

Preparations for and Description of a Dropping Operation (contd.)

It toward the late afternoon it was established through a repetition by London of the definite signals, that a parachute would take place during the course of the evening, Hahn. JERS again notified the section concerned, and after this there was nothing more to do. In the written description of the dropping point, which the Station concerned received from us, the approach route, its duration, time of the rendezvous, camouflage parking place, were accurately stated. When the parachutes took place at dropping points north of Akerfjord - this was nearly always the place - the MV for III F Driebergen, Att-Hilverus, SD-The Hague was nearly always the Koovelaskop vreesvaart, about 9 km. behind Akerfjord. Generally speaking, the Orpo B-Stelle travelled in III F transport, as both section lay close to one another.

On arrival in the vicinity of the dropping ground, which had to be approached without lights, the transport was parked and camouflaged with parachutes, at pre-determined points underneath trees. The SD personnel generally selected a position for themselves in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground, and the members of III F took up their positions on the ground, according to the direction of the wind. If the 'plans' was to be executed after midnight everybody had to be ready in their positions by 2330 hours, after lamps had been given a brief test.

Lights had to be extinguished immediately after the drop had occurred in order to make observation difficult for the 'plane in case it made a second flight over the ground. At the beginning of the Kripol affair it was up to the Abwehr to attend to the packing away of the material, whilst the SD were responsible for the collection of the agents. However, the SD attempted systematically, and with success, to take the matter out of Abwehr hands. Whilst at first all the material was put at Abwehr disposal, later this was reduced to half, again later this was whittled down to half of the weapons, and ultimately this was reduced to what the SD considered 'good for the Abwehr to have. About the end of 1942 the SD took over the carting away of the containers, and from then onwards the Abwehr had to be satisfied with what the SD permitted them to have. The Orpo B-Stelle in Driebergen wanted to participate in the distribution of the weapons and they were entered for by the SD in this respect.

The return journey from the dropping ground had to take place at the earliest possible moment and the transport had to disappear before the farm workers went out to the fields.

The arresting of the agents generally occurred after a short-greeting at the exact moment when they were endeavouring to release themselves from their parachute harness. Later the SD decide to conduct the agents in specially reserved houses in the vicinity of the landing ground where they arranged a large reception party celebrated with the support of the organization. During the course of these celebrations the agents generally became fairly inquisitive and were interrogated by D. German who were in the employ of the SD service. When the agents eventually became tired or turned in for the night they were arrested. This new procedure may have been motivated by the reaction on the part of the Agent AME, who, after his arrest, that the reception office was supposed to send a message to London, as found in the text which follows, at the earliest opportunity, to indicate that he had arrived safely - "MELINA arrived at station 57 minutes late".

This message was not despatched, because I had the instinctive feeling that there was something not quite in order with it. I therefore created the story about AME's brasters which notionally led to his ultimate death. Later it transpired that the message with "MELINA" really was a warning and there was something about it not in order. I assume that SCHAEFER introduced the variation in arresting the agents on account of this incident. In other words, they were only arrested after they had told everything to the supposedly genuine reception committee."

ANNEXURE III

Staged Sabotage.

During the early part of 1942, the Resistance groups in Holland had been instructed by London to refrain from any act of sabotage which might draw the attention of the Germans to the existence of an organisation in Holland. Only "sabotage inévitable" was to be carried out. At this time, therefore, no such actions were required on the part of III F.

Some time in July 1942, however, CATARRE, through EHEMNER, was asked for the fullest possible information about the w/l station Kootwijk, and was instructed to make plans for its destruction at a date to be notified. Shortly afterwards, this date was notified from London in a complicated code message which, however, was broken by the B-Stein.

As London appeared to attach considerable importance to the secrecy of this date, the Germans deduced that, on the day mentioned, operations of some importance would take place, and special precautions were taken by the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Holland, and the SD, but nothing eventuated. It was then arranged, however, to stage an attack on the wireless station, and it was proposed that a mock battle should take place with troops and "thunder flashes" in order to evoke amongst the civilian population the impression that an attack had really taken place, in view of the fact that it was feared that London might be independently controlling the existence of this attack. However, the staging of the mock battle was turned down on security grounds, as it was desired to keep the circle of people aware of the double-play as small as possible. It was, however, reported to London that the attack had failed as the groups had unexpectedly come upon anti-personnel mines and had incurred certain losses. The next day a notice from the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber, Holland, appeared in all the Dutch newspapers reporting an attack by criminal elements on the station, which however, thanks to the watchfulness of the guards and the excellence of the security measures, had been frustrated, and that on account of the active assistance rendered by sections of the Dutch population during the defeat of the attack, General CHRISTIANSEN would refrain from taking hostages.

After this attack, it was decided to mount a 'successful' operation. An old hulk of about 1,000 tons was procured through Referat III M, and loaded with wrecks of old and damaged aeroplanes. The 'planes' were painted up and covered with tarpaulins so that from a distance it was impossible to recognise their true nature. A charge was loaded in the hold of the ship by a certain Lieutenant KLINGENBERG of Ant-Belgien and Off'r. BODENS, who at that time was with Abt. II, Ant-Belgien, but was loaned for the occasion. It was arranged so that the charge could be initiated from the deck of the hulk. A naval tug was ordered to take the ship from Amsterdam to Doordrecht via Rotterdam. Apart from KLINGENBERG and BODENS and two sailors on board the ship, no one knew what had been planned.

When one morning the tug and its tow were in the vicinity of the Maas bridges in Rotterdam, the charge was ignited and the ship began to sink. The tug cut its tow and tried to push the damaged ship towards the shore, whereby another ship was rammed and badly damaged. The ship with the "planes" on board sank amidst cries of jubilation from the hundreds of Dutch people on the banks who believed it was an act of sabotage by Resistance organisations. KLINGENBERG and BODENS were actually arrested by the captain of the tug who suspected them of being saboteurs.

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Staged Sabotage (contd.)

From then onwards, from time to time, railway demolitions were carried out by UFFA. BOEENS who in most cases took care to leave at the scene of the incident material obviously of British origin. The purpose of these demolitions was to create amongst Dutch railway employees the idea that a British-controlled sabotage organization was actively operating. Later, however, I.I.F. were forced to stop these acts of sabotage as the SD had decided to take hostages when any act of sabotage had taken place, and it would have been noticed if in such cases hostages were not made.

In addition, it had become clear to GISENS that there was no sister organization in Holland controlled from London which was supervising such activities independently.

From then onwards, all acts of sabotage which took place in Holland, and which were undertaken by small indigenous groups with home-made materials, were attributed to the London organization and S.O.E. was notified of them. On one occasion a munition train from Belgium consisting of 25 trucks was probably sabotaged by an unknown Belgian group, but in any case a report of the incident was passed to London as being the act of one of the S.O.E. organizers. In addition, sabotage in dockyards and factories was freely invented and passed to London, and London expressed considerable satisfaction with the results obtained.

ANNEXURE IV.Christian LINDEMANS

RE. An account of LINDEMANS' activities is not strictly relative to the KORDPOL affair, but has been included for convenience.

GISKES' first meeting with LINDEMANS.

In February 1944, whilst GISKES was in Brussels in connection with the formation of PAK 307, he learned from KUP that NELLIS (Camp 020 case) had made the acquaintance of a man who had previously worked for the Belgian Intelligence Service and who was now prepared to change sides in exchange for the release of his brother imprisoned by the Germans in Rotterdam. GISKES instructed KUP to go further into this matter, and as a result GISKES decided to see this man (Christian LINDEMANS) himself.

The first meeting took place in a house near the Jardins Botaniques, Brussels, which was the billet of some of the Abwehr Hilfsoffiziere of III P, Brussels. Those present at the meeting were GISKES, using the name of Dr. GERMAN, his Adjutant Hptm. WURR (WALTER), KUP (WILLI) and NELLIS who brought LINDEMANS to the house. The meeting lasted about two hours, during which time LINDEMANS gave an account of his past activities with the Belgian and French Resistance and escape organisations. In addition he produced for inspection various papers and documents including Grenzübertrittscheine for Holland, Germany and France, made out in a false name which GISKES no longer remembers. LINDEMANS also showed a large quantity of blank documents which he used in his role as passeur, and various German Dienststellen stamps. LINDEMANS explained that in the autumn of 1941 he had enlisted the aid of his brother Hendrick LINDEMANS for his escape routes. The latter, however, had been caught by the Japs and was now in Rotterdam prison awaiting death. Christian LINDEMANS thereupon told GISKES that if his brother Hendrick were to be released he would give the Germans whole-hearted co-operation.

At the conclusion of the meeting GISKES told KUP to verify the facts about Hendrick LINDEMANS and, at a further meeting which took place in the same house about 3 days later, GISKES was able to tell Christian LINDEMANS that Hendrick would be released in return for his services. Accordingly Hendrick was released very shortly afterwards and Christian LINDEMANS started work for the G.I.S.

During the period February to August 1944, while LINDEMANS was working for PAK 307, GISKES had occasion to see him only about five times. LINDEMANS was handled exclusively by KUP, GISKES merely giving the general directions to the latter and leaving to LINDEMANS and KUP the ways and means of fulfilling the orders.

Three Main Tasks given to LINDEMANS

- 1) To give to Hptm. WURR the names and details of all Resistance and espionage movements with which he had come into contact, in France, Holland and Belgium. GISKES states that the mass of material supplied was so great that it took WURR two or three weeks to sort it out.
- 2) To go to Holland and make contact with his Dutch Resistance friends and ascertain their future activities. It is possible that the organisation OS. VI was penetrated by LINDEMANS.
- 3) To make contact with the Belgian Resistance movement and to find out details about the missions that they were receiving from London.

Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)Shooting of LINDEMANS.

About the end of April 1944, LINDEMANS happened to be in the Devijenschutskade, office in Rotterdam and apparently aroused the suspicion of a girl employee who called the police. On their arrival, LINDEMANS was asked to produce his papers and as he put his hand into his pocket he was shot by the police who thought that he was about to produce a revolver.

LINDEMANS was taken to hospital and on arrival there, the police were dismayed to find a document showing him to be an employee of the Abwehr. The matter was reported through Sipo channels to GISKES who instructed KUP to get LINDEMANS out of hospital without letting the Dutch hospital staff know that it was the Germans who were engineering the removal. KUP did take in such a way that the Dutch believed LINDEMANS to be a member of a Resistance movement who was being freed by his friends. GISKES then decided that it was impossible for LINDEMANS to continue working in Holland as his Resistance friends would think it very suspicious if once having been in the hands of the police he were still able to move about freely without danger of arrest. GISKES therefore decided that LINDEMANS must now work only in Belgium.

Resistance in Belgium.

LINDEMANS had good Resistance contacts in Antwerp and Malines and he frequently reported on the activities of these groups to GISKES who, however, decided to take no action, as he wished to build up and maintain LINDEMANS' contacts so that at the proper moment LINDEMANS would have received the full confidence of the Resistance and so be able to give really important strategic information, such as the date of the Allied invasion. GISKES had received from Leitstelle-III-west, and Ic Militaersbefehlshaber Belgium, a directive to find out the intentions of the Arace Blanche and the instructions that they were receiving from London in connection with the Allied invasion. GISKES' policy was apparently justified as, about the 25th August, LINDEMANS reported that the main Allied thrust would be directed against the Charleroi area and then northwards along the Meuse; LINDEMANS also reported that on a date which GISKES cannot remember, resistance in the Lille and Charleroi district were to come out into the open. LINDEMANS further declared about the end of August that the Allies would be in Brussels about the morning of 4th September. It is interesting to note that German estimates of resistance strength in Belgium varied between 15,000 and 50,000, and the German General Staff were never able to evaluate satisfactorily the potential danger of Resistance.

GISKES' last meeting with LINDEMANS.

GISKES last saw LINDEMANS on the 2nd September 1944, at his office in Brussels, and gave him the mission to stay behind in Belgium and try to penetrate the British L.S., with the idea of finding out their plans for the placing of Allied agents behind the German lines in Holland. The same day, GISKES went to the Leitstelle-III-west, which was at that time in Liege, returning to Brussels on 3rd September. That evening he went to Antwerp taking KUP with him, who had apparently made a rendezvous with LINDEMANS at a Customs house on the Belgo-Dutch frontier. LINDEMANS failed to keep the rendezvous. GISKES believes that after their last meeting in Brussels LINDEMANS may have decided to go to Antwerp.

Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)

LINDEMANS' return to Holland.

Later, on 20th September, GISKES received a telephone call from FAT 365 in Driebergen, which was then under PAK 306, saying that LINDEMANS was in Holland.

Before departure, GISKES had told LINDEMANS that if he managed to get back through the lines, on contacting German troops he was to ask for FAT 365.

About 3/4 weeks later GISKES received a written report from FAT 365 in which it appeared that LINDEMANS had crossed the lines near Eindhoven on the 15th September, having been given by the Allies the mission to contact resistance in Eindhoven and give them orders that the Allies would be occupying the town in the near future and that no action from them would be required. LINDEMANS had been taken to Fallschirm A.O.K. 1c, and gave the following information:-

- 1) That a British attack in the direction of Eindhoven was imminent. So far as GISKES can remember the date and time were 17th September, morning
- 2) That for this attack large forces of airborne troops were standing by. The exact place where these troops were to be employed was not given. After contacting the A.D.A.-I, LINDEMANS went to Driebergen and FAT 365, and thence back to Eindhoven and through the lines. The report further stated that during his stay in Brussels LINDEMANS had made Allied contacts at the Hotel Metropole. He mentioned two British Intelligence officers whose names GISKES cannot remember. LINDEMANS reported also that 21st Army Group H.Q. was in Antwerp, and gave other unimportant details, such as an account of living conditions in Belgium.

LINDEMANS' Finances.

GISKES states that LINDEMANS always seemed to have plenty of money. From KUP he received in all about 100,000 B.Frs. and about 1,000 Dutch guilders. LINDEMANS apparently always has large sums of money on him, which GISKES believes he got from the various Resistance groups. It was never clear to GISKES why LINDEMANS continued to work for the Germans.

Written statement by GISKES on LINDEMANS.

GISKES has submitted the following statement on LINDEMANS:-

"A report by FAT 365 in Driebergen reached me towards the end of October 1944, and I remember the following about the information given by LINDEMANS:

LINDEMANS had reported to Fallschirm A.O.K.-1, Abt. 1c on 15th September 1944 that -

- 1) The English attack in the direction of Eindhoven was imminent. (as far as I can remember LINDEMANS gave the time and date as being early on 17th September).
- 2) For the attack which was imminent, large forces of airborne troops were standing by. (The place or sector where these troops were to be committed was not given).

Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)

LINDEMANS on the same day had also given to FAT 365 a quantity of other information of a military nature, but it was of little importance.

The source of the information in paras. 1) and 2) above was not shown in the report from FAT 365. I do not know if Fallochirm A.C.E.L. Avtg. had questioned LINDEMANS on this."

Information from HUNTEMANN on LINDEMANS

The following information on LINDEMANS was supplied by HUNTEMANN:

LINDEMANS was handled exclusively by KUF and HUNTEMANN only saw him on two occasions; first whilst driving from Brussels to Lille on 30th/31st August, 1944, in his company. On this occasion, it was agreed between them that if they were stopped by German troops, HUNTEMANN should answer and if by Resistance, LINDEMANS, as he knew the password (namely "Vive la Belgique, vive la Belgique liberée"). HUNTEMANN does not know what LINDEMANS was doing in Lille.

The second occasion when HUNTEMANN saw LINDEMANS was on 15th September 1944, in the office of FAT 365 in Driebergen. Whilst HUNTEMANN was in the office of KIESEWETTER, the latter received a telephone call from Hilversum saying that LINDEMANS (CG) had returned there. KIESEWETTER then requested that LINDEMANS should be sent immediately to Driebergen. HUNTEMANN had to go away but on returning at 2100 hrs. he found KIESEWETTER and the remainder of the Abwehr personnel busy writing a report on the information supplied by LINDEMANS.

It appeared, according to HUNTEMANN, that LINDEMANS had received a mission from an officer in the Hotel Metropole at Brussels to go and contact four leading personalities of a Dutch Resistance organisation in Eindhoven and to deliver to them orders to the effect that their organisation was to cease activities as the Allies would be in Eindhoven within a few days. HUNTEMANN is not sure whether it was on this occasion or later that KIESEWETTER told him that LINDEMANS had reported an imminent airborne attack in the Muenster/Duelmen area.

It is pointed out that much difficulty has been encountered in attempting to reconstruct, under interrogation, the actual contents of LINDEMANS' reports concerning the imminent airborne attack in Holland. In the first place, GISKES was not at Driebergen on 15th September 1944, and secondly, HUNTEMANN was absent from FAT H.Q. at periods on that day. Furthermore, HUNTEMANN's memory is confused concerning the events. It has been thought advisable, therefore, to include, for what it is worth, HUNTEMANN's own statement on the subject:

"I know from statements from GISKES that one day, probably at the end of 1943, or beginning of 1944, that the V-Mann NSLIS, who was being run by Uffs. KUF, stated that he was in contact with a very important English agent who said he was prepared to place his extensive knowledge at the disposal of the German Abwehr and to co-operate with them in an active manner, provided that his brother, who was being held by the SD in the Scheveningen prison, would be released.

Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)Information from HURFMANN on LINDEMANS. (contd.)

"I assume that thereafter a few conversations took place between this English agent, known as "CC" and KUF, and perhaps also on one occasion with GISKES. At any rate, GISKES arranged for the release by the SD of "CC's" brother, who, as far as I know, had been imprisoned on account of some non-political matter. "CC" thereupon entered into the service of FAR 307 and was run by Uffz. XHE. The matter was "Graf-Saabe", i.e. nobody, apart from those participating in the case, was to receive any information. Hpts. JURE must, however, have a closer knowledge of the affair as the files in connection with the "CC" case were available to him and he referred to them with a great deal of interest.

Very great successes were evidently achieved through "CC". I was often told that the AORDELL affair had been quite harmless in comparison to the information which "CC" was supplying. Sometime in February 1945 at Ghent, GISKES gave me, when we were having a private conversation, the number of more important people who had been arrested through "CC's" co-operation. I believe that the figure mentioned was 311 or thereabouts.

Amongst other things, during a raid, "CC" was shot at by the SD (GISKES was suspicious at the time that the SD had done this purposely to put us at a disadvantage). He was in hospital, in pain I believe, and was set free by a genuine Dutch resistance organisation and brought to Brussels. The whole story of his release, however, had been conducted by Uffz. KUF. The first attempt failed as "CC" had just been taken into the X-ray room, but the second attempt succeeded a few days later.

I personally saw "CC" on two occasions. On the first occasion, I drove with him from Brussels to Lille in a camouflaged car of FAR 307. This was on the 30th or 31st August 1944. "CC" was picked up but not introduced to me, at a house in the vicinity of the Ave. Louise, by KUF, who accompanied us on the journey. I know, however, from what GISKES had said that "CC" would travel with me. I drove at the time to Lille to be present at the expected parachutage in connection with the case "FAIKEN-KAPPELE" and "CC" had a mission which was not disclosed to me. The matter was urgent and he needed the car for a whole day in Lille as he had to get back to Brussels the same evening. He put me down at the Grand Place in Lille, at about 11 o'clock in the forenoon. At the time, a certain amount of danger was involved in driving a lone car on the Brussels-Lille road. Many triangular shaped nails lay on the road for the purpose of sabotaging the tyres, and many surprise attacks were taking place by terrorists who also appeared on the scene wearing German uniforms. It was therefore agreed between "CC" and myself that in the event of the car being halted by the German Wehrmacht, I was to do the talking, but if the car on the other hand was stopped by civilians or the terrorists, he was to take charge of the conversation. He had the necessary papers to produce for just such an event, and knew the password "Vive la Belgique, la Belgique liberée". However, we were not stopped en route.

On the second occasion I saw "CC" in Diebergen. It was in the afternoon of the Friday preceding the air-landing at Arnhem when a telephone call came through from Hilversum, probably from the IC of

Christian LINDEMANS (contc.)

"the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber, to Major KIESEWETTER, asking whether he knew a certain Herr GERMAN. KIESEWETTER denied knowledge of this name. As I knew that GERMAN was a seldom used cover name of GISKES, I interrupted KIESEWETTER and explained this to him. Thereupon, KIESEWETTER affirmed on the telephone that he knew a Herr GERMAN, and Hilversum immediately replied that a certain "CC" had reported there and desired to speak immediately to Herr GERMAN concerning an urgent matter. KIESEWETTER then requested that "CC" should be sent immediately to Driebergen by car.

I had an appointment in Zeist with Krikrat. SCHREIJDER and only got back to Driebergen at about 21.00 hrs. I found KIESEWETTER and the remainder of his Abwehr personnel of the Trupp busy compiling a report concerning the information brought by "CC". If I am not mistaken, KIESEWETTER had meantime been to Hilversum and had also only just returned. From what KIESEWETTER and the remainder of those present related to me, and from what I remember in connection with the drawing up of the report - which I did not completely read through - I knew that "CC" had brought very important information. "CC" had succeeded in getting in touch with the enemy intelligence service and, in fact, after the occupation of Brussels, had immediately gone to the Hotel Metropole where an important Staff had set up its H.Q. There he enquired for an Intelligence Service officer, but there was none there at the time, and after a long period of waiting, a Captain arrived, who had set himself up in a room on the 4th floor. Moreover, in a room on the 4th floor, a W/T station had also been installed.

From this officer, "CC" was given orders for four leading personages of a Dutch Resistance Organisation, all of whom were employed with PHILIPPS in Eindhoven, and was instructed to deliver the orders personally to them. The order was to the effect that their organisation was to cease activities as in any case the Allied forces would be there in a few days' time. En route for Hilversum, "CC" had already handed over these orders in Eindhoven, at which point he had crossed the lines.

After having now considered the matter at some length, I am not altogether clear as to whether KIESEWETTER told me at the time that "CC" had reported on an imminent airborne landing in the area Maonster/Duelmen. It may be perhaps that Krikrat. SCHREIJDER, who always knew about many rumours and new events, and with whom I had just had a lengthy conversation, had told me about this. Certainly, nothing was talked about in my presence that evening and the following day concerning an imminent airborne landing in the Arnhem area. I am quite certain about that. Only much later, about February 1945, GISKES told me on an occasion in Wichl during a private conversation that "CC" had been a perfectly amazing V-Mann, as he had reported about the entire Arnhem undertaking beforehand. The fact that at the time I did not learn from KIESEWETTER about the Arnhem action does not necessarily mean that there was any mistrust of me; I had his complete confidence. In the confusion of that particular evening - at periods he was not there, and at times I was also absent - all those present were conversing confusedly about "CC's" reports - he may perhaps have taken it for granted that I also knew already at that time about this report. I must practically assume this now, since he came to me from time to time and said that the reports which "CC" had brought were quite amazing. I took this, however, to refer to the fact that "CC" had managed to play the double game with the enemy intelligence service.

Christian LINDEMANS (contd.)

"Next morning I did not see KIESEWITZER as he was in Halveraux. Not over, I only saw "CC" again in the morning after KIESEWITZER's return, and I do not exclude the possibility that "CC" was together with KIESEWITZER in Halveraux, but this is only an assumption on my part. Immediately after noon, "CC" drove with a car belonging to FAT 365 to the vicinity of Breda from which point he again intended to cross the lines. He had intention to return about a week later. From that date onwards, FAT 307 has neither seen nor heard anything more about him.

Much later, GISKES told me - I think it was also in February 1945 in Breda - that he feared that NEMIS had betrayed "CC", as NEMIS and "CC" had become enemies, and NEMIS knew precisely the role which "CC" had played. And, the pilots at FAT 365 had sent, of all people, this man NEMIS, through the lines to Belgium, from whence of course, he did not return."

Hendrik LINDEMANS.

GISKES believes that this man, after release from prison, went as a voluntary worker to Germany where he had relations.

Jan LINDEMANS.

GISKES believes that he was connected with the Resistance Movement. Christian LINDEMANS stayed with Jan when in Holland, and KUP could contact him at Jan's address. GISKES is emphatic that Jan did not work for the Abwehr and that he never received money from it. Jan probably knew that Christian was working for the Germans but did not know the nature of the work. GISKES believes Jan to have been a patriotic Dutchman.

ANNEXURE VTranslation of a joint statement by GISKES and HETTERAAN.APOLLO and BRUTUS

In the autumn of 1943 (September 2), London enquired, over the station "Golf", whether we were in a position to slip through from Belgium to Holland two agents who had a special mission. For this purpose, London asked us to give a contact address in Brussels and passwords. III P gave the necessary information.

UFFs. KMP was commissioned to arrange the contact address and prepare details of the clandestine journey. He was assisted in this work by the V-Man RIEDERHOF. London had not informed us when, and by what route, the agents were to arrive in Belgium.

During the next week period (early October 2), London asked over station "Golf" whether APOLLO and BRUTUS had reached Brussels. They were to have started the day before. The names APOLLO and BRUTUS were first given to the agents in the London message. Some days later, RIEDERHOF reported that BRUTUS had reached Brussels, had confided in him, and had no suspicions concerning his good faith.

BRUTUS had told RIEDERHOF the following concerning his journey:- The plane which was to drop him and APOLLO in Belgium had apparently made a forced landing after being hit by flak. After landing, it had begun to burn, and APOLLO, the crew and he, had jumped out and lost sight of each other. He had been able to rescue a case which he concealed in a wood in the vicinity of the landing place. He then made his way to Brussels where he reported at the address given. Thereupon, RIEDERHOF and BRUTUS carried out a two days' search for the case, but without success, as BRUTUS could not find the place again.

After being given a change of clothes by RIEDERHOF in Brussels, BRUTUS expressed his urgent desire to get to Holland; he was slipped over the Belgian-Dutch frontier by V-Man DE WILDE (a KIDDERING) (a safe crossing having been previously arranged with the frontier post at Bours-Neussau by III P). From Eindhoven (?) he travelled to Amsterdam accompanied by RIEDERHOF.

Contact with him was only maintained through fixed rendezvous with RIEDERHOF. After several days he was taken by RIEDERHOF to a small genuine Dutch Resistance Group in the immediate vicinity of Doorn. This Group was run by a certain FRANK VAN OORD, with whom BRUTUS took up permanent residence. Nothing was yet known to III P of his actual mission.

Meantime, a few days after the arrival of BRUTUS, APOLLO made an appearance at the Brussels Safe House. APOLLO had likewise lost everything in the forced landing, W/T apparatus, crystals, papers and money. It was agreed between BRUTUS and APOLLO, that APOLLO should remain for a bit in Brussels, as his mission could not be carried through without the lost equipment. APOLLO was then to return as quickly as possible to London, and after replacement of his equipment, start off afresh for Holland. Suitable messages giving this intention were sent to London over the station "Golf". England raised objections to APOLLO's return, but then agreed to let him journey back through a Paris address. APOLLO was thereupon sent to France in company of ANNA, (UFFs. CHRISTIAN III P Niederlande). I no longer

APOLLO and BRUTUS (contd.)

"remember how and by what route he continued his journey from there.

APOLLO took with him amongst other things, several reports from BRUTUS concerning his present activity in connection with his own mission. These reports went from BRUTUS to APOLLO, via HIL ERIKOF, and through this III F received exact knowledge of BRUTUS' mission in Holland, as follows:- United distribution of the illegal Dutch press according to the general directive which BRUTUS had brought with him from London; also the publication of articles in the Dutch secret press, which BRUTUS had brought with him from London in the form of micro-films.

Through the activities of BRUTUS and their observation by Sipo, in about December 1943 or January 1944, several facts about the illegal Dutch press were acquired. As the more important information which was expected did not come to light, however, and the necessary supervision of BRUTUS became increasingly difficult, Sipo arrested him and a few known members of the organisation. Nothing was actually known of the results of the trial at III F, at any rate nothing can be recollected by the writers of this.

APOLLO was sent back to England, principally in order to let a genuine English agent return, one who had had actual contact with the Dutch groups run by London. III F hoped for a restoration of the apparently shaken trust in the Dutch organisation founded in London. It was also hoped that London's confidence in HIL ERIKOF might thus be restored.

ANNEXURE VIGISES' activities on behalf of EBENEZER and TRUPET - August 1944.

At the beginning of August 1944, GISES, through Major KIRSCHNER, who was at that time commanding FAT 305, requested an interview with Brigade-fuehrer MAULANN, head of the S.D. and Sipo in Holland. The interview took place at The Hague on August 10th, and it was GISES' first meeting with MAULANN since January 1944, when the Sipo had attempted to hold GISES responsible for the escape of the five "Nordpol" agents from Haarlem. He had apparently asserted that if these men had been shot as spies, the affair would never have been 'blown' to England.

At the interview, KIRSCHNER and a certain Obersturmbannfuehrer REPPER of the Sipo, Holland, were also present. The reasons for the meeting were as follows:-

- (a) For several months past, FAT 305 had not been informed by the Sipo of important investigations which they had conducted in Holland, into the Dutch sabotage and resistance movements. The FAT 307 and FAT 365 had, however, heard about these investigations indirectly.
- (b) To arrange if possible, the release of EBENEZER and TRUPET to FAT 307 and to ensure that the "Nordpol" agents who had been transferred to Germany should continue to receive the treatment and privileges which had been promised to them by both GISES and SCHREIBER.

The interview proved abortive, and GISES could only obtain from MAULANN the promise that the conditions of TRUPET and EBENEZER would once again be reviewed. MAULANN then became aggressive, saying:

"It should be adequately clear to you that we have no confidence in you. Since the 20th July, we have arrested a good number of Abwehr officers. Do you know that Friends of yours were amongst them? I am in agreement with my colleagues in Paris and Brussels, in thinking that you will have to disappear at the earliest opportunity".

GISES states that he then terminated the interview. GISES learned later that MAULANN's reference to his friends related to Oberst-in-General-Stab Freiherr Von ROENNE, Obkdo. des Heeres, Abtg. Fremde Heere-West, and Hptm. KLAUROT, formerly with III F Copenhagen, both of whom had been arrested and shot after the July Putsch. GISES was then quite clear in his own mind that his position was extremely delicate, and considered that any intervention on his part in favour of EBENEZER and TRUPET would have no results. However, in September 1944, he sent HENTENANN to Holland to see SCHREIBER and make enquiries about the arrested "Nordpol" agents.

Statement by HENTENANN in reference to "Nordpol" agents.

"During the course of the first few months of the "Nordpol" affair, many promises were made to EBENEZER and TRUPET by the S.D. at The Hague, and in particular by Krim. Rgt SCHREIBER, which, for the most part, were not adhered to.

In addition to the basic promise that they would not be condemned to death, far reaching alleviations were to be made as regards their conditions whilst under arrest. They were to receive better food, longer periods daily

Statement by HUGENANN in reference to 'Nordpol' agents (contd.)

" in the open air, the time for 'lights out' at night was not to be enforced, and many small items which I can no longer recall today. Tobacco and a wireless set were also promised to them.

I always considered myself responsible to some extent for BRENNER and TRUPET, even though I had not made these promises to them, which in any case I had no authority to make. When I perceived that the S.D. only kept a few of the promises, I started to take independent action and procured for them regular supplies of tobacco, the purchase of shirts and other types of under-clothing, and books for the purpose of study. It was possible in those days to get round the question of obtaining authority from the S.D., since BRENNER and TRUPET were in the Wehrmacht prison and I thus had the chance of visiting them without applying each time for S.D. authority to do so. Moreover, at that time, I was not being controlled by the S.D. When I observed that both became spiritually depressed after having been imprisoned for some time, I made arrangements for them to be taken out of solitary confinement and placed in a cell together. Afterwards I informed the S.D. about the alteration which had been made and SCHREIBER could not then alter what was already a fait accompli.

Once the co-operation of BRENNER and TRUPET in the "Nordpol" affair was no longer necessary, the S.D. ceased bothering about either of them. I visited them whenever I happened to be in Haaren and procured for them, after much opposition, the radio set which for so long had been promised, and got the definite impression that the S.D. would not keep to their promises and would rescind their privileges, if my interest in the two men waned in any way. After PAK 307 went to Brussels I no longer had any opportunity to look after BRENNER and TRUPET and I suggested to GIESSES that the two men should be brought to Brussels. GIESSES agreed and negotiated with SCHREIBER who turned the matter down, as he was not in a position to release prisoners. Thereupon, GIESSES explained to the S.D. that we needed the two men in Belgium, as agents in connection with a similar type of case. The S.D. gave their assent to this and I then informed BRENNER and TRUPET, on one of my next visits, that they would shortly be brought over to Brussels, as I was anxious to get them out of the hands of the S.D. Moreover, I said that their release from the S.D. had been achieved under the pretext that they were required as agents for PAK 307. Both stated that under no circumstances would they agree to work against Holland, England or any of their Allies. I told them that I had never expected that they would do anything of the sort, but I suggested to them that, perhaps, there were matters which had a common interest to both parties, i.e. the clearing up of matters connected with Communism. (Klaerung Kommunistischer Stromungen). Nevertheless, I said, this matter could be talked about later on and the main pre-occupation at the moment was that they should be got away from the Haaren camp. (The possibility did exist at that time that they might be used by PAK 304 against an alleged Communist group, which, however, was not in itself one of the tasks of PAK units. I do not believe, however, that BRENNER and TRUPET would have done this work, and for my part, I wanted to get them to Brussels as "prisoners under protection". (More precise details are not remembered).

A few days after I had informed BRENNER and TRUPET about this plan, the invasion commenced, and the S.D. used this as a pretext to rescind their promise that the two men would be released. Evidently Brigfu. HUGENANN would not authorise the assent which had already been given by SCHREIBER.

The next time I again heard about BRENNER and TRUPET was in September 1944, when on enquiring what had happened to them, SCHREIBER told me that they had been sent to the Oranienburg concentration camp. (See Annexure VIII). As this was done against all the former S.D. promises, it resulted in my journey, already mentioned, to this place in an attempt to extricate them, but this did not succeed. I only succeeded in speaking to TRUPET.

SCHREIBER could not provide me at the time with any information whatever about the fate of the remaining "Nordpol" prisoners.

ANNEXURE VIIRecapture of the Escaped "Nordpol" Agents,
CABBAGE and PARSNIP

About March/April 1944, V-Man LINDEMANN reported to Uffs. RUP that he was in contact with an espionage group in Rotterdam. This group intended to send two agents to the U.K. with extensive quantities of espionage material. It was reported that matters had been arranged with London through a W/T operator who was working for this espionage group, and that the two couriers were to be fetched at an agreed point on the coast of one of the Zealand Islands by a British M.L.

Uffs. RUP of PAK. 507 received the order to make preparations for the arrest of the two couriers in such a way that the espionage material would be captured at the same time. Meantime it had become known from further reports by LINDEMANN, that the agents in question were from the U.K., who had been arrested but had escaped. This led to the assumption that the two agents in this case were probably connected with the five "Nordpol" prisoners who had escaped.

Special papers were necessary to make the journey to the Zealand Islands, which were a protected area. LINDEMANN procured the necessary papers for the two couriers on the grounds of his supposedly good connections with a German Diplomat. Thus, in this manner, III.P. through the Sipo, received particulars of the names and/or cover names, under which the two couriers were travelling.

A control or check on the train by officials of the S.D. or Sipo was carried out between Roosendaal and Bergen-op-Zoom on the day of the intended journey, and the couriers in question were arrested. It transpired that these two men were, in fact, none other than PARSNIP and CABBAGE. Extensive espionage material, about 500 small film negatives, were secured, and both agents were conducted to the prison at Haaren by the Sipo and later transferred to the prison at Assen.

A report was made by the Sipo to PAT. 565 - the PAT. concerned in the affair - regarding further arrests of the Dutch espionage group concerned in the affair, but GISKES and HUNTEMANN cannot now remember the details. Moreover, it is not known to HUNTEMANN and GISKES whether action was taken against CABBAGE and PARSNIP on account of their attempt to reach England.

In January/February 1944, the Sipo reported that the agent LACROSSE, who had escaped with PARSNIP and CABBAGE from Haaren in 1943, had been arrested in Belgium. He was taken to Haaren and probably later transferred to Assen. Details of this arrest are not known to GISKES or HUNTEMANN.

ANNEXURE VIIIHUNTERMANN's Account of his Visit to Oranienburg.

After hearing from Krim.Rat SCHREIBER in Driesbergen about the 10th September 1941, in reply to my question that LAUWERS and JORDAAN had been taken to the Oranienburg Concentration Camp, I reported this news to the Kommandoführer. As their detention there was contrary to every promise made by the S.D., WISSES instructed me to propose to the S.D. that they should be immediately released from the concentration camp; if necessary I was to go myself to Oranienburg and arrange for the release on the spot. I then returned to Driesbergen, where Krim.Rat SCHREIBER gave me highly reassuring explanations concerning the treatment of the two prisoners. They were accommodated in Stufe I, i.e., they were well treated and looked after and lived the same as every free worker in Germany except that they were accommodated in the Camp.

I thereupon explained to SCHREIBER that I was commissioned to procure the release of the prisoners. In consequence, after waiting for two days, I received from SCHREIBER a document, signed by him, from the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei and the S.D. in the Hague, to the Oranienburg Concentration Camp, in which the Concentration Camp was instructed to deliver to me the two prisoners for my disposal. SCHREIBER added verbally that the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin and the Concentration Camp in Oranienburg had been advised in advance by teleprint. On the evening of the same day SCHREIBER again rang me up and said that a telegram had just arrived from the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in Berlin, stating that under no circumstances could the two prisoners be placed at the disposal of FAK 307.

In spite of this, I went to Oranienburg, where the release to me of the two men was flatly turned down, on the grounds that LAUWERS and JORDAAN had been engaged in work on secret weapons and thus knew official secrets, and their release could only take place at the end of the war. As the pretence that it was urgently necessary to interrogate them on an Abwehr matter, I finally managed to arrange for the two men to be brought before me the next day. When I went again to Oranienburg the next morning it turned out that LAUWERS was nowhere to be found. It was presumed that he had been sent off to Rathenow as a worker. JORDAAN was thereupon brought before me. The "interrogation on an Abwehr matter" was naturally a pretext to see for myself that JORDAAN was actually there and what was his state of health; I also wished to hear his own story concerning his position there and find out any new possibilities for getting him out of the camp. JORDAAN appeared very badly cared for and extraordinarily depressed. Concerning LAUWERS' whereabouts, he only knew that he was working with an Arbeitskommando outside the Camp. As things stood, I could give JORDAAN no hope of imminent release from the Camp through our intervention, as we too were completely at the mercy of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. JORDAAN then said that he and LAUWERS knew well, from their own observation, to what an extent the Sigo were always frustrating any efforts on their behalf made by HILF. However, he had arranged with LAUWERS that as soon as the war was over, provided he lived till then, he would report to the H.Q. in London all that had happened. Further, he wished, and LAUWERS did too, to see me again after the war in happier circumstances, and for this reason gave me his home address in Baaksbergen, Bois de Hleek.

As is understandable, I too desired to know that after the war JORDAAN was at home again and well, as my inability to improve his position at that time depressed me greatly. When I left I had the impression that my visit had at least convinced him that he was not entirely abandoned.

ANNEXURE VIII (contd.)

On my return I reported to the Kommando on the result of my journey. The Kommandofuehrer now also saw no further possibility of undertaking anything in this matter which would lead to a positive result.

On my first interrogation by the U.S.A. Military Authorities (MIO) on 21st April in Goettingen, I reported to the American Interrogation officer that in the Grossenburg Camp there were two English agents, called LAUWERS and JORDAN, who belonged to the Dutch Section of the British Intelligence Service and who therefore should be taken over to London immediately after the liberation. The same officer told me ten days later, in the Schwarzenhorn Camp, that JORDAN had been found by the Americans. He had been taken to an American hospital as he was very weak and had to recuperate. There was no trace whatsoever of LAUWERS.

ANNEXURE IX

S. C. E. Questionnaire

Q. 1: What are the details of the initial penetration by JOHNNY which enabled the Germans to shadow CATARRH and to supply him with false Ia information, e.g. the location of the German cruiser, "Prinz Eugen", who was JOHNNY and over what period was the penetration maintained?

A. 1: The name JOHNNY is unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN. It is known, however, that CATARRH was constantly associating with the Dutch Captain of the Reserve, Van Den BERG, who had important connections with the port authorities in Rotterdam. It is possible, therefore, that Van Den BERG passed this information to CATARRH who in turn passed it to REMMEZER for onward transmission. Both GISKES and HUNTEMANN deny that false information of an Ia character was ever passed to Van Den BERG. RIDDERHOF first made contact with Van Den BERG in December 1941. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN know, RIDDERHOF did not use the name JOHNNY. RIDDERHOF was handled by Uffz. KUP.

Q. 2: What are the details of the liaison between the Asts in France, Belgium and Holland? What exchange of information existed for the briefing of interrogators of captured agents?

A. 2: Initial interrogations by SCHREIBER, and, when necessary, by GISKES, took place at S. D. H. Q. at The Hague. Subsequent interrogation on codes was carried out by Uffz. MEY at Heeren prison. MEY was purely a code and cypher expert. Berlin, in 1942, directed that a regular exchange of data, based on information received from the interrogations of captured agents, should take place between Asts in Holland, France and Belgium. In addition each Ast sent an individual report on each interrogation to III.F-Berlin. Reports consisted of about one page of foolscap giving the following information:-

- a. Name and cover name.
- b. Controlling organisation of the agent.
- c. Mission
- d. Short summary of training.
- e. Precise of the interrogation.

As far as is known to GISKES there was no similar interchange of information between the various S. D. Stellen.

III.F-Berlin issued, about every three months, a summary of British Intelligence activities in other countries, e.g. Middle East, North Africa, Crete, Scandinavia etc.

Technical R/T interrogations were carried out by the Funk-Abwehr who reported to their main office in Berlin; when the Funk-Abwehr was withdrawn from Holland, these interrogations were conducted by the Fu-B-Stelle-Grp, who also reported the results to their main office. Abtg. Funk-Abwehr, Berlin, issued a monthly circular which incorporated the information obtained from these two sources.

ANNEXURE IX (contd.)A. 2. (contd.)

Information on new sabotage devices was forwarded to Abtg. II-Berlin by the relevant Abtg. II-Stelle in the countries concerned. Any matters of special interest were incorporated in the 3-monthly III F-Berlin summaries.

MEY, at the beginning of 1942, had no knowledge of S.O.K. background and was compelled to build this up from his own interrogations. It is possible, however, that he may have received the results of interrogations of agents captured in other countries, through Sipo channels.

Q. 3: What were the details of the notional capture and death of MARROW and his w/T operator?

A. 3: III F "captured and killed" MARROW and his w/T operator on 19.11.42. (Message No. 1 from CUCUMBER via TRUMPET refers).

The Germans thought that the absence of casualties might cause suspicion in London and, as they were under the impression that London might be intending to ex-filtrate MARROW, he and his operator were selected for notional extermination.

Q. 4: The reason for the sudden cessation of the SPINACH messages?

A. 4: ERMENZER, in his signal Nr. 3 of 7.4.43, suspended BUN traffic mentioning suspected treason in 'VICTORY' circles. Ross VORLIX had been arrested shortly before this date and the Germans thought that news of this arrest would be bound to reach the U.K; as SPINACH had been carrying this traffic they deemed it advisable to shut him down.

Q. 5: What did the Germans know of CARROT?

A. 5: On 15.5.42, London, in OXG 17, told TRUMPET to make a rendezvous with CARROT. The address of this rendezvous was sent in a complicated code which was broken by the Germans. The address of the rendezvous was Bodega, Leidse Poort, Leidse Plein, Amsterdam. At this time of course, TRUMPET was under control, as was also TURNIP. For some reason unknown to GIBBER or HUNTEMANN the Sipo, who handled this affair, decided that TURNIP should keep the appointment. The latter, however, was able to warn CARROT, that his two companions were plain-clothes police, and he was able to escape through a lavatory.

Prior to the receipt of the message quoted above, the Germans had no knowledge of CARROT's existence, nor did they succeed in arresting him after his escape.

Q. 6: The two Anton de WILDES?

A. 6: a) Anton De WILDE & ADRIAN was the name employed by UFF's BOEENS of III F Ast-Niederlande for his notional ex-filtration to the U.K. in May 1943. He was passed through to Paris by ARNO (see A. 7 & 8), where he was 'arrested' in a safe in the Bvd. des Capucines, whilst in the company of the genuine British agent MARCEL. The latter, however, was uncollected.

APPENDIX IX (contd.)A.6 (contd.)

b) VAN DER WAALS & DE WILDE J ANTEN, was Haupt V-Mann of Irregular SCHREIBER of the SD, The Hague.

This man was responsible for the penetration of the Koca VERBOD group. In a message from London to BONI, Nr. 3 of 12.11.42, orders were given to contact a certain VENUS; the latter was a member of the Koca VERBOD group and VAN DER WAALS, after making this contact, was able to penetrate this organisation. In order to inspire confidence VAN DER WAALS asked that a E. B. C. message should be broadcast, and this was done. This confidence having been obtained, Koca VERBOD sent the 'VICTORY' messages through VAN DER WAALS, and these were transmitted on the BONI link.

It is pointed out that this affair - the group being indigenous - was handled by SCHREIBER, and III F merely loaned the BONI link for the purpose.

In the summer and autumn of 1943, black lists, distributed by one of the Dutch Resistance Groups, described VAN DER WAALS as being a notorious S. D. agent.

HUNTERMAN also declares that VAN DER WAALS was taken by Capt. ABEN (Camp 020 case) to see the British Military Attache in Stockholm. He is unable to give the date and this information is second-hand from SCHREIBER.

In September 1944, SCHREIBER told HUNTERMAN that "VAN DER WAALS in England sei was freiwillig Lersueber gegangen sei". HUNTERMAN had the impression that SCHREIBER was considerably worried at this news. He also recalls that, possibly in 1945 VAN DER WAALS was notionally murdered by the SD as he was 'blown' throughout Holland.

Q.7: Whether the BROADBEAN/GOLF escape line fitted into the general scheme of the Abwehr and what were the dividends they received from it?

A.7: Those two agents arrived in Holland on 2.2.43 and were duly arrested on landing. Interrogation established that their mission was to organise escape lines for ex-filtees, etc. For this purpose they had been provided with blank French and Belgian identity cards and a large sum of French and Belgian money. The actual running of an escape line presented considerable difficulties to the Germans, since, had they given the impression to London that the lines were working satisfactorily, there would have been no excuse for making difficulties over the ex-filtrations for which London was constantly asking. In addition, a series of notional arrests on these lines would also have appeared suspicious. The policy therefore was to minimise as far as possible, the potentialities of the BROADBEAN/GOLF lines.

The only dividends accruing to the Germans were the addresses of safe houses and contacts sent by London, over the BROADBEAN/GOLF link. As for example the information provided in Nr. 2 to

ANNEXURE LX (contd.)A.7 (contd.)

BROADBENT/GOLF dated 28.4.43, giving the address of a safe house and a password. It was found that the contacts given were, in most cases, of minor importance and no arrests, as far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN knew, resulted from this traffic, the policy being merely to keep observation and not to 'blow' the addresses or contacts. An exception to this was a house search, at the address where MARCEL lived in Paris, believed to be in the Place Clignancourt, as it was thought that, in view of ADRIAN's 'arrest', no action would have appeared suspicious.

At a later date, which neither can remember, ARNAUD & ARNO, i.e. Offz. CHRISTMANN, was sent to Paris to an address notified from London with a story that other ex-filtrees were to be expected shortly. On arrival, however, it appeared that London had asked for the ex-filtration of ARNO and the latter, willy-nilly, was sent along the line accompanied by a woman as far as Lyons. Here he came under suspicion, but managed to talk his way out of it and returned to Holland, where he reported the address of the house in Lyons. This address was passed to the Act in Lyons and the place was watched, but apparently the organisers of the line had realised the implication of ARNO's visit and nothing eventuated.

All addresses of safe houses and contacts sent by London, on the BROADBENT/GOLF link, were passed to the relevant Acts, but the results obtained were generally unknown to III F Holland.

Q.8:

What was the true identity of the person ARNO or ARNARDY?

A.8:

Offz. CHRISTMANN, III F, Ast-Niederlande.

Q.9:

Details of the activities of Col. KOPPERT?

A.9:

Col. KOPPERT was a man who had good connections with a few senior German officers, names unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN.

It appears that RIEDERHOF met KOPPERT 'by chance' in a train and commenced talking about resistance activities. It seems, however, that KOPPERT mistrusted RIEDERHOF but put him in touch with Sgt. KNOPPERS. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN are aware, RIEDERHOF only met KNOPPERS on a few occasions and was unable to produce anything of an incriminating or interesting character.

The Germans, however, naturally expected to receive from KNOPPERS a great deal of information on the activities and future plans of KOPPERT, after KNOPPERS had returned from the U.K.

Q.10:

Administrative arrangements under which RIEDERHOF worked for Abwehr in both Holland and Belgium?

XVII.

ANNEXURE IX (contd.)

A. 10: In the autumn of 1941, Uffz. KUP had come into contact with RIDDERHOF after the latter's release from prison. In December 1941 RIDDERHOF was receiving from III P a fixed salary of 200 guilders which by mid-1942 had risen to 300 guilders per month, and at the end of the same year, 500 guilders. By the summer of 1943 RIDDERHOF had become completely 'blown' in Holland and left for Brussels, with the idea, so GISKES and HUNTEMANN state, of withdrawing from all SIS activities. Nevertheless he still drew his monthly salary from Ant-Niederlande. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN are aware, RIDDERHOF was never paid by Ant-Brussels but, naturally, was known there and he could rely on the Ant's help for procuring identity papers, passports and living quarters, etc.

His various addresses, as known to III P-Niederlande, were as follows:-

- a) Biarritz, N. Holland, near Hilversum: Korte Moolenweg 2. Frequently used, and relatives of his (by marriage) lived there.
- b) There was another address, obtainable from the local police, in Arnhem. He was probably registered here under the name RIDDERHOF.
- c) Rue de Thone, Brussels. (Nr. forgotten).
- d) In the spring of 1943 he lived for a time in various hotels in Spa.

G. 11: Details of the two NORWICH agents, alleged to be a British captain and a Dutchman, brought from Holland to Belgium, in the summer of 1944. The two agents are said to have agreed to co-operate with the Germans, but only against the Russians.

A. 11: The two agents were EENEKER and TRUMPEL. Details are given in statements by GISKES and HUNTEMANN at Annexure VI. Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN can imagine how MIERSMANN was aware of this incident.

Partial Questionnaire Submitted by S. O. S.

- Q. 1: Was TOINAI identical with Ter HAAR? (See P. 1, Section 3 of this report).
- A. 1: No.
- Q. 2: Who is ABERY?
- A. 2: ABER is: Arnoldus Albert BAATSEN @ WATERKRESS.
- Q. 3: Escape of PARSNIP, CABBAGE and LACROGSET?
- A. 3: See statement by GISKES, Annexure VII.

ANNEXURE IX (contd.)Verbal Questionnaires Submitted by S.O.E. (contd.)

Q.4: Is EBERHOF identical with CHERRY BRANDY or George BRANDY?

A.4: EBERHOF, when making reports to LIEP on George BRANDY, was supposed to refer to him as CHERRY.

Q.5: Radio-Risnat?

A.5: Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN have any knowledge of this organisation, nor have they even heard of it.

Q.6: IS VI ?

A.6: Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN know a great deal about this organisation. However, it is possible that it was penetrated by the Sipo, through LINDEMANS.

Q.7: Explanation of the German spelling of the key-word "ERLIS" in A/978 from KALE?

A.7: EBERNER was certainly not being used to encipher, translate or transmit on the 25.4.42, when the word "ERLIS" appeared in message A/978 from KALE via BROOCCOLI. At this time EBERNER was imprisoned at Haren and the suggested explanation of this incident by HUNTEMANN is as follows:-

Members of the Orpo frequently transmitted in the neighbourhood of 't Hartogenbosch, and on these occasions often visited the Haren prison. It is possible, though unlikely, that one of these men gave to EBERNER the draft message and asked him to encipher it. EBERNER may have learnt BROOCCOLI's key word through tapping on the central heating system, and thus have had the chance to insert the word "ERLIS" in the message. HUNTEMANN thinks, however, that this would have been very unlikely as, almost always, messages were enciphered at the Fu-P-Stelle-Orpo, then at Driebergen, and taken to the place of transmission already enciphered. In addition, all enciphering and deciphering was subject to a double check done by two different members of the B-Stelle. Accordingly, no credible explanation for this incident can be offered by HUNTEMANN or GISKES.

At the same time it is emphasised that all matters connected with deciphering and transmission were dealt with entirely by the Orpo and HUNTEMANN and GISKES knew little about the procedure adopted. Neither possesses any technical knowledge of codes, ciphers, or W/T.

Custody of captured S.O.E. agents.

In spring and summer of 1942, all captured agents were taken to the SD prison in Scheveningen. Interrogation generally took place in the prison, but in special cases agents were interrogated personally by SCHRIEDER in the HQ's of the Sipo, Binnenhof, The Hague.

EBERNER and TRUMPEY were detained for several weeks in the military prison at Scheveningen as they were being played back, and were actually transmitting. It was therefore necessary to prevent them coming into contact with other Dutch prisoners and their Dutch guards.

ANNEXURE IX (contd.)Custody of Captured S. O. E. Agents (contd.)

In about September or October 1942, all NORDPOL agents were taken to the special prison at Haaren. From this date onwards all arrested agents were conducted straight to Haaren, where they were interrogated, except those who appeared to have received special missions, e. g. Johan GRUEN & BRUTUS and a female agent named FELIX & CHICOORY, who were first interrogated at Binnhof by SCHREIEDER.

After the escape from Haaren in December 1943 of PARSNIP, CABBAGE and LACROSSE, all NORDPOL agents, with the exception of EBENSZER, TRUMPET and FELIX, were transferred early in 1944 to the prison at Assen, and thence at some later date, unknown, to camps in Germany.

In mid-September 1944, SCHREIEDER told HUNTEMANN that TRUMPET and EBENSZER had also been sent to Germany, and that they were at Sachsenhausen Camp. At the same time, SCHREIEDER professed ignorance of the whereabouts of the other NORDPOL agents. Nevertheless he promised to make enquiries, but LII P were never informed of the result. As GIERES felt a special responsibility for EBENSZER and TRUMPET as a result of the promises that had been made to them, he ordered HUNTEMANN to visit them at this camp. An account of HUNTEMANN's visit is given at Annexure VIII.

A certain Ertstuf. WACKER was in charge of the prison at Haaren, which was also, at times, used as a detention prison for hostages.

Notes on S. O. E. Agents.

It must be emphasized that the actual handling of the agents after arrest was entirely an SD responsibility, and for this reason both GIERES and HUNTEMANN are not good sources of information on the behaviour and personalities of the captured agents; in fact, many of them were never even seen by GIERES or HUNTEMANN.

EBENSZER: Is described by HUNTEMANN as being crafty and moody. He was only prepared to co-operate as a result of a definite promise made that none of the agents caught through his treachery would receive the death penalty. The promise that his own life would be spared made no impression on him, and it was impossible to turn him by threats of this nature. He was absolutely convinced that London would be aware that he was operating under control, within three weeks. In fact he stated that a certain Col. BLUNT had assured him that this would be the case before he left the U.K. Special pains were taken to school a B-Stelle operator in EBENSZER's transmitting idiosyncracies, as it was feared that if he should become aware of the seriousness of the position that his behaviour had entailed, he would, at no matter what cost, take steps to inform London. He never concealed his dislike of the Germans.

TRUMPET: Is described as being a man of little initiative and with a dislike for hard work. He appeared to be completely disinterested in his situation and HUNTEMANN had the impression that, even if free, he would have been a poor agent. During imprisonment he was subject to frequent fits of depression and for that reason HUNTEMANN arranged for him to share a cell with EBENSZER.

ANNEXURE IX (Contd.)Notes on S.O.E. Agents (contd.)

CATARRH: Is described by GISKES as being a man of outstanding courage and determination. No promises or threats would induce him to provide information or to co-operate in any way. After the failure of an attempted escape he refused to give his parole not to escape again. Any information that he did provide, was given, when he was quite sure that it would do no harm to his cause.

FRILIA (Ter FINE): A female agent who behaved very well, and from whom it was almost impossible to obtain information. When London proposed an address in The Hague for her contact, SCHREIBER promised her her liberty if she would consent to act as an SD agent in making the contact. She refused SCHREIBER's proposal, preferring imprisonment where, however, she was well treated, according to HUNTEMANN.

MARROW: Is described as a man of high ideals and great patriotism. HUNTEMANN however considered that his affection for his wife and child was such that he would never have been a good agent. Whilst under arrest he was constantly asking for news of his family. HUNTEMANN declared that he persuaded SCHREIBER to send the wife a letter and money through an imaginary Dutch organisation, and the wife was allowed to send a letter back through the same intermediary.

WATERGROSS: Is described by HUNTEMANN as a bad character who voluntarily spied on his fellow prisoners at Haaren and reported on them to the SD. Through him, many written messages from one prisoner to another found their way into the hands of the SD. At a later period he fell into disfavour with the SD who found papers indicating his intention to escape.

BEETROOT & VANSITTARD (BEETROOT): Former members of the Marechaussee. Described as excellent agents who, at initial interrogations, convinced the Germans that they were people of very minor importance. When, in a signal from London at a later date, it was made clear to the Germans that the pair were "EUREKA" instructors, they were further interrogated, but both claimed to have forgotten their knowledge of the subject and the Germans were obliged to send the first set they captured to Berlin, for expert examination, before they could work it.

PARSLEY: Described as a good agent from whom the SD could get nothing for a long time. At his first interrogation after capture, he insisted that a W/T message should be sent to London stating: "ELVIRA reached the station 57 minutes late". This message appeared suspicious to GISKES and HUNTEMANN, and in order to obviate having to transmit it, PARSELEY had to be notionally killed.

KALE & CAULIFLOWER: Described by SCHREIBER to HUNTEMANN as being good trustworthy men who gave nothing away of any importance.

BROADEBAN: Volunteered to work for the Germans. His offer was refused as HUNTEMANN believed that he only made the offer with a view to future escape.

TURNIP: Showed considerable resource in warning CARROT. (See A.5 of S.O.E. Questionnaire)

SCHREIBER expressed the opinion that the quality of agents sent, progressively deteriorated.

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Allied Agents arrested in Holland not connected with Nordpol.

Early 1943, a Dutch naval cadet whose name may have been TER HAAR or LAAR, who

Sometime later, VAN DER HEYDEN, agreed to act as a double agent, was played by the Sipo without success.

DE JONGE (leader))
HADEMA (w/T))

Were arrested by Sipo about May or June 1943. They had arrived by M. T. R. at the beginning of 1943 and had landed near Katwijk. Their mission was purely espionage, and III F with HADEMA's assistance tried to establish contact. London must, however, have been aware of what was happening since, after several schemes, the traffic stopped.

GRIS (w/T)

Was caught by R.D.F. of the Orpo on Whit Monday, 1942.

ALBAS (w/T)

Call sign T.R.O. Dutch cadet or sub-lieutenant. Worked with success for a long time in Holland. All the efforts of the Orpo and Sipo were frustrated by his caution and skill. Was arrested in a trap set by the Sipo in the house of his girl friend in The Hague. He did not give any information about his mission or the other members of his group and next to TACKNIS was the best and most valuable agent when London sent to Holland and who fell into German hands.

NEERACKER (w/T)

Was arrested by the Sipo in Amsterdam after his address had become known through the Nordpol traffic. He had for several months frustrated the efforts of the Orpo (R.D.F. and shadowing) who had brought special equipment to Holland for this purpose.

• First Group
(names no longer known)

Parachuted in Sept./Oct. 1943 near Graves or Nijmegen. The drop took place in the early evening when it was still quite light, close to a road where there were a lot of people so that the agents, who fell in a garden and on a roof, had to flee immediately. Leavin, w/T set, codes and a case full of their personal effects.

• Second Group
(names no longer known)

Landed Oct./Nov. 1943 near Graves. They were apparently expected by contacts of the First Group (see above) who helped them to hide their equipment in a neighbouring farm. In some way, however, troops in the neighbourhood got to hear of this and, without informing the Abwehrstelle or Sipo, occupied the farm. When later the agents returned to fetch their equipment, there was a fight, one being shot whilst the other escaped. One of these agents may have been a certain SCHRINJEMAKER (Phillips factory, Eindhoven) as his name was marked on the clothes found.

HEINTJE I, II, III, IV.

A group of agents arrested by the Sipo about Feb./March 1944 after HEINTJE II and III had been captured in Amsterdam on consecutive days whilst transmitting. Arrests were due to the Sipo tried to play them back (the Sipo "Egmont" affair), but London closed the traffic after several weeks with a message referring to the last message sent by III in the Nordpol case.

BERGMANN

Was found dead in a shot down aircraft in the Zuidersee some time in the summer of 1944. Had a large sum of foreign money and a letter of introduction from Capt. ZOMER to a certain Burgermeister in Holland. His companion saved himself on a Dutch ship and escaped.

HUNTEMANN now states that he thinks that these two groups may have been the same as the HEINTJE I, II, III and IV group.

ANNEXURE XI.Captain ABEN and Jongkeer Van GEEVERS-DEYNOOD.

In the spring of 1943 Krimrat. SCHREIBER of the SD, The Hague, came one day to Referat III F and explained that his V-Mann, Capt. ABEN (Camp O/O Case) had received instructions from the British Embassy in Stockholm to bring to Sweden the former police president of the Hague, Jongkeer Van GEEVERS-DEYNOOD. SCHREIBER was willing that GEEVERS-DEYNOOD should go to Stockholm as he hoped to arrest him on his return to Holland and thus learn the instructions that the latter had received from the British Embassy. SCHREIBER had instructed ABEN to engage GEEVERS-DEYNOOD as a cook on board his ship the "Hollandia", but a complication had arisen in that an espionage group had entrusted to GEEVERS-DEYNOOD a large number of Leica films. GEEVERS-DEYNOOD as a cook felt that it would be difficult to conceal these and had asked ABEN to put them in the ship's safe in the Captain's cabin. ABEN thereupon brought the film to SCHREIBER who showed them to III F in order to determine whether they could be allowed to go forward to the British Embassy. On examination, the films were discovered to be of exceptional importance and under no circumstances could they be allowed to fall into enemy hands. The films were accordingly replaced with old paper and the sealed up envelope was given to ABEN for safe custody. The problem now presented itself how to get rid of the package en route and at the same time not let GEEVERS-DEYNOOD know that ABEN was working for the Germans. It was therefore decided to stage a surprise search of the ship Kory. Kapt. NEWECKE of Referat III X of 1st Niederlande, was entrusted with the arrangements and HUNTEMANN at his own request accompanied him. Accordingly, NEWECKE, HUNTEMANN and some SD officials boarded a tug and accosted the "Hollandia" and another ship sailing in company with her. The two ships were ordered to lay to and anchor, and the search of the second ship began. The unusual proceedings were, of course, noticed by those on board the "Hollandia", and ABEN called GEEVERS-DEYNOOD to his cabin and told him that under such circumstances he could not keep the package in the safe. He then suggested to GEEVERS-DEYNOOD that the latter should take it and hide it somewhere else. GEEVERS-DEYNOOD replied that he was unable to find a hiding place on board, and agreed that the package should be thrown over the side, and this was done in the presence of GEEVERS-DEYNOOD. One of the Naval Guard on board the "Hollandia" had however noticed the jettisoning of the package and reported the matter to Capt. NEWECKE. An "enquiry" was therefore held in ABEN's cabin, the latter declaring that he was smuggling cigarette papers to Sweden and had thrown them overboard to avoid unpleasantness with the customs authorities. The "Hollandia" with GEEVERS-DEYNOOD on board was then allowed to proceed. It is not known to GIERES or HUNTEMANN if GEEVERS-DEYNOOD returned to Holland from Sweden.

ANNEXURE XIIMiscellaneous pointsPersonalities of S.O.S. known to GISKES

The only names recollected by GISKES are -

Lieut. Colonel BLURT
His successor Major BINGHAM
Miss BORD
Lieut. KNIGHT

Funk-Norchdienst and Fluko-Norchdienst

The Funk-Norchdienst knew some of the call signs of aircraft carrying agents to the Continent. According to GISKES trial flights were made in the afternoon prior to the operation of that night, and it was in many cases possible to intercept traffic between the aircraft and its controlling station. When this traffic was reported to GISKES, he concluded, and was generally right, that an operation would take place that night.

The Fluko-Norchdienst were given special orders to plot the courses of single low-flying aeroplanes, and in this way, from their reports, GISKES was able to get a general picture of the scope of dropping operations.

ANNEXURE XIII.Descriptions of Miscellaneous Officials.1. Hauptf. MAY.

Seen by GISKIES between February 1942 and March 1944 in The Hague, Driebergen and Haaren. At that time was responsible for the examination of agents in W/T and codes for the NOEDPOL affair, and therefore lived chiefly in the Haaren camp, where the prisoners were brought. A fanatical National Socialist, who however treated the prisoners well and with great care.

Description: German; aged about 38; strong build; height about 1.74m; light brown hair; grey eyes; cleanshaven; wore civilian clothes, seldom uniform; speaks German with Swabian accent.

2. Hauptf. WACKER.

Seen in the winter of 1942 in Haaren, where he was Leiter of the prison. After the escape of the second group of NOEDPOL agents, he was dismissed and removed to The Hague. It is believed he did his best to treat the prisoners well. LAUTERS and JORDAAN must know him well.

Description: German; aged about 48; broad shouldered; height about 1.75m; dark brown hair, slightly grey; probably wears glasses, certainly for reading; small moustache; wore uniform.

3. Ostuf. LAGES.

Seen 1942/43 in Amsterdam where he was Leiter of the Amsterdam Aussenstelle of the Sicherheitspolizei and the SD.

Description: German; aged about 40; slender, athletic build; height about 1.80m; dark brown hair; grey ? eyes; thin, haggard face; healthy complexion; cleanshaven; wore S.S. uniform.

PP-601 532

Copy to Huntmann P.F.
Original in Berlin

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INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

From Major Hughes

To Colonel Stephens

GISKES/HUNTEMANN

With reference to Mr. Wilson's memo to Colonel Stephens dated 1st June 1945:

1. HAUSWALD

GISKES does not know if HAUSWALD himself was in the habit of going to Spain or whether he sent agents to that country; he is quite certain that the branches of Abt. I Ast Niederlande did have connections with that country. SCHLEIFER, I W1, travelled frequently to Spain.

2. SCHLESWALD = SCHICKWITZ

3. Major NOERING

NOERING was never with B.d.S. Holland.

4. BUSCH

This man is unknown personally to either GISKES or HUNTEMANN; he was employed at one time at the Devisenschutzkommando in Amsterdam where STADLER was also employed. STADLER probably at this time was handling BUSCH.

5. Graf KREUZ

KREUZ was later with Leitstelle III West and was last seen by GISKES in February 1944 in Paris; the latter does not know if KREUZ was ever in Bad Ems. KREUZ was not a W/T technician, but according to GISKES speaks perfect French and English.

6. Hptm. Dr. GROSSE

GROSSE is a member of the Swiss German Journalists Association. He had constantly stated that on the defeat of Germany he would go to Switzerland to reconstitute his fortunes. It is possible that GROSSE, after leaving FAK 307 did manage to get a mission from ?R.S.H.A. to go to Switzerland but GISKES is quite certain that he would have used it only for the purpose of getting to that country. He is quite certain that he would have made no attempt to carry it out.

7. BOEDEKER

BOEDEKER is almost certainly identical with BOEDEKER @ BORSIG.

8. PLATE @ PETERS.

This man, an ex-member of the Kripo was with III. P Ast Brussels and then attached to FAT 363. He and SCHELLEWALD had many dealings with the Zentral Vernehmungsstelle in Bonn. This office was under the P/W administration of Wehrkreis 6 and was principally engaged in the interrogation of escaped Allied P/Ws. PLATE appeared to be very anti-Nazi. His wife lives in Hachenburg Westewald. SCHELLEWALD can supply more information on this man. GISKES found him useful owing to his connections with the Stapo.

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With reference to Mr. Wilson's memo to Colonel Stephens dated 18.7.45:

9. Van der REYDEN

To the best of GISKES' memory Van der REYDEN was arrested in January 1942. GISKES saw him in the S.D. prison in Schoonhoven, probably in January. SCHREEDER was present and the Leiter III of the Sipo, at that time probably a certain WOLFF. GISKES knows that already at that time when he first saw Van der REYDEN the Funk-Abwehr was in possession of the former's signal plan. He does not know how this was obtained from Van der REYDEN. GISKES heard at this interview that Van der REYDEN was in touch with a doctor in Wassenaar who was already known to the Sipo. The doctor in question was eventually arrested by the Sipo. GISKES cannot remember his name. The whole affair was handled by the Sipo but GISKES had the impression that Van der REYDEN "war nicht sehr hart". He remembers also vaguely that some women with children, possibly van der REYDEN's wife, was mixed up in the affair. GISKES thinks that the Sipo knew so much about his contacts that they were in a position to put pressure on him.

Camp 020/39.7.45.
JH/RLG

T. H. Hughes
Major

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Translation.

Statement handed in by HUNTEMANN/GISKES
26. 6. 45.

Huntermann File 70
RF. 601, 8324
(FRANHEIM marked
for coding in Giskes)

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

From: Major Hughes

To: Colonel Stinson

GISKES/HUNTEMANN

The following information has been given by GISKES and HUNTEMANN:

I. A certain Dr. ? FRANHEIM (no description available) of the A.B.P. Cologne, which moved to Engelskirchen before the fall of the former town, is an authority on false papers, secret inks, etc. He worked principally for the S.D. but, as a favour to KUCHENBECKER, prepared false papers for the Waterloo and Nina missions. KUCHENBECKER knows this man well. FRANHEIM, who, HUNTEMANN thinks, was formerly with the Kripo had no connection with G. Truppen.

HUNTEMANN states that as far as he knows the A.B.P. in Berlin and Copenhagen did not prepare false identity papers, etc., and their chemical sections were only engaged in testing for S/W etc.

II. No G. Truppen were attached to III.P. Kommandos or Truppen but GISKES believes members were attached to Leitstelle III West and I Kommandos.

J. Hughes

Comp 020
17.7.45.
JH/MS

(f) Engineer SCHRJEDMAKERS, who had been employed by the PHILLIPS firm in Eindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with some words in English, which was taken to be his "pseud". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

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Translation.

Statement handed in by HUNTEMANN/GISKES
25. 6. 45.

Colonel Stephens

CAMP 020

From: Mr. D.I. Wilson **SECRET.**

D.I.S.

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GISKES and HUNTEMANN

1. As promised, I asked D.I.S. some time ago for comments and questions in connection with G20 reports on GISKES and HUNTEMANN. These reports have been sent to Holland, but meanwhile the Dutch country section has let us have a very brief comment, which I am passing to you for what it is worth:-

(a) Reference statement of 24.6.45.

- Para I (a) Cannot place.
- " I (b) Cannot place
- " III (c) Correct
- " III (e) Refers to Lt. Col. SCHER, head of Dutch D.I.S.
- " III (f) Refers to an agent of Dutch country section who was never arrested.

(b) They further state that the details given in the progress report of 27.6.45 are all, to the best of their knowledge, substantially correct. The name of Van der MEYDEN, now in their hands, has been passed to The Hague for necessary action.

P.P. 601,712
P.P. 601,832
11.7.45.

For D.I. Wilson

2 " 1945

5 - JUL 1945

(c) Engineer SCHAJNEMAKERS, who had been employed by the PHILLIPS Firm in Eindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with some words in English, which was taken to be his "poem". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

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Translation.

Statement handed in by HUNTERMAN/GISKES
26. 6. 45.

VRH

PA HUNTERMAN file

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P.F. 601,712 /WHOAC
P.F. 601,832

5th July, 1945

Dear Major Delaforce,

GISKES/HUNTERMAN

Ho Please refer to your letter JD/KV/3376 of 28.6.45 in which you enclosed a photograph of COMTE for Camp 020. I am now sending you a note from Major Hughes on GISKES' and HUNTERMAN's reactions on being shown this.

I am keeping the photograph, as I imagine you have other copies.

Yours sincerely,

L.M. Bingham

Major J. Delaforce,
S.O.S.

5 - JUL 1945

(?) Engineer SCHREIJENMAKERS, who had been employed by the PHILLIPS firm in Mindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch L.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with song words in English, which was taken to be his "poem". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

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Translation.

Statement handed in by HUNTERMANN/GISKES
25. 6. 45.

SECRET.

CAMP 020.

REPORT dated 3rd July, 1945.

WRH
FILE
H. Huntermann
(photo attached)
PF 601832

GISKES/HUNTERMANN

With reference to R.L.W.'s (Mr. Wilson's) memo. of 30.6.45, HUNTERMANN and GISKES have been shown the photograph of GILBERT with the following results:-

HUNTERMANN recognises the photograph and is almost certain that it is identical with D.GIER.

GISKES does not recognise the photograph (he has never seen D.GIER).

J. Hughes
for Colonel Stephens

Encl. Photograph of GILBERT.

JH/ED

(*) Engineer SCHULINEMANN, who had been employed by the firm in Eindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with song words in English, which was taken to be his "poem". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

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Translation.

Statement handed in by HUNTERMAN/GISKES
26. 6. 45.

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Original in P.F. 601,712

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P.F. 601,712
P.F. 601,832 / W.R.C.4.C

30th June, 1945

Dear Major Delaforce,

GISKES/HUNTERMAN

I am sending you herewith the latest statement
in this case, which should be of interest to you.

We shall be grateful for your assistance in
identifying any enterprises and agents known to your
organisation, and for your comments or questions in
this connection.

Yours sincerely,

(Miss) L.M. Bingham.

Major J. Delaforce,
S.O.E.

13 JUL 1945

(f) Engineer WILHELM RECHNER, who had been employed by the Waffen-SS in Eindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with song words in English, which was taken to be his "poem". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

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Translation.

Statement handed in by HUNTEMANN/GISKES
26. 5. 45.

Copy
Original in P.F. 601,712

WRH
P.F. 601,832

V.D.B., Captain Farmer

I am sending you herewith a statement dated
26.6.45 forwarded by Camp 020, in the hope that you
may be able to identify some of the individuals or Allied
organisations mentioned therein. pages 1-4.

We should be most grateful for any comments or
suggestions for further questioning of GISKES and
HUNTEMANN based on this report.

W. R. C. 40 Co
30.6.45.

P.F. 601,712
P.F. 601,832

JUL 1945

(f) Engineer SCHEIJNMAKERS, who had been employed by the PHILLIPS Firm
in Eindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to
Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown.
In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November
1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in
Stockholm with some words in English, which was taken to be his "poem".
Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

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PHOTOGRAPH

39^a

Translation.

Statement handed in by HURTEMANN/GISKES
26. 6. 45.

I. Names of Prominent Dutchmen arrested through RIDDERHOF and LINDEMANS.
(a) RIDDERHOF.

To: Colonel Stephens
CAMP 020

From: Mr. H. I. Wilson
R.I.S. *[Signature]*

SECRET.

Copy
Original in P.F. 601,712
HURTEMANN/GISKES

Major DeLaforce was asked to forward the attached photograph of GONITS to Major Hughes.

R.I.S. have the following aliases of GONITS in their records:-

- PASSIN (real name)
- PIQUIER
- POINCH
- PROMETIN
- DAUBIGNY
- BARRAC
- THOCCOIS
- JEAN FIERRE
- WILAY
- SIP

P.F. 601,712
R.I.S. 601,832
30.6.45

for H. I. Wilson

1306/1945

(f) Engineer SCHWINEMAKERS, who had been employed by the PHILLIPS Firm in Eindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with song words in English, which was taken to be his "poem". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

[Handwritten signature]

39-

Translation.

Statement handed in by HUNTSMAAN/GISKES
26. 6. 45.

I. Names of Prominent Dutchmen arrested through RIDDERHOF and LINDEMANS.

(a) RIDDERHOF.

A Dutch university professor, middle-aged, living at Zeist (?), whose

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for comments.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

JL/KV/3376

28th June, 1945.

Dear Miss Bingham,

Would you kindly forward the attached photograph to Major Hughes at O20. He will know to what the photograph refers.

Could you tell him that the aliases of COMETE in our records are:-

- FASSIN (Real Name)
- FIQUIER
- PERCH
- PROMENTIN
- DAUBIGNY
- BARSAC
- GERMOIRE
- JEAN PIERRE
- HILAY
- SIF

Yours sincerely,

JOHN DELAFORCE, Major.

Miss Bingham,
M-I-5

JUL 1945

me, 1945.
16 601.832

joint statement giving the names through RIDDERHOF of interest in case.

Colonel Stephens.

f statement by 26.6.45.

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(f) Engineer SCHWIDEMAKERS, who had been employed by the PHILLIPS firm in Eindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with song words in English, which was taken to be his "poem". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

390

Translation.

Statement handed in by HUNTEMANN/GISKES
26. 6. 45.

I. Names of Prominent Dutchmen arrested through RIDDERHOF and LINDEMANS.

(a) RIDDERHOF.

A Dutch university professor, middle-aged, living at Zeist (?), whose name GISKES cannot remember, was in the Autumn of 1943 arrested at

RET.

CAMP 020.

*Huntemann 2158
26.6.45
Copie. 6 V.D.S. 1518
for comment.*

REPORT dated 26th June, 1945.

HUNTEMANN/GISKES.

Enclosed are copies of a joint statement made by HUNTEMANN and GISKES giving the names of prominent Dutchmen arrested through RIDDERHOF and LINDEMANS, etc. This may be of interest in connection with the LINDEMANS case.

A. Powell

For Colonel Stephens.

RS/NOI.

Encl: 6 copies of translation of statement by HUNTEMANN and GISKES dated 26.6.45.

(f) Engineer SCHREIJEMAKERS, who had been employed by the PHILIPS firm in Middeloven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with some words in English, which was taken to be his "poem". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

39^a

Translation.

Statement handed in by HOUTEMANN/GISKES
26. 6. 45.

I. Names of Prominent Dutchmen arrested through RIDDERHOF and LINDEMANS.

(a) RIDDERHOF.

A Dutch university professor, middle-aged, living at Zeist (Y), whose name GISKES cannot remember, was in the Autumn of 1943 arrested whilst trying to cross into Belgium. RIDDERHOF had reported beforehand that the Professor was being sent by the "Braz van COORD" group in Doorn to England via Spain with information. He travelled on the same route as APOLIO of the "Nordpol" case. On his arrest by the Sipo, it was confirmed that he was in possession of important espionage material.

(b) Christien LINDEMANS.

A Belgian priest (name forgotten), some time in April 1944, came to Rotterdam with a mission from a Belgian Resistance Group in order to hold a conference with a Dutch Escape Organisation which was already known. After LINDEMANS had reported on the priest, he was arrested.

other

II. Names of Agents in Holland.

VAN DEN BERG (cover name), domiciled in Amsterdam. Description attached. In 1943 and 1944, was V-Mann of IIIf. Handled by Uffz. CHRISTMANN, later by Uffz. BODEERS.

III. Names of Resistance or Espionage Group Leaders, and how they were arrested.

(a) Admiral QUADT, an O.D. leader, was arrested in 1941 by the Sipo.

(b) A director of the aeroplane factory FOKKER in Amsterdam, name forgotten, was arrested in 1943 by the Sipo during the breaking up of a Resistance and Espionage Group in Amsterdam.

(c) A schoolmaster called JUIJF was arrested in the Summer of 1943 at Bergen op Zoom as a leader of an espionage group. He was known to IIIf. and Sipo because in the "Nordpol" affair, London gave his name as a contact.

(d) A Dutch reserve G.S. officer (name forgotten) domiciled at The Hague, was, according to the Sipo, arrested in November 1941 as the leader at that time of the O.D.

(e) Capt. ZOOMER; a "Doctor SOGLER" was, according to a report which reached IIIf. in the Spring of 1942, active in the resistance group and was said to be domiciled in Breda. Details of his activities were not known. According to reports in the Spring of 1943 (from Dutch Resistance circles) ZOOMER had, in the meantime, become chief of the Dutch I.S. in London. He was identified as the Dutch Major ZOOMER, formerly instructor in the Dutch Military Academy in Breda. On the body of an agent found in a shot down A/C in the middle of 1943, among other things, were found a photograph of Major ZOOMER and a micro-photo letter to a relative of his in Holland - a Dutch Burgomaster. The letter was apparently to serve as an introduction for the agent to ZOOMER's relative. According to an unconfirmed report in the Autumn of 1943, ZOOMER was in Holland at that time.

(f) Engineer SCHWITHEMAKERS, who had been employed by the PHILLIPS firm in Eindhoven, and who had been sent by his firm in the Autumn of 1943 to Sweden, was known to be in the Dutch I.S. Details of the source are unknown. In the luggage of an agent who landed by parachute in Holland in November 1943, was found, amongst other things, a handbill for a film premiere in Stockholm with song words in English, which was taken to be his "poem". Also in the luggage was found a civilian suit which the Sipo found had been

390

made in Bindhoven for SCHWENEMAKERS. It is not known if he was arrested.

IV. Names of prominent people arrested in Belgium.

In the middle of 1944, the head of the Intelligence Service ZERO was arrested (cover name ROULEAU). The arrest was occasioned by the penetration of the group by the G.P.P. in Brussels. PAT. 362 also had a contact with the ROULEAU Group but it came to nothing. Details of other Abwehr agents in Brussels can only be given by the Truppe who handled them.

V. Information on British I.S., appointments, names of officers, units, agents' schools, instruction and courses.

There was copious information on the above in the files of Leitstelle IIIf. and FAKs. The Sipo also had a profound knowledge of the subject, especially as regards training of agents in England. Exchanging of information between IIIf. and the Sipo was exceptional. Information of this nature, in the possession of IIIf. and later FAKs. and FAKs was passed to Abw. III, Berlin, and later to the Leitstelle III-West fuer Frontaufklaerung. Abw. III, Berlin and later III-West correlated the information received, and issued from time to time, summaries regarding new information, and full charts of the British I.S. These works of reference were always available, and consequently, neither HANSMANN nor GISKES carried much in their heads.

S.O.S. was known to be the organisers of secret action (secret operations executive, secret overseas expeditions). Among others, were the following sections - Dutch, French, Belgian, Norwegian, Spanish, Italian, and probably German. The work of the sections was training, equipment and the despatch of agents to their particular countries on sabotage missions, and the creating, arming and leading of sabotage and Resistance groups. The following names in the Dutch Section are remembered: - Lt. Col. BLUNT and his Secretary, Hans BOND, also his successor, Major RINGHAM; also the name of Lt. KNIGHT.

About Schools, the following are remembered: Patriotic Schools (vetting), Parachute School at Ringsay, and a sabotage school on a small island in Scotland. W/T and cypher school in London. The Luftwaffe knew two airfields in England from whence agents were despatched.

The R.D.F. service (Fluko-Horchdienst) of the Luftwaffe knew some of the call-signs of the A/C which carried agents. From the interception of this traffic before the aeroplane started (it is believed during practice flights in the afternoon before a mission) the operations of the night often became known. The Fluko-Horchdienst of the Luftwaffe had special instructions to report on low-flying A/C and especially those cruising in certain areas. The combination of the information received from the Funkhorch- and the Fluko-Horchdienst enabled the areas to be established in which regular parachuting A/C operated, and thus gave a picture of the parachute operations which had been carried out. At the H.Q. of the Feld and Oberfeldkommandanturen and in some cases of Ortskommandanturen and Flukohauptstellen, motorised columns were kept alert for action where parachute operations had been observed, and could with certainty be presumed to have taken place. The results, however, were meagre for the following reasons: The alert was given too late, reports on the locality of the operations were too inaccurate, lack of petrol, too great a distance to cover to reach the locality of the operation. Only one case where these columns succeeded is known, namely, in France in the Autumn of 1943 (? near Chartres) which resulted in the arrest of several agents in a car who had just left the dropping ground.

Camp 680/27.5.45.
JH/LSK.

2. Allied Agents arrested in Holland not connected with Nordpol.

Early 1941, a Dutch naval cadet whose name may have been TER HAAR or LAMB, who
Sometime later, VAN DER REYER, agreed to act as a double agent, was played by the Sipo without success.

DE JONGE (leader))
RABEMA (W/T))

Were arrested by Sipo about May or June 1943. They had arrived by M.T.B. at the beginning of 1943 and had landed near Katwijk. Their mission was purely espionage, and ILL P with RABEMA's assistance tried to establish contact. London staff, however, have been aware of what was happening since, after several schedules, the traffic stopped.

OCHET (W/T)

Was caught by R.D.F. of the Orpo on unit Monday, 1942.

ALMAS (W/T)

Call sign: T.R.O. Dutch cadet or sub-lieutenant, worked with success for a long time in Holland. All the efforts of the Orpo and Sipo were frustrated by his caution and skill. Was arrested in a trap set by the Sipo in the house of his girl friend in The Hague. He did not give any information about his mission or the other members of his group and next to TACKER was the best and most valuable agent when London sent to Holland and who fell into German hands.

HEINRICKER (W/T)

Was arrested by the Sipo in Amsterdam after his address had become known through the Nordpol traffic. He had for several months frustrated the efforts of the Orpo (R.D.F. and shadowing) who had brought special equipment to Holland for this purpose.

= First Group
(names no longer known)

Parachuted in Sept./Oct. 1943 near Graves or Nijmegen. The drop took place in the early evening when it was still quite light, close to a road where there were a lot of people so that the agents, who fell in a garden and on a roof, had to flee immediately, leaving W/T set, codes and a case full of their personal effects.

= Second Group
(names no longer known)

Landed Oct./Nov. 1943 near Graves. They were apparently expected by contacts of the First Group (see above) who helped them to hide their equipment in a neighbouring farm. In some way, however, troops in the neighbourhood got to hear of this and, without informing the Abwehr-Staffel or Sipo, occupied the farm. When later the agents returned to fetch their equipment, there was a fight, one being shot whilst the other escaped. One of these agents may have been a certain SCHRIJVERMAKER (Phillips factory, Sindsloven) as his name was marked on the clothes found.

380

5.

HEINTJE I, II, III, IV.

A group of agents arrested by the Sipo about Feb./March 1944 after HEINTJE II and III had been captured in Amsterdam on consecutive days whilst transmitting. Arrests were due to R.D.P. The Sipo tried to play them back (the Sipo "Egmont" affair); but London closed the traffic after several weeks with a message referring to the last message sent by III.F in the Nordpol case.

DEIGMANN

Was found dead in a shot down aircraft in the Zuidzee some time in the summer of 1943; had a large sum of foreign money and a letter of introduction from Capt. SOMER to a certain Burgemeester in Holland. His companion saved himself on a Dutch ship and escaped.

HUNTERMANN now states that he thinks that these two groups were the same as the HEINTJE I, II, III and IV group.

380

3. GISEKES' Knowledge of British Intelligence Services

Abwehr Abt. III and later Leitstelle III West were in possession of a great deal of information and details of the training, personalities, etc. of these services. As these books of reference were available, GISEKES did not bother to keep such information in his head, and therefore what he can give here is scrappy.

Exchange of information between the Sipo and III-F did not take place except occasionally, but GISEKES does know that the Sipo had a great deal of information on agents' schools in the U.K.

Names of Personalities in S.O.E.

The only names recollected by GISEKES are Lieut. Col. BLUNT and his successor Major BINGHAM, Miss BOND and Lieut. KNIGHT.

Schools known to GISEKES

- a) Patriotic School (for vetting)
- b) Parachute school in Ringway (four jumps, one by night)
- c) Sabotage school on a small island off Scotland
- d) A/T and cipher school in London.

The Luftwaffe knew of two airfields from which aircraft carrying agents used to leave the U.K.

Punk-Horchdienst and Fluko-Horchdienst

The Punk-Horchdienst knew some of the call signs of aircraft carrying agents to the Continent. According to GISEKES trial flights were made in the afternoon prior to the operation of that night, and it was in many cases possible to intercept traffic between the aircraft and its controlling station. When this traffic was reported to GISEKES, he concluded, and was generally right, that an operation would take place that night.

practice

The Fluko-Horchdienst were given special orders to plot the courses of single low-flying aeroplanes, and in this way from their reports GISEKES was able to get a general picture of the scope of dropping operations.

4. Double Play and Spielmaterial

Once contact had been made between III-F and an Allied Intelligence Service, authority for maintaining this contact had to be given by Abwehr Abt. III Berlin. Information was divided into four classes:-

a) Spielmaterial

Spielmaterial, i.e. a stock of information which was kept always ready and as far as possible up to date for passing to the Allied, was supplied either by ONS West or Abt. III.D, which supplied information on Germany of a political, military or economic nature.

b) Normal Routine Traffic

GISEKES had a free hand for the conduct of this and no authority was required from III.D, but at the end of each month a copy of all signals despatched was sent to Abwehr Abt. III Berlin.

38a

c) Answers to Specific Enquiries

All enquiries from the Allies had to be reported immediately to Abt. III. GISES was given authority to prepare drafts for the relevant answers. These drafts were first submitted to the Headquarters concerned for their approval and then to III.D. Information asked for on Germany was invariably supplied by III.D.

d) Deception

The Intelligence branches of the highest service authorities in the occupied countries concerned could pass to the relevant Abt information for deception purposes, but in such cases, the onus of informing III.D was on the originator, i.e. Intelligence branch of the service concerned.

5. Referat III.D.

A small section of the GEF at Berlin (Kirpitzufer), consisting of the Leiter, Oberst SCHEFFER, one technical assistant and a woman secretary.

With the absorption of the Abwehr by RSHA, III.D lost all significance and Spielmaterial of all descriptions was distributed entirely by the Ia branch of the Oberkommando der Wehr, and later Leitstelle III West.

GISES states that the whole policy of Spielmaterial and Deception was never thoroughly clarified and with the absorption of III.D by the RSHA, general confusion seemed reign.

One Source of Spielmaterial

GISES states that genuine seized espionage material was always a good source. The Dutch and Belgian Intelligence Services were in the habit of forwarding material in triplicate by three different means and if it could be established that copies of the seized material had already been sent through other channels, the seized material, even if correct, was passed through a German-controlled channel to inspire confidence.

J. H. ...
Major

Camp 020
E/ 6.45-
JH/MS

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Hunterman
per

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29/6


PROGRESS REPORT

in the cases of

GISKES and HURTEMANN

27.6.45.

1. Layout of Front Aufklärung.



Detailed organisation, appointments and directives of these Headquarters senior to the Leitstelle III West, are known to GISKES.

1/7

PROGRESS REPORT

SECRET

WAR ROOM

Hunterman file 370

36a

V.B.5 Mr. Townshend

Please refer to our note of 5.6.45 on GISKES.

The interrogation at Camp 020 of GISKES and HUNTEMANN is progressing, and before producing an Interim Report the interrogating officers are anxious to have detailed questionnaires to put to these two characters, both of whom are talking freely. You have already received a Progress Report on GISKES.

I am now enclosing the Field report on HUNTEMANN, and various preliminary reports on both men, and would very much appreciate the comments of your P sections on these, as well as any suggestions as to specific matters on which they would like the two men questioned further. For instance, are any S.I.S. agents still unaccounted for?

NING
HOLLAND.
NG
RZEN-

BLEICHER @ VERBECK is also at Camp 020. His interrogation is in its initial stages. Are there any special points to be cleared up in connection with S.I.S. agents who are known to have been in contact with, or to have worked for, BLEICHER?

W.R.C.A.C
27.6.1945

FP. 600, 861
FP. 601, 712
FP. 601, 382

601 832

GEN

28 JUN 1945

Handwritten signatures and initials, including "29/6/45" and "24.6.45".

regarding reconnoissance, or deception, of the enemy.

33F

34A

PROGRESS REPORT

SECRET

WAR ROOM

36a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Typed 1700 P.M. 21.6.45
Dispatched 21.6.45 1730
Channel OSS CX-2

Reference 448
Case Officer DD/WR
File 601,832

TO: 12TH ARMY GROUP
FROM: WAR ROOM BLUM

pa file.

- A. HUNTEMANN HAS GIVEN INFORMATION CONCERNING SOE AGENT JORDAAN WHOSE ACTIVITIES HE KNEW IN HOLLAND.
- B. HUNTEMANN STATES THAT ON 26 APRIL DURING HIS INTERROGATION AT "MIC" AT GOETTINGEN OR POSSIBLY SCHWARZENBORN HE LEARNED THAT JORDAAN HAD BEEN FREED FROM ORANIENBERG BY US TROOPS AND WAS THEN IN HOSPITAL.
- C. IF POSSIBLE PLEASE INFORM US PRESENT LOCATION JORDAAN AS THIS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SOE.
- D. JORDAAN IS DUTCH NATIONAL BORN HAAKSBERGEN JULY 1918, HEIGHT 6'5", BLUE EYES, FAIR HAIR, LONG FACE.

24 JUN 1945

DISTRIBUTION

1 D/WR 1 WR/WR 1 WR/DSDOC 1 W/F 1 WRX 1 CARD 2 SIS(VF)
1 OSSX2 3 DD/WR

WFC
24 6 25

regarding reconnaissance, or deception, of the enemy.