

HEINTJE I, II, III, IV.

A group of agents arrested by the Sipo about Feb./March 1944, after HEINTJE II and III had been captured in Amsterdam on consecutive days whilst transmitting. Arrests were due to R.I. The Sipo tried to play them back (the Sipo "Egmont" affair), but London closed the traffic after several weeks with a message referring to the last message sent by III. in the Nordpol case.

PERGMANN.

Was found dead in a shot down aircraft in the Zuidersee some time in the summer of 1943. Had a large sum of foreign money and a letter of introduction from Capt. ZOMER to a certain Buergemeister in Holland. His companion saved himself on a Dutch ship and escaped.

HUMMANS now states that he thinks that these two groups may have been the same as the HEINTJE I, II, III and IV group.

ANNEXURE XI.

Captain ABEN and Jongkeer Van GEEVERS-DEYNOD.

PP W L-11  
7325/43  
GEEVERS

In the spring of 1943 Kriarat, SCHREIBER of the SD, The Hague, came one day to Referat III F and explained that his V-Mann, Capt. ABEN (Camp 020 Case) had received instructions from the British Embassy in Stockholm to bring to Sweden the former police president of the Hague, Jongkeer Van GEEVERS-DEYNOD. SCHREIBER was willing that GEEVERS-DEYNOD should go to Stockholm as he hoped to arrest him on his return to Holland and thus learn the instructions that the latter had received from the British Embassy. SCHREIBER had instructed ABEN to engage GEEVERS-DEYNOD as a cook on board his ship, the "Hollandia", but a complication had arisen in that an espionage group had entrusted to GEEVERS-DEYNOD a large number of Leica films. GEEVERS-DEYNOD as a cook felt that it would be difficult to conceal these and had asked ABEN to put them in the ship's safe in the Captain's cabin. ABEN thereupon brought the films to SCHREIBER who showed them to III F in order to determine whether they could be allowed to go forward to the British Embassy. On examination, the films were discovered to be of exceptional importance and under no circumstances could they be allowed to fall into enemy hands. The films were accordingly replaced with old paper and the sealed up envelope was given to ABEN for safe custody. The problem now presented itself how to get rid of the package en route and at the same time not let GEEVERS-DEYNOD know that ABEN was working for the Germans. It was therefore decided to stage a surprise search of the ship. Forv. Kapit. WENNECKE of Referat III M of 1st Niederlande, was entrusted with the arrangements and HUNTEMANN at his own request accompanied him. Accordingly, WENNECKE, HUNTEMANN and some SD officials boarded a tug and accosted the "Hollandia" and another ship sailing in convoy with her. The two ships were ordered to lay to and anchor, and the search of the second ship began. The unusual proceedings were, of course, noticed by those on board the "Hollandia", and ABEN called GEEVERS-DEYNOD to his cabin and told him that under such circumstances he could not keep the package in the safe (he \*) suggested to GEEVERS-DEYNOD that the latter should take it and hide it somewhere else. GEEVERS-DEYNOD replied that he was unable to find a hiding place on board, and agreed that the package should be thrown over the side, and this was done in the presence of GEEVERS-DEYNOD. One of the Naval Guard on board the "Hollandia" had however noticed the jettisoning of the package and reported the matter to Capt. WENNECKE. An "enquiry" was therefore held in ABEN's cabin, the latter declaring that he was mauling cigarette papers to Sweden and had thrown them overboard to avoid unpleasantness with the customs authorities. The "Hollandia" with GEEVERS-DEYNOD on board was then allowed to proceed. It is not known to GEEVERS or HUNTEMANN if GEEVERS-DEYNOD returned to Holland from Sweden.

S 36926

7325/43

APPENDIX XIIMiscellaneous pointsPersonalities of U.C.E. known to GISKES

The only names recollected by GISKES are -

Lieut. Colonel BLUNT  
His successor Major BINGHAM  
Miss BOND  
Lieut. HICKEY

Punk-Horchdienst and Fluke-Horchdienst

The Punk-Horchdienst knew some of the call signs of aircraft carrying agents to the Continent. According to GISKES trial flights were made in the afternoon prior to the operation of that night, and it was in many cases possible to intercept traffic between the aircraft and its controlling station. When this traffic was reported to GISKES, he concluded, and was generally right, that an operation would take place that night.

The Fluke-Horchdienst were given special orders to plot the courses of single low-flying aeroplanes, and in this way, from their reports, GISKES was able to get a general picture of the scope of dropping operations.

ANNEXURE XIII.

Descriptions of Miscellaneous Officials.

1. Detuf. MAI.  
PF602,063  
*Card n  
amend*

SFS2 | Hall 0.014 CA  
33290

Seen by GISES between February 1942 and March 1944, in The Hague, Driebergen and Haaren. At that time was responsible for the examination of agents in W/T and codes for the WRODPOI affair, and therefore lived chiefly in the Haaren camp, where the prisoners were brought. A fanatical National Socialist, who however treated the prisoners well and with great care.

Description: German; aged about 38; strong build; height about 1.74m; light brown hair; grey eyes; cleanshaven; wore civilian clothes, seldom uniform; speaks German with Swabian accent.

2. Detuf. WACKER.  
PF602,642  
*Card n  
amend*

N.N.I.

Seen in the winter of 1942 in Haaren, where he was Leiter of the prison. After the escape of the second group of WRODPOI agents, he was dismissed and removed to The Hague. It is believed he did his best to treat the prisoners well. LAJWERS and JORDAAN must know him well.

Description: German; aged about 48; broad shouldered; height about 1.73m; dark brown hair, slightly grey; probably wears glasses, certainly for reading; small moustache; wore uniform.

3. Detuf. LAJES.  
SA1491  
NNI-  
*Amend n  
card if  
needed*

Seen 1942/43 in Amsterdam where he was Leiter of the Amsterdam Aussenstelle of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD.

Description: German; aged about 40; slender, athletic build; height about 1.80m; dark brown hair; grey ? eyes; thin, haggard face; healthy complexion; cleanshaven; wore S.S. uniform.

H/3. H.H.D. S

**SUMMARY OF TRACES.**

Date: 1.8.45. Name: GISKES, Hermann  
 Reference: Interim Report 24.8.45. File No.: P.F. 601,712.

NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	PP.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
	0	<u>1.1/4 Tonate Alfred Kraus KRAUS</u>

C.R. No. \_\_\_\_\_ MINUTE SHEET No. 582

To : W.R.H.

GISKES/HUNTERMANN

I attach 4 copies of the Camp 020 Top Secret report on the "Nordpol Affair". One, which I have marked for Registry action, should go in the GISKES file; another should go in HUNTERMANN's file and the third should be put in the S.F. for Abwehr III F activities in Holland. The fourth is a spare for cut-up.

Please ask for any further copies you need.

W.R.C.4.(c)  
30.7.45

31 JUL 1945

ARMY FORM A 2007 (Ins. Sheet).

30309. W.W.217/29937. 315,000 7445  
K. & U., Ltd. 062715

(P.T.O.)

<u>Abwehr Finance.</u>	20 89	<u>B.F. *75/Germany/LOR.</u>  <u>7 S.F. 62/4/4(94)</u> <u>Abwehr Abt. Z.</u>  <u>F. Langton. H.S.d. 1.8.45.</u>
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H/3. HHD. 5

**SUMMARY OF TRACES.**

Date: 1.8.46. Name: GIERES, Hermann  
 Reference: Interim Report 24.5.45. File No.: P.F. 601,712.

NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	PP.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
KRAUS	8	18/w Tante Alfred Maria KRAUS

**SECRET.**

**TOP SECRET**  
**CAMP 020.**

58a

**REPORT dated** 25th July 1946.

*Mc, PP*  
GIERES/HUNTEMANN

I enclose herewith 40 copies of the Report on the Investigation into the "Nordpol" Affair to be read in conjunction with the Interim Reports on GIERES and HUNTEMANN.

*M. Handison.*  
For Colonel Stephens.

Enc. As above.

PAB.

*HHD*  
*31-7-46*

Abwehr Finance.

28  
29

S.F. 75/Germany/10R.

7 S.F. 52/4/4(94)  
Abwehr Abt. 2.

F. Langton. F.S.d. 1.8.46.

H/3. H+D. S.

**SUMMARY OF TRACES.**

Date: 1.8.45. Name: GISKES, Hermann  
 Reference: Interim Report 24.5.45. File No.: F.P. 601,712.

NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	PP.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
FRANK	6	10/W Iznatz Alfred Maria FRANK

C.R. No. \_\_\_\_\_ MINUTE SHEET No. \_\_\_\_\_

To: W.R.H.

I am sending you at once a copy of the Interim Report on GISKES and of the report on the "Nordpol" affair, in order that you may, as a priority matter, extract passages sidelined into the S.F. on "Abt. III D of the Abwehr and G.I.S. use of deception material". Mr. Wilson is about to write a note on the subject and would be glad of this file, when it is up to date.

Please keep attached copies for further cut-up purposes.

Copies marked for carding, etc. following shortly.

L. M. Bingham

W.R.C.4.c  
26.7.45

MY FORM A 2007 (Ins. Sheet).

X306 Wk. 28/99/927 312,000 743  
H. & H., Ltd. 965/712

(P.T.O.)

Abwehr Finance.

28  
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S.F. 76/Germany/1GR.

7 S.F. 62/4/4(94)  
Abwehr Abt. 2.

E. Langton, E.S.A. 1.8.45.

H/3, HLD. 5

**SUMMARY OF TRACES.**

Date: 1.8.45. Name: GISELES, Mervin  
 Reference: Interim Report 24.3.45. File No.: S.F. 601,712.

NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	PP.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
	6	in/w Lenatz Alfred Maria KRAUS

C.R. No. \_\_\_\_\_ MINUTE SHEET No. \_\_\_\_\_

570

To: W.R.H.

GISELES

I attach two copies of the Interim Report on the above. One for the file, I have marked for carding and extracting. The other is a spare for out-up.

Please request any further copies you need from Helan Lefrey.

W.R.C.L. (c) *kg.*

30.7.45

31 JUL 1945

ARMY FORM A 2007 (Ins. Sheet).

3039. W4 W2175/057. 312 000 743.  
R. & H. Ltd. G6575.

[P.T.O.]

N.Y. Pa. etc.	23.	77 Funkpostwesen, Germania S.F. 75/Germany/10R.
Abswehr Finance.	25 29	7 S.F. 52/4/4(94) Abswehr Abt. 2.

F. Langton, R.S.A. 1.8.45.



H/3. H.H.D. 5  
1. 70

## SUMMARY OF TRACES.

Date: 1.8.45. Name: SIGRES, Hermann  
Reference: Interim Report 24.8.45. File No.: P.F. 501,712.

NAME; ADDRESS; PARTICULARS; INFORMATION	PP.	SUMMARY OF TRACES
KRAUS	8	18/w Ignatz Alfred Maria KRAUS P.F. 500,278.
KACSMANN, Abwehr gehilfen	9	N.T.
* HERBERT		18/w HERBERT, Herr P.F. 500,278 KRAUS Vols. 1 and 2 c.s. S. Card 37797
East NIEDERLANDE	9	N.T.
	10	But S.F. 52/Holland/2 Link vol. German Espionage activities in Holland.
	20, 21,	
	22,	
MIIF in Holland.	9	S.F. 52/Holland/5 Abwehr Abt. III Organisation in Holland.
	10, 20	
	21, 22	
F.A.M. 307	11, 18	
	13, 14	
	25, 27	
LEITSVILLE III WEST	12	S.F. 52/13/3
	13	
	25.	
Abwehr Abt III Berlin	17	S.F. 52/4/25 Abwehr III General Orgn.
SONSCHIK, Major	17	N.T. This spelling but identical with SOBOCYK, Dr. S SOBOCYK, Dr. S. 787
MEYER-WÄSTERLING	17	N.T. this spelling but identical with MEYER-WETTERLING S. 220
OXDMANN, Major von	17	N.T.
Ass HAMBURG.	18	S.F. 52/16/4 K.G.M. HAMBURG
Alpt. PARIS Gruppe III	19	S.F. 52/4/4(34) Abwehr Abteilung III N.G. Organisation in France.
V.H.V. Fu. etc.	23.	?? Funküberwachungskompanie S.F. 75/Germany/10R.
Abwehr Finance.	28	7 S.F. 52/4/4(84)
	29	Abwehr Abt. E.

F. Langton, E.S.A. 1.8.45.

SECRET

COPY NO. 570

SECRET.

CAMP 020.

REPORT dated 25th July 1945.

GIKKS Hermann

I enclose herewith 45 copies of the Interim Report on the case of Hermann GIKKS.

M. Jandison.  
For Colonel Stephens.

Enc. As above.

PAB.

ARRIVED 020: 24.5.45.

SECRET

COPY NO.

570

CAMP 020  
INTERIM REPORT  
ON  
THE CASE OF

Hermann GIEBIS

ARRIVED 020: 24.5.45.

SECRET.

CAMP Q20 INTERIM REPORT ON THE CASE OF

Bernard GISELES.

(To be read in conjunction with the report on  
Gerhard HUNTEMANN and the NORDPOL Affair.)

Date of Arrival at Camp Q20: 20.5.45.

CAMP 040 INTERIM REPORT

NAME: GIESKE, Oberstint. CHRISTIAN NAMES: Hermann  
ALIASES: Dr. GEBHART, Dr. GERTAN,  
CHUCK.

SPY NAMES:

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 20.9.36, Erfeld.

NATIONALITY: German

OCCUPATION: Regular Army Officer.

Date of Arrival at  
Camp 040: 24.5.45.



Height: 5' 11 $\frac{1}{4}$ ".  
Build: Well built.  
Hair: light brown, greying,  
receding on forehead,  
bald on top.  
Face: Oval, long nose, wart  
on right cheek.  
Eyes: Blue.  
Physical: 3 vaccination scars  
Familiarities: left upper arm; scar r  
right wrist; scar  
right knee; mole  
right buttock.

Last Permanent Address: Hamburg, Mittelweg, 10.  
Languages: German, some French, some English.  
Father: Wilhelm GIESKE. (died 1933).  
Mother: Maria (née BERG) (died 1918).  
Brother: Mario, aged 52.  
Sisters: Antonia, aged 50.  
Irngard, aged 36.  
Wife: Anna, née NOLPEK.  
Children: -  
Identity Documents: None.

R E P O R T

EARLY LIFE

- 1896 Born on 28th Sept. in Krefeld (Rheinland); son of merchant Wilhelm GISKES and Maria, nee BERGMS.
- 1902 Preparatory school in Krefeld.
- 1905-10 Gymnasium in Krefeld
- 1911-12 Gymnasium School in Karthaus near Trier (matriculated).
- 1913-14 Hochschule Handelsfachschule (commercial college) in Krefeld.
- 1914 1st October, army volunteer with Field Artillery Regt. 31 in Hagenau (Alsace).
- 1914 December, transferred to the 2. Bavarian Ski Bn.
- 1915 Campaigns in the Carpathians, South Tyrol and Serbia.
- 1916 Western front (Rheims, Verdun), severely wounded mid-July. Bavarian Militaerverdienstorden 3rd Class with swords, and Iron Cross 2nd class.
- 1917 March, Reserve Lieutenant. Instructor with the Gebirgs-Jaeger-Brn. in Immenstadt (Allgau), unfit for service at the front until April 1918.
- 1918 Mother died.
- 1918 From April till 12th October on the Western front with Inf. Reg. 471 (Rheims-Ardenne-Maine-Rheims) as Coy. Commander of the 10. Coy; in October as 2nd in command. French prisoner-of-war at Vandetree, s. Suippe on 12th October. Subsequently in an officers' P/W camp at Chateauroux (Indre).
- 1919 In officers' P/W camp at Chateauroux (Indre);
- 1920 Released from P/W camp, went to Krefeld. Entered father's business (Tobacco Factory, Wilh. GISKES, Krefeld).
- 1921-26 Partner in above firm.
- 1925 December married Anna, nee NOLTEN, from Krefeld, daughter of Ferdinand NOLTEN, owner of saw-mill in Krefeld. Wife now living in Schaepphysen, Mrs. Moers, Rheinland
- 1926-38 Own business: importer of leaf tobacco, and dealer in tobacco products, with residence in Krefeld.
- 1936 Compulsory training as Res. Offz. with I.R. 39 Wesel (Oberlt. d.R.)
- 1938 Compulsory training as Res. Offz. with I.R. 77 Cologne (Hauptm. d.R.)
- 1938 In August, GISKES met an old ailing friend, a certain Hptm. v. FELDLMANN, who had become a regular officer in the German Army in 1935. FELDLMANN suggested to GISKES that he should rejoin the Army and explained that he was in the Abwehr in charge of Referat III.F of Ast Hamburg and a new Referat III.C(2) was being formed in which there would be a vacancy for a Captain.

GISKES at this time was not fully aware of the functions of the Abwehr and decided to think the matter over. In September 1938, however, he had taken his decision and applied for reinstatement in the German Army; his reasons were, the increasingly difficult economic conditions in the tobacco trade due to import restrictions, and the constant friction between himself and the local Nazi chieftains owing to his refusal to join the party on religious and political grounds.

1939 Father died.

1939 His application was accepted and he was instructed to report to Leiter Hamburg on 1st January 1939 for six months' probationary service. He was given the rank of Rtm.

REFRAT III.C(1)

Jan. On arrival at Hamburg he found that he was to work in Refrat III.C(1) under a certain Rpta. Dr. G. WERS who was the only other officer in the section. The responsibilities of this staff were threefold:-

(a) The internal and office security of various Government departments (civil and military) in Wehrkreis 10. In each office there was a representative of the above who sent in to III.C(1) regular routine reports on the care of secret documents and office security generally.

(b) The security of various protected places in Wehrkreis 10, such as certain factories working on armaments, shipyards, etc. Any foreigner who wished to visit places of this nature had to obtain a permit which was only issued after joint enquiry by III.C(1) and the Stapo.

(c) Preparations for the mobilising of certain personnel for East Hamburg on the outbreak of war.

Nothing of interest happened for the next four months and GISENS spent his time reading regular routine reports from the various Abwehr representatives mentioned above.

REFRAT III.C(2)

Apr. At the end of April GISENS was made the Leiter Refrat III.C(2) which took over the security of protected places from III.C(1). The Refrat was responsible only for the investigation of suspected espionage within the protected place and if on enquiry it was established that an incident demanded further investigation III.C(1) worked with the relevant branch concerned, i.e. Stapo, III.Ra III.R, etc.

If it was discovered that a foreign power was involved the investigation was made in conjunction with III.R who, however, being understaffed, delegated a certain amount of the work to III.C(2).

During the next thirteen months GISENS remembers the following five incidents which occurred:-

(a) The Case of the Semtatsfel Rebel

It was reported to GISENS that a certain young German was very friendly with a female French consular at the Prussian Consulate-General at Hamburg and had accompanied her on a trip to the Riviera. The young German had apparently met the French girl that he was employed in a certain chemical factory at Hamburg and expected soon to be made a director. This factory was engaged in Government work and it was considered worth while to make enquiries. It transpired, however, that the man in question was a Semtatsfelwaker employed in the offices of Wehrkreis 10 and he never worked in the factory. On the outbreak of war the man was sent to the Polish front but at the request of LEITH was brought back for enquiries of which GISENS never learned the result.

(b) Employee at British Consulate

In the summer of 1939 an acquaintance reported to GISENS that an employee (name unknown) at the British Consulate General at Hamburg

REPORT III.C.P. (contd.)

1939 (contd.) (b) Employee at British Consulate (contd.)

was taking an undue interest in the movements of the German Navy and current merchant ship building. Surveillance was kept and in conjunction with III.H. an enquiry was started but before any decision could be reached the war broke out and the man in question left in company with the other members of the staff for Holland. GISKES believes that the man was subsequently employed at the British Consulate in Stockholm or Copenhagen.

(c) The Case of the French Consul-General

In the summer of 1939 the French Consul-General left Hamburg hurriedly and an associate of his, a Captain of a German merchant ship, was arrested. On interrogation the latter admitted that he had been charged by the Consul to obtain information about the boom across the Eux.

(d) Journey to The Hague

In June 1939 orders were received to hand over counter-espionage work in Holland to Ant Huenster. Up to this time both Hamburg and Huenster had been working in Holland but it was now decided that Hamburg should hand over its agents to Huenster. Owing to lack of officers at Hamburg GISKES (the only officer available) was sent in company with Major v. ROSENBERG of III.F Huenster to hand over a certain agent (name forgotten) to the latter and collect 2,500 Dutch Fls. from the agent which had been advanced by Hamburg. GISKES introduced the man to ROSENBERG but discovered that the man was not in a position to return the money. GISKES learned later that the man had been seen in the company of people known to be working for the British Passport Control Office (P.P.C.O.) at The Hague and that he had been dropped.

(a) The Case of JANSSEN

A Dutchman named JANSSEN acted as a "boite aux lettres" for FELDMANN at Nijmegen and was also employed by the P.P.C.O. at The Hague. This man was taken over by Huenster in the summer of 1939. Prior to being taken over, however, JANSSEN had reported to FELDMANN that he had been instructed by the P.P.C.O. to arrange a "boite aux lettres" in Germany for P.P.C.O. contacts from which he was to collect the correspondence. JANSSEN was given by FELDMANN the address of an acquaintance of GISKES:-

Anna Maria KONSCHER,  
Krefeld,  
Hamerachmidstrasse 6.

Shortly afterwards the Stano arrested at Bremen a German believed to be in British service who on interrogation admitted that he had been instructed to use the above address for communicating with the P.P.C.O.

GISKES emphasizes that KONSCHER was not aware of what was happening and was never connected with the G.I.S. as far as he knows.

Passport Control Office at The Hague

GISKES declares that III.P Hamburg was very well informed about the personnel of the P.P.C.O. and he was shown a cinema film of the



KEMMEL III.C(2) (contd.)

1939 (contd) staff and employees which had been taken in 1937/38 from a bulk lying opposite the office at the Hague. GISES also remembers hearing that some time in 1938 III.F and III.H Hamburg had supplied to the P.M.G.O., through a V man, false plans of the battleship "TIERRA" in addition a P.M.G.O. agent named WILHELM or WILHELMUS had been arrested at Danzig in 1938 and executed.

SFS 4/25/6

OUTBREAK OF WAR

Oct. Shortly after the outbreak of war Oberst. I.G. von BERTHOLDI of Abt. Abt. III started to get together the nucleus of Mobile Abwehr Kommandos for the offensive in the west which was to have taken place in November, and GISES was sent to Muenster where the Trupp that he was to command was forming. Four Kommandos were to be formed, each with 4 Trups under command. The establishments were to have been:-

Kommando

- 3 officers (C.O. a major)
- 20 O.R.s (clerks and drivers)

Trupp

- 2 officers (C.O. a captain)
- 3 O.R.s (including 3 C.F.P.).

Their role was to have been:-

- (a) Security of material.
- (b) The evaluation of captured documents from the III.F angle.
- (c) Make up guesses which were thought to be of interest from the III.F point of view.

1940  
Jan. The offensive however was postponed and these units were gradually allowed to disintegrate, the personnel being reabsorbed in their original units, and so in January 1940 GISES returned to Ast Hamburg where in conjunction with a certain Hptm. CHRISTIANSEN he became responsible for the conduct of Referat III F.

ARMED SITUATION IN BELGIUM AND DENMARK

After Hamburg had handed over its Dutch commitments to Muenster in the summer of 1939, it was given the responsibility of Belgium and Denmark and from the III.F point of view special stress was placed on the establishment of contacts with the British Intelligence Service. Hamburg was however not solely responsible for these two countries as the Izt at Cologne and the Izt at Biele also had interests in Belgium and Denmark respectively. GISES maintains that at this period very little was known about British activities in these two countries and that in fact the results achieved up to the time of his departure in the summer of 1940 were very unsatisfactory; he attributes this to the great lack of trained Abwehr officers.

During the period January to May 1940 GISES can only remember two cases where any positive results were achieved, details of which are as follows:-

(a) The French Consulate at Copenhagen

In the early spring Leiter III Hamburg gave CHRISTIANSEN orders to enquire into the activities of a French Consular office which had been opened at Copenhagen at the outbreak of war. CHRISTIANSEN sent

ABWEHR SITUATION IN BRUSSELS AND COPENHAGEN (contd.)

1940 (contd) Four agents to make enquiries and it was established that in fact the Consulate was being used as a cover for espionage activities, but before representations could be made to the Danish Government the problem was solved by the German occupation of Denmark.

(b) RIEKE and FURSTENAU

Shortly after the outbreak of war a certain RIEKE (surname unknown) arrived in Holland from England and a few days later was joined by a certain FURSTENAU, a German national but of Jewish extraction, also coming from England. RIEKE reported to the German consulate at the Hague that she had been given a mission by the British Intelligence Service and, owing to a personal arrangement between the Consulate and FELDMANN, the pair were sent to III F Hamburg who were looking for just such a contact.

According to GISKES, RIEKE had been blackmailed by the British into accepting a mission, by threats that her liaison with the Jewish FURSTENAU would be made known to the German authorities, thus causing trouble to her relations in Germany, one of whom was a Nazi chieftain in Munich. RIEKE had had no training and had been given no special mission beyond making a contact at the Palace Hotel at Lugano.

The pair were installed in a flat at Hamburg for four weeks and later transferred to a flat in Berlin where they were kept under surveillance as their story was not believed. Some time however in early 1940 RIEKE received via the American Express Co. in Berlin a payment of 300 RM. from Switzerland and this tended to make FELDMANN, who was handling the case, believe that something might eventuate. FURSTENAU who was apparently a theatrical agent wanted to exploit RIEKE's connection with the British with a view to getting himself financed by the Germans.

It was agreed therefore that FURSTENAU should set up a theatrical agency and be paid 500 RM. per month whilst RIEKE was to receive about the same. The agency was accordingly set up in Milan (Italy was then neutral) and RIEKE made her contact in Lugano, and thus contact was established between III F Hamburg and the British Intelligence Service. RIEKE apparently was given various missions by her contact and a certain amount of information was passed back to the U.K., of which two items were outstanding, namely - the detailed German plan for the attack on Norway and Denmark in April 1940, but care was taken that it should arrive at Lugano too late for it to be of use - the location of the H.Q. of Flieger General Oberst von RICHTHOFFEN shortly before the German offensive in May 1940. This location was given falsely as being at Friedenstadt with the object of making the allies believe that the main thrust would be further to the east than where it was actually to take place.

All information passed to Lugano was prepared by III F Hamburg on the instructions of Abw. Abt. III D.

Towards the end of May GISKES was sent by FELDMANN to Milan to make contact with RIEKE and FURSTENAU as since the beginning of that month the latter had given no sign of life and had not answered telegrams. After an unsatisfactory interview in a hotel at Milan at which FURSTENAU demanded more money, GISKES left and did not see the pair again, but he believes that they were sent to Barcelona where FURSTENAU opened a theatrical agency in the autumn of 1941.

TRANSFER TO PARIS

June - On the way back to Hamburg GISKES stopped in Berlin to see Oberst ROHLER of Abw. Abt. III who told him that he was to be transferred to

S.F. 52/4/25/6

REFUGEE IN PARIS (cont.)

940  
(contd)

Act Paris, then in the process of forming, and accordingly on June 16th GISES reported to Major LANSCHUTTER who was to be the Gruppenleiter III of the Act.

ACTIVITIES

On reporting to the Act Leiter GISES was told to take over Referat III.C(2) with the rank of Major and work under Gruppenleiter III Major MITSCHLICH. GISES at this time was alone in this section but by the end of the year the Referat consisted of 9/8 officers with the relevant number of Abwehrgehilfen.

The Referat which was located in the Hotel Lutetia was responsible for the investigation of cases of suspected espionage in Paris and the Departments of the Seine and Seine et Oise, with the proviso that any affair which had connections with a foreign power had to be turned over to III.F.

At this time the S.D. and Stago were only responsible for matters concerning Communists, German originists, Freemasons, Jews, and Church affairs but encroachment on Abwehr territory was not long delayed.

GISES claims that during his stay in Paris and indeed during the whole of his service with the Abwehr he took especial care not to have direct contact with agents; orders to the G.F.P., the executive arm of the Abwehr, were given by him in writing.

GISES declares that most of the reports that reached him were worthless, and that during his stay in Paris only three cases were of any importance, of which details are given as follows:-

(a) The DEEGAN SUTCH Case

Oct.

Some time in October 1940 a few British evaders from the evacuated B.N.F. were arrested in Paris by the G.F.P. Investigation showed that they had been helped by the French Red Cross and certain persons in the U.S. Embassy in Paris. A V-man (a young Russian) was instructed to go to the Embassy and ask for help in escaping to England. This man on presenting himself was put in touch with a certain Mrs. DEEGAN, an American employee of the Embassy, and two secretaries, HUNT and CROSS. In connection with his "escape" the Russian visited the Embassy several times and was also able to give GISES a description of an English employee who rarely left the building. About this time Referat III.F had received reports that a certain SUTCH of the U.S. Embassy was acting as a post box for an espionage group and that messages of an espionage nature were being transmitted by W/T from the Embassy.

Surveillance was kept by the G.F.P. and it was found possible to arrest SUTCH on one of the rare occasions when he ventured outside. SUTCH was handed over to III.F for investigation and GISES believes that he was ultimately condemned to death.

Meanwhile evidence that Mrs. DEEGAN was helping evaders had accumulated and she was arrested in December at her flat. GISES had two interviews with her and claims that the evidence against her was so overwhelming that she had no alternative but to sign a confession which also implicated CROSS and HUNT.

DEEGAN was released and continued to work at the Embassy but representations were made to the U.S. Government by the German Foreign Office

ASE PARIS (cont.)

1940  
(contd)

which resulted in her recall to the U.S.A. together with CROSS and HUNT.

GISEKS also remembers that a certain elderly U.S. Colonel, who had been resident at the Ritz for a number of years, was likewise concerned in helping evaders. He was arrested and condemned to two years imprisonment in spite of representations that were made by his friend Dr. SCHACHT, brother of SCHACHT the banker.

1941  
Feb.

(b) The Musée de l'Homme

In February 1941 the Sipo informed GISEKS that the Jewish Director of the Musée de l'Homme, together with his brother, was working for a Polish Intelligence Service and that the brother was the proprietor of a newspaper stall in the hall of the Hotel Majestic, at that time H.Q. of the Kommandant and Verwaltungstab of the Militärbefehlshaber. The two Poles and their father were arrested and a long investigation ensued which had not been completed when GISEKS left for Holland.

(c) Jacqueline de BROGLIE and KRAUS

? 600,278

In the spring of 1941 a certain Flieger Ltpt. SCHADE of I/TW reported to GISEKS that a former colleague of his in Siemans Helake named KRAUS wanted to be put in touch with someone who handled espionage affairs. GISEKS arranged a meeting with SCHADE at his flat, No. 2 Rue du Cinque, for a few days later at which KRAUS was present. The object of KRAUS's visit, according to GISEKS, was to find out if anything was known against a certain Jacqueline de BROGLIE. GISEKS had de BROGLIE looked up and, although finding that nothing was known about her, arranged another meeting with KRAUS about 14 days later at which the latter told GISEKS that de BROGLIE had been directly approached at the Ritz by a certain BREWBERG-GOSSLER who asked him when she was going to start work for the G.I.S. GISEKS denies that BREWBERG-GOSSLER was a member of the G.I.S. GISEKS thereupon decided that the matter must be investigated and on hearing that KRAUS intended to marry de BROGLIE made the following bargain with him - KRAUS was to report upon de BROGLIE and her associations to GISEKS and the latter in return gave an undertaking to protect his fiancée if necessary. Shortly afterwards KRAUS reported that de BROGLIE was very busy at her parents' home in Neuilly doing secretarial work for a certain Captain COURTOIS and that there were constant comings and goings at the house - chiefly young people of de BROGLIE's own age. Inquiries were then set on foot by G.F.P. and Abwehrgehilfen to establish the identity of COURTOIS but it was discovered that he had left for the unoccupied zone with a married woman. About 10 days later this woman was seen by the G.F.P. in Paris and detained for enquiries. She was told that it was known that she had crossed the line of Demarcation without proper papers and that proceedings would be taken against her with their attendant publicity; rather than risk her husband hearing about the trip the woman gave the Germans a list of addresses that COURTOIS had visited in the unoccupied zone.

A short time later KRAUS told GISEKS that he had been asked by COURTOIS to take a package to the manager of GIB's et Cie. at Marseilles. GISEKS told KRAUS to comply with this request but that naturally he (GISEKS) must first see its contents. KRAUS accordingly brought along the package which was found to contain information on the position of airfields and other material of a military nature. The material was photostatted and the appropriate alterations made, GISEKS also inserting the plans of an out of date French tank. KRAUS was then allowed to deliver the package at Marseilles.

Extract  
of  
KRAUS

P. 600,278

SF 12/1/20/16

Copy 620 case.

AST PARIS (cont.)

1941 (contd)

On two or three subsequent occasions GISKES passed false information to COURTOIS through KRAUS. The house at Neuilly was kept under observation by the G.P.P. and towards the end of June COURTOIS was arrested when leaving it, and after a short interrogation by the G.P.P., transferred to Fresnes.

A few days later KRAUS reported to GISKES that the arrest of COURTOIS was not known to those at Neuilly and that a man of some importance named Pierre d'HARCOURT & COLLEGE was on the point of leaving for the unoccupied zone and that he (KRAUS) would be dining at a restaurant in the Bois de Boulogne with d'HARCOURT and de BROGLIE that evening. It was decided to detain d'HARCOURT and the actual arrest by G.P.P. took place at a Metro station in the vicinity of the Bois. d'HARCOURT tried to escape and was wounded in the leg, being transferred under guard to a German hospital in the neighbourhood of the Gare d'Austerlitz. GISKES discovered later that by an oversight d'HARCOURT had been allowed to retain a large sum of money with which he had bribed a German medical orderly to warn his sister of his arrest.

Meanwhile the associates of COURTOIS were being kept under surveillance and in some cases house searches were carried out. At the house of a certain meteorologist named EVERMILL plans of a new bomb sight, on which he had been working, were found and the matter was referred to SCHADE who offered EVERMILL facilities for continuing his research in Germany and promised him the lives of his associates if he would agree to cooperate. EVERMILL agreed to these proposals. (GISKES is not certain if the meteorologist was called EVERMILL or KOLISS).

On leaving for the Hague at the end of July GISKES handed over the investigation and interrogation of COURTOIS and d'HARCOURT to Major ENIL of Referat III.F; the latter told GISKES later that the affair had lead to the uncovering of a large Polish Intelligence organisation.

(The story told by GISKES agrees in the main with that told by KRAUS but there are certain discrepancies which GISKES explains by the fact that KRAUS was being handled by the Abwehrgehilfen HACHMANN O HERBERT and that he, GISKES, cannot remember after so long a lapse of time the chronological sequence of events).

KRAUS - P.F. 600,278

AST NIEDERLANDE

GISKES was transferred to Ast Niederlande in August 1941 and appointed Leiter Referat III.F with the rank of Lt. Colonel. He found that he was responsible, for administration purposes, to the Leiter of the Ast who was a member of the staff of the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Holland but, for purely Abwehr matters, he was to deal with his friend RCHLEDER of Abw. Abt. III.

The larger part of his time in Holland until April 1944, when he was given command of FAK 307, was devoted to the "Nordpol" affair which is the subject of a special report, but a brief account is given below of the activities of interest during this period:-

(a) Coastal Net

On arrival GISKES, who had heard in Paris of the constant sea operations between the U.K. and France, discovered that there was no organised information service operating on the Dutch coast and charged one of his assistants, Hptr. BUSSE, with the organisation of such a service; he declares that although a good organisation was set up no positive results were obtained.

ABW Referat III.F  
Holland  
S.F. 52/Holland 15

HERBERT

See 44  
Coded - P.F. 600,278

AST NIEDERLANDE (cont.)

1941 (contd) (b) Spanische Reiter

This was the code name given to the investigation of infiltration and escape lines between Holland, Brussels and the Swiss frontier. The investigation was carried out by Major KESSEWATER assisted by BOEENS and HAGEMANN and it was discovered that the organiser was the Dutch consul in Berne, a certain Van TRICHT; in addition a number of safe houses on the Belgian-Dutch frontier were uncovered and the occupants arrested.

(c) Hannibal

This was the cover name given to the investigation of an ex-infiltration organization on the Dutch-German frontier. The enquiry was carried out by Ast Wilhelmshafen since in Holland as far south as the Zuyder Zee, together with the hinterland, was a Wilhelmshafen sphere; this arrangement led to endless difficulties but continued as long as GISKES was in Holland. A certain Dutchman, HOSEBANS, a V-man of Wilhelmshafen, who had been dismissed from Ast Niederlande by GISKES for malpractice and blackmail of his own nationals took a leading part in the investigation. GISKES cannot remember the outcome of the enquiry.

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Locations of Referat III.F Niederlande

August 1941 - May 1942	Hoogweg Scheveningen
May 1942 - November 1942	Am Flein The Hague
November 1942 - March 1944	Duisbergen Hoogstraat

FORMATION OF PAK AND FAT.

1944  
Jan.

In the winter of 1943/1944 the situation in France and Belgium and, to a certain extent, Holland had deteriorated and it became obvious to Abw. Abt. III that an intensification of effort would be necessary as it was known -

- a) that the organisation and arming of Resistance from the U.K. was proceeding rapidly.
- b) that clandestine transmitters were on the increase.
- c) that enemy espionage had become more efficient and was producing good results.

On the other hand the Oberkommando West felt that, under the existing arrangements, it was unable to combat these threats to military security in view of -

- a) Lack of trained personnel.
- b) The increasing readiness of the civilian population to cooperate with the Allies - a readiness which, it was felt, would increase as the date of the allied invasion of the Continent drew near.
- c) The mistrust felt by the R.S.H.A. of the Abwehr and of all officers who were not members of the K.S.D.A.P., which resulted in the R.S.H.A. continually trying to encroach on military security.

In view of this situation it was decided by Abw. Abt. III that it was necessary to withdraw all III.F personnel from the various Referats and from PAKs and FATs, directly under the Leitstelle III West and the relevant

FORMATION OF FAK AND PAT (cont.)

1944 (contd)

Army H.Q. thus ensuring a very much more direct liaison with the military side and also strengthening the Abwehr's hand in its struggle against the R.S.H.A.

FAK 307 3F 52/11/9

Extract  
re SF  
FAK 307

In January 1944 GISKES was appointed to the command of FAK 307 with PATs 362, 363, 364 and 365 under command\*. For the next three months GISKES was busy with the formation of his command and also carrying on his routine work in Holland during the transitional stage. He was constantly travelling between Driebergen where Referat III.F Niederlande was making ready to hand over and Brussels, Place de l'Industrie, where FAK 307 was forming. He had constant difficulties owing to lack of personnel, as it was not necessary to find officers and men who had had military, as well as Abwehr, experience - this last was a matter of some importance as it was essential to make a good impression on the staffs of the formations to which his units were to be ultimately attached. In addition, M/T, field telephones, W/T equipment etc. were in short supply and GISKES had to use a considerable amount of ingenuity in getting the stores that were allotted to his units on the establishment. Further, it had been made clear to him by the Leitstelle III West that the units under his command might have to operate as ordinary military reconnaissance Truppe, working in uniform, thus making it necessary to train them for these duties. (On several occasions between September 1944 and April 1945 normal I(a) reconnaissances were made by the Truppe for identification purposes).

March

Finally however preparations were so advanced that he could open in Brussels and close his H.Q. in Driebergen and in early March the new structure came into operation, although none of the units ever received the personnel and equipment laid down on the establishment.

GISKES' Functions

The area allotted to FAK 307 and units under command stretched from the south bank of the Ems to the mouth of the Seine, comprising Holland, Belgium and the French Departments of the Nord and Pas de Calais. GISKES was responsible for keeping the I(c) branches of the C.I.C. Wehrmacht Holland and C.I.C. Belgium and North France informed of the III.F position in this area; in addition he was to a certain extent under the Leitstelle III West but GISKES says that, in practice, he was really subordinate to the I(c) branches of the relevant Army H.Q.s.

GISKES states that from March onwards he practically ceased to be a technical Abwehr officer, his duties consisting of administering his unit and attending endless staff conferences in the capacity of a C.E. expert.

(His duties appear to have approximated to those of a G.S.O. I(b) at an Army H.Q. with units under command).

ARMY'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS RESISTANCE

GISKES found that the static H.Q. in Holland and Belgium were completely unaware of the potential dangers of Resistance in the event of an invasion. The I(a) staffs consisted chiefly of elderly reserve officers who could not conceive of a war in terms of Resistance behind their own lines, and regarded GISKES as an alarmist whose ideas would only cause extra work. GISKES himself was convinced of the very real danger.

\*Details of personnel and stations are given in HUNTSMAN Report, Appendix IX.

3.F.52/11/9

ARMY'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS RESISTANCE (cont.)

1944 (contd)

611 EST 6

At a later period however, after September 1944, when GISKES was working with Heeresgruppe I(c) he found that the regular officers at this H.Q. were very much under the influence of the successes achieved by Resistance in France and Belgium - so much so in fact, that they tended to exaggerate the potential danger of foreign workers and P/Ws in Germany and were continually asking for investigation of the wildest rumors about Resistance groups. GISKES himself now thinks that the Resistance movements in France and Belgium played a large part in the defeat of the German Armies in the West but that there is no reason to believe that organized resistance existed behind the lines in Germany, at least not in the sector Heeresgruppe B. There may have been locally formed groups which however achieved nothing of importance.

RAK ACTIVITIES

March/ Sept.

Accounts of the cases of interest in the period between March 1944 until the evacuation of Brussels on 2nd September are given in the HURSTMAN and "Wordpol" reports - DAHLER, LATJER, PAUCOCKER in the former, LINDENBERG in the latter.

HEERESGRUPPE B

Sept.

From 3rd September, the date of the withdrawal from Brussels, until the liquidation of the Ruhr pocket in the first half of April 1945, an almost complete confusion reigned in the Heeresgruppe B sector and GISKES states that from 3rd September onwards it was impossible to carry out any order with any prospect of success. He gives the following reasons for the chaos -

a) The total breakdown of communications. All line communications were useless and he was compelled to depend on W/T for communications with the Leitstelle and the RAKs under command. W/T spare parts were practically non-existent and petrol for the generators could only be obtained in the black market, e.g. exchanging rations or cigarettes for petrol. He was often out of W/T contact for weeks at a time.

D/Rs could only be used sparingly owing to the lack of petrol and could only move at night. The trucks and cars suffered very severely on the icy roads during the winter and replacements were in most cases unobtainable.

b) Replacements from normal Army sources of all equipment were lacking and it was often necessary to send men direct to the factories in Germany to fetch stores. The only men available for such duties were office clerks and often a third of the personnel was absent on such errands or acting as D/Rs; this naturally resulted in chaos in the office records. In some cases men sent away on such errands took the opportunity to disappear.

c) The Leitstelle issued orders which were incapable of fulfilment, e.g. projects for dropping agents behind the allied lines although no aeroplanes were available - the setting up of an agents school for W/T operators without supplying equipment for training - the project to set up an informant system on the left bank of the Rhine in spite of the fact that the local Gauleiter intended to evacuate the entire civil population in this area.

Leitstelle  
W/T  
SF  
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88 52/13/3



LEITSTELLE III WEST

1944/1945:

From September, 1944, to April, 1945, the Leitstelle issued four directives:-

- (i) In September 1944 instructions were issued to P.A.K.s to set up schools for the training of agents to be parachuted behind the Allied lines<sup>2</sup>
- (ii) In November 1944 instructions were issued for the organisation of a stay-behind net on the left bank of the Rhine, the Claudius net<sup>2</sup>
- (iii) In December/January instructions were issued for the organisation of a stay-behind net on the right bank of the Rhine, Carolus Net.<sup>2</sup>
- (iv) In March instructions were received for the Leitstelle to withdraw all Soldbuchs and issue new ones. The Leitstelle believed that Abwehr personnel would be ill-treated in the event of capture and to prevent this, new Soldbuchs were issued showing the holder to be a member of an ordinary military unit. As in some cases Abwehr personnel were carrying out reconnaissance patrols in uniform the danger of capture had increased. GISKES is insistent that this is the only reason for the issue of new Soldbuchs.

S.F.S. 2/15/3

MISSIONS ORDERED BY I.C. HEERESGRUPPE B.

After the evacuation of Brussels liaison between Heeresgruppe I.c and GISKES became closer and towards the finish almost all orders to PAR. 307 came from this source. The chief preoccupations of the Heeresgruppe I.c were the organisation of stay-behind nets on both banks of the Rhine and the fear of organised resistance among Allied G/Ws and foreign workers. (An account of how GISKES attempted to cope with these problems is given in the HUNTERMANN report, Appendix 5)

In addition four deception missions were given to GISKES by I.C. Heeresgruppe B, the details of which are as follows:-

- a) At the end of November 1944 GISKES was given a list of locations of formation and unit headquarters in the area of Muenchen-Gladbach and Dueren with instructions that this was to reach the Allies as coming from a first-class source. PAR. 307 was entrusted with the infiltration. The package was given by an Abschirgehilfe in plain clothes to a foreign worker who was attempting to regain Allied territory. This man's passage was arranged and he was successfully infiltrated with orders to hand over the package to the first Allied officer he met; he naturally was acting in good faith. Enclosed in the package was a covering letter stating that the information emanated from a group of German communists trench-digging close behind the German lines and asking that a wireless broadcast be made from Radio Luxemburg mentioning the words 'Otto Von Sachsen' to indicate safe reception of the package. This broadcast was made.
- b) In December 1944 and January 1945 messages were passed through to the Allied lines by the same methods asking that a W/T operator and set should be dropped at a place, the name of which is now forgotten by GISKES. It was intimated that an organised Communist group existed that needed direct W/T contact with the Allies. These two attempts to establish contact with the Allied I.S. failed.
- c) In January, 1945, a satchel was left behind at a place in the Kiffel, the name of which GISKES cannot remember, shortly before it was to be overrun by the U.S. forces. The signals wallet contained papers

Extract into SF file

PAR 307 SF 2/19

S.F.S. 2/19

S.F.S. 2/25/0

<sup>2</sup> For details and missions see HUNTERMANN report, Appendix 5.

Prisoner Number 6

purporting to be the property of a staff officer of P.A.G.K.6 and contained among other items the staff tables for the move of this formation to Holland; in reality the formation was transferred to Hungary.

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LOCATIONS OF P.A.K. 307 AFTER LEAVING BRUSSELS

3.9.44 - 10.9.44	Schloss Hillenraad bei Roermond.
10.9.44 - 1.3.45	Derdorf bei Bonn.
1.3.45 - 20.3.45	Hausen.
20.3.45	Huegenhausen nr. Luedenschied.

THE COLLAPSE AND GISKES' ARREST

On 29 April GISKES received orders from Col. MICHAEL of I. & Heeresgruppe B to collect the survivors of P.A.K. 307 and P.A.T.s 363 and 364 and to put himself under command of A.O.K. 5. From this date until the final collapse normal military duties were carried out - chiefly patrols in uniform, for the purpose of getting identifications and documents.

On the 12th April GISKES decided that the situation was hopeless and decided to assemble what remained of his command at a spot 12 kms. north of Luedenscheid with the idea of dispersing them to avoid their being taken prisoner. From this place the party retired to Wuppertal where GISKES went to see MICHAEL who told him that all was over and that it was a case of *sauve qui peut*. MICHAEL formally relieved GISKES of all further military duties. GISKES sent back to his party which was then at Leichlingen, 20 km. south of Dusseldorf, and explained the situation. On arrival he found that some of the party had already disappeared whilst others, like many German soldiers at that time, had procured civilian clothes and had found employment on the land. GISKES himself decided to set out for his home at Schaepehusen, Mrs. Koers, Rheinland, which was not far distant.

Accordingly he went, still in uniform, to Benrath hoping to cross the Rhine at Aesseldorf. At Benrath he registered with the police in his own name and stayed with an acquaintance. Two days later the place was occupied by the Americans and GISKES, who wanted to avoid capture, changed into plain clothes.

He stayed at Benrath until 21st April and then, realising that it would be impossible to cross the Rhine, decided to go to the school at Wieh; after the last of the trainees had dispersed at the end of March GISKES had installed in the school some of his friends and relations and he went to join them there, arriving on 23rd April. On 24th April GISKES' sister-in-law attempted to get ration cards from the local mayor, mentioning that these were needed for her brother-in-law, Lt.-Col. GISKES. The mayor refused to issue the ration card and advised the woman that GISKES should surrender to the Americans. At 17.00 hours on the same day a U.S. C.I.C. Detachment in charge of an officer arrived, together with the two ex-trainees CLAUDE and GILLES, and GISKES was arrested. At the time of his arrest he was in possession of an out-of-date German Passport and identity card, both made out in his real name.

GISKES was transferred to Camp 020 on 25.5.45.

RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION

GISKES is a German officer and was a very astute member of the Abwehr. He is intelligent and realizes that the fact that he was taken in plain clothes, trying to avoid capture, has prejudiced his position considerably; this circumstance has probably rendered him more co-operative than he might otherwise have been. He also is aware that the information that he gives can be checked, with the result that he has been found to be a fruitful and accurate source.

He has been directly responsible for the arrest of a number of S.O.S. agents in Holland, but interrogation of one of these agents now in the U.K., bears out GISKES' contention that he did his utmost to protect them from the ministrations of the Sipo.

GISKES, both in Holland and Belgium, was always playing for higher stakes than the suppression and arrest of espionage and Resistance Groups; his aims were to effect contact with Allied Intelligence Services in order to discover their plans and to carry out deception - in these two aims he was remarkably successful.

GISKES is now a middle-aged man with no prospects in a chaotic Germany; it is thought unlikely that he has, or knows of, any long-term plans for the rehabilitation of the Abwehr, but he might, if released, gravitate towards such a movement if it existed now, or in the future. GISKES, although strongly anti-Nazi at whose hands he has to a certain extent suffered, in before everything a German officer, and as such, could be a danger in the future if he were to come under the influence of brother officers working for the resurrection of a pre-Nazi Germany.

Investigated by:

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
Major

Camp 020  
July 1945  
JR/LSK

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Abwehr III San. Organ.

- II -

APPENDIX I.

Abwehr Abt. III - Berlin.

Personnel.

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Berlin

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Shall or amend if  
necessary

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1. Oberst i.G. von BENTIVEGNI, Gruppenleiter III  
(1938/July 1943: Sept. 1943/January 1944).
2. Oberst i.G. HEINRICH, Gruppenleiter III  
(August 1943: January 1944/March 1944).
3. Oberst ROHLDER, Ref. III F  
(1938/January 1945).
4. Kapt. z. See MEISSNER, Ref. III P-West.  
(until April 1940).
5. Oberst v. ROSENBERG, Ref. III P-West;  
(1940/end 1942).
6. Major MORA, Ref. III P-West.  
(1943).
7. Major BRUNNER, Ref. III P-West.  
(1944).
8. ~~Major SORSCHIE~~, Ref. III G 2 (1939/1943 ?) See L.U.  
Later Ref. III C and III C 1 ?
9. Major HEIDSCHKE, Ref. III H.  
(1939/1940).
10. ~~Major MEYER-SCHREIBER~~, Ref. III L;  
(1939-1941/1942) See L.U.
11. Preg. Kapt. SOKOLSKI, Ref. III M.  
(Spring 1941/1944).
12. Oberst SCHAEFER, Ref. III D.  
(1939/1944 ?).
13. ~~Major von OYDMANN~~, Ref. III N. See L.U.  
(period of service unknown).

Personnel of Ref. III W1, and Ref. III Kgf. unknown to GISKES.

APPENDIX II.

Ast-Hamburg.

Personnel.

1. Major i.G. CROME - Astleiter (1938/Autumn 1939).
2. Major DISCHLER - Gruppenleiter III (1937 ?/May 1940).  
Astleiter (Sept. 1939/May 1940).
3. Kapt. z. See WICHMANN - Gruppenleiter I (1939/?); formerly with  
Ref. I M; Astleiter (June 1940/1945 ?).
4. Oberstltnt. HAHNICH, Ref. III H (1936 ?/June 1940 ?);  
Gruppenleiter III (June 1940/1944 ?).
5. Major von FRIEDMANN, Ref. III F (1936 ?/January 1940).
6. Oberstltnt. GISKES (subject of this report), III G2 (January 1939/  
May 1940), Ref. III F (January 1940/May 1940).
7. Hauptmann CHRISTIANSEN, Ref. III F (1939/May 1940).
8. Sonderfuehrer GRELL, Ref. III F (May 1940/1943 ?).
9. Hauptmann PIEPE, Ref. III F (November 1939/April 1940).
10. Sonderfuehrer Graf KREPEZ, Ref. III F (Sept. 1939/May 1940).
11. Offz. <sup>++</sup>HERBST, Ref. III F (August 1939/October 1939).
12. Sonderfuehrer Dr. HEWEL, Ref. III F (1940/Autumn 1942).
13. Offz. <sup>++</sup>KONHOLTINGER, Ref. III F (Autumn 1939/Autumn 1940?).
14. Hauptmann Dr. UEBIGER, Ref. III C 1 (1937 ?/August 1941).
15. Hauptmann Dr. DRESCHER, Ref. III C 1 (July 1939/July 1940).
16. Korv. Kapt. HENNIGKE, Ref. III C 2 (January 1940/End 1940?).
17. Sonderfuehrer HACHMANN, Ref. III C 2 (1942/1944 ?).
18. Hauptmann ERACK, Ref. III H (1939/1945).
19. Major von SCHMIDT, III L (1939/1941 ?).
20. Korv. Kapt. FREUND, Ref. III M (1938/1940).
21. Kapitaneitnt. ZWELBAEUMER, Ref. III M (1939/1940).
22. Freg. Kapt. LIEBENSCHUETZ, Ref. III W1 (1937 ?/Autumn 1939).
23. Oberstltnt. JESINGHAUS, Ref. III W1 (1938/1943).
24. Oberstltnt. HERRLITZ, Ref. I H (1939/1940 ?).
25. Oberstltnt. PRAETORIUS, Ref. I W1 (1938?/1943?).
26. Korv. Kapt. SCHNEIDMUND, Gruppenleiter II (1939/194??).
27. NECHTERSCHEN, Hauskapelle Ast-Hamburg III F. (Was a Kriminalrat).

Personnel of Ref. AO III Rue and Ref. III N as well as Ref. I L,  
unknown to GISKES.

++ Later promoted to Lieutenant.

Extract from  
SF

Ast  
Hamburg

SF 52/10/4

S.F. 52/10/4

Fa

SF 52/4/4 (34)

Abwehr Abteilung III H.Q. Organ.  
in France.

- IV -

APPENDIX III.

Ast-Paris, Gruppe III (1940/1941).

Personnel.

1. Major LORECHMIDT, Leiter III (1940); shot after 20th July 1944.
2. Korv. Kapt. LIEBENSCHUETZ, Leiter III (1940/1941). (See also Appx. II)
3. Major BRACK, III H (see also under Appendix II to this report).
4. Major MEYER-WABERLIN, III Luft; killed during air-raid on Berlin (see also under Appendix I to this report).
5. Major WITTKOENIG, III C; 1938/40 with Ast-Muenster III G.
6. Major BOEMER (?), III C 1.
7. Major GISKES, III C 2 (subject of this report).
8. Major FEIL, III C 2. Later said to be in Koenigsberg.
9. Major KLEINWERTER, III C 2.
10. Hptm. Weber von OSTWALDEN, III C 2.
11. Hptm. KRUELL, III C 2. Probably released from Wehrmacht in 1943 ?.
12. Sdf. MERKER, III C 2. Later with III F.
13. Sdf. HACHMANN, III C 2. (see also under Appendix II to this report).
14. Sdf. Graf KREUTZ, III C 2. (see also under Appx. II to this report).
15. Uffz. CHRISTMANN - "ARNO", III C 2.
16. Ogefr. SCHEIDT, III C 2.
17. Gefr. KUCHENBACKE, III C 2. Later with III F.
18. Major NELLE, III W. 1939 with Ast-Wiesbaden, III F.
19. Oblt. s. S. Dr. RANFT, III N.
20. Major SCHAEFER, III W1 (see also under Appx. I to this report, latterly Leiter III).
21. Major KOSSTNER, III Xgf.
22. Major Dr. DEURLEIN, AG III Rue.

GISKES is unable to give the personnel of III F and ABP.

→ Later with III F.

Exhibit for  
M. A. G.  
Paris  
Gruppe III

S.F. 52/4/4/34

## APPENDIX IV.

Ast-Niederlande (as given by GISKES and HUNTMANN).

## Personnel.

1. Oberst HADSWALDT, Leiter (June 1940/August 1943).  
1939 I Luft, Abw. Abt. Berlin. 1944 said to have  
become Flughafenkommandant in Czechoslovakia.
2. Oberst HEUSER, Leiter (August 1943/Summer 1944). Later  
I Luft, Abw. Abt. Berlin. Formerly probably with  
Ast-Stuttgart.
3. Major MERGER, Leiter Gruppe I, and I Luft (until Autumn 1942).  
1939 Ast-Muenster. Later I Luft, Ast-Muenster.  
Summer 1944 reported to have gone to the West.
4. Hptm. KOEHLER, Gruppe I, I Heer.
5. Kapt. Lt. STRAUCH, Gruppe I, Subsidiary Stelle I Marine,  
Amsterdam.
6. Hptm. SCHARRER, Gruppe I, I Wi. Formerly with Nest-Koeln,  
under control of Ast-Muenster.
7. Hptm. STEIN, Gruppe I, I G.
8. Oberstltm. HEMPEL, Leiter Gruppe III (until Autumn 1943).  
Formerly with III-H Wiesbaden and Ast-Muenster.  
Sept. 1943 Leiter Ast-Marseilles. Spring 1944 Abw.  
Abt. ZP, Berlin.
9. Oberstltm. von SOPPE, Leiter Gruppe III (from Autumn 1943/rd. 400).  
Formerly Leiter III-H Ast-Dijon.
10. Oberstltm. MAHRMANN, III H (from Autumn 1941). Previously,  
from 1938, with Ast-Wiesbaden. March 1944, probably  
transferred to the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Niederlande.
11. Oberstltm. von ROLAND, Gruppe IIII, III-Luft. March 1944,  
transferred to the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber as Abschr-  
offizier Luft.
12. Hptm. UNTERMANN (until appx. end 1942) Hilfsoffizier, III-Luft.
13. Korv. Kapt. MEHNKE, III-Marine (until about end of 1943).  
Prior to 1939 III-Marine, Ast-Stettin. Autumn 1942  
III-Marine Ast-Athens. Since Spring 1944 III-Marine  
Boulogne.
14. Korv. Kapt. NENNIGER, III-Marine (from 1943). See also Appx. II  
to this report. III-Marine, Norway as Leiter prior to  
joining Ast-Niederlande. Later transferred to the  
Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Niederlande as Naval Abwehr-offizier.
15. Hptm. CHRISTIANSEN, III-Marine Subsidiary Stelle in Rotterdam.  
See also Appx. II to this report.
16. Oberstltm. RUTHERER, III-C (until Autumn 1942). Later III F Lille.
17. Sdfr. K. GRONE, III-C (from 1942). Later III-F Lille.
18. Hptm. FISCHER, Hilfsoffizier III-C (until appx. October 1942).  
Later III-F Lille.
19. Hptm. MUELLEJANZ (section unknown).
20. Major GROTHE, III Wi (?).
21. Major MEYER-RODENBERG, III F (until August 1941). 1936/7  
with III F, Ast-Muenster.
22. Oberstltm. GISKES - subject of this report, III F (from August  
1941).
23. Hptm. GENWACHER, III F (until October 1941). Then III F Ast-  
Koenigsberg.
24. Sdfr. Z. JAAGS, III F (until early 1942.)
25. Major KIESWITZER, III F (1942/1944). Reserve officer since 1939  
with Ast-Dresden, then Ast-Prague; Autumn 1940 Ast-Paris,  
III-C 2, then III F, Ast-Athens.
26. Hptm. WURR, III F (from 1941/44). 1939 Reserve officer of  
Ast-Dresden, III F.
27. Hptm. RECKEL, III F (abt. October 1942/beginning 1945). 1945  
III F, Toulouse.

Extract to  
SF 52  
Ast  
Niederlande

S.F. 52/Holland/S



APPENDIX IV - contd.  
Personnel of Ast-Niederlande - contd.

- 28. Rittmeister NOELLE, III F (mid-1942/end 1942). Early 1943, III F Ast-Belgien, Brussels.
- 29. Hptm. WEBER von OSTWALDEN, III F (1943). Later III F, Southern France. See also Appx. III to this report.
- 30. Hptm. DROEGSLER, III F (1943/44). Until Autumn 1943, Hilfsoffizier III F Stellen on the Eastern Front (Bucharest?).
- 31. Sdfr. Dr. HENSEL. (See also Appx. II to this report.) III F.
- 32. Sdfr. HUNDELMAN, III F.
- 33. Hptm. BUSSE, III F (until March or April 1942). Then Ast-Nuernberg, but returned to Ast-Niederlande III F in 1943.
- 34. Uffz. KUP, III F. Before the war, worked with Abt. I in Holland.
- 35. Gefr. HARGER, III F. 1940/41 with Abwehrenebenstelle-Bremen. End 1941/43 Ast-Niederlande III F.
- 36. Gefr. CHRISTMANN (ARNO). 1940 Ast-Hamburg. Dec. 1941 III F Ast-Niederlande. 1942 Ast-Paris, III C 2, but returned in 1943 to Ast-Niederlande. (See also Appx. III to this report).
- 37. Uffz. BODENS, III F. (1943). 1941/42 Ast-Brussels (Gruppe II?).
- 38. Obergefr. SCHROEDER, III F. See also Appx. III to this report.

Secretaries.

- 39. Frl. MEINERS, Vorzimmer Leiter.
- 40. Frl. von WALCERSDORF (until approx. mid-1942), III Luft.
- 41. Frl. BAUME, III Marine.
- 42. Frl. CUSTODIS, III C.
- 43. Frl. SCHERRER (until mid-Oct. 1942), III F.
- 44. Frau SPOLZERFOTH (from abt. mid-October 1942), III F.
- 45. Frl. JANSSEN, III F (Geheime Haushalt, Kasse).
- 46. Frl. DUERNBERG (until abt. Feb. 1942), III F.
- 47. Frl. STOTTER (until abt. beg. 1943), III F.
- 48. Frl. IENE (III F).
- 49. Frl. BILING, III F.

Miscellaneous

- 50. Hptm. BRUNTMANN, Bureau-offizier.
- 51. Uffz. MUELLER, Bureau-offizier.
- 52. Frl. GUHL, Secretary.
- 53. Stabszahlmeister DECKER (until approx. mid-1943).
- 54. Oberzahlmeister WESSELS (from about mid-1943).
- 55. Kapt. z. See Richard PROTZE, Stelle 'P' (under command of Abt III, Section III-F Berlin, but for administration matters, attached to Ast-Niederlande).
- 56. Frau FRENZEL, Kartei.
- 57. Frau DEIBEN, Registry.
- 58. Frl. KADUR, Registry.
- 59. Oberstltnt. JESINGHAUS (section unknown). See also Appx. II to this report.

Also 2 Secretaries, names unknown.

Agents of Ast-Niederlande.

- 1. RIDDERHOFF, George, V-Mann for III F, under Uffz. KUP.
- 2. GRAAN, V-Mann for III F and sub-agent of RIDDERHOFF.
- 3. METZ Isaac, V-Mann for Sdfr. JAAKS of III F.
- 4. LOOS, V-Mann for III F (1942/44) under orders of Uffz. BODENS and Gefr. HARGER.

↔ May be an alias.

S. 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

APPENDIX IV - contd.

Agents of Ast-Niederlande - contd.

S.F. 2/Melland/S

- 5. DE WILDE @ WILDERING, V-Mann for III F, under Uffs. KUP.
- 6. DABEN @ RON @ KROESCH @ DE VRIES @ Johannes FITTORS, V-Mann under Uffs. KUP, and later under Uffs. BODENS and Gefr. HARGER.
- 7. PIET (alias), agent of III F 1943/44; in association with RIDDERHOF and NELIS. Later run by Uffs. KUP.
- 8. VERLOOF @ NELIS. Prior to 1944, agent of Ast-Lille, III F.
- 9. VAN DEN BERG (unwittingly), sub-agent of RIDDERHOF.
- 10. BLEHMANN Sgt. (unwittingly), sub-agent of RIDDERHOF.
- 11. Proprietor of Hotel Suisse, The Hague (name unknown), sub-agent of RIDDERHOF; also in touch with Uffs. KUP.

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APPENDIX V

Ast-Wilhelmshafen

Personnel.

1. Kapt.z.See SCHULTZ, Leiter  
(1939/End 1943)
2. Freg. Kapt. SCHMIDT, Leiter III  
(from 1943 Ast Leiter)
3. Freg. Kapt. SKOJOWSKI, Ref. III.F.  
(1938/1940)
4. Korv. Kapt. BAYER, Ref. III.F.  
(1941/1945 ?)
5. HOSEMANN, V-Mann, Nest Groningen ?

Further details of organisation and personnel unknown to CISKES.

APPENDIX VI

Ast-Husum

Personnel.

1. Oberst BRENDEL, Ast Leiter. (1939/1943 ?)  
previously Leiter III (to outbreak of war)  
Ast Leiter before Oberst SCHMIDT was a  
Generalstabsoffizier, Hptm. ... (name  
unknown to CISKES).
2. Major (later Oberst) Von ROSENBERG, Ref. III.F.  
(1938/1940)
3. Hptm. SCHNEWEISS, Ref. III.F.  
(1939/1940)
4. Major SCHWEMMEL, Ref. III.F.  
(1941/1942)
5. Major WITTRIGEL, Ref. III.G.  
(1939/1940)  
Later Ast-Paris III.G.

Further information unknown to CISKES.

? Funkuberwachungskompanie

~~SF 52~~ 23  
SF 75 Germany 110R.

Extract to  
WVV/F  
SF 75/ Germany 110R.

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APPENDIX VII.

W/T - as given by HUNTEMANN and GISKES.

Funkabwehr, Aussenstelle Brussels.

1. Oberlt. LORENTZEN, Leiter (1943/44).
2. Uffz. BELMERICH.
3. Uffz. MIERSMANN.
4. Uffz. RICHTER.

Also 3 other N.C.Os and 2 drivers.

B-Stelle, Orpo (W/T intercept) Holland.

1. Ltnt. or Oberltnt. HEDRICH, Leiter (until Summer 1943).
2. Hptm. LIENHARDT, Leiter (Summer 1943/44).
3. Polizeimeister LUDWIGOWSKI (March 1942/end 1942).
4. Polizeimeister RUDOLPH (March 1942/March 1944).
5. Polizeimeister KIRSCHKE ( " " ).
6. Polizeimeister PIEHL ( " " ).
7. Polizeimeister KLOSS ( " " ).

APPENDIX VIII.

Heeresgruppe B, I.c. - as given by HUNTEMANN and GISKES.  
(Code Name 'Altwater')

Personnel.

1. Oberstl. i. Genstab. MICHAEL, Dritter Generalstabsoffizier.
2. Hptm. UTEGMANN, Hilfsoffizier.
3. Leut. NIENKRIEZE, Hilfsoffizier.
4. Fwvl. BAHR (Autumn 1944/April 1945) in charge of office, and document evaluator.
5. Oberstltm. LANGE, Abwehr-offizier.

Also one additional Lieutenant, name unknown.

Shaw & WNC3.  
who require no action.

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APPENDIX IX.

S.D. Holland. (as given by HUNTMANN and GISKES).

Personnel.

1. Brigadefuehrer HARSTER, O.C. Sipo and S.D. Holland (until Autumn 1943).
2. Brigadefuehrer NAUMANN, successor to HARSTER (1943/?).
3. Ostuf. LEFFNER, Leiter III. (1943/44).
4. Ostuf. SCHREIBER, Leiter Referat IV E (1940/45).
5. Rptstuf. KNOOP, Kommissar with Referat IV E (1942/44).
6. Sipo-Kommissar FRANK, 1st. Assistant to SCHREIBER (1943/March 1944).
7. Fr. Elisabeth GAIGERSEDER, Secretary (1942/43).

Agents.

1. POOS (said to have been shot in the Autumn of 1944).
2. SLACKER
3. VAN DER WAALS & DE WILDE & ANTON, Haupt V-Mann of SCHREIBER in The Hague.

APPENDIX X.

S.D. France and Belgium.

Personnel (France).

1. Ostuf. KIEFFER, Leiter Abt. IV E. (1941/1944).

Personnel (Belgium).

1. Standartenfuehrer Dr. CANARIS, Leiter (1944).
2. Stuf. STRAUB, Leiter III (1944).

APPENDIX XI.

Other S.D. and Gestapo Personnel.


1. SS Standarten- or Brigadefuehrer STRUCKENBACH, Stapoleiter in Hamburg 1939; afterwards in Duesseldorf; later in Berlin (with the RSHA).
2. GISKES got to know the Stapoleiter of Cologne in November 1944. Name no longer remembered.

Excerpt with  
Leitstelle III West SF 52/13/3

APPENDIX XII

1. Layout of Front Aufklaerung.

S.F. 52/13/3




Detailed organization, appointments and directives of those Headquarters senior to the Leitstelle III West, are unknown to HSRK23.

Excerpt with SF for FAX 307. SF 22/4/9

APPENDIX XIII

ORGANISATION OF P.A.K. 307 and its SUBSIDIARY TROOPS

SF 22/4/9



Punkabwehr  
(See Appx. VII)

P.A.K. 307  
(see Appx. I)  
(Code Name 'Cognac')

A.O.K. Incoressgruppe B  
(See Appx. VIII)  
(Code Name 'Altvater')

Skimette Agent  
School

Bellevue Agent  
School  
(Code Name 'Fomard')

Details being provided separately

P.A.T. 362 (Code Name 'Brussels')  
(Code Name 'Kuemuel')  
See Appx. II

P.A.T. 363 (Code Name 'Allardit')  
(Lings)  
See Appx. III

P.A.T. 364 (Code Name 'Whisky')  
(Ghent)  
See Appx. IV

P.A.T. 365 (Driebergen)  
See Appx. V

P.A.T. 396 M (Joc Havre)  
(Code Name 'Sorbet')  
See Appx. VI

Extract into SF file

Form 307


8F52/11/9

-XIII-  
APPENDIX XIV.

F.A.A. 307  
W/T Network.

October 1945-March 1945 (with coverpages)

8.F.52/11/9





16 on SF  
to Min. Finance  
Extract to it.

? SF 52/4/4(94)  
Abwehr Abt. 2. 28

-XIV-

A P P E N D I X XV

FINANCE - G. FONDS

All expenditure not of an ordinary military character was made out of G. Fonds also called Gebein Haushalt. G. Fonds payments included all those made on account of purely Abwehr work. The Ast staff paymaster was responsible for both open and secret accounts but in large Stellen there was sometimes a special paymaster, under the staff paymaster, responsible for G. Fonds only.

Procedure at Ast Hamburg

Gruppe III and Referat III.C(2) had no special funds at their disposal. Accounts of expenses incurred were forwarded, with or without a receipt, to the paymaster for settlement. The Leiter of the Referat certified that the payment had been made in cash and the account was forwarded to the Paymaster; before the latter could make a reimbursement the payment had to be approved by the Gruppenleiter III and the Leiter Ast. Payments by the various Referats of large sums in Reichsmark or foreign currency had to be sanctioned in advance by the Gruppenleiter and Leiter Ast; really big sums (extent unknown to GISES) had to be sanctioned by Berlin in advance. GISES is unaware of the total monthly payments made by his Referat in Hamburg as he claims that he was only in a subordinate position but thinks that III.C(1) and III.C(2) never disbursed big sums.

Procedure in Paris

This was the same as in Hamburg. Payments over 2,000 French francs had to be sanctioned by the Leiter Ast in advance. As far as GISES remembers no payments were made in foreign currency by his Referat. The average monthly expenditure of his Referat was 20,000/30,000 French fr.

Procedure in Holland

The same procedure was in force except that, owing to the fact that Referat III.F was always situated at some distance from the main offices of the Ast, 3,000 Gulden were always held by him as 'afloat' which were accountable to the paymaster. Payments of more than 500 Gulden had to be sanctioned in advance by the Leiter Ast provided that there were not recurring payments which had already been approved. French and Belgian currency were also used for payments; the approval of Berlin was not required. Average monthly payments reached about 8,000 Gulden.

Procedure for FAK. and PAI.

These dealt directly with the paymaster at the Leitstelle III West. Owing to distances units held ready cash sufficient for three weeks and accounts were rendered every fourteen days if communications permitted.

Before the evacuation of Brussels FAK.507 held cash in hand 5,000 R.M. and the average monthly expenditure was 6,000/7,000 R.M.

Expenditure by the F.A.T. was on a considerably higher scale than that of the F.A.K. as the latter, with about two exceptions, did not employ agents or informers. The F.A.T. only held currency of the country in which they were operating.

After the evacuation of Brussels all foreign currency was changed to R.M. and a reserve sufficient for a month was held.

The provision of funds for missions, especially if foreign currency was involved, had to be approved by Leitstelle III West which also supplied the actual cash.

SF 52/4/4(94)

APPENDIX XV -contd-

S.F. 52/4/4/94

Each head of a section or unit (Referat, Trupp, etc.) certified monthly that he held only cash in hand equal to advances made to him less disbursements. Any surplus was forwarded to the relevant paymaster with a written explanation.

GISKES declares that neither FAK.307 nor any Referat with which he has been connected ever opened an account with a Bank nor was such an account ever held by a nominee of the FAK. or Referats.

A P P E N D I X X V I .

Organisation of Abwehrkommandos and Troops, 1939/1940, in the West.

Personnel.

1. Major (Oberst) von ROSENBERG, Einsatzfuhrer West
2. - von FEILMANN, Kommandofuhrer (Holland).
3. Major (Oberst) von ENGELMANN, Kommandofuhrer (Belgium).
4. Major (Oberstltm) REILE, Kommandofuhrer (Luxemburg-Lorraine-Northern France).
5. Hauptmann (Oberstltm) HOFFMEISTER ?, Kommandofuhrer (Alsace-Lorraine).
6. Oberltm. HERBST (unter von FEILMANN).
7. Hauptmann CHRISTIANSEN (unter von FEILMANN).
8. Korv. Lept. SOKOLWESKI (?) (unter von ENGELMANN).
9. Major NAIMANN (?) (unter von FEILMANN).
10. Major ADAM (?) (unter von ENGELMANN).

-XVII-

APPENDIX XVII

1st-Belgian, Brussels.

Personnel

1. Oberst SNEVAIS, Asst Leiter. (1942/feb. or March 1944)
2. Oberst STOLZE, Asst Leiter. (April 1944/JULY 1944)
3. Oberst HENNINGHAUER, Leiter III (3rd 1943/early 1944)
4. Hptm. LEBMANN, Bureauoffizier. (1943/1944)
5. PLATE O WETTERS, Clerk III.F. (to summer 1944)  
November 1944., with P.A.K. 107 in Dursdorf.

APPENDIX XVIII

Miscellaneous Personnel

1. Hptm. KAYSER, Liaison officer of Abt.I.c. and Leitstelle III West since early 1944. Previously (probably) employed with Ref.III.F. Paris.
2. Hptm. LEYERER, dealt with personal questions and internal organisation, Leitstelle III West, from spring 1944. Previously (1941/1943) with Referat III.F. Paris.

pl. Fisher 55  
Card in marked

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

From Major Hughes

To Colonel Stephens

SECRET

573

L.R.H.

JD/KV/3459

23rd July, 1945

dated

Dear Miss Bingham,

*copy*

*p.a. copy for [unclear]*

at of  
uite  
[unclear]

Oberst STAHLER

Thank you for your P.F. 601,712/W.R.C.4.C. of the 18th July.

*20  
Fisher*

I regret that we have no trace of this man in our records.

It would seem most unlikely that the coded message which was discovered at the beginning of February, 1944 in The Hague, would be anything to do with any of our W/T operators, as we had no agent transmitting at that time.

You will recall that the Nordpol affair had continued until about the Autumn of 1943, and that there was then a gap in our activities in Holland until about March 1944. In any case our Country Section cannot recall ever receiving the message in question.

Yours sincerely,

*John Delaforce*

J. DELAFORCE, MAJOR.

Miss L.M. Bingham,  
S.H.A.E.F. War Room,  
RYDER STREET.

*25-7-45*

SSE, after  
to  
only  
hat he

27 JUL 1945

*[Handwritten initials]*

BCRSIG.

27 JUL 1945

Russels  
with the  
adminis-

escaped Allied D/Vs. WATE appeared to be very anti-Nazi. His wife lives in Hachenburg Westervald. SCHELLENWALD can supply more information on this man. CISMES found him useful owing to his connections with the Stapo.