

R E S U M E

BRIEF ANSE.

- 1901. Born First October, the son of Gottfried HUNTERMAN, merchant in Hamburg, and Hilda HOFFMANN, née WITT. The father had his own firm which was founded in 1890 and was representative for drug and pharmaceutical firms.
- 1908. Attended Kuratortenschule in Grossflottbek bei Hamburg to which place his parents had moved.
- 1911. Attended Städtischen Reform Real Gymnasium in Altona.
- 1921. Matriculated at Städtischen Reform Real Gymnasium.
Learner in the Import and Export firm - F.M. WOLFF, Hamburg, Hohe Bleichen 20.
- 1923. Termination of period as learner. Three months each as volunteer with the following firms: -
 - BRÜCKNER, LANGE & Co., Drug Exporters,
Berlin, Neue Grunerstrasse;
 - G.A.F. KAMMANN, Chemische Fabrik A.G.,
Berlin-Adlershof;
 - VEREINIGTE SCHMIDT- u. MASCHINENFABRIKEN,
Hannover-Bahnhofs.
- 1924. Three months as volunteer with JESSE NEWMAN & Co., Import and Export firm, Hamburg, Schauenburgerstr. 1. Beginning of May, left for Guayaquil, Ecuador, to take up position with the firm of POMPE & Cia, Quito and Guacamal.
- 1925. February, went to Valparaiso, Chile, as employee of the COMPAÑIA SALITERERA DE MOQUEVILLA (H.B. SICKMANN, Salpeterminerale, Hamburg). Owing to the death of his father, returned to Hamburg in August to take over his business.
- 1927. Autumn, journey to Ecuador and Chile in order to make export connections.
- 1928. Returned to Germany.
Liquidation of the firm as, owing to the increasing economic crisis, it was impossible to carry on business at a profit. In the Autumn, went to Holland to his friend, Thomas M. MARK, Schiedamschen, The Hague, Gentschestrant, in order to set up a business agency in Rotterdam with him. This venture failed at the end of 1931.
- 1932. January, returned to Hamburg. Unemployed. Lived with a family named SCHOLVIN in Grossflottbek, with whom he was friendly. Lived very poorly, doing various jobs such as cashier at the Totalisator, sometimes stayed with his mother in Berlin.
- 1933. Began to go to Africa as passenger with the DEUTSCHE AFRIKA LINIE. First trip after a short initiation in December. HUNTERMAN did this because it had become clear to him that for a German, only Africa offered chances of advancement after it became distasteful to him to remain in Germany owing to the political situation. He wanted, during the trips, to go round Africa to get a picture of the various countries and to meet the right people who could help him to get a job ashore.
- 1937. February, left the service of the DEUTSCHE AFRIKA LINIE and, after a short probationary period, left for Lagos to work for the firm G.L. BAISSE, Hamburg/Lagos, which represented the Resident P. LAMISE in Lagos. At the end of a year, posted as assistant to the Direktor at Port Harcourt, and after a further six months as Manager of the net Faktorei at Onitsha.

1939.

OUTBREAK OF WAR.

Sept.

The outbreak of war found HUNTEMANN, who had returned on four months' leave from Africa in June, living with his mother at Berlinerstr. 40, Berlin. He was not liable to be called up to the Army as he had done no military service, neither was he a member of the A.S.B.A.P. He felt, however, that he must find work of some description as he was compelled to support his mother.

Oct.

One day, in October, he chanced to meet an old acquaintance, a certain Dr. Helmuth SOLTAN, whom he had known for some years. HUNTEMANN enquired of him as to the possibilities of finding work, and at a subsequent meeting, SOLTAN told him that a certain Hptm. KLOPPE, of Budaerstr. 20, Berlin, required people who spoke foreign languages, and on going to see KLOPPE, HUNTEMANN found that it would be a question of working in the Foreign Censorship Department; as a result of the interview, HUNTEMANN was engaged at a monthly salary of RM. 290, which subsequently rose to RM. 400.

A.B.P. - Berlin.

HUNTEMANN started work in the Marmoraal, in the Tiergarten, with the Auslandsbriefpruefstelle (A.B.P.), on 19th October, 1939. There were approximately 5,000 employees, and the head of the organisation was a certain Lieut. Col. RUTH.

The A.B.P. and the A.T.P. (Auslandstelegrammpraefstelle) were at this time attached to Referat III N of the Abwehr, and it was only at a later date (June 1944) that they were taken over by the S.O.

Sections of the A.B.P.

There were three sections of the A.B.P.:

- I - dealt with private letters.
- II - dealt with prisoners-of-war letters.
- III - under a certain Major von FREEDEN, dealt with commercial correspondence.

It was with this last section that HUNTEMANN first worked.

At the end of about a fortnight, HUNTEMANN was transferred, as a specialist on Colonial matters, to the newly formed Rohstoffgruppe. This consisted of experts on various raw materials, iron, cotton, wool etc., and was also under Major von FREEDEN. This new innovation, however, did not prove a success and HUNTEMANN, after a fortnight, was transferred to the Schnellpraefstelle.

Schnellpraefstelle.

This section was set up to deal with the commercial correspondence of large firms who were bitterly complaining of the delay caused by Censorship; apparently weigh-bills and bills of lading were in many cases delivered a considerable time after the arrival of the merchandise to which they referred. It was therefore arranged so that certain large firms were given permits enabling them to send their correspondence open, direct to the Schnellpraefstelle, and this correspondence was dealt with as an urgent priority. The personnel of this office consisted of about four to six men who, although they did not speak foreign languages, dealt with correspondence for China, Japan, Sweden, Denmark, etc.

1940 Transfer to Copenhagen

April

In April 1940, HINTERMANN's chief, von FREYDEN, was transferred to Abwehr Section 3 at III N at Copenhagen, and in June, returned to Berlin on a visit. He asked HINTERMANN to go with him to Copenhagen and work in the A.B.P. which had recently been opened there. HINTERMANN agreed.

A.B.P. - Copenhagen

The head of the A.B.P. was a certain spm. DRIBBLER, described by HINTERMANN as a wpt. - Fasc. The rest of the staff, comprising in all about nineteen, came from the three A.B.P.s in Hamburg, Berlin and Frankfurt. Unfortunately, none of the German staff spoke Danish, so it was found necessary to recruit a large number of Danish-speaking female employees, mostly Danish subjects from Schleswig-Holstein, and also some German.

Oct

Transfer to A.I.F.

In October 1940, HINTERMANN became bored with his work and asked Von FREYDEN to release him to the Ansluudstaf forprussifolia at Copenhagen. Von FREYDEN acceded to this request, and HINTERMANN started work under a certain Lt. THOMAS. This was a small section consisting of about eighteen men and HINTERMANN's particular work was the checking of records of intercepted telephon conversations between the island of Bornholm and Denmark. HINTERMANN found this work extremely uninteresting, and at the end of four months, again asked Von FREYDEN for a change of employment.

1941

Transfer to Press Attaché

Feb.

Accordingly, in February 1941, HINTERMANN was transferred to the Press Section. His work consisted of censoring news agency telegrams. The policy of censorship was laid down by the Press Attaché of the German Embassy in Copenhagen; however, Lt. H. von WOLFF of the A.B.P. at Copenhagen, was very interested in those items which had been suppressed by the Censorship. HINTERMANN was accordingly ordered by Lt. THOMAS, who was also in charge of this section, to draw up summaries of the items suppressed and THOMAS handed these summaries to WOLFF. HINTERMANN only saw WOLFF on one occasion, over a purely private affair. HINTERMANN concluded that the types of news passed to WOLFF were mostly small extracts, normally appearing in any Free Press, but censored in the German State-controlled papers.

July

Search for new employment.

Aug.

About July or August, HINTERMANN wished for a move and, in addition, feared that he would be called up for military service in the near future. He therefore wrote to various friends whom he thought might be of assistance to him in procuring work which would come under a reserved category. Amongst them was a certain Ptl. KRIBENBURG, whom he had known in the A.B.P. in Berlin, and who was then working in the A.B.P. in Paris. He replied that there was an opening for him in the A.B.P. in Paris, but that it would not be a reserved post, and that when the time came he would have to do his service in the Army. HINTERMANN declined this offer and asked Ptl. KRIBENBURG to try and find him something else. It appears that certain members of the A.B.P. in Paris were also members of the Moss in the Hotel Latetia, and that Ptl. KRIBENBURG had there made the acquaintance of a certain Major GIESKE of Ist-Paris. GIESKE was interested in HINTERMANN's qualifications and told Ptl. KRIBENBURG to let HINTERMANN know that he would soon be offered work in Paris.

Aug

In August, however, GIESKE was transferred to Schwedinger as Lecter of Abwehr Referat III P, Niederlande.

Sept/
Oct.

In September/October, GIESKE telephoned HINTERMANN at Copenhagen telling him not to worry about his call-up, but that he would have to

1941 (cont'd): Search for new employment - contd.

Sept./
Oct. So his initial basic training, and that at its conclusion, arrangements had been made for his transfer to Holland.

HUNTEMANN states that at this period, he was totally unaware of what the job would be and that, although he had heard of the Abwehr, he did not know exactly what functions it performed.

MILITARY SERVICE.

Nov. On the 5th November 1941, HUNTEMANN was called up with his class for military service, and on the 10th, received orders to report to the III Coy. Landesschutz. (Ira. S. L. III at Strassberg, near Berlin. He states that his section of the Coy. was composed of men of the 1931/32 and 1933 class, who were being trained for work in the Zöllgerschutz.

HUNTEMANN completed his initial training and early in December, received orders to report to Lt. Col. GISEKE at the offices of the 1st-Niederlande, Parikweg, Schveringens.

HUNTEMANN JOINS THE ABWEHR.

Dec. HUNTEMANN reported to GISEKE on arrival in uniform, and was immediately sent back to his home in Berlin to fetch civilian clothes, which he did. For the next few weeks, his work consisted of reading files and getting a general idea of the work carried out by the Section (III P) with which he was to work.

Dec./
1942: Jan. HUNTEMANN'S First Case.

At the end of December or beginning of January 1942, GISEKE told HUNTEMANN to investigate a report that a wireless transmitter for the yacht "Djin III" then lying at Amsterdam, was being used to maintain W/T communications with the U.K. HUNTEMANN accordingly got in touch with the owner, a certain STUMPF, under the pretext of buying the yacht for a Hitler Youth organization. In this way, he managed to get on board the yacht, but found that there was no trace of any W/T set on board.

March. Some time early in March, GISEKE gave HUNTEMANN a short written message, the text of which he cannot now remember, (he thinks that it may have referred to a man called HEADY) for translation from German into English. At the time, HUNTEMANN had no idea of the reason for this, but realises now that it was the beginning of the "Nordpol" affair which is dealt with in a separate report based on the interrogation of both GISEKE and HUNTEMANN.

16th Mar. Raid on the NEDERLANDSCHES ELEKTROFABRIK

On the 16th March, Sdfr. JAKS, a member of III P, told HUNTEMANN that a V-Mann named MAESEN, living in Hilversum, had reported that certain persons in this factory, a branch of PHILIPS, were building wireless sets with parts stolen from the factory. The leader of this group was a certain Engineer SLOOF. The S.D. planned a raid on the factory and JAKS, representing the Abwehr, was also present. HUNTEMANN was sent along for instruction. The suspected men were arrested, but SLOOF attempted to escape, and a chase through the factory and into the streets ensued. SLOOF was re-arrested and brought back to the factory. In the meantime, however, a crowd had collected and an unknown man fired, wounding HUNTEMANN in both legs. He spent about a month in hospital and on sick leave, and in the first half of April, reported back to GISEKE who informed him of the "Nordpol" affair, telling him that he was to occupy himself solely with the conduct of the W/T

1942 (cont.):

Mar/April. traffic, and that from then onwards, his role with III F. would be one of "playing back" captured Allied W/T operators.

A full account of HUNTERMAN's activities from March 1942 - March 1944 are given in the "Norwich" Report.

Mar. '42/ Finance.
Mar. '44:

During the whole of his service with the Armee, HUNTERMAN was paid at ordinary Army rates according to his rank. In addition, he received RM 400 per month from the A.B.F. Berlin. On being called up to the Army in 1941, he had applied to the offices of the municipal council in Berlin where he had filled in a form stating the salary he had been receiving in his civilian employment. This form was sent to the A.B.F. Berlin, who contracted to pay him his full salary during his engagement in the Army provided that he agreed to return to the A.B.F. on the cessation of hostilities. This money, at HUNTERMAN's request, was paid monthly to his mother.

March. HUNTERMAN JOINS PAR. 307.

Early in March 1943, HUNTERMAN was given three weeks' leave which he spent in Paris and then returned to Brussels and reported to BLIKES who was in the process of forming PAR. 307 which had PAFs. 362, 363 and 364 under command. The PAR. was in the state of forming, and at that date, consisted of a certain Dr. JACQUES who had been transferred from Ant-Broccois, and Kittmeister MULLER. HUNTERMAN was still to be responsible for the playing back of captured W/T operators, but he states that there was very little work at this stage, and he spent his time either as a clerk helping MULLER or amusing himself. He became tired of this, however, and BLIKES sent him off to visit the various Trapps under command of PAR 307.

Allied W/T Lay-out in Belgium.

Spring.

In the Spring of 1944, an average of three W/T operators of the Armee Blanche were being arrested each month. From their interrogations, it was clear that they were working on the 'Centrale' System, i.e. in each region a Bloc of four operators who transmitted only, and another Bloc who only received. This latter Bloc, of course, could not be detected by the Punkabwehr. The organisation of the transmitting Bloc was such that the arrest of one of its members latest immediately became known to the other three operators in the Bloc who transmitted this information to England, thus preventing any chance of playing back the arrested operator. In addition, the transmitting operator received their messages from their organisers, etc. already enciphered.

HUNTERMAN's Activities up to the end of August.

HUNTERMAN was connected with only three cases between April and the beginning of September, details of which are as follows: -

April. (a) Arrest of GILBERT G. DALLER G. COUSTE, and his Mistress, Henriette GILLES.

In the first half of April, a certain Charles DALLER, said by HUNTERMAN to have been chief of the B.O.A. and a former Captain in the French Army, was arrested in Paris together with his mistress, Henriette GILLES, by Mtrs. NERDUP of PAF. 362, then stationed at Lille. The circumstances leading to his arrest are as follows: -

* The composition and movements of these units is given at APPENDIX III.

HUNTEMANN JOINS PAK. 307 - contd.

244: April.

(a) Arrest of CLEMENT & DACIER & COLETTE, and his mistress
Henriette GILLES (contd).

A V-Man of NIEHOFF in Lille (name unknown to HUNTEMANN) had penetrated a French Resistance organisation in that town, and had gained their confidence. This V-Man was instructed by the organisation to take certain reports to Paris where he was to hand them over to CLEMENT, a rendez-vous having been fixed in a certain restaurant. The S.D. in Paris had been warned of the circumstances of this rendez-vous, but by some oversight, were not present, and the actual arrest of CLEMENT and GILLES was carried out by NIEHOFF. The two prisoners were handed over by NIEHOFF to the S.D. in Paris, where it transpired that CLEMENT had been known to them for a long time for his Resistance activities in the South of France; at the time of his arrest, however, CLEMENT was resident in Lille and had only travelled to Paris for a few weeks.

Independently of these arrests, two W/T operators had been arrested in the first half of April in Lille. The Pankabwehr had succeeded in locating one of these men who was arrested whilst transmitting, and his interrogation led to the arrest of the second. One of these men, HUNTEMANN believes, was called LOUIS. From joint interrogation of these two men, it was found that their organiser was CLEMENT.

HUNTEMANN on being informed of the arrest of the two W/T operators, travelled from Brussels to Lille in order to investigate the possibility of playing them back. The operator who received could be worked immediately as he had given his signal plan, and in fact several messages were received, but the transmitting operator had been in the habit of receiving his messages from CLEMENT already enciphered, and for controlled transmission, the collaboration of the latter was necessary.

HUNTEMANN therefore went to Paris and got permission from the S.D. in the rue des Saussaies, to speak to CLEMENT. CLEMENT, who had proved very difficult under interrogation by the S.D., refused to co-operate for a play back, and maintained that in any case, London by that time would have been informed of his arrest.

HUNTEMANN had a long conversation with CLEMENT, and stated that he was so impressed by his bearing and patriotism that he decided to attempt to save the lives of both CLEMENT and GILLES. In order to do this, the first step was to remove the two from the custody of the S.D., and HUNTEMANN returned to Brussels reporting to GISES that it was possible to play CLEMENT back, but that first CLEMENT would have to be removed from Paris to Lille. GISES gave his consent, and got a certain Maj. SCHAEFER of Leitstelle III-West, to undertake the necessary negotiations for the release with the S.D. in Paris, and some time later, HUNTEMANN was sent by GISES to Paris to arrange for the transfer of CLEMENT and GILLES to Lille: the S.D., however, considered that CLEMENT was a man of capital importance and would agree to release him for a fortnight only. Accordingly, on the 1st. May, HUNTEMANN, in company with a number of the GPP Lille, took CLEMENT and GILLES to Lille, where CLEMENT was lodged in the prison at Loos, whilst GILLES, who was expecting a baby, was sent to the hospital of the prison in Loos.

May:

HUNTEMANN JOINS FAK. 307 - contd.

1944: May
(contd.)

(a) Arrest of CLEMENT @ DACIER @ COMETE, and his mistress
Henriette GILLES (contd.)

As has been explained above, a play-back was impossible, and HUNTEMANN's only object in transferring these two to Lille was to save their lives. The S.D. pressed constantly for the return of CLEMENT, but HUNTEMANN managed to stave off these demands by reporting that CLEMENT was of great interest to FAK. 307, and that he was needed in Lille. In addition, the G.F.P. at Lille and PAT. 362 also began to press for the return to the S.D. of CLEMENT and GILLES, the G.F.P. on the grounds that they needed the cell he was occupying, and PAT. 362 on the grounds that the V-Mann who had been responsible for CLEMENT's arrest was in danger as long as CLEMENT was alive. It became increasingly difficult to protect CLEMENT and GILLES in the face of these demands, but HUNTEMANN succeeded. HUNTEMANN, who was known to CLEMENT as WEBER, does not know if the latter was transferred to Germany on 1st September, but thinks that probably he was released by the Allies, as the intervention of the Swiss Consul in Lille prevented the transport of most of the political prisoners to Germany. GILLES was liberated when the Allies captured Loos. The name and address of GILLES' mother is as follows:-

Madame CHANALELLES,
43, rue Mercerie, Montelinar Drome.

HUNTEMANN states that the photograph of COMETE sent by S.O.E. is of the man known to him as CLEMENT.

(b) Arrest of LATIMER

LATIMER, possibly a British officer, was arrested in July 1944. Interrogation showed that he was a code and cypher expert in charge of a 'resseau' of about 16 W/T operators; HUNTEMANN thinks that he was connected with an organisation called the Bureau de Loges. Under interrogation LATIMER is said to have given a great deal of information on his organisation, but HUNTEMANN does not think that many arrests followed, as the alarm had been given.

The lead to LATIMER was given by a W/T operator who was arrested in Ecaussines by the Funkabwehr. Interrogation of this man led to a certain JEAN PIERRE(?) who gave LATIMER's name. JEAN PIERRE was later liberated by patriots, and in the ensuing fight a certain German Major MEUERS was killed. It is pointed out that HUNTEMANN only read reports on this case and as there was no chance of a play back, he did not pay much attention.

(c) LACOURBERT @ FACUONNIER

August:

Some time in August 1944 HUNTEMANN came in contact with FACUONNIER who was being handled by Uffs. NIERHOFF of PAT. 362 at Lille. FACUONNIER had been arrested in Lille as the result of R.D.F. by the Funkabwehr. On interrogation he readily agreed to work for the Germans. HUNTEMANN was informed of this and decided to play him back. FACUONNIER apparently had a mission to contact allied aeroplanes dropping stores. On three occasions during the moon period in August FACUONNIER had R/T contact with an aeroplane whose call sign was 'Marius II', and on one occasion a stores dropping operation was arranged, and took place.

FACUONNIER was released by HUNTEMANN in Lille on 1st September 1944. The code name given by the Germans to this operation was 'Falken Kapelle'.

HUNTEMANN JOINS PAK. 307 - contd.

1944: August
(contd.)

(c) LACQUEMENT @ FACUONNIER (contd.)

During this period, namely April to September, this was the only occasion upon which HUNTEMANN was able to play an agent back.

(d) Funklage

In addition to these somewhat spasmodic activities HUNTEMANN was given by GISKES the task of preparing a weekly report on the Funklage, i.e. the layout of clandestine transmitters in Belgium and North West France. The report was based on the results of intercepts by the Funkabwehr and was sent weekly to Leitstelle III West.

September

PAK. 307 Leaves Brussels

On 1st September HUNTEMANN, who had been in Lille in connection with the FACUONNIER affair, met a certain Maat KUCHENBECKER of PAT. 396M, who told him that owing to the Allied advance it would be impossible to get back to Brussels and HUNTEMANN decided to join Trupp 364 at Antwerp. This he did but the following day he managed to get to Brussels where he found Lieut. JESHOE (Nationalsozialistische Fuehrungs Offizier of PAK. 307) who told him that the unit had already left for Schloss Hillenraad, near Roermonds. HUNTEMANN then set out, arriving at Hillenraad early on 4th September. HUNTEMANN on arrival found that there was very little to do, and that conditions were chaotic. He thereupon suggested to GISKES that he should go and contact the two "Nordpol" agents EBENEZER and TRUMPET who had been transferred to Germany. GISKES granted this request and an account of his journey is given in the "Nordpol" investigation report.

HUNTEMANN rejoined his unit at Dersdorf bei Bonn at the end of September.

October
(beginning)

Formation of PAK. 307 Training School

At the beginning of October GISKES called a meeting at Dersdorf at which the following were present:-

- Obstlt. GISKES
- Hptm. SCHELLEWALD (of PAT. 363)
- Hptm. PIEZE (of PAT. 364)
- Hptm. FISCHER (of PAT. 362)
- Hptm. WISEMANN (of PAT. 362)
- Uffz. HUNTEMANN (of PAK. 307)
- Maat KUCHENBECKER (of PAK. 307)

GISKES told those present that orders had been received from Leitstelle III West, to form a school and train agents for the penetration of the Allied Intelligence Services. The agents were to be parachuted behind the Allied lines, with orders to make contact and then to return if possible, with missions, thus enabling III.F. to ascertain the objectives of the Allied Intelligence Services. (In point of fact, no agent recruited under this scheme was ever parachuted behind the Allied lines).

PAT. commanders were instructed to recruit suitable trainees from amongst the V-Maenner who had retreated from France and Belgium with them, or their contacts.

*See Appendixes
for entrenching &
caching instructions*

1944: Oct.
(contd.)

Formation of FAK 507 Training School - contd.

KUCHENBECKER, who claimed to be a personal friend of DORIOT of the P.P.F., suggested that he would be able to recruit suitable persons in these circles.

HUNTEMANN was entrusted with finding a suitable place for the school. The directing staff was to be as follows:-

- Rittmeister NOELLE @ NISSEN (C.O.)
- Uffz. WEIL @ Dr. FORSTMEIER.
(Group 365; General Abwehr behaviour)
- Maat KUCHENBECKER @ KRAMER (P.P.F. contacts)
- Uffz. HOMBURG (no alias) (not Abwehr; in charge of records)
- Uffz. HUNTEMANN @ HANSE.
(non-technical instructor of W/T operators)
- **Wachtmeister EICHENAUER @ KWIEST (code, cypher and W/T instructor)
- Obgefr. HOLLER @ HARTMANN (responsible for the taking of photographs for the purpose of false identity documents).

Nov. (beg.)

In mid October HUNTEMANN managed to find suitable accommodation in the Gasthof Schoettler at Reblin, near Herscheid, and the school was opened at the beginning of November.

The first contingent of trainees was recruited by a certain MARECHAL, a former P.P.F. organiser in the Lille district and a V-Mann of FAT. 362 who had retreated with this unit. The group was as follows:-

- ROLAND
- JEAN
- ANDRE
- FERNAND
- PAUL (real name LR BAS)

All the above were French.

Transfer of School to Wiclh

The school remained in Reblin for about 4 weeks and was then transferred to Landjahr Lager, Abbenrood, near Wiclh.

Of the original group, ROLAND and JEAN were returned to the Gestapo at Erfurt as they had been found unsuitable, whilst the other three were transferred to Wiclh.

The Female "Claudia" operators

Nov. (mid)

About the middle of November, Leitstelle III West had decided to attempt to form a stay-behind net on the left bank of the Rhine, and for this purpose, had selected ten women W/T operators from the Heeresfunkereignerschule at Erfurt, and towards the end of November Lieut.

Nov. (end)

SIEGERS, Adjutant to GISKES, was sent to Erfurt to bring the Nachrichten-hilferinnen to Wiclh, and HUNTEMANN was given the job of vetting them.

** EICHENAUER did not join the school until December as prior to that date no W/T sets were available.

Nov. Formation of FAK 307 Training School - contd.

1) - contd. The Female "Cladius" operators - contd.

On questioning them, he realised that they were quite unsuitable for the purpose, and in addition, had not been informed of the true nature of their future work. They were apparently under the impression that they were to be W/T operators in tanks. On HUNTEMANN explaining what their work was to be, seven immediately refused any such mission, and later the remaining three did the same. Three were retained by the Kdo. as W/T operators, whilst the remaining seven were returned to the Leitstelle.

Dec. Further recruits.

At the beginning of December, the following were brought by KUCHENBECKER from DORIOT's HQ. at Neustadt a/d Weinstrasse: -

ROBERT
PIERRE
CLAUDE
GILLES
JACQUES
DANIEL
GILBERT
ALBERT

About the 7th December, two more members of the P.P.F. arrived: -

MARCEL
JOSEF.

All the above were French.

The next to arrive, a few days later, were Belgians from FAT.363: -

PIRMOLIN
PEETERS
and a third man whose name HUNTEMANN cannot remember.

These three men had been V-Maenner with Trupp 363, since its inception and returned to the Trupp after training.

Shortly afterwards, Hptsturm. MOSKOFF, who was the German liaison officer with the SS Legion Wallonie, brought the following Belgians: -

Feldw. ROBERT
FRANCOIS
LOUIS
MARIAE

The next group, a few days later, also from the SS Legion Wallonie, consisted of: -

Dr. WILLEMJNS
NERO
Untersturmf. WILLIAM
Scharf. GHOFFREY

On the same day, arrived a certain

BAUER (a German hunchback from Xanten, recruited by BODENS of FAT.365).

1945: March.

Formation of FAK 307 Training School - contd.

Further recruits - contd

Early in March 1945, a certain ATNEH (real name; a friend of Feldw. ROBERT) arrived together with an oldish man (name unknown to HUNTEMANN, who had been employed in some S.D. Stelle in Brussels.)

The last two were considered unsuitable and were eventually returned to the SS Legion Wallonie at Stettin.

Later in March, a Belgian female trainee named OIGA (real name probably Olga LIPPEN) was brought by Uffz. SCHOLVIN of Trupp 364; she was an ex-Nachrichtenhilferin of Jagdverband Nord-West, and her husband was probably serving in this unit.

Payment of Agents.

According to HUNTEMANN, the trainees received only RM. 50/150 a month for current expenses. They received no fixed monthly salary.

Contract.

The only contract, signed by the trainees, was a declaration swearing to keep secret all that they had learned at the school. In the event of their death, they were told that their dependants would receive the ordinary pension of German Service personnel, according to rank.

Codes and Cyphers.

Cyphers were provided by the wireless section of the OKW. Key-words, for Playfair codes, were registered on the agent's individual card at the school and were chosen arbitrarily by HUNTEMANN.

W/T Sets.

These were provided by the Leitstelle III-West. No set was available for instruction until towards the end of December 1944. They were always in short supply and were mostly of British manufacture.

Contact Addresses.

In September 1944, a certain Cefr. STADLER had been sent to Bregenz in order to arrange infiltration through Switzerland, and also to procure contact-addresses in that country. Each agent on setting out on a mission, was given one of such addresses. These contact-addresses were only intended for use in case of break-down of W/T communication. Letters to these contacts were to be in Playfair Code. No instruction was given in S/W nor were secret-inks available. Money was to be dropped to agents behind the Allied lines by aeroplane when necessary.

Instruction.

There would appear to have been no fixed syllabus for the course, and HUNTEMANN is not aware of the exact nature of the instruction given by other members of the directing staff. His own syllabus is given at APPENDIX IV.

1945: (cont'd)

Formation of FAK 307 Training School - cont'd.

Missions and eventual disposal of agents.

Various missions are given at APPENDIX V. Disposal of trainees, together with descriptions is given at APPENDIX VI.

HUNTEMANN's Movements: 29th March - 14th April, 1945.

The school at Wichl closed down on the 29th March, only four agents - ALBERT, OLGA, PAUL and BAUER remaining - and on GISELES' instruction, HUNTEMANN reported to the Second School of FAK 307 at Kirspe Bahnhof where he remained until about the 7th April, 1945.

Previous to this date, HUNTEMANN had been trying to arrange for his transfer to Ic of Heeresgruppe B under Oberstlt. MICHAEL whom he knew, but GISELES was not aware of these manoeuvres on HUNTEMANN's part. MICHAEL had pointed out to HUNTEMANN that at a Heeresgruppe HQ. he would have to wear uniform and would be treated according to his rank, which was that of Uffz., and HUNTEMANN had shelved the matter. Ever since the FAK had the various PAFs, under command, had left Brussels, they had been called upon at various times to carry out normal reconnaissance duties in uniform, and HUNTEMANN now understood that he would have to take part in these military activities as it was intended to attach him to one of the PAFs. This idea displeased him immensely, and he applied to MICHAEL again for transfer, and this time, the matter was arranged satisfactorily for him.

In connection with these reconnaissance duties, new Soldbuchs were issued to those concerned, as they were acting as normal fighting troops, and it was thought by GISELES that they would be better treated if taken prisoner, if there were nothing in their Soldbuchs to show a connection with the Abwehr; it was believed that the P.F.Ns of the Kommando and Truppe were known to the Allies.

HUNTEMANN accordingly went to the office of Heeresgruppe B Ic at Neuhausstein, near Olpe, but found that the Bq. had moved to Roldo, where he found his new formation. Shortly afterwards, the office was again transferred to Cloerthalaparre.

During this period, HUNTEMANN, who had practically no work to do, was allowed by MICHAEL to visit the house of Rittersmeister WOLLE, his future father-in-law, at Luederscheid, and on the 11th April, when the Americans were on the point of taking the town, he asked MICHAEL's permission to go there again; this was granted. Luederscheid was taken on the 13th April, and on the 14th, HUNTEMANN gave himself up to the Americans in civilian clothes. He explains that he thought there was less chance of being shot on the spot if he gave himself up as a civilian. He declares that he had decided some time previously to surrender and place his knowledge at the disposal of the Allied Intelligence Services, and gives as his reason, his disgust with the Nazi regime.

After interrogation by the U.S. Military authorities, HUNTEMANN was transferred to Camp 020 on 24th May, 1945.

RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION.

HUNTEMANN claims that he surrendered in order to place his knowledge of the Wehr at the disposal of the Allies; the interrogating officer feels that HUNTEMANN has justified this claim. Throughout interrogation, he has been helpful and co-operative, and where checking has been possible, the information he has given has been found reliable.

It must be remembered, however, that he has been indirectly responsible for the deaths of a number of S.O.E. agents. If there is any mitigation, then it is only fair to point out that, according to the interrogation report on a Dutch S.O.E. agent now in the U.K., the III F personnel in Holland, and especially HUNTEMANN, were humane in their behaviour towards captured agents.

HUNTEMANN claims that he was never a Nazi and this is almost certainly correct, his whole background and career are in keeping with such a claim. He states that he is not aware of any long-term planning either by the German General Staff or the N.S.D.A.P., but inclines to the opinion that the latter may have certain plans for the future, but he can give no definite grounds for this view.

HUNTEMANN is an optimist for he discusses the possibility of obtaining an appointment with a German firm after release and, in addition, has the intention of marrying the daughter of Rittmeister ROELLE, 22 years younger than himself; such a marriage was forbidden under the Nuremberg laws.

Investigated by: -

J. Hughes

Major

Camp 020
July 1945
JH/530:LSK

I.

LIST OF APPENDICES.

| | |
|--|-------------------|
| <u>APPENDIX I</u> - Censorship Personnel, Berlin. | Pages II - III. |
| <u>APPENDIX II</u> - Censorship Personnel, Copenhagen. | Pages IV - VI. |
| <u>APPENDIX III</u> - Composition and Movements of PAK 307 and FATS 362, 363, 364, 365 and 396 M, together with personnel of PAK 307 School "Bellevue". | Pages VII - X. |
| <u>APPENDIX IV</u> - Non-Technical Training of W/T operators. | Pages XI - XII. |
| <u>APPENDIX V</u> - Missions. | Pages XIII - XV. |
| <u>APPENDIX VI</u> - Descriptions and disposal of Trainees. | Pages XVI - XXIV. |
| <u>APPENDIX VII</u> - Ast-Copenhagen. | Page XXXV. |

II.

APPENDIX I.

Personnel of the Censorship - Berlin.

1. VON FREDEN, Oberstlt.-Hermann. In peacetime, worked in the Ministry of the Interior, Berlin. October 1939/about May-June 1940, in the ABP, Berlin. June 1940/about June 1941, Abwehrstelle Copenhagen, again for a short time in the Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, then Leiter of ATP, Oslo, then Leiter of AHP, Paris, until March 1944, after which he again returned to the Ministry of the Interior, Berlin. First met at the ABP, Berlin, in October 1939; seen for the last time in September 1944 in Berlin. Address: Warmbrunnerstr. Berlin.
2. FRITZ, Berno. Lived in England before the war. Is married to an Englishwoman. The wife and one daughter live in England, another daughter in Germany. First met at the ABP, Berlin, in October 1939; went to the ABP, Copenhagen in July 1940 and left at his own wish in about the beginning of 1941; became a merchant in Berlin.
3. FENKE, Oberst. October 1939, Leiter of the Censorship Office in Berlin; was later sent back to the Army and won the 'Ritterkreuz'. Seen in October 1939, Budapeststr. 20, Berlin, at the ABP.
4. HUTH, Major. Leiter of AHP, Berlin, successor to Oberst HEKKE. Co-partner of the firm "Apparatebau HUTH & Co", Berlin, and in later years returned to this business. Met in the ABP Berlin, Budapeststr.20, in July 1940.
5. KLOPPE, Oberlt. Chief of the ABP Staff, Berlin, from September 1939 until about the end of 1940. First met at the Budapeststr. 20, Berlin, in July 1940. Was court-martialled because he got immunity from military service for members of the ABP Berlin, in exchange for payments and goods. He was either condemned to death or given a long term of imprisonment.
6. LUBBS, Oberlt. In peacetime, worked in the Head Office of LUBBS Soap Factory, Berlin. At the outbreak of war, joined the ABP Berlin; in July 1941, in the ABP Copenhagen; moved from there, about the middle of 1942, probably to a Dienststelle in Paris. Lives in Berlin.

III.

APPENDIX I - contd.

Personnel of the Censorship, Berlin.

7. FRIESSEN, Frank. In peacetime, agent for a grain firm in Berlin. Sent to Madrid in 1942 as interpreter to the Spanish Blue Division. First met in October 1939 at ABP Berlin, went to Copenhagen in July 1940; about the middle of 1941 moved to the Central Censorship Office, Berlin.
8. SCHANNEVITZKI, Oberlt. In peacetime, bank clerk in Berlin. First met in October 1939 at the ABP Berlin; went to the ABP Copenhagen in July 1940. Lives in Berlin.
9. SEELE, Hptm. In peacetime, Bank Clerk in Berlin. First met in October 1939, Berlin. In July 1940, went to the ABP Copenhagen; still there in November 1941. Lives in Berlin.
10. WARLUTH, Fritz. In peacetime, employee of a Berlin Forwarding agency. First met at the ABP Berlin, in October 1939; went to Copenhagen in July 1940. Lives in Berlin.
11. Von EIRKENBURG Pri.
Adrienne
ROSENBAUM. Employed with ABP Berlin as examiner from October 1939 till July 1940; with ABP Copenhagen from July 1940 till about the end of August 1940; with ABP Paris from about the beginning of September 1940 till the evacuation of Paris in 1944. Knew the one-time Major, now Oberstlt. GISMES; recommended HUNTERMANN to him, and thus brought him to GISMES, his subsequent Kommandofuehrer.
12. STEPAN, Pri. Eva. Came to ABP Berlin as examiner in October 1939. Told HUNTERMANN on a visit in October 1940 that she was going to work for Ast-Berlin (presumably as V-Frau). Father comes from Koenigsberg where he has a forwarding agency.
-

IV.

APPENDIX II.Personnel of Censorship - Copenhagen.

1. BOLDT-CHRISTMAS. Examiner with ATP Copenhagen. Peacetime occupation unknown. First met at the ATP Copenhagen in December 1940. Lives in Hamburg.
2. CORDUA, Sdfr. Supervising Officer with ATP Copenhagen in December 1940, until about the middle of 1941. Proprietor of CORDUA & Co. Import & Export firm.
3. DRESCHER, Hptm. Dr. In peacetime, Reichstaatsanwalt in Hamburg. About 1942, returned to this job. Is a former SA man and Party Member, and was therefore very quickly promoted from Amtsrichter of a small town in Holstein to Reichstaatsanwalt in Hamburg. After the heavy air-raid on Hamburg, he was arrested as he had dismissed the prisoners in the interrogation prison on account of inadequate shelter from the air-raid. A great number of them did not return to custody. DRESCHER was put into the prison of Fuhlsbuettel. An appeal of the Hamburg magistrates was refused by HDMIER. First met at the ABP Copenhagen in July 1940; still there in November 1941.
4. FRITZ, Benno. For details see Appendix I.
5. HAASE, Hptm. Dr. From July 1940 till about February 1941, was in charge of the office of ABP Copenhagen, and from about February 1941 till November 1941 when HUNTEMANN left Copenhagen, was in charge of the office and deputy Leiter of ATP, Copenhagen. Previously with ABP Hamburg. Was later transferred to an Abwehrstelle as Abwehr officer. Lives in Hamburg.
6. HASSE, Lt. Since July 1940 with ATP Copenhagen; left about May 1941.
7. HEYN. Was examiner with ATP Copenhagen, previously with ABP Hamburg. In peacetime a merchant in Hamburg. Lives in Hamburg.
8. KIRCHOFF, Lt. With ATP Copenhagen probably since July 1940. Left Copenhagen about March 1941. In peacetime was a composer of incidental music for cultural films.
9. Hptm. KRUSCHKA. With ABP Copenhagen from July/December 1940. During this time, was Leiter of Abtg. Photokopie, ABP, Copenhagen. Letters received, connected with the suspect-list, were handed to him.
10. LUHNS, Oberlt. For details see Appendix I.
11. OTERSEN. Was examiner with ATP Copenhagen from July 1940 until HUNTEMANN left in November 1941; previously with ABP Hamburg. In peacetime a merchant in Hamburg, where he lives.

APPENDIX II - contd. Personnel of Censorship - Copenhagen.

12. PRIESEN, Frank. For details see Appendix I.
13. SCHANNWITZKI ObIt. For details see Appendix I.
14. SEELIG, Hptm. For details see Appendix I.
15. SPATER, Hptm. First seen in July 1940 at ABP Copenhagen where he was Leiter of the Chemical Section. Returned to Frankfurt/Main about September 1940. Lives in Frankfurt/Main.
16. THOMAS, Hptm. Since the outbreak of war, probably in ABP Berlin. In July 1940, was Leiter of the ATP in Copenhagen, left there about October 1941. Was returned to an Army depot as he was unfit for other posts. Lives in Berlin.
17. WARMUTH, Frits. For details see Appendix I.
18. WEYHER or WEYER. An employee of the Forschungsamt in Berlin, and as such, commandeered for ABP Copenhagen, in order to make full use of its experience for the benefit of the Forschungsamt. With ABP Copenhagen from July to December 1940. Lives in Berlin.
19. WILHELM, Oberlt. Came in July 1940 from ABP Frankfurt/Main to ABP Copenhagen as Buerooftizier, and was still there on HUNTELMANN's departure in December 1940. Lives in Frankfurt/Main.
20. BOHDT-CHRISTMAS, Frau. Examiner with ATP Copenhagen. Peacetime occupation unknown. Seen with ATP Copenhagen December 1940 until HUNTELMANN's departure in November 1941. Lives in Hamburg.
21. Von KARFF, Fri. Was formerly with the Abwehrstelle Hamburg; came in July 1940 to the business office of ABP Copenhagen as Secretary and was still there on HUNTELMANN's departure from Copenhagen in November 1941. Father was Admiral Von KARFF, the Commandant for many years of the Kaiser's yacht "Hohenzollern". Seen with ABP Copenhagen from July to December 1940. Lives in Hamburg.
22. KOELISCH, Fri. Maria. Was examiner with ATP Copenhagen. Seen at ABP and ATP Copenhagen from July 1940 till HUNTELMANN's departure in November 1941. Had formerly lived for a long time in Copenhagen. Lives in Berlin.
23. HAYEN, Frau. Examiner with ATP Copenhagen; seen there from December until HUNTELMANN's departure in November 1941.
24. OSCHUETZ, Fri. Came from Berlin to ATP Copenhagen as Secretary through Hptm. THOMAS. Did not come up to standard and in Autumn 1941 was sent back to Berlin as she was expecting a child. Seen with the ATP Copenhagen from the Spring of 1941 till the Autumn of that year.

VI.

APPENDIX II - contd.

Personnel of Censorship - Copenhagen.

25. PETERSEN, Frl. Was examiner with ABP Copenhagen and ATP Copenhagen; previously employed with ABP Hamburg. Seen in the ABP and ATP from July 1940 till HUNTEMANN's departure in November 1941. Lives in Hamburg.
26. PICKLITZ, Frl. Secretary with ATP Copenhagen from July 1940 till HUNTEMANN's departure in November 1941. Previously with ATP Berlin, where she lives.
27. SCHUEZ, Frl. Now married; married name unknown. Came from ABP Frankfurt/Main. Was working in the Chemical Dept. of the ABP Copenhagen from July 1940 where she still was when HUNTEMANN was transferred from the ABP to the ATP Copenhagen in December 1940. Shortly afterwards, returned to Frankfurt as she got married. Married the Leiter of Abtg. Chemie ABP Copenhagen, a certain Dr. holding the rank of S3fr. in Copenhagen. The latter is also a native of Frankfurt/Main.
28. WEYHER or WEYER, Frau (née KRUSIUS) Since the outbreak of war was examiner with ABP Frankfurt/Main; in July 1940 came to ABP Copenhagen; returned to Germany (probably at her own wish) in 1941 and married Herr WEYHER or WEYER of the Forschungsamt, who had made her acquaintance at the ABP Copenhagen, and was then employed with ABP Berlin.
29. ZIEREN, Frau Helga (née SCHACHT) Examiner with ATP Copenhagen from December 1940 onwards. On HUNTEMANN's departure from Copenhagen in November 1941, was still there. Niece of the Reichsbankpräsident, Dr. SCHACHT.

VII.

APPENDIX III.

Composition and Moverents of FAK 307 and FAKs 362, 363, 364, 365 and 396 M, also personnel of FAK 307 "Bellevue" School.

I. FAK 307 (Code Name 'COGNAC': Feldpostnummer O4 417).

FAK 307 had been stationed at Brussels since March 1944. A small part left Brussels on September 1st, the main part on September 3rd, 1944, and proceeded to Schloss Hillenraad near Roermond, Holland. The newly formed Staffel II, composed of all superfluous staff, was transferred in the middle of September, under the com. and of Hptm. WURR, to Kierspe-Bahnhof, where it remained until April 1945. The remainder of the Kommando went to Derdorf, near Bonn, at about the end of September 1944, and a few days before the occupation of Bonn, moved to Roennigen. In mid-March 1945, the Kommando went to Hueinghausen, near Plettenberg in Westphalia, where it finally broke up.

Personnel of FAK 307.

1. RIDLOFF, Major, later Oberstlt.
2. SCHAEFFER, Major.
3. WURR, Hptm.
4. GROSSE, Hptm. Dr.
5. JESCHKE, Ltnt.
6. von KORB, Hptm.
7. SIEGERS, Ltnt.
8. KUP, Uffz.
9. GERTH, Uffz.
10. GEWEYER (or GEWERTER), Erloo, Uffz.
11. BOEMDEL, Gefr.
12. STADLER, Uffz.
13. CHRISTMANN (I), Uffz. @ ARNO.
14. WEHNER, Feldw.
15. WALLENFANG, Gerhard, Feldw.
16. STEINBUCHSEL, Feldw.
17. SCHWABLER, Feldw.
18. SCHUELMANN, Feldw.
19. CHRISTMANN (II), Uffz.
20. LANZINGER, Feldw.
21. HASE, Joseph, Uffz.
22. FEURLE, Uffz.
23. STOLTERFOTH, Frau.
24. JANSSEN, Frl.
25. GRAU, Frl.

HURTMANN states that in addition to the above, there were about 25 soldiers acting as guards, drivers, assistant W/T personnel, etc.

Excerpt into FAT 362 file

SF 52/11/9(3)

VIII.

APPENDIX III - contd.

II. FAT 362 (Address: rue de la Loi Brussels - Ast-Belgien building)
(Code name 'KUELSSEL')

and

Aussenstelle Lille.

After the evacuation of Lille and Brussels, FAT 362 moved first to the neighbourhood of Schloss Hillenraad bei Roermond. After PAK 307 left Hillenraad, Aussenstelle Lille moved in. The major portion of FAT 362 went to a small place near Hasselt. Its ultimate destination is unknown but, unlike the other units of PAK 307 which went to the Ruhr Valley, it was forced away beyond Kassel. The Truppfuehrer, Major LEMMING, was discharged for health reasons about October 1944 and replaced by Hptm. FISCHER.

a) Personnel.

1. LEMMING, Major.
2. WISHERS, Hptm.
3. WIESENANN, Hptm.
4. BOEDERER, Uffz.
5. NOELLE, Rittm.
6. KOHL, Uffz.
7. CONRAD, Gefr. or Obergefr.
8. ROTHER, Gefr. or Obergefr.
9. LUDLER, Uffz.
10. FISCHER, Hptm.
11. NIENOFF, Uffz.
12. HOLLER, Uffz.

b) Former V-Man for FAT 362, Aussenstelle Lille.

③ MARSCHAL (real name unknown)

WIESENANN states that in addition to the above, there were also a number of soldiers acting as drivers and guards, with FAT 362, and two soldiers as drivers with Aussenstelle Lille.

SF 52/11/9(3)

Extract for FAT 363 file

IX.

SF 52/11/9 (2)

APPENDIX III - contd.

III. FAT 363, Liege (code name: 'ALLASCH'); Aussenstelle Namur.

The return route of this Trupp from Belgium is unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN. In March 1945, the Trupp was in Wisl in transit and then withdrew to a small place about 5 km. from Gummersbach.

Personnel.

1. SCHELLMAYR, Hptm.
2. TROOST, Ltnt.
3. NEUMANN, Ltnt.
4. SCHLEISS, Uffz.
5. WEIL, Uffz.
6. BOCKEMEIER, Uffz.

Aussenstelle Namur.

1. BAHKE, Hptm.

HUNTEMANN states that in addition to the above, there were also a few soldiers acting as drivers and guards.

SF 52/11/9 (2)

Extract for FAT 364 file

SF 52/11/9 (1)

IV. FAT 364, Ghent (code name: 'WHISKY'); Aussenstelle Antwerp.

Exact details of the return route of this Trupp from Belgium are not known to HUNTEMANN and GISKES, but latterly it lay in or near Leichlingen near Solingen.

Personnel.

1. PIERE, Hptm.
2. WIESEMANN, Hptm.
3. KUNZMANN, Werner (?), Wachtmeister.
4. MUELLER, Wachtmeister.

Aussenstelle Antwerp.

1. SALGMANN, Hptm.
2. HELM, Uffz.
3. SCHOLVIN, Uffz. (deceased)

HUNTEMANN states that in addition to the above, there were also several soldiers acting as drivers, guards, etc. with FAT 364, and one soldier as driver with the Aussenstelle, Antwerp.

SF 52/11/9 (1)

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12

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X.

APPENDIX III - contd.

V. FAT 365. (Address: Driebergen, Holland, in the buildings in which Referat III F, Ast-Niederlande, was situated).

After the formation and transfer of FAK 307 to Brussels, FAT 365 remained in the buildings previously occupied by Referat III F, Ast-Niederlande. To HUNTERMAN's knowledge, the Trupp remained until the last in Driebergen. About the beginning of October 1944, the Trupp was transferred from command of FAK 307 to FAK 306, so that FAK 307, from this time onwards, was no longer represented in Holland. The Trupp Commander, Major KIRSCHWITZER, was replaced for reasons of ill-health, in about February 1945, by a younger officer (name unknown).

Personnel.

1. KIRSCHWITZER, Major.
2. SCHROEDER, Hptm.
3. DROESSLER, Hptm.
4. BODENS, Uffz.
5. Dr. HENSEL, Uffz.
6. HUEPNER, Uffz.
7. HANER, Gefr.
8. SCHROEDER, Obergefr.
9. KOCK, Feldw.

HUNTERMAN states that in addition to the above, there were also ten soldiers acting as drivers, guards, etc.

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VI. FAT 396 M (Le Havre). (Code name: 'SORBET').

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Trupp 396 M was from January 1944 to August 1944 in the Le Havre district. After the evacuation of France, the Trupp arrived in Brussels, from the Rouen area, where it had been badly dispersed, and was then incorporated in FAK 307. It was always the problem child of the Kdo. and never accomplished anything. The Truppfuehrer, Hptm. BAHKE, was first appointed by FAK 307. He was formerly Leiter of the Anwesenstelle Namur, of FAT 363. From September 1944 to March 1945, Trupp 396 M was in the S. Bifel and Vauxis. It has been missing since the end of March 1945.

Personnel.

1. TIEBESCHER, Obltnt. s. Sec.
2. BAHKE, Hptm.
3. KOEHLINGER, Ltnt. (or Fahnenjunker-Feldw.).
4. KUCHENBECKER, Maat.

VII. Personnel of FAK 307 "Bellevue" School.

1. NOELLE, Rittm.
2. WEIL, Uffz.
3. KUCHENBECKER, Maat.
4. HUNTERMAN, Uffz. (subject of this Report)
5. EICHENAUER, Ernst, Oberwachtm.
6. HOMBURG, Uffz. Heinrich.
7. HOLLER, Obergefr.
8. LOSKOPF, SS Hptstuf.

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14

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Copy of App: IV
Should go to
SF for FAX 307 Wicht.
School at Wicht.

SF 52/4/4 (87)

APPENDIX IV.

Non-Technical Instruction of W/T operators at
FAK School at Wicht.

HINTSMANN was responsible for the non-technical instruction of W/T operators. The instruction that he gave was based on the experience that he gained whilst operating the Nordpol affair. Each agent had about 10 hours' individual instruction from him, and he maintains that this was necessary in order that he should know intimately each operator as he states that this would assist in telling at a future date if the operator was acting under control. He thinks that during the Nordpol affair those handling S.O.E. agents in Holland lacked this intimate knowledge of their agents; if they had not, it would have been impossible for the Germans to have operated for such a long time.

R.D.F.

Normal procedure for R.D.F.ing was explained in some detail, i.e. static stations, mobile stations and portable sets. There seems to have been no very noticeable innovations in the German procedure.

Protective Measures against R.D.F.ing

Basic Rules

- a) Frequent change of headquarters.
- b) The operator to have as many W/T sets as possible in order to obviate transport of sets.
- c) Experience proved that in Holland R.D.F.ing was inaccurate in the neighbourhood of large stretches of water, therefore where possible transmit near water.
- d) During full moon R.D.F.ing is also inaccurate, therefore this is a good time for transmission.
- e) The importance of lock-outs.
- f) Previously reconnoitred escape routes.
- g) In the event of the doorbell ringing in a house where an operator is working, he must not cease work, as it is the practice to ring at all doors in the suspected neighbourhood and at the same time listen with a portable apparatus. If on a bell being rung, transmission ceases, the house is immediately pin-pointed.
- h) If a W/T set is to be transported it is advisable for one person to leave it in some such place as the cloakroom in a station, and for another person unknown to the first person to fetch it.

Map Reference

The Michelin map served as the basis for the designation of all places in ciphered signals. Map references are in addition coded. Each map has a designated number. The squares on the map from West to East are numbered A, B, C, D etc., and the parallel lines on the map are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 etc. To give the map reference, the following procedure is used. The first figure is the serial number of the Michelin map, e.g., 4. The letter of the longitudinal line west of the place to be designated is then shown, e.g., D. Therefore the

SF 52/4/4 (87)

next symbol in the map reference should be D, but a word is used beginning with this letter. Thus the first part of the map reference would be 4 Dora. From the line D to the designated place, the number of millimetres is given, say, 54. Thus we have 4 Dora 54. Then the number marked on the righthand side of the map is taken, giving the numbering of the latitude, say, for example, 3. The reference now runs, 4 Dora 543.

Then the number of millimetres is taken from the designated place to the parallel line immediately below the place. This must always be a three-letter figure and if necessary a zero must be inserted in front of the number of millimetres - say, 72. The full map reference will read, 4 Dora 543072. To this six-figured number the agent adds his personal number, but with no carry forward, e.g., if the agent's number is 196835 the final figure will be

543072
196835
339907

This number, of course, in the message would be enciphered.

Procedure if Arrested

If a w/T agent is captured and there is no possibility of his talking his way out, he should immediately hand over his code. Before setting off on a mission, the agent will have been supplied with two test questions. One of these test questions he will give away to the enemy, the other he will not. The test question he will give away will be the one which will immediately appear obviously to the enemy to be a test question, e.g. "When did your wife have her second child", the answer being "Uncle Theo was a heavy smoker". The answer to this question will of course entail reference by the enemy to the operator. The second test question which he will not disclose to the enemy is one which will contain a normal demand for information which the enemy can be expected to answer without reference to the operator, e.g. "Are the local trains in the neighbourhood of Brussels now running on schedule". To such a question the enemy, if controlling the operator might be expected to answer without reference to him, whilst the real answer, agreed upon in advance, would be "Shall investigate and reply in next message".

The importance of indicating that he was being controlled was very much stressed.

Indicatives

To make it perfectly clear from whom a message comes, a suitable indicative is provided, namely, each agent in a group is allotted a letter, e.g., organiser A, w/T operator B. Locally recruited sub-agents will be numbered serially, thus, locally-recruited w/T operator would be B.1.

Broadcasts

Crack messages for broadcasting to indicate infiltration or dropping operations etc. were taught, but the use of broadcast messages to inspire confidence in contacts was absolutely forbidden.

This instruction was based on HUNTERMANN's own ideas and as far as he knows was not used in other Abwehr Schools.

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It had originally been planned to drop the group near "Waterloo" to carry out a penetration mission in accordance with the Leitstelle III West directive, but no aeroplane was ever made available for this purpose. The group was eventually committed in Bonn and briefing was given by Lieut. TROGEL of PAT 363. Their mission was as originally planned, i.e. to allow themselves to be overrun and then to attempt to penetrate allied intelligence services. In addition, if opportunity offered, they were to transmit I(a) intelligence.

P.F. 601,378

THE CLAUDE GROUP

The group consisted of the following:-

- CLAUDE - Leader and W/T operator.
- GILLES
- JACQUES
- JOSEPH

P.F. 602,082

It was originally planned to drop the group in N. France with the exception of JOSEPH who was too old to jump and was to reach France via Switzerland and rejoin the group there.

As the situation for Germany grew increasingly worse it became evident that such a mission to France would be profitless and almost impossible. It was therefore decided in the middle of March to hand over the group to PAT 363, which was keeping observation on groups of escaped P/W and foreign workers in Wuppertal. The group was to be used in the penetration of these foreign groups, and on being overrun by the allies was to carry out the same mission as that given to the "Waterloo" Group (see above).

THE NORA GROUP

- ROBERT - Leader and W/T operator.
- PIERRE
- PAUL
- ALBERT

It was originally planned to drop this group in the Lille area from which it was to operate. Its mission was in accordance with the directive of the Leitstelle III West. The group was never briefed or committed.

All missions of this character were briefed by the PATs concerned, and GISKES merely saw that the general mission was in accordance with the directive, leaving the details and supplementary missions to the Truppe, Abt.I.c of the Armies to which the PATs were attached also probably asked for special tasks such as the transmission of I(a) intelligence.

R NETS

THE CHARLES NET

At the end of September 1944 the Leitstelle III West issued a directive to organise a III F Intelligence Reseau on the left bank of the Rhine against the event of the allies reaching the river line.

The PATs under command were therefore given orders to arrange contacts and safe houses for the collection of information and the sheltering of

Extract
with PP. 6
TOWAIN H.

S.F. 52/4/4/107

See SF 52/4/107
7

these collecting information. Information was to be transmitted from behind the allied lines by W/T operators trained for the purpose.

As male operators were not available, the Heeresfunkerrinnen Schule at Erfurt was ordered to supply 10 female operators, but these proved completely unsuitable and were discarded.

The work was undertaken and a large number of the civilian population offered their co-operation. Feldwebel KUNZMANN was entrusted with the task of supervising and amplifying the arrangements made by the various PAFs. The Ardennes offensive in December brought these preparations to a halt, but after the failure of the offensive, orders were received about the middle of January 1945 from the Leitstelle III West and Heeresgruppe B Abt. Ic to report on the state of preparedness of the Reseau. The report rendered by PAF 307 made it clear that the organization of the Reseau as planned was quite impossible for the following reasons:

1. Investigation had shown that the co-operation of the civil population had only been offered to circumvent the evacuation order which was to come in force with the allied advance. In addition, those offering to help had only done so to avoid service in the Volksturm.
2. The continuous bombing by the Allies had already completely disrupted the Reseau that had been tentatively formed.
3. Suitable W/T sets, as always, were not available.

In spite of this discouraging report, Leitstelle III West and especially Heeresgruppe B Ic ordered intensification of the preparations and asked for progress reports. Accordingly, Uffa. KUP and GEMETER were attached to KUNZMANN for this purpose until the German withdrawal at the end of 1945.

In view of the lack of W/T sets, carrier pigeons were made available to KUNZMANN and were distributed in various parts of the territory on the left bank; these however, were liberated before the allied occupation and arrived back without messages or message-containers.

At the beginning of March, KUNZMANN fractured his skull as the result of a motor cycle accident and neither GISMES nor HUNTEMAN know what has become of him.

No positive results of any sort were obtained from "Claudius".

THE CAROLUS NET

SF 52/15/3

About the middle of February 1945, Leitstelle III West issued a directive for the preparation of a similar Reseau on the right bank of the Rhine. This order was passed to the PAFs concerned and the operation was given the code name "Carolus". No positive results of any sort were achieved. Towards the end of March, carrier pigeons were made available to PAFs 363 and 364 for use in the bridge-heads round Cologne and Dusseldorf, but as the Allies did not attack in this sector, but compressed the Ruhr pocket from the East, the results were never known as the pigeon lofts had been overrun by the Allies before the struggle in the Ruhr pocket in the Cologne/Dusseldorf sector was finished.

Extract of
Leitstelle
in West

Extract this Appendix
 in 1970 with the file in
 PAK school project. 29. Le Bas.
 new names!

8F52-14/4/87

APPENDIX VI.

Descriptions and Disposal of Trainees (as given by HUNTEMANN and GISKES.

Pupils of "Skihutte" (PAK 307 School in Reblin).
 (Details and Description by HUNTEMANN only).

1. @ ANDRE Transferred to "Bellevue" School. Details given later.
2. X LE BAS (or X DE BAS) @ PAUL Ditto.
3. @ FERNAND Ditto.
4. @ JEAN. Recruited by MARECHAL. Was brought from Erfurt by Uffz. HOLLER, and was taken back to Erfurt at the beginning of December 1944 because he was unsuitable to be a member of PAK 307. Was placed at the disposal of the Gestapo in Erfurt for further employment. At "Skihutte" in November 1944.

Description: French; age about 24; small and slender; height about 1.68 M; black hair; brown complexion; clean-shaven; civilian clothes; spoke French only.

5. @ ROLAND. Recruited by MARECHAL. Came with Uffz. HOLLER from Erfurt at the beginning of November 1944. Sent back to Erfurt at the beginning of December as he was unsuitable to be a member of PAK 307. Was placed at the disposal of the Gestapo in Erfurt for further employment.

Description: French; age about 23; slender; height about 1.66 M; dark blond hair; grey eyes; pale complexion; clean-shaven; civilian clothes; spoke French only.

Pupils of "Bellevue" School in Wiehl.

Belgians.

1. FIRMOLIN (possibly real name) PF 601,378 NNI. Came from FAT 363 to the Wiehl School with Uffz. SCHLEISS at the beginning of December 1944. Worked as V-Mann for FAT 363 in Liege during the war and was handed over by this Trupp to the School. Returned to Trupp 363 at the beginning of the German offensive in mid-December 1944. Has been captured.

Description: (HUNTEMANN only) Belgian; age about 40; broad-shouldered and strong; height about 1.76 M; dark blond hair; blue/grey eyes; moustache (whilst at "Bellevue" School, grew a beard); civilian clothes; speaks French, Flemish and some German.

2. FEETERS (possibly real name) NN PF 601,378. Came with Uffz. SCHLEISS from FAT 363 to the school in Wiehl at the beginning of December 1944. Had worked as V-Mann for FAT 363 in Liege during the war, and was brought to the school by this Trupp. Returned to FAT 363 at the beginning of the German offensive, about 18th December 1944. Captured.

(contd: -

SF 52/4/4/87

APPENDIX VI - contd.
Pupils of "Bellevue" School in Wicli - contd.

2. PRETTERS - contd.

Description: Belgian; age about 35; slim; height about
(HUNTERMAN only) 1.78 M; fair hair; blue eyes; cleanshaven;
civilian clothes; speaks French, Flemish
and some German.

3. Anon Belgian from
Trupp 363.

HUNTERMAN

Came with FIRMOLIN and PRETTERS. During the war, was a V-Mann of FAT 363 in Liege. Came at the beginning of December 1944 with UFFR. SCHLEISS from FAT 363 to Wicli, and after the beginning of the December offensive, about 18th December 1944, was sent back to FAT 363.

Description: Belgian; age about 35; slim; height about
(HUNTERMAN only) 1.75 M; dark brown hair; was growing a beard;
civilian clothes; speaks French and Flemish.

4. @ FRANCOIS

NNI

December 1944/March 1945 at the PAK 307 "Bellevue" School, Wicli. Came to the School through Hptsturmfuhrer MESSKOPF, from the Legion Wallonie. (MESSKOPF was Liaison officer to DEBREILLE and had his HQ. in a hotel in Gamsarsbach.) FRANCOIS had worked for the GFP in Mons as V-Mann during the war. He was unsuitable for work with PAK 307 and was therefore posted, together with LOUIS, ROBERTS and ATNEEH to Stettin at the beginning of March 1945, in order to rejoin the Legion Wallonie there.

Description: Belgian; age about 24; slim; height about
(HUNTERMAN only) 1.77 M; black hair; grey eyes; pale complexion;
cleanshaven; miserable appearance; civilian clothes, also uniform of the SS Legion Wallonie; speaks French and some German.

5. @ LOUIS

NNI

December 1944/March 1945 at the PAK 307 "Bellevue" School in Wicli. Came from the Legion Wallonie to the school, through Hptsturmfuhrer MESSKOPF in Gamsarsbach. During the war, he had worked as V-Mann for the GFP, Mons, and was totally unsuited for work with PAK 307. He was therefore posted at the beginning of March 1945, together with FRANCOIS, ROBERTS and ATNEEH to Stettin, to the Legion Wallonie.

Description: Belgian; age about 25; thickset; height about
(HUNTERMAN only) 1.68 M; dark brown hair; cleanshaven;
civilian clothes, also uniform of the SS Legion Wallonie; speaks French.

6. @ ROBERTS, Feldw.

NNI

December 1944/March 1945 at the "Bellevue" School, Wicli. Came from the Legion Wallonie to PAK 307 through Hptsturmfuhrer MESSKOPF. He was a Feldwebel and had various decorations, such as the Iron Cross II class, Silver wound stripe, Infanterie-Sturnabzeichen, etc. As there seemed no longer any possibility of using him for PAK 307, he was sent back to the SS Legion Wallonie, Stettin, together with

(contd: -

S.F. 52 / 4 / 4 / 87

APPENDIX VI - contd.
Pupils of "Bellevue" School in Wischl - contd.

6. @ ROBERTS, Feldw. - contd. FRANCOIS, LOUIS and ATRECH, beg. March 1945.

Description:
(HUNTERMAN only)

Belgian; age about 30; slim; height about 1.74 M; black hair; brown eyes; cleanshaven; civilian clothes, also uniform of the SS Legion Wallonie; soft voice; speaks French and some German.

7. @ MARIAN

PF 601.378

NNI

December 1944/March 1945 at the "Bellevue" School, Wischl. Came to PAK 307 through Hptsturnfuhrer MOSKOPF in Gummersbach. Had been a W/T operator in the Legion Wallonie. Was placed, together with WILLIAM, GEOFFREY and NERO in Bonn, as W/T operator for the Group Waterloo, where he was captured in March 1945.

Description:
(HUNTERMAN only)

Belgian; age about 28; broadshouldered and thickset; height about 1.73 M; dark blond hair; grey eyes; cleanshaven; looks like a boxer; civilian clothes; speaks French, Flemish and some German.

8. WILLINGBONE Dr. @ BILL

NNI

January/February 1945 at the "Bellevue" School. Came from PAK 364, for whom he had worked as V-Mann during the war, in Ghent. He was proposed as Gruppenchef for the Waterloo Group mission in Belgium, but did not gain the confidence of the group who had been chosen as his associates (WILLIAM, GEOFFREY, NERO and MARIAN). He was talkative and unfriendly, and as there was no possibility of using him in PAK 307, for this reason, he was sent, at his own request, to the Septago in Stuttgart. In civilian life, lawyer in Ghent or Brussels.

Description:
(from HUNTERMAN)

Belgian; age about 28; slim; height about 1.73 M; dark blond hair; wears horn-rimmed glasses; small moustache; civilian clothes; English, French Flemish and German spoken.

Description:
(from GISMES)

Belgian; age about 30; slim; height about 1.70 M; dark brown hair (?); ? spectacles; narrow face; ? small moustache; looks like a student; simple clothes; speaks French, Flemish and some German.

9. @ WILLIAM, Uetuf.

NNI

December 1944/March 1945 at the "Bellevue" School. Came from the SS Legion Wallonie to PAK 307 through Hptsturnfuhrer MOSKOPF in Gummersbach. Was discharged from there, at his own request, with the rank of Untersturnfuhrer. Was placed in Bonn as Gruppenfuhrer of the Waterloo Group, together with GEOFFREY, MARIAN and NERO, in March 1945, a few days before the occupation of Bonn; was captured there.

(contd. -

PF 52/4/4/87

APPENDIX VI - contd.
Pupils of "Bellevue" School in Wicli - contd.

9. @ WILLIAM, Ustuf. contd.

Description: Belgian; age about 30; slim; height about 1.80 M; dark blond hair; grey eyes; grew a moustache in Wicli; civilian clothes; speaks French, Flemish and German.

10. GEOFFREY. (alias)

NNI.

December 1944/March 1945 in the "Bellevue" School. Came to PAK 307 from the Legion Wallonie (where he was Uschaf.) through Hptsturmfuhrer MOSKOPF in Gummersbach. He was released at his own request, with the rank of Ustuf. Was placed in Bonn by FAT 363 with WILLIAM, NERO and MARIAN (Waterloo Group); was captured there.

Description: Belgian; age about 30; slim; height about 1.78 M; dark blond hair; grey eyes; small moustache; civilian clothes; nervous twitch of the eyes; speaks French, Flemish, and German.

11. @ NERO.

NNI.

January/March 1945 at the "Bellevue" School. Came, together with Dr. WILHELMJENS @ BILL, from FAT 364 to PAK 307. During the war, had worked on German minesweepers; was a seaman before the war. Placed by FAT 363 in Bonn, together with WILLIAM, GEOFFREY and MARIAN (Waterloo Group); was captured there.

Description: Belgian; age about 50; thickset; height about 1.65 M; black hair; often wears glasses for reading; cleanshaven; civilian clothes; speaks English, French, Flemish and German.

12. ATKESH (Sr. ADKESH)
(probably real name)

March 1945 at the "Bellevue" School. Came to PAK 307 from the Legion Wallonie either at the request of ROBERTS or through Hptsturmfuhrer MOSKOPF in Gummersbach. He was an expert W/T operator. As there was no longer any possibility of training or using him for PAK 307 in March, he was sent back with ROBERTS, FRANCOIS and LOUIS as a soldier to the Legion Wallonie in Stettin.

Description: Belgian; age about 26; thickset; height about 1.72 M; dark brown hair; cleanshaven; civilian clothes; also uniform of the SS Legion Wallonie; speaks French and Flemish.

13. 2nd. Anon Belgian
(companion of ATKESH)

During the war, was a Rechercheur in a Brussels Dienststelle concerned with fighting the Black Market. Came at the beginning of March 1945, through Hptstuf. MOSKOPF, to the school at Wicli; was unsuitable there and was not trained, but in the middle of March was sent to the Legion Wallonie in Stettin, although he was not a soldier. (contd: -

SFS 2/4/4/P)

APPENDIX VI - contd.

Pupils of "Bellevue" School in Wiehl - contd.

16. LE BAS (or DE BAS)
@ PAUL - contd.

Description:
(HUNTEMANN only)

French; age about 24; strong build; height about 1.72 M; black, curly hair; pale complexion; cleanshaven; civilian clothes; speaks some German.

17. @ ANDRE.

November 1944/February or March 1945, at the PAK Schools in Reblin and Wiehl. Recruited by MARECHAL. Came to Reblin in November 1944 with Uffs. HOLLER of PAT 362 from Erfurt and after the closing of the Reblin School, was transferred to "Bellevue". Was uninterested and unreliable. At the end of February or beginning of March 1945, was sent back to Erfurt where he was placed at the further disposal of the Gestapo.

Description:
(HUNTEMANN only)

French; age about 48; strong build; height about 1.74 M; black hair; cleanshaven; civilian clothes; speaks French only.

18. @ FERNAND.

November and December 1944 in Reblin and Wiehl. Recruited by MARECHAL. In November, came with Uffs. HOLLER from PAT 362 in Erfurt to Reblin; was transferred to "Bellevue" School, Wiehl, on the closing of the school in Reblin, and on the 18th December, at the beginning of the German offensive, was attached to Trupp 396 M, but was not put into action as the Trupp itself was not committed. After waiting for weeks with the Trupp, returned, at his own wish, to Erfurt, exasperated. Subsequent whereabouts unknown.

Description:
(HUNTEMANN only)

French; age about 24; slender; height about 1.66 M; black hair; wears glasses; cleanshaven; Jewish appearance; civilian clothes; speaks French only.

19. @ ROBERT.

End November 1944, came to Wiehl with Uffs. HOLLER of PAT 362, from the P.P.F. in Neustadt. Had previously been a French W/T operator. Was to have been used as chief W/T operator of the 'Nora' Group. As there was no possibility of his being given a mission with PAK 307, in view of the development of the general situation, he returned, at his own wish, about the middle of February to the P.P.F. on Lake Constance, together with PIERRE. He wished to try and get to France through the Party, and there join the Maquis. Very fanatical and active.

3 P 52 / 4 / 4 / 87

NNI

NNI

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APPENDIX VI - contd.

Pupils of "Bellevue" School in Wicli - contd.

19. @ ROBERT - contd.

Description: French; age about 30; tall; height about 1.72 M; black hair; cleanshaven; smart; civilian clothes; speaks some German.
(RIEDEMANN only)

20. @ PIERRE.

Came to the school in Wicli from the P.P.F. in Neustadt, together with Uffz. HOLLER of FAT 362 at the end of November 1944. Had been working during the war for a II Trupp of the Abwehr in France, and had left France with it. On the December offensive, was posted to FAT 396 M (?) but received no missions, and returned to Wicli. As there were no possibilities of work with FAT 307 any more, he returned to the P.P.F., at his own wish, in the middle of February 1945, together with ROBERT. Wished to reach France through the K.F.F. Very fanatical and active.

Description: French; age about 30; broad-shouldered; height about 1.72 M; black hair; wears glasses; small moustache; civilian clothes; hoarse voice; speaks French only.
(RIEDEMANN only)

21. TOUTAIN, Christian @ CLAUDE.

and the Abwehr

Came at the end of November 1944 from the P.P.F. in Neustadt to the School in Wicli, together with Uffz. HOLLER of FAT 362. Had previously been working for the Gestapo in Munich (run by Sonderf. Freiherr v. AURENBERG) and had, so he said, parachuted into North Africa in order to carry out enquiries concerning the French Post-Armistice Army. Was trained as a W/T operator and was chief W/T operator of the 'CLAUDE' Group. As FAT 307 offered him no more possibility of work in France, he was sent to Wuppertal as W/T operator, together with GILLES and JACQUES (Group 'CLAUDE'); they were left to themselves to be overrun there. Captured after the occupation of Wuppertal. According to GISSOS, he was arrested by the U.S.A. Military authorities in Wuppertal in April 1945. Was in prison at G.I.C. Gummersbach/Rhld. until 26th April 1945. Then in the U.S.A. E/W Camp at Schwarzenborn/Rossen.

Description: French; age about 28; broad-shouldered; height about 1.70 M; fair hair; blue eyes; no glasses; recently grew a small moustache; civilian clothes; speaks some German; born in the neighbourhood of Paris.
(from RIEDEMANN)

22. STEBIG @ GILLES.

Came to Wicli from the P.P.F. in Neustadt in November 1944, with Uffz. HOLLER of FAT 362. Previously worked for the Gestapo in Munich, together with 'CLAUDE' and JACQUES. Sent with 'CLAUDE' and JACQUES to Wuppertal (Group 'CLAUDE') where they were to allow themselves to be overrun. On the occupation of Wuppertal, CLAUDE and GILLES were captured on the denunciation of JACQUES. According to GISSOS, he was arrested by the U.S.A. Military
(contd)

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P.F. 602.082

602.082

APPENDIX VI - contd.

Profile of "Bellevue" School in Wiesel - contd.

R.F.602,082

SF 52/4/4/87

22. STEIG & GILLES
contd.

authorities in Wuppertal in April 1945. Was in prison at C.I.O. Gummersbach/Rhld. until 26th April 1945. Then in the U.S.A. P/W Camp at Schmarsborn/Hessen.

Description:
(from HUNTEMANN)

French; age about 25; slender; height about 1.67 M; black hair; cleanshaven; civilian clothes; speaks French only.

23. DAURY & JACQUES.

Came to Wiesel from the P.P.F. in Neustadt at the end of November, 1944, together with Uffz. HOLLER of FAT 362. Had already worked previously with CLAUDE and GILLES for the Gestapo in Munich. In March 1945, was sent with CLAUDE and GILLES (CLAUDE Group) to Wuppertal, where they were to allow themselves to be overrun. Denounced CLAUDE and GILLES to the Americans. Occupation: Boxer; owner of brothels in Marseilles and North Africa.

Description:
(HUNTEMANN only)

French; age about 35; broad-shouldered; height about 1.65 M; dark blond hair; grey eyes; cleanshaven; pugilist type; civilian clothes; speaks some German.

24. NEYRET (?)
@ ALBERT.

Came to the school in Wiesel from the P.P.F. in Neustadt at the end of November 1944, with Uffz. HOLLER of FAT 362. Was intended for the 'NORA' Group which was not put into action. As there was no possibility of work with FAT 307, he was released, at his own wish, in order to try to return to France on his own. April 1945, went to Luedenscheid to find work through the Arbeitsamt there. Was then going to be sent to France as a French worker together with other workers. His only desire was to get home to France.

Description:
(HUNTEMANN only)

French; age about 34; slim; height about 1.77 M; dark blond hair; grey eyes; cleanshaven; civilian clothes; squints slightly; speaks French only.

25. @ GILBERT.

Came to Wiesel from the P.P.F. in Neustadt at the end of November 1944, with Uffz. HOLLER of FAT 362. After the beginning of the German offensive about 18th December 1944, was placed at the disposal of FAT 396 M, together with PIERRE and FERNAND, but was not used. Was killed in an air raid.

Description:
(HUNTEMANN only)

French; age about 30; slim; height about 1.74 M; black hair; cleanshaven, probably side-whiskers; civilian clothes; speaks French only.

26. @ MARCEL.

NNI.

Came to Wiesel from the P.P.F. in Neustadt at the end of November 1944, with Uffz. HOLLER of FAT 362. At the beginning of the German offensive about the 18th December, was handed over to FAT 363 (?) or FAT 396 M. His whereabouts are unknown.

(contd: -

APPENDIX VI - contd.
Prills of "Bellane" School in Wicht - contd.

26. MAXIMEL - contd:

Description: French; age about 45; slightly hump-backed; height about 1.65 M; dark brown hair; clean-shaven; miserable appearance; civilian clothes; speaks French only.

27. JARIGE & JOSEPH

JARIGE & JOSEPH
PF 601,822 U2cs.

Came to Wicht from the P.P.F. in Neustadt at the end of November 1945. Uffr. HOLLER of PAT 362. As there was no possibility of his being given a job, and as he did not show much interest, he was released, at his own wish, about the end of February or beginning of March 1949. Wished to try to be taken back to France as a French worker. Had been a French P/W in Germany, and with his genuine papers as such, went to Switzerland en route for France.

Description: (HUNTERMAN only)

French; age about 35; slim; height about 1.70 M; dark brown hair; clean-shaven; civilian clothes; speaks French only.

German

28. BAUR

In peacetime was a chemistry student. Came to the school in Wicht through Uffr. BODENS of PAT 365, and was to be trained there as a W/T operator for the 'CLAUDIUS' Nets. The training was protracted as BAUR was lazy and without ability. In March 1945, the training had to be broken off, and as there was no longer any possibility of him being offered work, he was given work by the Arbeitsamt in Inselscheid.

Description: (from HUNTERMAN)

German; age about 24; hunchback; height about 1.50 M; dark blond hair; blue/grey eyes; wears glasses; clean-shaven; civilian clothes; languages - unknown, speaks German with Rhine accent. Lives in Xenthen on the Rhine.

Description: (from GISKES)

German; age about 25; small, lean; height 1.60 M (?); fair hair; blue (?) eyes; wears glasses; lean face; pale complexion; clean-shaven; large hands; ordinary clothes; a hunchback; speaks German only.

5152/4/4/87

APPENDIX VII

Personnel of Ast-Copenhagen.

1. VON FREDERH, Oberstlt. Hermann.
 With Ast-Copenhagen from June 1940/June 1941.
 Description and details given at APPENDIX I
 to this report.

*Card on
 Award to
 recipient
 of
 Bnr Bismarck is
 identical with
 HERBERT HEIN
 E HACHMANN
 PF 600278 KRAUS
 v 1, 2 c.
 - unc - Waag in FISKEs.*

2. HACHMANN, Sdr. K.
 Met at Ast-Copenhagen in the Autumn of 1941.
 Was at this time in III C. Went later,
 probably 1942/43 to Yugoslavia. Before the
 war, was an active member of the SEMM Company
 in Hamburg. One of his brothers was an
 active member of Ast-Paris III/F, and since
 1942 has been in Ast-Hamburg III C or III/F.
 Lives in Hamburg.

Description:
 German; age about 44; slender; height about
 1.74 M; dark blond hair; cleanshaven; naval
 uniform, also civilian clothes; speaks English,
 French, and German without accent.

3. HOWOLDT, Kept.s. See
 Seen in Copenhagen, Autumn 1940/Autumn 1941.
 Was at this time, Leiter of the Abwehrstelle-
 Copenhagen.

Description:
 German; age about 50; strong build; height
 about 1.78 M; dark brown hair; cleanshaven;
 Naval uniform, also civilian clothes; languages
 unknown - speaks German without accent.

P.N L PF 601,832 HUNTEMANN

No. 16

Original L PF 601,712 GISKES ~~1584~~ H 90

TOP SECRET

Forwarded by Camp 020
under cover of Y.P. dated
25.7.45

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE
"MORFOL" AFFAIR

(To be read in conjunction with Interim
Reports on GISKES and HUNTEMANN)

Camp 020
July, 1945

[Handwritten initials]

TOP SECRET

REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE
"BORIA-OL" AFFAIR

Based on the interrogations of
GLIKIN and HURVICHAN

(To be read in conjunction with Interrogation
reports on GILLES and HURVICHAN)

- Investigated by:

J. Huston

Major.

Group 1
TOP SECRET

NORD-CL INVESTIGATION.

1. General Situation in Ast-Niederlande.

In August 1941, GISKES was transferred from Ast-Paris to Ast-Niederlande, with the rank of Oberstleutnant, and appointment of Leiter Referat III F. On taking up his new appointment he found that the entire section needed reorganisation, as many of the officers were quite incapable and, in addition, many of the NSB members of the section were using their positions merely to terrorise their own nationals; moreover, GISKES had to reckon with the hostile attitude of the Sipo and the SD towards the Abwehr. This hostility became more acute every year until, as will be seen later, GISKES' life was even in danger.

As there was a German civil administration in Holland as opposed to a Wehrmacht administration in the other occupied countries, internal security was completely in the hands of the Hoehere SS und Polizeifuehrer, and, theoretically at least, the work of III F was confined entirely to military matters and was not executive. The Abwehr had no powers of arrest, and so in all cases where action was necessary it was taken by the Sipo.

For purely disciplinary matters GISKES found that he was subordinated to the Leiter of Ast-Niederlande, but, as regards his own activities, he was responsible to a certain Oberst ROEHLER, Abtg. III, Berlin. While GISKES was still at Paris ROEHLER had painted a gloomy picture of the unsatisfactory state of affairs of III F at The Hague, and had charged him with the task of reorganising the Referat.

On arrival GISKES made sweeping changes and restaffed his section with men recommended to him for their capabilities, amongst these being a certain Gerhard HUNTEMANN.

2. British Activity in Holland in summer 1941.

It was known through RDE, operated at that time by the Funk-Abw., that two enemy transmitting stations were active and there were constant rumours about sea communications between Holland and the U.K. Prior to GISKES' arrival, a seaplane had endeavoured to land off the Dutch coast and, in a brush with the German police, several of the latter had been killed. It is thus evident that at this stage British espionage and resistance activities in Holland were on a small scale, at least as far as III F were aware.

3. Arrest of W/T Operators.

At the beginning of September 1941, as a result of RDE, a W/T operator was arrested in the Bildhoven district and on him was found a series of messages, signed AC. The messages were of a purely intelligence nature. This matter was handled entirely by the SD, and III F were not told of the identity of the arrested agent, but GISKES thinks that he was a Dutch Naval cadet, whose name may have been TER HAAK or LAAK. A second operator, whose name GISKES believes was Van der REYDEN, was arrested probably in January 1942. This man agreed to act as a double agent, but the attempt by the SD to play him back proved abortive. This case also was handled exclusively by the Sipo, and the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, who had replaced the Funk-Abwehr towards the end of 1941.

4. Arrest of RIDDERHOF.

Amongst those handling counter-espionage and counter resistance agents in III F, was a certain HFFs. KUI, who had been employed by the Referat since the German occupation of Holland in 1940. Sometime in the late summer or early autumn of 1941 a certain George RIDDERHOF VAN VLIET, an agent of KUI, had been imprisoned in Amsterdam for illicit dealings in gold and diamonds. Whilst serving his term of imprisonment RIDDERHOF made the acquaintance of a man, name unknown to GISKES or HUNTERMAN, who was apparently a member of an indigenous resistance group. When RIDDERHOF was released he was asked by the unknown to make contact with his wife and visit certain friends, whose addresses would be given by the wife. RIDDERHOF reported this to KUI who in turn informed GISKES. The latter then gave instructions that RIDDERHOF was to attempt to penetrate this group by contacting the addresses. In due course reports came in from RIDDERHOF as follows:-

- a) About the beginning of December 1941, RIDDERHOF reported that a man with a motor-boat intended to make an escape to the U.K. and that he required petrol for the journey. RIDDERHOF was given 25 litres of petrol from III F and the Sipo had the starting point watched. But nothing transpired and RIDDERHOF later reported that the man had departed from a point other than the one which had previously been decided upon. Enquiries were made at the man's home address, near the Abw-Stelle Scheveningen, on the corner of Parkweg and Hoogeweg, and it was established that the man's name was MAAS and that he had been absent from home for three months.
- b) In January 1942 the broadcasting by London of the *Wilhelminalied* was to be the signal that a motor-boat would be arriving at Scheveningen to pick up certain members of the Dutch Resistance Movement, to take them to the U.K. On the appointed day, plain-clothes police were on the beach and arrested Dutch patriots who were awaiting the motor-boat, which however failed to arrive.
- c) Later in January 1942, RIDDERHOF reported that he was in touch with a certain Capt. VAN DEN BERG, a Dutch Army reserve officer, living at The Hague, who was connected with a resistance organisation at Vierlingsbeek, near Nijmegen. Reports on this organisation were to the effect that arms and explosives were hidden in churches and monasteries in the neighbourhood. A sub-agent, GRAAN, was charged with the surveillance of this group.

Again, later, RIDDERHOF reported that the organisation expected an aeroplane to arrive from the U.K. to drop sabotage material, and gave the locality but not the exact position of the dropping ground. Upon hearing this, GISKES, who at this time was sceptical, said to KUI: "Wen die een Nordpol mit solcher Gesandhten". (It is for this reason that the code name *NORDPOL* was given by III F to cover the subsequent turning and playing back of S.O.S. agents.

HUNTERMAN, who had recently been discharged from hospital, was accordingly sent to Assen to keep observation. Towards the end of February 1942 a British plane was seen one night, during the full-moon period, circling in the vicinity, and later it was learnt that

4. Arrest of EBENEZER (contd.)

in fact two containers had been dropped. On this occasion there was a genuine Dutch resistance reception committee headed by Capt. VAN DEN BERG, and a certain Sgt. BIERMANN. Only one container was found by the committee, which was taken to a warehouse nearby; VAN DEN BERG then went to RIDDERHOF, living at that time in The Hague, and asked him to arrange for the transport of the material to his (RIDDERHOF's) flat for safe keeping; RIDDERHOF obliged. This incident, when reported to GISKES, convinced him that there was a W/T operator in direct touch with the U.K., especially as prior to this date the Fu-E-Stelle-Orpo had intercepted, but not deciphered, signals in The Hague area. Furthermore, RIDDERHOF had also given information, gleaned from VAN DEN BERG, to the effect that two British agents had been dropped, at the end of November 1941, in the area of Assen. It was therefore decided by GISKES that intensive efforts would have to be made to locate and arrest the operator. Accordingly, the Fu-E-Stelle-Orpo was given this task as a first priority, and the area in which the operator was working was finally narrowed down to the vicinity of Laan Van Meerdavort, The Hague. A raid was organised in the district and one Hubertus Mattheus Gerardus LAUWERS & EBENEZER was arrested on the 6th March 1942. He had evidently become aware that a raid was in progress and after throwing the W/T set into the garden, left the house with TELLER, the proprietor.

KUP, who was taking part in the raid, had been furnished by RIDDERHOF with a personal description of EBENEZER, which had been obtained from Capt. VAN DEN BERG, and apprehended him in the street. Both men were conducted to TELLER's house where the W/T set was found in the garden, and GISKES had a short interview with EBENEZER. The latter was then conveyed to the so-called Oranje Hotel, where Dutch patriots were imprisoned. At first he was confined in the SD section of the prison, but about a month afterwards, on GISKES representation, he was transferred to the Wehrmacht section where conditions were better.

5. Implications of EBENEZER's arrest.

Interrogation of EBENEZER by Kriarat. SCHREIBER, and to a lesser extent by GISKES himself, convinced the latter that if British intentions were realised and numerous well equipped sabotage and resistance groups were created, an extremely dangerous military situation would arise, particularly if these measures succeeded simultaneously in all the Western occupied countries. For this reason, therefore, GISKES decided to concentrate the activities of his Referat on the hindering or prevention of any such plans.

6. Employment of Double Agents.

An Abwehr Abtg. III directive from Berlin, circulated during the early part of the war, laid down the objects to be achieved in playing back captured agents, as follows:-

- a) To maintain contact with Allied espionage agents and their H.Q.'s in order to ascertain missions, and enemy intentions.
- b) Deception (procedure is given in Annexure I).
- c) To control any Allied organisation and thus prevent the growth of a sister organisation unknown to the Germans.
- d) To penetrate organised escape routes. (III F were not interested in individuals who escaped haphazardly as these matters were handled by the Sipo.

7. The 'turning' of EBENEZER.

Shortly after EBENEZER's arrest, KUP asked permission to visit him in prison, and on his return informed GISKES that EBENEZER was prepared to work for the Germans. GISKES maintains that no physical force was used to turn him. GISKES also personally visited him in prison, and with SCHREIBER guaranteed his life as well as the lives of any subsequent Allied agents, who might fall into German hands through his treachery. EBENEZER, on accepting the proposal to work for the Germans, told both GISKES and SCHREIBER that he had been assured by a certain Colonel BLUNT, before leaving the U.K., that in the event of his arrest he was at liberty to accept any proposal put forward by the Germans to save his life; for, at the most, it would be discovered within three weeks if he were working under control. EBENEZER accordingly accepted the German proposal and, on the 18.3.42, sent his first message of German origin. This message requested further supplies and stated that the location of a previously agreed dropping point was too dangerous. (EBENEZER CXG 18.3.42. refers). Three further messages, all dated 15.3.42 - CXG 14 containing information about a ship's crew, money and a reference to BRANDY, CXG 15 dealing with political and industrial information, and CXG 16 containing information about the position of the Prinz Eugen - all of which had been previously composed by EBENEZER and found on him after arrest, were allowed to go forward by the Germans.

The information as to the locality of the Prinz Eugen was found on reference to Referat III M to be false, but GISKES denies that prior to this date false information had been passed to Resistance Groups for onward transmission. He declares that as far as he can remember EBENEZER had received the information from his organizer, Thijs TACONIS @ CATARRH, who in turn probably obtained it from VAN DEN BEES as the latter was believed to have certain sources among the Port Authorities and dockyard workers in Rotterdam.

8. Distribution of Functions.

GISKES was responsible for the general policy of playing back EBENEZER and subsequent W/T operators captured, but the non-technical, detailed conduct of the traffic, i.e. preparing drafts of messages, seeing London signals received answers, keeping traffic on the right lines, and when necessary the notional killing of operators, etc., was the sole responsibility of HUNTEMANN, who was struck off all other duties until the termination of the traffic on 1st April 1944. The messages were drafted by HUNTEMANN and then taken to the Fu-B-Stelle of the Orpo which was always in close proximity to III F. The B Stelle was solely responsible for the encyphering and decyphering of all signals and for the actual transmission. In this connection it is interesting to note that only 2 S.O.E. W/T operators ever actually transmitted, namely EBENEZER for about 3 months after capture, and IRIBERT (see below). All traffic with these exceptions was conducted by trained operators of the B Stelle.

The actual arrest and custody of the agents were entirely Sipo responsibilities, but of course both GISKES and HUNTEMANN had access to them when necessary.

An account of the procedure and the division of responsibility during a Dropping Operation is given at Annexure II.

9. Arrest of CATARRH.

About the 18th March 1942, Thijs TACONIS & CATARRH was arrested by the Sipo at Arnhem whilst trying to effect the rescue of a member of his group who had been taken prisoner by the Germans. Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN know much about the circumstances of the arrest as the entire affair was handled by the Sipo, but it appears that at the time of his arrest the Germans were unaware of his identity, and it was only at a later date that they realised the importance of their capture. GISKES had an interview with him at the prison at Schoeveningen the day after he had tried to escape, but CATARRH refused to give details about himself, and it was only at a later date, when he had been convinced that the whole organisation had been 'blown', that he could be induced to give details of his mission. As he was not a W/T operator he was not of much interest to GISKES and HUNTEMANN, but GISKES expresses considerable respect for his steadfast and soldierly behaviour.

10. Arrest of WATERCRESS.

On the 19th March 1942, S.O.K. signal CXG 21 to EREMEZER advised that an independent agent was to be expected from the 24th March 1942 onward, together with 3 containers, with the result that Albert Arnoldus BAATMAN & AROR & WATERCRESS was received on the 27th March near Steenwijk by a Dutch reception committee working under SD control, among those taking part in the reception were the Dutch subjects SCHLACHTER, POOS and RIDDERHOF; the latter was drunk and his behaviour was such that his attendance on future occasions of this nature was forbidden by the Germans. The "safe" arrival of WATERCRESS was acknowledged in EREMEZER's CXG 24, of the 28th March 1942 to London.

WATERCRESS voluntarily offered his services to the Germans and was even prepared to undertake a mission abroad for the SD. He was used, however, by the Sipo for spying on his fellow prisoners at Haaren to which all captured agents were sent after a short stay at Schoeveningen prison.

11. Arrest of LEPTICE, TRUMMET and TURNIP.

Early in April 1942 III 7 was informed by the Feldgendarmerie that a dead parachutist had been found in a field N.W. of Holten; it appeared that he had hit his head on a stone water-trough on landing. From tracks in the neighbourhood of the body there were grounds for believing that other agents had landed at the same time. Early in May the Sipo, on information received from a certain Dr. STEMKEL of the Inkasso and Hypotheken Bank, Utrecht, arrested Goswigen Hendrik Gerard RAS & LEPTICE and Johan JORDAAN & TRUMMET. The arrests were effected by the Sipo, and GISKES thinks that the informant acted unwittingly. About the same time the Sipo also arrested Leonardus ANDRINGA & TURNIP on information supplied by a woman (name unknown) in Utrecht. The informant is thought by GISKES to have acted unwittingly.

Interrogation of the three agents produced the full story of the Dropping Operation on the 28th March and established the identity of the dead man, a W/T operator named JOHN & SWEDE. The latter's signal plan was found on TURNIP which enabled the Germans at a later date to operate a notional, locally recruited operator named SWEDE.

11. Arrest of TRUMPET, TRUMPET and TURNIP (contd.)

Moreover, under interrogation the three captured men gave the numbers of Dutch S.O.B. agents who had completed their training and who could therefore be expected to be arriving in the not distant future. In addition, personal descriptions, aliases, an estimate of the capabilities, together with a description of their future roles, i.e. W/T operator, saboteur, clandestine press, organizer etc. were obtained. Hence-forward the Germans devoted a good part of the interrogation of captured agents to the obtaining of this type of information, with the result that they generally knew whom to expect in the future; the information obtained enabled them to impress captured agents during interrogation with their seeming omniscience.

It must be remembered that towards the end of April, B-Stelle had been aware that clandestine transmissions were taking place, but they had been unable to decipher the messages.

The first controlled message on the TRUMPET link was transmitted on the 5th May 1942 (CGX 14) proposing a new Dropping Point.

12. LEEK and W/T Operator.

On the 5th April 1942 Barend MOOS @ LEEK was dropped blind with his W/T operator Hendrik JENES @ HECK @ LEEK. It appears that during the drop the W/T set was damaged and although these two agents were not, like the others, apprehended immediately, they were never able to get in touch with the U.K. They were eventually arrested at a date unknown to GISKES and HUNTELMANN. HUNTELMANN recalls that after the arrest, London was asked for a replacement of the W/T set on another link, and this was furnished. The HECK transmitter was first operated on the 22nd August 1942 by the Germans, but HECK himself never operated.

13. Arrest of POTATO

On the 19th April Johannes Henricus Marie De HAAS @ PYL @ POTATO arrived in Holland by a sea-operation. On the 24th April TRUMPET in CGX 7 reported to London that he was in touch with POTATO, contact having been established through TURNIP, but that he could not contact EBENEZER. At this date TRUMPET had not been arrested although his signals had been intercepted by the B-Stelle. On TRUMPET's arrest, in early May, the Germans were able to decipher the TRUMPET messages that they had intercepted, and it is probable, according to GISKES and HUNTELMANN, that POTATO's arrest by the Sipo was due to information furnished by TRUMPET. The first POTATO message sent, CGX 14 on the 5th May 1942, refers to a dropping point.

14. Meeting of CARROT and TURNIP

On the 15th May London, in CGX 17, advised TRUMPET of a meeting place where he was to contact GEORGE @ CARROT who had arrived in Holland on the 27th February 1942. The name of the rendezvous was sent in an elaborately coded message, but was decoded by the B-Stelle and found to be The Bodegas, Leidsche Poort, Leidsche Plein, Amsterdam.

For some reason unknown to GISKES and HUNTELMANN, the Sipo decided to send TURNIP, not TRUMPET, to the rendezvous and TURNIP was able to warn CARROT that his two companions were members of the Sipo. CARROT thus succeeded in escaping through a lavatory, eventually arriving in the U.K. on the 2nd September 1943.

15. The Situation in May 1942.

It had, at this period, become evident to GISKES from interrogations of captured agents that S.O.E. was trying to build up a well organised sabotage organisation capable of operating throughout Holland. Groups were to be formed by the various organisers by recruitment among, N.C.Os. of the Dutch Army, railwaymen and dockyard hands, for sabotage of railways, harbour installations, dockyards, shipbuilding yards, locks and bridges; in addition instruction had been given in "sabotage insaisissable". Regions and missions had been allotted as follows:-

CATARIN Provinces of N. and S. Holland and Gelderland.
WATERCRESS Special mission not divulged by S.D. to III F.
LETTUCE Utrecht area.
LEEK Oberijssel area
POTATO Establishment of sea communication between Holland and U.K. Suitable landing places were to be concited in the area of Katwijk and later Egmond-aan-see.

GISKES gave consideration to the possibility of using the organisers, already arrested, for forming German controlled Resistance Groups; this would have ensured that the best and most resistant elements in the population would be known and could, therefore, be arrested at any time when it was thought necessary, but he decided that such action was too great a risk to the security of his controlled W/T links.

16. BEETROOT and W/T Operation

On the 1st May 1942 London advised EBENEZER in Message No. 46 of the impending arrival of two agents, and on the 29th May Herman PARLEVLIET & BEETROOT, and his W/T operator Antonius VANSTEEN were both dropped to the customary S.D. reception near Steinwijk.

GISKES describes these two men as being excellent agents and it was was only at a much later stage that they divulged, under interrogation, that they were Eureka instructors; in addition they were to be assistants to WATERCRESS.

17. PARSNIP and SPINACH

On the 15th June 1942 London advised TRUMPET (Message No. 28) of the impending arrival of two further agents and accordingly on the 22nd June, John Jacob VAN RIETSCHOTEN & PARSNIP and his W/T operator Johannes Jan BUIJZER & SPINACH were dropped to a German reception near Holten. Interrogations showed that PARSNIP had an independent mission in N. Holland whilst SPINACH was to act as W/T operator, not only to PARSNIP, but also to POTATO, who had notionally been using EBENEZER, as London apparently feared that too much traffic on the EBENEZER link might endanger the latter who, of course, had been arrested on the 6th March 1942.

HUNTEMANN deduced from this that London regarded EBENEZER as being the best operator.

The "Safe" arrival of PARSNIP and SPINACH was notified to London on the 24th June 1942 in TRUMPET 77.

18. KAR OW and W/T Operator.

On the 15th June London, in No. 61 to EMBREKER, advised the Field to stand by from the night of the 24th June onwards to receive two bodies with the result that, on the night of the 26th June, George Louis JAEBOES & KAROW and his W/T operator Joseph BUDGENS (BAKERS) & ERIT & KAROW were duly arrested, near Wesep. EMBREKER acknowledged the "success" of the operation on the 27th June 1943, adding "ERIT staying with us some time".

19. The six main links

Although during the Nordpol affair the Germans operated many links, (at one time they were operating 15) the 6 main links over which fresh arrivals were advised were as follows: - EMBREKER, KAROW, THIER-ET, HDK, SWEDE, SPINACH, accounts of whose arrests have been given above.

An account of the APOLLO and BRUTUS affair advised over GOLF is given in Annexure V

At a conference at which S.O.E. and M.I.5 were represented it was decided that it was unnecessary to give an account of the arrests of subsequent agents as they present little interest, the procedure being monotonously identical with that already described, i.e., London advising departure to the Germans with the resident S.D. reception.

S.O.E. however put forward a written questionnaire and, at a subsequent conference, a verbal questionnaire to fix a basis for future interrogations, Annexure IX

20. Reasons for closing the "Nordpol".

At the end of August 1943, two of the captured S.O.E. agents, Pieter DOORLEIN & SPRUY, and Johan Bernard UBBINK & DEIVE, escaped from Haaren and eventually reached the U.K. via Switzerland.

When in October 1943, London intimated that Holland could expect no further deliveries owing to commitments elsewhere, GISKES was certain that these two men had either reached the U.K. or had in some way conveyed to London the information that the entire S.O.E. organisation in Holland was German-controlled. During the next two months, the traffic from London was of a non-digital character and GISKES concluded that the "Nordpol" was of an end. Confirmation that S.O.E. was aware of what possibilities were at an end, had happened came through the arrest, at the beginning of 1944, of the HELNEJE Group which took place in Amsterdam through R.D.F. of one of the W/T operators. (It is interesting to note that at this period relations between the S.D. and Abwehr were so strained that III F were only informed of this group after its arrest, and the subsequent attempt to play it back was entirely handled by the S.D.).

The HELNEJE Group had been sent by the Dutch S.I.S. in London and had been briefed for an espionage mission by MAJOR SOEHN. According to GISKES and HUNTELMAN, this group had received, towards the end of November 1943, a W/T signal from London that the sister organisation, the S.O.E. Resistance Movement, was completely under German control and further, that two agents who had been in Haaren had reached London. This information of course only became available in early 1944 when the group was arrested and the intercepted traffic could be deciphered. GISKES wanted to close the "Nordpol" affair immediately, with a message to London, giving the news that all those agents who had been notionally killed were in reality still alive. However, Abt. III F Berlin refused permission for this and sent orders that the closing message must breathe a spirit of confidence in the final victory for German arms, and in the certitude of repelling any Allied invasion of Holland. Accordingly, the closing signal to this effect was transmitted to London, not inappropriately, on the 1st April 1944, thus ending the "Nordpol" affair which had lasted a little over two years.

ANNEXURES

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| 1) Deception and Policy of XX agents: | Pages: II - III |
| 2) Account of Deception Committee: | IV - VI |
| 3) Staged sabotage: | VII - VIII |
| 4) HINDENBURG: | IX - XV |
| 5) APOLLO and BRUTUS: | XVI - XVII |
| 6) Attempted release of EBENEZER & THURMPT: | XVIII - XIX |
| 7) Statement on escape of GARRAGE, PARENIP and LACROSSE: | XX |
| 8) Account of HUNTERMAN's visit to Oranienburg: | XXI - XXII |
| 9) S.O.E. Questionnaire: | XXIII - XXV |
| 10) Allied agents arrested in Holland not known to have been connected with "Wordpol": | XXVI-XXXII. |
| 11) Captain ADEN and GEEVERS-BEYWOOD: | XXXIII. |
| 12) Miscellaneous Points. | XXXIV. |
| 13) Descriptions of misc. officials. | XXXV. |

ANNEXURE IDeception and Policy of XX AgentsGerman Policy and Procedure.

The passing of 'Spiekmaterial' to enemy intelligence services was a regular part of the functions of the Abwehr. All Dienststellen carrying out this work kept on hand a regular stock of such material in order to be able to comply, within a reasonable time, with any request for information that might be made by W/T by the Allies.

For definite deception purposes, prepared material was distributed by higher authority (i.e. C-in-C West, 1c Army Groups, OKW, Seekriegsleitung) to the III F. Referats concerned, for passing on to the Allies, where possible through several independent channels.

Each time contact was made with the Allies, no matter in what manner, Abw. Abt. III had to be informed and authority obtained for maintaining this contact. All enemy requests for information had to be reported immediately to Abt. III together with suggested replies. Material for drafting replies was collated by III F with the help of other branches of the Abt. and had then to be submitted for approval to the relevant military authority, e.g. Luftwaffe Holland. When this approval had been obtained, the suggested answer was telephoned to Abt. III D in Berlin for approval. If, however, time pressed, the information was often supplied and III D's authority obtained afterwards. All material regarding economic or political conditions in Germany, or the sphere of activity of another Abt., was supplied by III D.

When information on any specific target was required, a member of III F had to assume the role of an agent in order that only such information should be sent as could normally be procured by a real agent.

Deception.

The intelligence branches of the highest military authorities in the occupied countries could give information to the relevant Abt for passing to the Allies, but in such cases the onus of informing III D lay with the originator, e.g. the intelligence branch of the service concerned.

Referat III D.

This was a small section in the OKW at Berlin (Tirpitzerufer) consisting of the Leiter, Oberst SCHAEFER, one technical assistant and a female secretary. With the gradual eclipse of the Abwehr this section lost its importance and its role in the RSHA as III D was only a small one.

From 1943/44 onwards 'Spiekmaterial' was distributed entirely by the 1c branch of the higher Wehrmacht H.Q. e.g., C-in-C. West, Army Group B. etc.

There was apparently however no very fixed policy after the eclipse of III D with regard to 'Spiekmaterial' and some very curious incidents occurred; for example in January/February 1944 GISKES heard that films seized in Brussels were forwarded through G.I.S. channels by mistake immediately after they had been developed.

One Source of 'Spiekmaterial'.

In this connection GISKES states that genuine seized espionage material was always a good source of 'Spiekmaterial'. The Dutch and Belgian I.S. were in the habit of forwarding material in triplicate by three different means and, if it was established that copies of the seized material had already been sent through other channels it was then forwarded in order to inspire confidence in the German-controlled channel.

Naval 'Signal Office'

During the M. J. J. affair, GIBBS states, that at various dates which he cannot remember, information was passed about the position of German warships, coastal batteries on the island of Beveland, the positions of H.Q. of divisions alleged to be in Holland; in addition reports on the Dutch armaments industries were also sent.

These reports were, of course, additional to the normal current traffic which was being sent over the various S.O.E. links. For such routine traffic GIBBS gave HONTEAU a free hand and, unless it was necessary to forward answers to questions on specific military targets or troop movements etc., no other authority was required; but as has been stated above this latter type of message had to be referred to the relevant authority and III D for their approval.

Copies of all signals sent or received had to be sent routinely to Abn. Abt III.

ANNEXURE IIStatement by WUROperations for and description of a Dropping Operation.

During no periods in the morning and afternoon, warning signals as to whether an operation was to take place. The times were given by certain figures. Three different messages, of fifteen figures each, indicated the dropping of agents, the dropping of stores, or scrubbing.

If in the morning a signal was given announcing the dropping of stores or agents, the actual confirmation came through late in the afternoon. If, however, the morning's signal was negative, no further signal was sent and the operation was scrubbed.

As soon as a positive warning order came through in the morning it was the duty of Hauptmann WUR to warn the relevant branches of the impending operation, namely the Ast itself (III P was always located at some distance from the other sections of the Ast), S.D., the Orpo, the Orpo, and, at a later period, any army units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground.

At the beginning when it was only a question of one operation during a single night, the necessary action was taken by III P and S.D. alone, and the following procedure was adopted. The four lights were held by members of the III P (the senior officer present holding the white light at the apex of the triangle) whilst the S.D. waited at a certain distance from the dropping ground and only intervened if complications arose. As soon as agents left the plane, members of III P who were holding the lamps withdrew, and S.D., using Detachment in its service, occupied the dropping ground and arrested the agents. It was an unwritten law that whoever was in charge of the lighting arrangements, was also in charge of the operation, and for this reason it never happened that the S.D. ever got hold of a lamp even to help out temporarily.

When dropping operations increased and, when often 4-6 took place during a single night, the problem of occupying all the dropping grounds became a difficult one, since there were only 5 officers on the strength of III P, who were often not all available. recourse was then made to other officers employed in the Ast who were then used for this purpose. As also there were not enough of these, at a later date, members of the B-Stelle Orpo were used, who often came to the scene in all available strength. It was so arranged that on only one occasion was the S.D. in charge of the operation.

When in the morning an operation was signalled, Hauptmann WUR warned the Ast so that they could make available the necessary number of officers and also the S.D. so that they could do the same.

The passing of this information to the two interested branches was done by telephone in a disguised form. The dropping grounds which had already been selected by WUR were given cover names such as "Loorgragen", "Brandheide", "Wochenendhaus", etc. These cover names, together with a detailed description of the dropping ground and route of approach, were notified in writing to these branches concerned.

The word "Dass" was used to indicate agents. Thus a telephone warning to the S.D. of an impending operation would be something like this:

"Preparations for and description of a dropping operation (contd.)"

"We would like to invite you this evening to a little party at Wochenendhaus. We shall have some guests and would be delighted if you could come. A couple of "Baren" are also coming. Bring a couple of partners for them or they may be bored". The B-Stelle Ornc was not warned by telephone, but orally, as they were always close to where III P was located. They of course knew that an operation was planned before III P, as it was they who operated the W/T sets, but consultations had to take place with them over the availability of their men.

As the lack of personnel became more and more acute (the same men could not be out three nights running, especially as their normal daily duties remained to be carried out which would have meant that they got no sleep) Hauptmann WURR, on choosing a new landing ground approached units in the neighbourhood and asked for the loan of 1/2 officers for the nights when an operation was planned. This request was always gladly granted and we got the greatest support from those units in Steenwijk, Wezer etc. and before returning in the morning were well looked after. For these army officers a parachute operation was a new and unheard of thing and a very pleasant break in the dull daily routine. But for another reason also, units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground had to be warned, namely on account of the experience gained in France and Belgium when receptions not under Abwehr control took place, it had been ordered that all units were to send out strong bicycle patrols at night especially in lonely heath country to look for suspicious lights and people wandering about, and to search for reception committees and if necessary shoot immediately. After such a patrol had almost attacked a reception committee under Major KLEINWETTER at Rolde near Assen, it was decided that, in future, all units near a dropping ground must be warned of the operation, although such a measure was obviously undesirable on security grounds.

At first, night-fighter units, i.e., III Fliegerkorps, were warned of impending dropping operations in order to obviate the possibility of any aeroplane destined for us being shot down. Later this fighter "protection" was dropped, as it would have become noticeable, if these planes were never attacked. Later they were again reported to the night-fighters, but no longer protected and were treated in the same way as other planes. In one instance a plane was shot down immediately over the dropping ground by a night-fighter, so that the reception committee only just managed to get to safety in time, and on one occasion a plane crashed on its right wing whilst coming in to drop. Evidently it was too slow and low. Two of the pilots were saved from the burning plane by Hauptmann WURR, and his men, and brought to the Luftwaffe hospital in Amsterdam. A W/T operator (Funkner) was also employed on the dropping ground after representations had been made by the Luftwaffe, and he kept in contact with the night-fighter organisation, signalling as soon as the plane had dropped its load and was taking off. The idea being that the plane should then be chased by night-fighters which were then taking off. However, this produced no results and this arrangement was dropped. III P, in any case was against it, as we feared that W/T signalling in the immediate neighbourhood of the dropping ground might endanger matters.

After all sections concerned had been advised by Hauptmann WURR to the effect that one or several droppings were to be expected for the following night, the planes were notified within III P. S.O. on the dropping point was a member of III P section, even if, in addition, a higher ranking officer was ordered from Sgt-Hilversum to act as his assistant. Only if nobody from III P could be allocated to the job, the command of the party on the spot was taken over by an officer from Hilversum.

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