leitstelle-III-West, which was at that time in Liege, returning to Brussels on 3rd September. That evening he went to Antwerp taking KUP with him, who had apparently made a rendezvous with LINDEMANS at a Customs house on the Belgio-Dutch frontier. LINDEMANS failed to keep the rendezvous. GISKES believes that after their last meeting in Brussels LINDEMANS may have decided to go to Antwerp.

P.F. 600,513 & P.F. 600,804



Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)

LINDEMANS' return to Holland.

Later, on 20th September, GISKES received a telephone call from FAT 365 in Driebergen, which was then under WVR 506, saying that LINDEMANS was in Holland.

Before departure, GISKES had told LINDEMANS that if he managed to get back through the lines, on contacting German troops he was to ask for FAT 365.

about 3/4 weeks later GISKES received a written report from FAT 365 in which it appeared that LINDEMANS had crossed the lines near Eindhoven on the 15th September, having been given by the Allies the mission to contact resistance in Eindhoven and give them orders that the Allies would be occupying the town in the near future and that no action from them would be required. LINDEMANS had been taken to Fallschirm A.C.K. 1c, and gave the following information:-

P.F. 600512 - P.F. 600,804

- 1) That a British attack in the direction of Eindhoven was imminent. So far as GISKES can remember the date and time were 17th September, morning.
- 2) That for this attack large forces of airborne troops were standing by. The exact place where these troops were to be employed was not given. After contacting the A.C.K. 1c, LINDEMANS went to Driebergen and FAT 365, and thence back to Eindhoven and through the lines. The report further stated that during his stay in Brussels LINDEMANS had made Allied contacts at the Hotel Metropole. He mentioned two British Intelligence officers whose names GISKES cannot remember. LINDEMANS reported also that 21st Army Group H.Q. was in Antwerp, and gave other unimportant details, such as an account of living conditions in Belgium.

LINDEMANS' Finances.

GISKES states that LINDEMANS always seemed to have plenty of money. From KOF he received in all about 100,000 B. frs. and about 1,000 Dutch guilders. LINDEMANS apparently always had large sums of money on him, which GISKES believes he got from the various Resistance groups. It was never clear to GISKES why LINDEMANS continued to work for the Germans.

Written statement by GISKES on LINDEMANS.

GISKES has submitted the following statement on LINDEMANS:-

"A report by FAT 365 in Driebergen reached me towards the end of October 1944, and I remember the following about the information given by LINDEMANS:

LINDEMANS had reported to Fallschirm A.C.K. 1, Abt. 1c on 15th September 1944 that:-

- 1) The English attack in the direction of Eindhoven was imminent (as far as I can remember LINDEMANS gave the time and date as being early on 17th September).
- 2) For the attack which was imminent, large forces of airborne troops were standing by. (The place or sector where these troops were to be committed was not given).

Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)

"LINDEMANS on the same day had also given to PAT 365 a quantity of other information of a military nature, but it was of little importance.

The source of the information in paras. 1) and 2) above was not shown in the report from PAT 365. I do not know if Pallachin A.G.E.L. Abtg. 1c had questioned LINDEMANS on this."

Information from HUNTEMANN on LINDEMANS.

The following information on LINDEMANS was supplied by HUNTEMANN:

LINDEMANS was handled exclusively by KUF and HUNTEMANN only saw him on two occasions; first whilst driving from Brussels to Lille on 30th/31st August, 1944, in his company. On this occasion, it was agreed between them that if they were stopped by German troops, HUNTEMANN should answer and if by Resistance, LINDEMANS, as he knew the password (namely "Vive la Belgique, vive la Belgique liberee"). HUNTEMANN does not know what LINDEMANS was doing in Lille.

The second occasion when HUNTEMANN saw LINDEMANS was on 15th September 1944, in the office of PAT 365 in Driebergen. Whilst HUNTEMANN was in the office of KIESEWETTER, the latter received a telephone call from Hilversum saying that LINDEMANS (CG) had returned there. KIESEWETTER then requested that LINDEMANS should be sent immediately to Driebergen. HUNTEMANN had to go away but on returning at 2100 hrs. he found KIESEWETTER and the remainder of the Abwehr personnel busy writing a report on the information supplied by LINDEMANS.

It appeared, according to HUNTEMANN, that LINDEMANS had received a mission from an officer in the Hotel Metropole at Brussels to go and contact four leading personalities of a Dutch Resistance organisation in Eindhoven and to deliver to them orders to the effect that their organisation was to cease activities as the Allies would be in Eindhoven within a few days. HUNTEMANN is not sure whether it was on this occasion or later that KIESEWETTER told him that LINDEMANS had reported an imminent airborne attack in the Muenster/Duelmen area.

It is pointed out that much difficulty has been encountered in attempting to reconstruct, under interrogation, the actual contents of LINDEMANS' reports concerning the imminent airborne attack in Holland. In the first place, GISKES was not at Driebergen on 15th September 1944, and secondly, HUNTEMANN was absent from PAT H.Q. at periods on that day. Furthermore, HUNTEMANN's memory is confused concerning the events. It has been thought advisable, therefore, to include, for what it is worth, HUNTEMANN's own statement on the subject:

"I know from statements from GISKES that one day, probably at the end of 1943, or beginning of 1944, that the V-Mann NEHLS, who was being run by Uffz. KUF, stated that he was in contact with a very important English agent who said he was prepared to place his extensive knowledge at the disposal of the German Abwehr and to co-operate with them in an active manner, provided that his brother, who was being held by the SD in the Scheveningen prison, would be released.

PF 600, 613 & P.F. 600, 604

Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)

Information from ROYERMAN on LINDEMANS (contd.)

"I assume that thereafter a few conversations took place between this English agent, known as "CC" and KUP, and perhaps also on one occasion with GISKES. At any rate, GISKES arranged for the release by the SD of "CC's" brother, viz, as far as I know, had been imprisoned on account of some non-political matter. "CC" thereupon entered into the service of FAK 507 and was run by Off'r. KUP. The matter was "Chef-guiche", i.e. nobody, apart from those participating in the case, was to receive any information. Off'r. KUP must, however, have a closer knowledge of the affair as the files in connection with the "CC" case were available to him and he referred to them with a great deal of interest.

Very great successes were evidently achieved through "CC". I was often told that the KORDON affair had been quite harmless in comparison to the information which "CC" was supplying. Sometime in February 1945 at Wihl, GISKES gave me, when we were having a private conversation, the number of more important people who had been arrested through "CC's" cooperation. I believe that the figure mentioned was 311 or thereabout.

Amongst other things, during a raid, "CC" was shot at by the SD (GISKES was suspicious at the time that the SD had done this purposely to put us at a disadvantage). He was in hospital, in pain I believe, and was not free by a genuine Dutch resistance organisation and brought to Brussels. The whole story of his release, however, had been conducted by Off'r. KUP. The first attempt failed as "CC" had just been taken into the X-ray room, but the second attempt succeeded a few days later.

I personally saw "CC" on two occasions. On the first occasion, I drove with him from Brussels to Lille in a camouflaged car of FAK 507. This was on the 30th or 31st August 1944. "CC" was picked up but not introduced to me, at a house in the vicinity of the Ave. Louise, by KUP, who accompanied us on the journey. I know, however, from what GISKES had said that "CC" would travel with me. I drove at the time to Lille to be present at the expected parachute in connection with the case "PALKEN-NAMILLE" and "CC" had a mission which was not disclosed to me. The matter was urgent and he needed the car for a whole day in Lille as he had to get back to Brussels the same evening. He put me down at the Grand'Place in Lille, at about 11 o'clock in the forenoon. At the time, a certain amount of danger was involved in driving a lone car on the Brussels-Lille road. Many triangular shaped nails lay on the road for the purpose of sabotaging the tyres, and many surprise attacks were taking place by terrorists who also appeared on the scene wearing German uniforms. It was therefore agreed between "CC" and myself that in the event of the car being halted by the German Wehrmacht, I was to do the talking, but if the car on the other hand was stopped by civilians or the terrorists, he was to take charge of the conversation. He had the necessary papers to produce for just such an event, and knew the password "Vive la Belgique. La Belgique liberée". However, we were not stopped en route.

On the second occasion I saw "CC" in Orisbergen. It was in the afternoon of the Friday preceding the air-landing at Arnhem when a telephone call came through from Hilversum, probably from the Is of

P.F. 600,513 - P.F. 600,804

Christian KISSWETTER (contd.)

"the Neumaichtafel numbers, to Major KISSWETTER, asking whether he knew a certain Herr GERMAN. KISSWETTER denied knowledge of this name. As I knew that GERMAN was a nickname used cover name of GISELA, I interrupted KISSWETTER and explained this to him. Thereupon, KISSWETTER affirmed on the telephone that he knew a Herr GERMAN, and Silberstein immediately replied that a certain "OO" had reported there and desired to speak immediately to Herr GERMAN concerning an urgent matter. KISSWETTER then requested that "OO" should be sent immediately to Döberberg by car.

I had an appointment in Geist with Arnsdorf. SCHREIBER was only got back to Döberberg at about 21.00 hrs. I found KISSWETTER and the remainder of his Abwehr personnel of the Troop busy compiling a report concerning the information brought by "OO". If I am not mistaken, KISSWETTER had sometime been to Silberstein and had also only just returned. From what KISSWETTER and the remainder of those present related to me, and from what I remember in connection with the drawing up of the report - which I did not completely read through - I know that "OO" has brought very important information. "OO" had succeeded in getting in touch with the enemy intelligence service and, in fact, after the occupation of Brussels, had immediately gone to the Hotel Metropole where an important staff had set up its H.Q. There he enquired for an intelligence service officer, but there was none there at the time, and after a long period of waiting, a Captain arrived, who had set himself up in a room on the 4th floor. Moreover, in a room on the 4th floor, a V/T station had also been installed.

From this officer, "OO" was given orders for four leading parachutes of a Dutch Resistance Organization, all of whom were employed with SHILLING in Aachen, and was instructed to deliver the orders personally to them. The order was to the effect that their organization was to cease activities as in any case the Allied forces would be there in a few days' time. On route for Silberstein, "OO" had already handed over these orders to Rindowen, at which point he had crossed the lines.

After having now considered the matter at some length, I am not altogether clear as to whether KISSWETTER told me at the time that "OO" had reported on an imminent airborne landing in the area Eindhoven/Döberberg. It may be perhaps that Arnsdorf, SCHREIBER, who always knew about many rumors and new events, and with whom I had just had a longfay conversation, had told me about this. Certainly, nothing was talked about in my presence that evening and the following day concerning an imminent airborne landing in the Aachen area. I am quite certain about that. Only much later, about February 1945, GISELA told me on an occasion in Aachen during a private conversation that "OO" had been perfectly amazing V-Man, as he had reported about the entire Aachen undertaking beforehand. The fact that at the time I did not learn from KISSWETTER about the Aachen action does not necessarily mean that there was any mistrust of me; I had his complete confidence. In the confusion of that particular evening - at periods he was not there, and at times I was also absent - all those present were conversing confidentially about "OO's" reports - he may perhaps have taken it for granted that I also knew already at that time about this report. I must practically excuse this now, since he came to me from time to time and said that the reports which "OO" had brought were quite amazing. I took this, however, to refer to the fact that "OO" had managed to play the double game with the enemy intelligence service.

PF 600,804 - P.F. 600,803



Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)

"Next morning I did not see KIESENTER as he was in Hilversum. Moreover, I only saw "CC" again in the morning after KIESENTER's return, and I do not exclude the possibility that "CC" was together with KIESENTER in Hilversum, but this is only an assumption on my part. Immediately after the fall, "CC" drove with a car belonging to PAT 365 to the vicinity of Eindhoven from which point he again intended to cross the lines. He had the intention to return about a week later. From that date onwards, PAK 307 has neither seen nor heard anything more about him.

Much later, GISKES told me - I think it was also in February 1945 in Wicli - that he feared that NELIS had betrayed "CC", as NELIS and "CC" had become enemies, and NELIS knew precisely the role which "CC" had played. And, the pilots at PAT 365 had sent, of all people, this man NELIS, through the lines to Belgium, from whence of course, he did not return."

Hendrik LINDEMANS.

GISKES believes that this man, after release from prison, went as a voluntary worker to Germany where he had relations.

Jan LINDEMANS.

GISKES believes that he was connected with the Resistance Movement. Christian LINDEMANS stayed with Jan when in Holland, and KUP could contact him at Jan's address. GISKES is emphatic that Jan did not work for the Abwehr and that he never received money from it. Jan probably knew that Christian was working for the Germans but did not know the nature of the work. GISKES believes Jan to have been a patriotic Dutchman.

Q-1-600-513 x P.F. 600-804

Extract into  
PF for RODDERHOFF  
@ Van VIET

ANNEXURE V

Translocation of a Joint state unit by APOLLO and BRUTUS.

APOLLO and BRUTUS

In the autumn of 1943 (September ?), London enquired, over the station "Golf", whether we were in a position to ally through from Belgium to Holland two agents under a special mission. For this purpose, London asked us to give a contact address in Brussels and passwords. III F gave the necessary information.

UFFs. KUP was commissioned to arrange the contact address and prepare details of the clandestine journey. He was assisted in this work by the V-Man RIDDERHOFF. London had not informed us when, and by what route, the agents were to arrive in Belgium.

During the next week period (early October ?), London asked, over station "Golf" whether APOLLO and BRUTUS had reached Brussels. They were to have started the day before. The names APOLLO and BRUTUS were first given to the agents in the London message. Some days later, RIDDERHOFF reported that BRUTUS had reached Brussels, had a hide-out in his flat, and had no suspicions concerning his good faith.

BRUTUS had told RIDDERHOFF the following concerning his journey:- The plans which were to drop him and APOLLO in Belgium had apparently made a forced landing after being hit by flak. After landing, it had begun to burn, and APOLLO, the area and he, had jumped out and lost sight of each other. He had been able to reach a place which he concealed in a wood in the vicinity of the landing place. He then made his way to Brussels where he reported at the address given. Thereupon, RIDDERHOFF and BRUTUS carried out a two days' search for the case, but without success, as BRUTUS could not find the place a hide-out.

P. 560, x 79  
L 397/14/10/12

L 397/14/10/12

After being given a change of clothes by RIDDERHOFF in Brussels, BRUTUS expressed his urgent desire to get to Holland; he was clipped over the Belgian-Dutch frontier by V-Man DE WIDE (G WIDERING), a safe crossing having been previously arranged with the frontier post at Boarle-Nassau by III F. From Mindhoven (?) he travelled to Amsterdam accompanied by RIDDERHOFF.

Contact with him was only maintained through fixed rendezvous with RIDDERHOFF. After several days he was taken by RIDDERHOFF to a small genuine Dutch Resistance Group in the immediate vicinity of Doorn. This Group was run by a certain BRAM VAN OORD, with whom BRUTUS took up permanent residence. Nothing was yet known to III F of his actual mission.

Incidentally, a few days after the arrival of BRUTUS, APOLLO made an appearance at the Brussels Safe House. APOLLO had likewise lost everything in the forced landing, V/T apparatus, crystals, papers and money. It was agreed between BRUTUS and APOLLO, that APOLLO should remain for a bit in Brussels, as his mission could not be carried through without the lost equipment. APOLLO was then to return as quickly as possible to London, and after replacement of his equipment, start off afresh for Holland. Suitable messages giving this intention were sent to London over the station "Golf". England raised objections to APOLLO's return, but then agreed to let him journey back through a Paris address. APOLLO was thereupon sent to France in company of ARNAUD, (UFFs. CHRISTIANN III F Niederlande). I no longer

APOLLO and BRUTUS (contd.)

"remember how and by what route he continued his journey from there.

APOLLO took with him amongst other things, several reports from BRUTUS concerning his present activity in connection with his own mission. These reports went from BRUTUS to A. OLIO, via RIDSEKOP, and through this III F received exact knowledge of BRUTUS' mission in Holland, as follows:- United distribution of the illegal Dutch press according to the general directives which BRUTUS had brought with him from London; also the publication of articles in the Dutch secret press, which BRUTUS had brought with him from London in the form of micro-films.

Through the activities of BRUTUS and their observation by Sipo, in about December 1943 or January 1944, several facts about the illegal Dutch press were acquired. As the more important information which was expected did not come to light, however, and the necessary supervision of BRUTUS became increasingly difficult, Sipo arrested him and a few known members of the organisation. Nothing was actually known of the results of the trial at III F, at any rate, nothing can be recollected by the writers of this.

APOLLO was sent back to England, principally in order to let a genuine English agent return, one who had had actual contact with the Dutch groups run by London. III F hoped for a restoration of the apparently shaken trust in the Dutch organisation founded in London. It was also hoped that London's confidence in RIDSEKOP might thus be restored.

P. 56000 479

ANNEXURE VIGISENS' activities on behalf of EBENEZER and TRUMET - August 1944.

At the beginning of August 1944, GISENS, through Major KISEWITZER, who was at that time commanding FAT 365, requested an interview with Brigade-Fuehrer NARIMAN, head of the S.D. and Sipo in Holland. The interview took place at The Hague on August 10th, and it was GISENS' first meeting with NARIMAN since January 1944, when the Sipo had attempted to hold GISENS responsible for the escape of the five "Nordpol" agents from Maastricht. He had apparently asserted that if these men had been shot as spies, the affair would never have been 'blown' to England.

At the interview, KISEWITZER and a certain Obersturmbannfuhrer DEPPER of the Sipo, Holland, were also present. The reasons for the meeting were as follows:-

- (a) For several months past, FAT 365 had not been informed by the Sipo of important investigations which they had conducted in Holland, into the Dutch sabotage and resistance movements. The FAK 307 and FAT 365 had, however, heard about these investigations indirectly.
- (b) To arrange if possible, the release of EBENEZER and TRUMET to FAK 307 and to ensure that the "Nordpol" agents who had been transferred to Germany should continue to receive the treatment and privileges which had been promised to them by both GISENS and SCHREIBER.

The interview proved abortive, and GISENS could only obtain from NARIMAN the promise that the condition of EBENEZER and TRUMET would once again be reviewed. NARIMAN then became aggressive, saying:

"It should be adequately clear to you that we have no confidence in you. Since the 20th July, we have arrested a good number of Abwehr officers. Do you know that friends of yours were amongst them? I am in agreement with my colleagues in Paris and Brussels, in thinking that you will have to disappear at the earliest opportunity".

GISENS states that he then terminated the interview. GISENS learned later that NARIMAN's reference to his friends related to Oberst-im-General-Stab Freiherr Von ROEMER, Obkdo. des Heeres, Abtg. Fremde Heere-West, and Herta KLEIBOH, formerly with III P Copenhagen, both of whom had been arrested and shot after the July Putsch. GISENS was then quite clear in his own mind that his position was extremely delicate, and considered that any intervention on his part in favor of EBENEZER and TRUMET would have no results. However, in September 1944, he sent HUNTERMAN to Holland to see SCHREIBER and make enquiries about the arrested "Nordpol" agents.

Statement by HUNTERMAN in reference to "Nordpol" agents.

"During the course of the first few months of the "Nordpol" affair, many promises were made to EBENEZER and TRUMET by the S.D. at The Hague, and in particular by Kraut-Rdt SCHREIBER, which, for the most part, were not adhered to.

In addition to the basic promise that they would not be condemned to death, far reaching alleviations were to be made as regards their conditions whilst under arrest. They were to receive better food, longer periods daily



Statement by HUPFANG in reference to "Nordpol" arrests (contd.)

" in the open air, the time for 'lights out' at night was not to be observed, and many small items which I can no longer recall today. Tobacco and a wireless set were also promised to them.

I always considered myself responsible to some extent for BRENNER and TRUMPET, even though I had not made these promises to them, which in any case I had no authority to make. When I perceived that the S.D. only kept a few of the promises, I started to take independent action and procured for them regular supplies of tobacco, the purchase of shirts and other types of under-clothing, and books for the purpose of study. It was possible in those days to get round the question of obtaining authority from the S.D., since BRENNER and TRUMPET were in the Wehrmacht prison and I thus had the chance of visiting them without applying each time for S.D. authority to do so. Moreover, at that time, I was not being controlled by the S.D. When I observed that both became spiritually depressed after having been imprisoned for some time, I made arrangements for them to be taken out of solitary confinement and placed in a cell together. Afterwards I informed the S.D. about the alteration which had been made and SCHNEIDER could not then alter what was already a fait accompli.

Once the co-operation of BRENNER and TRUMPET in the "Nordpol" affair was no longer necessary, the S.D. ceased bothering about either of them. I visited them whenever I happened to be in Haaren and procured for them, after much opposition, the radio set which for so long had been promised, and got the definite impression that the S.D. would not keep to their promises and would rescind their privileges, if my interest in the two men waned in any way. After FAK 307 went to Brussels I no longer had any opportunity to look after BRENNER and TRUMPET and I suggested to GIKES that the two men should be brought to Brussels. GIKES agreed and negotiated with SCHNEIDER who turned the matter down, as he was not in a position to release prisoners. Thereupon, GIKES explained to the S.D. that we needed the two men in Belgium, as agents in connection with a similar type of case. The S.D. gave their assent to this and I then informed BRENNER and TRUMPET, on one of my next visits, that they would shortly be brought over to Brussels, as I was anxious to get them out of the hands of the S.D. Moreover, I said that their release from the S.D. had been achieved under the pretext that they were required as agents for FAK 307. Both stated that under no circumstances would they agree to work against Holland, England or any of their Allies. I told them that I had never expected that they would do anything of the sort, but I suggested to them that, perhaps, there were matters which had a common interest to both parties, i.e. the clearing up of matters connected with Communism. (Klärung kommunistischer Streisangen). Nevertheless, I said, this matter could be talked about later on and the main pre-occupation at the moment was that they should be got away from the Haaren camp. (The possibility did exist at that time that they might be used by FAK 364 against an alleged Communist group, which, however, was not in itself one of the tasks of FAK units. I do not believe, however, that BRENNER and TRUMPET would have done this work, and for my part, I wanted to get them to Brussels as "prisoners under protection". More precise details are not remembered).

A few days after I had informed BRENNER and TRUMPET about this plan, the invasion commenced, and the S.D. used this as a pretext to rescind their promise that the two men would be released. Evidently Belg. MAJANS would not authorize the assent which had already been given by SCHNEIDER.

The next time I again heard about BRENNER and TRUMPET was in September 1944, when on enquiring what had happened to them, SCHNEIDER told me that they had been sent to the Oranienburg concentration camp. (See Annexure VIII). As this was done against all the former S.D. promises, it required in my journey, already mentioned, to this place in an attempt to extricate them, but this did not succeed. I only succeeded in speaking to TRUMPET.

SCHNEIDER could not provide us at the time with any information whatever about the fate of the remaining "Nordpol" prisoners.

Extract into  
PP for LINDEMANN'S

ANNEXURE VII

Recapture of the Escaped "Nordpol" Agents,  
CABBAGE and PARENIF

About March/April 1944, V-Mann LINDEMANN reported to UFFs. KUP that he was in contact with an espionage group in Rotterdam. This group intended to send two agents to the U.K. with extensive quantities of espionage material. It was reported that matters had been arranged with London through a W/T operator who was working for this espionage group, and that the two couriers were to be fetched at an agreed point on the coast of one of the Zealand islands by a British M.L.

UFFs. KUP of FAE. 30/ received the order to make preparations for the arrest of the two couriers in such a way that the espionage material would be captured at the same time. Meantime it had become known from further reports by LINDEMANN, that the agents in question were from the U.K., who had been arrested but had escaped. This led to the assumption that the two agents in this case were probably connected with the five "Nordpol" prisoners who had escaped.

Special papers were necessary to make the journey to the Zealand Islands, which were a protected area. LINDEMANN procured the necessary papers for the two couriers on the grounds of his supposedly good connections with a German Dienststelle. Thus, in this manner, III.F. through the Sipo, received particulars of the names and/or cover names, under which the two couriers were travelling.

A control or check on the train by officials of the S.D. or Sipo was carried out between Roosendaal and Bergen-op-Zoom on the day of the intended journey, and the couriers in question were arrested. It transpired that these two men were, in fact, none other than PARENIF and CABBAGE. Extensive espionage material, about 500 small film negatives, were secured, and both agents were conducted to the prison at Haaren by the Sipo and later transferred to the prison at Assen.

A report was made by the Sipo to FAI. 159 - the FAI. concerned in the affair - regarding further arrests of the Dutch espionage group concerned in the affair, but GISKES and HUNTEMANN cannot now remember the details. Moreover, it is not known to HUNTEMANN and GISKES whether action was taken against CABBAGE and PARENIF on account of their attempt to reach England.

In January/February 1944, the Sipo reported that the agent LACROSSE, who had escaped with PARENIF and CABBAGE from Haaren in 1941, had been arrested in Belgium. He was taken to Haaren and probably later transferred to Assen. Details of this arrest are not known to GISKES or HUNTEMANN.

FA 600.513

ANNEXURE VIIIHUNTEMANN's Account of his Visit to Oranienburg.

After hearing from Krim Rat SCHREIBER in Driesbergen about the 10th September 1944, in reply to my question, that LAUWERS and JORDAAN had been taken to the Oranienburg Concentration Camp, I reported this news to the Kommandofuehrer. As their detention there was contrary to every promise made by the S.D. GISEKES instructed me to propose to the S.D. that they should be immediately released from the concentration camp; if necessary I was to go myself to Oranienburg and arrange for the release on the spot. I then returned to Driesbergen, where Krim Rat SCHREIBER gave me highly reassuring explanations concerning the treatment of the two prisoners. They were accommodated in stufe I, i.e., they were well treated and looked after and lived the same as every free worker in Germany except that they were accommodated in the Camp.

I thereupon explained to SCHREIBER that I was commissioned to procure the release of the prisoners. In consequence, after waiting for two days, I received from SCHREIBER a document, signed by him, from the Reichsliehaber der Sicherheitspolizei and the S.D. in the Hague, to the Oranienburg Concentration Camp, in which the Concentration Camp was instructed to deliver to me the two prisoners for my disposal. SCHREIBER added verbally that the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin and the Concentration Camp in Oranienburg had been advised in advance by teleprint. On the evening of the same day SCHREIBER again rang me up and said that a telegram had just arrived from the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin, stating that under no circumstances could the two prisoners be placed at the disposal of F&S 507.

In spite of this, I went to Oranienburg, where the release to me of the two men was flatly turned down, on the grounds that LAUWERS and JORDAAN had been engaged in work on secret weapons and thus knew official secrets, and their release could only take place at the end of the war. On the pretence that it was urgently necessary to interrogate them on an Abwehr matter, I finally managed to arrange for the two men to be brought before me the next day. When I went again to Oranienburg the next morning it turned out that LAUWERS was nowhere to be found. It was presumed that he had been sent off to Rathenow as a worker. JORDAAN was thereupon brought before me. The "interrogation on an Abwehr matter" was naturally a pretext to see for myself that JORDAAN was actually there and what was his state of health; I also wished to hear his own story concerning his position there and find out any new possibilities for getting him out of the camp. JORDAAN appeared very badly cared for and extraordinarily depressed. Concerning LAUWERS' whereabouts, he only knew that he was working with an Arbeitskommando outside the Camp. As things stood, I could give JORDAAN no hope of imminent release from the Camp through an intervention, as we too were completely at the mercy of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. JORDAAN then said that he and LAUWERS knew well, from their own observation, to what an extent the Sigo were always frustrating any efforts on their behalf made by ILLF. However, he had arranged with LAUWERS that as soon as the war was over, provided he lived till then, he would report to the H.Q. in London all that had happened. Further, he wished, and LAUWERS did too, to see me again after the war in happier circumstances, and for this reason gave me his home address in Haaksbergen, Huis de Bleek.

As is understandable, I too desired to know that after the war JORDAAN was at home again and well, as my inability to improve his position at that time depressed me greatly. When I left I had the impression that my visit had at least convinced him that he was not entirely abandoned.

ANNEXURE VIII (contd.)

On my return I reported to the Kommando on the result of my journey. The Kommandofuehrer now also saw no further possibility of undertaking anything in this matter which would lead to a positive result.

On my first interrogation by the U.S.A. Military Authorities (MIC) on 24th April in Goettingen, I reported to the American Interrogation officer that in the Oranienburg Camp there were two English agents, called LAUWERS and JORDAAN, who belonged to the Dutch Section of the British Intelligence Service and who therefore should be taken over to London immediately after the liberation. The same officer told me two days later, in the Schwarzenborn Camp, that JORDAAN had been found by the Americans. He had been taken to an American hospital as he was very weak and had to recuperate. There was no trace whatsoever of LAUWERS.



XIII.

ANNEXURE IX

S.O.E. Questionnaire

Q.1: What are the details of the initial penetration by JOHNNY which enabled the Germans to shadow CATARRH and to supply him with false information, e.g. the location of the German cruiser, "Prinz Eugen"; who was JOHNNY and over what period was the penetration maintained?

A.1: The name JOHNNY is unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN. It is known, however, that CATARRH was constantly associating with the Dutch Captain of the Reserve, Van Den BERG who had important connections with the port authorities in Rotterdam. It is possible, therefore, that Van Den BERG passed this information to CATARRH who in turn passed it to REIDERMAN for onward transmission. Both GISKES and HUNTEMANN deny that false information of an in character was ever passed to Van Den BERG. REIDERMAN first made contact with Van Den BERG in December 1941. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN know, REIDERMAN did not use the name JOHNNY. REIDERMAN was handled by Uffr. KUP.

Q.2: What are the details of the liaison between the Aets in France, Belgium and Holland? What exchange of information existed for the briefing of interrogators of captured agents?

A.2: Initial interrogations by SOHRKINDER, and, when necessary, by GISKES, took place at S.D. R.G. at The Hague. Subsequent interrogation on codes was carried out by Uffr. MEY at Meeresgraven. MEY was purely a code and cypher expert. Berlin, in 1942, directed that a regular exchange of data, based on information received from the interrogations of captured agents, should take place between Aets in Holland, France and Belgium. In addition each Aet sent an individual report on each interrogation to III.F-Berlin. Reports consisted of about one page of foolscap giving the following information:-

- a. Name and cover name.
- b. Controlling organisation of the agent.
- c. Mission.
- d. Short summary of training.
- e. Precise of the interrogation.

As far as is known to GISKES there was no similar interchange of information between the various S.D. Stellen.

III.F-Berlin issued, about every three months, a summary of British Intelligence activities in other countries, e.g. Middle East, North Africa, Crete, Scandinavia etc.

Technical A/T interrogations were carried out by the Funk-Abwehr who reported to their main office in Berlin; when the Funk-Abwehr was withdrawn from Holland, these interrogations were conducted by the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, who also reported the results to their main office. Abtg. Funk-Abwehr, Berlin, issued a monthly circular which incorporated the information obtained from these two sources.

ANNEXURE IX (contd.)

A. 2. (contd.)

Information on new sabotage devices was forwarded to Abtg. II-Berlin by the relevant Abtg. II-Stelle in the countries concerned. Any matters of special interest were incorporated in the 3-monthly III F-Berlin summaries.

MEY, at the beginning of 1942, had no knowledge of S. O. E. background and was compelled to build this up from his own interrogations. It is possible, however, that he may have received the results of interrogations of agents captured in other countries, through Sipo channels.

Q. 3: What were the details of the notional capture and death of MARRON and his W/T operator?

A. 3: III P "captured and killed" MARRON and his W/T operator on 19.11.42. (message No. 1 from COCKBURN via TRUMPET refers).

The Germans thought that the absence of casualties might cause suspicion in London and, as they were under the impression that London might be intending to ex-filtrate MARRON, he and his operator were selected for notional extermination.

Q. 4: The reason for the sudden cessation of the SHIMACH messages?

A. 4: BRANZEL, in his signal No. 3 of 7.4.43, suspended BONI traffic mentioning suspected treason in 'VICTORY' circles. KOOS VORRINK had been arrested shortly before this date and the Germans thought that news of this arrest would be bound to reach the U.K.; as SHIMACH had been carrying this traffic they deemed it advisable to shut him down.

Q. 5: What did the Germans know of CARROT?

A. 5: On 15.5.42, London, in OXC 17, told TRUMPET to make a rendezvous with CARROT. The address of this rendezvous was sent in a complicated code which was broken by the Germans. The address of the rendezvous was Boegge, Leidsehe Poort, Leidsehe Plein, Amsterdam. At this time of course, TRUMPET was under control, as was also TURNIP. For some reason unknown to GIBENS or HINTSMANN the Sipo, who handled this affair, decided that TURNIP should keep the appointment. The latter, however, was able to warn CARROT, that his two companions were plain clothes police, and he was able to escape through a lavatory.

Prior to the receipt of the message quoted above, the Germans had no knowledge of CARROT's existence, nor did they succeed in arresting him after his escape.

Q. 6: The two Anton de WILDES?

A. 6: a) Anton De WILDE & ADRIAN was the name employed by Uffa BOEKENS of III P Act-Niederlande for his notional ex-filtration to the U.K. in May 1943. He was passed through to Paris by IRNO (see A. 7 & 8), where he was 'arrested' in a cafe in the Bvd. des Capucines, whilst in the company of the genuine British agent MARCEL. The latter, however, was uncollected.

P.F. 600, 924 & P.F. 600, 929

Q. 6.  
A. 6.  
P.F. 600, 929

P.F. 600, 924

ANNEXURE IX (contd.)

A.6 (contd.)

*Contd*

PF600,924

b) ~~X~~ VAN DER WAALS & DE WILDE & ANTONI was Haupt V-Mann of Krijzset, SCHREIJDER of the SD, The Hague.

This man was responsible for the penetration of the Koois VERBOD group. In a message from London to BONI, Nr. 36 of 12.11.42, orders were given to contact a certain VENUS; the latter was a member of the Koois VERBOD group and VAN DER WAALS, after making this contact, was able to penetrate this organization. In order to inspire confidence VAN DER WAALS asked that a B.B.C. message should be broadcast, and this was done. This confidence having been obtained, Koois VERBOD sent the 'VICTORY' messages through VAN DER WAALS, and these were transmitted on the BONI link.

It is pointed out that this affair - the group being indigenous - was handled by SCHREIJDER, and III F merely loaned the BONI link for the purpose.

In the summer and autumn of 1943, black lists, distributed by one of the Dutch Resistance Groups, described VAN DER WAALS as being a notorious S.D. agent.

HUNTEMANN also declares that VAN DER WAALS was taken by Capt. ABEEN (Camp O20 case) to see the British Military Attache in Stockholm. He is unable to give the date and this information is second-hand from SCHREIJDER.

In September 1944, SCHREIJDER told HUNTEMANN that "VAN DER WAALS in England sei und freiwillig Herueber gegangen sei". HUNTEMANN had the impression that SCHREIJDER was considerably worried at this news. He also recollects that, possibly in 1943 VAN DER WAALS was notionally murdered by the SD as he was 'blown' throughout Holland.

Whether the BROADBEAN/GOLF escape line fitted into the general scheme of the Abwehr and what were the dividends they received from it?

These two agents arrived in Holland on 2.2.43 and were duly arrested on landing. Interrogation established that their main aim was to organise escape lines for ex-filtrees, etc. For this purpose they had been provided with blank French and Belgian identity cards and a large sum of French and Belgian money. The running of an escape line presented considerable difficulties to the Germans, since, had they given the impression to London that the lines were working satisfactorily, there would have been no excuse for making difficulties over the ex-filtrations for which London was constantly asking. In addition, a series of notional arrests on these lines would also have appeared suspicious. The policy therefore was to maintain as far as possible, the potentialities of the BROADBEAN/GOLF lines.

Not only dividends according to the Germans were the addresses of safe houses and contacts sent by London, over the BROADBEAN/GOLF link. As for example the information provided in Nr. 2 to

PF600,924

Q.7:

A.7:

## ANNEXURE IX (contd.)

## A.7 (contd.)

FRADREY/GOLF dated 25.4.43, giving the address of a safe house and a password. It was found that the contacts given were, in most cases, of minor importance and no arrests, as far as GIBBS and HOFFMANN know, resulted from this traffic, the policy being merely to keep observation and not to 'blow' the addresses or contacts. An exception to this was a house-search, at the address where MARCEL lived in Paris, believed to be in the Place Clignancourt, as it was thought that, in view of ARIELAN's 'arrest', no action would have appeared suspicious.

At a later date, which neither can remember, ARNAUD & ARNO, i.e. Uffs. CHRISTMANN, was sent to Paris to an address notified from London with a story that other ex-filters were to be expected shortly. On arrival, however, it appeared that London had asked for the ex-filters inc of ARNO and his latter, willy-nilly, was sent along the line accompanied by a woman as far as Lyons. Here he came under suspicion, but managed to talk his way out of it and returned to Holland, where he reported the address of the house in Lyons. This address was passed to the Ast in Lyons and the plane was watched, but apparently the organizers of the line had realized the implication of ARNO's visit and nothing eventuated.

All addresses of safe houses and contacts sent by London, on the FRADREY/GOLF link, were passed to the relevant Asts, but the results obtained were generally unknown to III P Holland.

Q.8:

What was the true identity of the passour ARNO or ARNAUD?

A.8:

Uffs. CHRISTMANN, III P, Ast-Niederlande.

Q.9:

Details of the activities of Col. KOPPERT?

A.9:

Col. KOPPERT was a man who had good connections with a few senior German officers, names unknown to GIBBS and HOFFMANN.

It appears that RIDDERHOF met KOPPERT 'by chance' in a train and commenced talking about Resistance activities. It seems, however, that KOPPERT mistook RIDDERHOF but put him in touch with Sgt. KNOPPERS. As far as GIBBS and HOFFMANN are aware, RIDDERHOF only met KNOPPERS on a few occasions and was unable to produce anything of an incriminating or interesting character.

The Germans, however, naturally expected to receive from KNOPPERS a great deal of information on the activities and future plans of KOPPERT, after KNOPPERS had returned from the U.K.

Q.10:

Administrative arrangements under which RIDDERHOF worked for abwehr in both Holland and Belgium?

Card  
a extract

P.F.600.617



ANNEXURE IX (contd.)

*Extract into  
PF for RIDDERHOFF*

A. 10:

In the autumn of 1941, UZFA KUP had come into contact with RIEDERHOFF after the latter's release from prison. In December 1941 RIEDERHOFF was receiving from III F a fixed salary of 300 guilders which by mid-1942 had risen to 500 guilders per month, and at the end of the same year, 500 guilders. By the summer of 1943 RIEDERHOFF had become completely 'blown' in Holland and left for Brussels, with the idea, as GISEKS and HUNTEMANN state, of withdrawing from all SIS activities. Nevertheless he still drew his monthly salary from Ast-Niederlande. As far as GISEKS and HUNTEMANN are aware, RIEDERHOFF was never paid by Ast-Brusselle but, naturally, was known there and he could rely on the Ast's help for procuring identity papers, passports and living quarters, etc.

*P.F. 600479*

His various addresses, as known to III F-Niederlande, were as follows:-

- a) Biarritz, N. Holland, near Hilversum: Korte Moolenaarweg 2. Frequently used, and relatives of his (by marriage) lived there.
- b) There was another address, obtainable from the local police, in Arnhem. He was probably registered here under the name RIEDERHOFF.
- c) Rue de Throne, Brussels. (Nr. forgotten).
- d) In the spring of 1943 he lived for a time in various hotels in Spa.

*Extract into  
MERSMAJONS  
PF*

A. 11:

Details of the two MORDEGL agents, alleged to be a British agent in and a Dutchman, brought from Holland to Belgium, in the summer of 1944. The two agents are said to have agreed to co-operate with the Germans, but only against the Russians.

The two agents were EYENSZER and TRUMPET. Details are given in statements by GISEKS and HUNTEMANN at Annexure VI. Neither GISEKS nor HUNTEMANN can imagine how MERSMAJONS was aware of this incident.

*P.F. 604045*

Verbal Questionnaire Submitted by S.O.E.

- Q. 1: Was TOMBAT identical with Ter HAAKY (See P. 1, Section 3 of this report).
- A. 1: No.
- Q. 2: Who is ABOR?
- A. 2: ABOR is: Arnoldus Alberts BAATSEN @ WATERGROSSE.
- Q. 3: Escape of PARSNIP, CABBAGE and LACROSSE?
- A. 3: See statement by GISEKS, Annexure VII.

ANNEXURE IX (cont'd.)Verbal Questionnaire Submitted by S.O.S. (cont'd.)

Q.3: Was REIDERHOF identical with CHERRY BRANDY or George BRANDY?

A.3: REIDERHOF, when making reports to III F on George BRANDY, was supposed to refer to him as SHERRY.

Q.4: Radio-Dienst?

A.4: Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN have any knowledge of this organisation, nor have they even heard of it.

Q.5: IS VI ?

A.5: Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN know a great deal about this organisation. However, it is possible that it was penetrated by the Sipo, through LINEMANN.

Q.6: Explanation of the German spelling of the key-word "PREIS" in A/978 from KALE?

A.6: BRENEZER was certainly not being used to encipher, translate or transmit on the 25.4.43, when the word "PREIS" appeared in message A/978 from KALE via BROCCOLI. At this time BRENEZER was imprisoned at Haaren and the suggested explanation of this incident by HUNTEMANN is as follows:-

Members of the Orpo frequently transmitted in the neighbourhood of Mbertogenbosch, and on these occasions often visited the Beart's prison. It is possible, though unlikely, that one of these men gave to BRENEZER the draft message and asked him to encipher it. BRENEZER may have learnt BROCCOLI's key word through tapping on the central heating system, and thus have had the message to insert the word "PREIS" in the message. HUNTEMANN thinks, however, that this would have been very unlikely as, almost always, messages were enciphered at the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, then at Driebergen, and taken to the place of transmission already enciphered. In addition, all enciphering and deciphering was subject to a double check done by two different members of the B-Stelle. Accordingly, no credible explanation for this incident can be offered by HUNTEMANN or GISKES.

At the same time it is emphasised that all matters connected with enciphering and transmission were dealt with entirely by the Orpo and HUNTEMANN and GISKES knew little about the procedure adopted. Neither possesses any technical knowledge of codes, ciphers, or W/T.

Conduct of captured S.O.S. Agents.

In spring and summer of 1942, all captured agents were taken to the SO prison in Scheveningen. Interrogation generally took place in the prison, but in special cases agents were interrogated personally by SCHREIBER in the HQ's of the Sipo, Bussehof, The Hague.

BRENEZER and TRUMPER were detained for several weeks in the military prison at Scheveningen as they were being played back, and were actually transmitting. It was therefore necessary to prevent their coming into contact with other Dutch prisoners and their Dutch guards.

ANNEXURE IX (contd.)Custody of Captured S. G. E. Agents (contd.)

In about September or October 1942, all NORDEFEL agents were taken to the special prison at Haaren. From this date onwards all arrested agents were conducted straight to Haaren, where they were interrogated, except those who appeared to have received special missions, e.g. Johan GRUEN & BRUTUS and a female agent named FRUX & CHLOXX, who were first interrogated at Haaren by SCHREIBER.

After the escape from Haaren in December 1943 of PARSNIP, CABBAGE and MARGOSSE, all NORDEFEL agents, with the exception of BREMEKER, TRUMPET and FALDI, were transferred early in 1944 to the prison at Assen, and thence at some later date, unknown, to camps in Germany.

In mid-September 1944, SCHREIBER told HUNTEMANN that TRUMPET and BREMEKER had indeed been sent to Germany, and that they were at Sachsenhausen Camp. At the same time, SCHREIBER professed ignorance of the whereabouts of the other NORDEFEL agents. Nevertheless he promised to make enquiries, but this was never informed of the result. As GISSER felt a special responsibility for BREMEKER and TRUMPET as a result of the promises that had been made to them, he ordered HUNTEMANN to visit them at this camp. An account of HUNTEMANN's visit is given at Annexure VIII.

A certain B. Stuf, WACKER was in charge of the prison at Haaren, which was also, at times, used as a detention prison for hostages.

Notes on S. G. E. Agents.

It must be emphasized that the actual handling of the agents after arrest was entirely an SD responsibility, and for this reason both GISSER and HUNTEMANN are not good sources of information on the behaviour and personalities of the captured agents; in fact, many of them were never even seen by GISSER or HUNTEMANN.

**BREMEKER:** Is described by HUNTEMANN as being crafty and moody. He was only prepared to co-operate as a result of a definite promise made that none of the agents caught through his treachery would receive the death penalty. The promise that his own life would be spared made no impression on him, and it was impossible to turn him by threats of this nature. He was absolutely convinced that London would be aware that he was operating under control, within three weeks. In fact he stated that a certain Col. ELDM had assured him that this would be the case before he left the U.K. Special pains were taken to school a B-Staff operator in BREMEKER's transmitting idiosyncracies, as it was feared that if he should become aware of the seriousness of the position that his behaviour had entailed, he would, at no matter what cost, take steps to inform London. He never concealed his dislike of the Germans.

**GRUEN:** Is described as being a man of little initiative and with a dislike for hard work. He appeared to be completely disinterested in his situation and HUNTEMANN had the impression that, even if free, he would have been a poor agent. During imprisonment he was subject to frequent fits of depression and for that reason HUNTEMANN arranged for him to share a cell with BREMEKER.

Card

P.F. 692 642 N.N.1

ANNEXURE D. (Contd.)Notes on S. O. E. Agents (contd.)

CATARRH: Is described by GISKES as being a man of outstanding courage and determination. No promises or threats would induce him to provide information or to co-operate in any way. After the failure of an attempted escape he refused to give his parole not to escape again. Any information that he did provide, was given, when he was quite sure that it would do no harm to his cause.

PELLA (Ter WINDT): A female agent who behaved very well, and from whom it was almost impossible to gain information. When Londen proposed an address in The Hague for her contact, SCHREIEDER promised her her liberty if she would consent to act as an SD agent in making the contact. She refused SCHREIEDER's proposal, preferring imprisonment where, however, she was well treated, according to HUNTEMANN.

MARROW: Is described as a man of high ideals and great patriotism. HUNTEMANN however considered that his affection for his wife and child was such that he would never have been a good agent. Whilst under arrest he was constantly asking for news of his family. HUNTEMANN declares that he persuaded SCHREIEDER to send the wife a letter and money through an imaginary Dutch organisation, and the wife was allowed to send a letter back through the same intermediary.

SATERSCHERS: Is described by HUNTEMANN as a bad character who voluntarily spied on his fellow prisoners at Haaren and reported on them to the SD. Through him, many written messages from one prisoner to another found their way into the hands of the SD. At a later period he fell into disfavour with the SD who found papers indicating his intention to escape.

HEESTROOF & VANRETTARD (HEESTROOF): Former members of the Marechaussee. Described as excellent agents who, at initial interrogations, convinced the Germans that they were people of very minor importance. When, in a signal from London at a later date, it was made clear to the Germans that the pair were "BUREAU" instructors, they were further interrogated, but both claimed to have forgotten their knowledge of the subject and the Germans were obliged to send the first set they captured to Berlin, for expert examination, before they could work it.

FARSLAY: Described as a good agent from whom the SD could get nothing for a long time. At his first interrogation after capture, he insisted that a W/T message should be sent to London stating: "ELVIRA reached the station 57 minutes late". This message appeared suspicious to GISKES and HUNTEMANN, and in order to obviate having to transmit it, FARSLAY had to be notionally killed.

FALE & CAULIFLOWER: Described by SCHREIEDER to HUNTEMANN as being good trustworthy men who gave nothing away of any importance.

BROADBENT: Volunteered to work for the Germans. His offer was refused as HUNTEMANN believed that he only made the offer with a view to future escape.

TURNIP: Showed considerable resource in warning CARROT. (See A.5 of S. O. E. Questionnaire)

SCHREIEDER expressed the opinion that the quality of agents sent, progressively deteriorated.



Allied Agents arrested in Holland not connected with Nordpol.

Early 1941, a Dutch naval cadet whose name may have been TER HAAR or LAAR, who

Sometime later, VAN DER REYDEN, agreed to act as a double agent, was played by the Sipo without success.

ER JONKE (leader) )  
HALEMA (w/T) )  
were arrested by Sipo about May or June 1943. They had arrived by M.T.E. at the beginning of 1943 and had landed near Katwijk. Their mission was purely espionage, and III F with HALEMA's assistance tried to establish contact. London must, however, have been aware of what was happening since, after several schedules, the traffic stopped.

ORKE (w/T) was caught by R.D.F. of the Orpo on Whit Monday, 1942.

ALBLAS (w/T) Civil sig. T.B.O. Dutch cadet or sub-lieutenant, worked with success for a long time in Holland. All the efforts of the Orpo and Sipo were frustrated by his caution and skill. was arrested in a trap set by the Sipo in the house of his girl friend in The Hague. He did not give any information about his mission or the other members of his group and next to TACONIS was the best and most valuable agent whom London sent to Holland and who fell into German hands.

HINDEWIJER (w/T) was arrested by the Sipo in Amsterdam after his address had become known through the Nordpol traffic. He had for several months frustrated the efforts of the Orpo (R.D.F. and shadowing) who had brought special equipment to Holland for this purpose.

\* First Group  
(names no longer known)  
Parachuted in Sept./Oct. 1943 near Graves or Nijmegen. The drop took place in the early evening when it was still quite light, close to a road where there were a lot of people so that the agents, who fell in a garden and on a roof, had to flee immediately leaving w/T act, codes and a case full of their personal effects.

\* Second Group  
(names no longer known)  
Landed Oct./Nov. 1943 near Graves. They were apparently exposed by contacts of the First Group (see above) who helped them to hide their equipment in a neighbouring farm. In some way, however, troops in the neighbourhood got to hear of this and, without informing the Abwehrstelle or Sipo, occupied the farm. When later the agents returned to fetch their equipment, there was a fight, one being shot whilst the other escaped. One of these agents may have been a certain SCHIJNEMAKER (Phillips factory, Bindhoven) as his name was marked on the clothes found.