

schen Banknoten reichlich ausgerüstet worden. Wie sollten solche Aufträge, die allein von den Funkmeldungen abhingen, scheitern können? Und wodurch?

Da war guter Rat teuer. Es galt immer neue Ausflüchte, immer neue Erklärungen zu erfinden. Sie mußten logisch bis ins letzte durchdacht sein, sie durften keine Lücke offen lassen, durch die ein Mißtrauen hereinschlüpfen konnte. Und dann kam der Augenblick, wo auf alle Fälle Aktionen konstruiert werden mußten...

Ein Agent wird zurückgerufen

London erwartete zum Beispiel Jambroes zurück. Diese Tatsache hatte der umsichtige Pionieroffizier verschwiegen. Sie mußte nach seinen Berechnungen einmal jenes Täuschungsmanöver auffliegen lassen. Giskes und Schreieder erleben die dringenden Mahnungen zur Rückkehr. Die Situation ist äußerst prekär. Schließlich gibt man seine angebliche Abreise über die Escape Line via Spanien nach London durch. Jambroes kommt aber, wie es erklärlich ist, nicht an. Das ist Veranlassung genug, um den gemeldeten Nachfolger, den Agenten Beukema toe Water, anzufordern. Man kann sich vorstellen, wie wichtig für den Tag X diese Vorbereitungen des Unternehmens Jambroes gewertet wurden. Man mußte in London berichtet haben. Beukema toe Water startete dann — nach deutscher Funkmeldung — mit einem Motorboot. Auch er schien auf dieser Fahrt verlorengegangen zu sein, da er nicht erschien. Darum drängt London um Bericht durch den Nachfolger. Die Deutschen bitten „von einem dauernden Wechsel der Leitung abzusehen“. London aber will einen Berichterstatter. Über den Strohmännchen, den Giskes durch echte und falsche Spione, mit und ohne Hilfe der Grenzpolizei, schließlich nach Portugal bringen läßt, von wo aus er dann später das HQ erreicht, über diesen Vertreter war man in London höchst unzufrieden und ungehalten. Man hatte einen völligen Ignoranten vor sich. Im Office des SOE schüttelte man den Kopf. Es gab ein paar Fachleute, die damals nicht mit ihrer Meinung zurückhielten, aber leider nicht gehört wurden. Die Deutschen wunderte das keineswegs, daß sie anderer Meinung waren als sie.

Kontroll-Agenten kommen

Eines Tages spielte man von England zwei Agenten herüber, die völlig selbständig waren und für die man nur zwei Kontaktadressen in Brüssel und in Holland erbat. Einer der Agenten kam schließlich bei einem V-Mann, den Giskes in Brüssel hatte, an. Wo aber war der andere geblieben, fragten sich die Deutschen. Es wurde peinlich, und schwieriger von Tag zu Tag. Zuviel der Bälle, die die einzeln spielende Hand in sich vereinigen wollte, zu schneller Rhythmus, mit dem man von London aus dieses Jonglieren begleitete. Apollo und Brutus waren die Decknamen der beiden, die von London aus angekündigt waren. Die Maschine der RAF geriet kurz nach Überfliegen des Kanals über belgischem Boden in deutsches Flakfeuer und stürzte brennend ab. Nach einer glücklichen Notlandung trennten sich die beiden Agenten und erreichten erst später die von Holland durchgegebenen Kontaktadressen. Schreieder läßt sie bewußt in Ruhe, beobachtet sie nur. Apollo ist mit einem Male dann aus dem Blickfeld dieser Beobachtung verschwunden. Auch Brutus will sich von seinem Stützpunkt entfernen. Darüber wird er verhaftet. Er gibt bei seiner Vernehmung zu, daß er den Auftrag hatte, die illegale Presse im allgemeinen Widerstand zu lenken. Sein Freund Apollo aber sitzt längst wieder in London. Niemand vermag bei den Deutschen zu sagen, ob er Verdacht schöpfte. Sie wissen nicht, inwieweit man sie durchschaut. Sicherlich stehen diese Fragen, wann das Spiel zu Ende gehen wird und wer es zu Ende bringt, täglich vor ihnen auf. Schreieder macht sich darüber seine eigenen Gedanken, die er wie so vieles jedoch verschweigt.

Es geht zu Ende

Es hatte sich gezeigt, daß es noch ein paar andere Linien gab, auf denen man Material sicher nach England bringen konnte. Die aber lagen nicht in der Hand der Abwehr. Man tat sich überhaupt bei den Spionageleuten schwerer als bei den Sabotageleuten. Bei den ersteren ging es um klare Unterlagen, die man in London sehen wollte. Was nutzte da ein Spiel? Was nutzten da die kunstvollsten Versuche der deutschen Militärs, um Material zu erstellen? Man konnte das England-Spiel umgehen! Man mußte andere Wege finden.

Es kann nicht von der Hand gewiesen werden, daß Schreieder damals begann, sich mit solchen Gedanken vertraut zu machen. Das England-Spiel war für ihn bereits aus. Er buchte tonnenweise Waffen, Munition, Zehntausende Menschen und viel Geld auf seiner Seite. Er hatte London Tag und Nacht beschäftigt. Die Deutschen hatten viel dabei gewonnen. Weit über allem aber stand die Erkenntnis: Der Tag X würde an der Kanalküste stattfinden! Die Invasion würde auch Holland in ihren Raum einbeziehen. Dieses Wissen, belegt an den Vorgängen von fast anderthalb Jahren, war der Mühe wert. Ihm verblieb nur die Aufgabe, den Zeitpunkt zu erfahren, oder nach dem System der Astronomen ihn zu berechnen. Das war seine neue Arbeit. Dazu würde ihm die letzte Verbindung dienen müssen.

Zwei Agenten flüchten

Neue Schwierigkeiten tauchen auf, als in der Nacht zum 30. August 1943 Ubbink und Dourlein, zwei Agenten, aus Haaren ausbrechen und entkommen. Das Spiel geht wirklich dem Ende zu.

Ubbink hat den Agentennamen Udema, Dourlein heißt Diepenbroek. Der letztere ist am 10. März, sozusagen zum Jahrestag des England-Spiels, Schreieder vom Himmel geworfen worden. Der 29. August ist ein Samstag. Es ist ein Tag wie jeder andere für die auf Eis gelegten Agenten. Sie wissen nichts von draußen. Man hält sie isoliert wie in einem Kloster. Über ihren Zellen befinden sich Oberlichter, die von zwei Eisenstangen im Abstände von 25 cm waagrecht gesichert werden. Die Wachmannschaft teilt das Abendessen aus. In dem Augenblick, da sich die Essenträger auf der anderen Seite des Flurs befinden, zwängen sich Ubbink und Dourlein durch diese Stangen hindurch. Es ist in der Tat ein Kunststück ersten Ranges, den Körper hindurchzubekommen und in den nur augenblicklich unbewachten Flur herabfallen zu lassen. Es gelingt. Sie erreichen die Aborte, deren Fenster nicht besonders gesichert sind. Hier verbergen sie sich bis zur Nacht. Mit einem Seil, das sie aus der Bettunterlage geflochten haben, lassen sie sich in der Dunkelheit zum Garten hinunter. Ein gefährliches, aber glückliches Wagnis. Die Nacht ist ihnen günstig, und die Kenntnis der Gegend. So überwinden sie Stacheldraht und Wassergräben. Sie sind frei. Mit Hilfe von Geistlichen, Patrioten, Widerstandskämpfern und

Schmugglern erreichen sie endlich über viele Umwege die Schweizer Grenze und die Kontakteute in der Schweiz. Sie haben die Escape Line vermieden. Niemand ist sicher, geht er nicht seine eigenen Wege.

Schreieder hat mit Giskes ein paar ernste Stunden und Gespräche. Die Bewachung und Inhaftierung untersteht der Sicherheitspolizei. So leid es Giskes tut, daß die Agenten über alle Berge sind, so ist er doch irgendwie froh, „nicht diese Suppe auslöffeln zu müssen“, wie er sagt, etwas zu sehr im Kasinoton, empfindet Schreieder, der bereits nach einem Löffel sucht.

Als Zuschauer in einem Schachspiel gibt es keine größere Überraschung, als wenn ein fast aussichtsloser Zug plötzlich zum Erfolg führt. Die Partie war zwar verloren, aber sie mußte elegant zu Ende gebracht werden. Eigentlich war alles sehr aussichtslos. Ubbink und Dourlein gaben in der Schweiz ihre Berichte nach London über den holländischen Militärattaché, der entsetzt ist. Schreieder fühlt, daß alles auf ihn ankommt. Da beginnt er von neuem.

Spekulation auf den Ehrgeiz

Es ist eines jener psychologischen Experimente, auf die nur ein Kriminalist verfallen kann, der Erfahrung mit Menschen und Militärs besitzt. Zwölf Stunden, nachdem alle Nachforschungen nach den Entflohenen eingestellt sind, läßt er über den Funk eine dringende Warnung an London senden, in der er die Tatsachen, die Ubbink und Dourlein bei ihrer Ankunft in London von sich geben werden, als Legende bezeichnet. Die beiden Agenten seien schmählich zu dem Feinde übergelaufen. Sie hätten bestimmte Aufträge übernommen, würden versuchen, das HQ zu bluffen. „Seien Sie auf der Hut“, schließt die Warnung.

Man könnte sich der Meinung Giskes anschließen, der mit allen Beweisgründen seinem Kollegen klarzumachen versucht, daß „daruf kein Pferd hereinfalle“ und man so dumm nicht einmal beim Secret Service sei, um das zu glauben. Schreieder bedachte, daß diese Meinung begreiflich sei und daß er so denken mußte, denn Giskes gehörte zu den Militärs, er war aber kein Kriminalist. Schreieder bedachte, daß in London „der Streber Bingham“, wie er sich ausdrückte, Karriere gemacht hatte, nachdem Blunt-Blizzard

die Operationsbasis Italien übernahm. Würde dieser Mann, dessen Stellung, dessen Ansehen und Ehre davon abhing, daß er seit anderthalb Jahren Erfolg meldete, freiwillig bekennen, er habe sich täuschen lassen, man habe ihn überspielt, fast zwei Jahre lang. Würden die Mitarbeiter und Assistenten, die er besaß, so schnell umstecken können, ohne militärischen Selbstmord zu begehen? Der Kriminalist sagte: Nein, und die Erfahrung gab ihm recht.

Die beiden Agenten machten sich noch einmal von der Schweiz auf und gingen ihren schweren Weg durch das vom Feinde besetzte Land. Nach vielen Tagen gelang es ihnen, die spanische Grenze zu erreichen, dann kamen sie nach Portugal und nach England. Hier wurden sie nach ihrer Landung noch auf dem Flugfeld verhaftet und ins Gefängnis eingeliefert. Niemand verübte militärischen Selbstmord. Alles blieb beim alten erfolgreichen Kurs, der höchste Anerkennung, der Orden und Auszeichnungen gebracht hatte.

Die verpaßte Chance der anderen

Hätte man umzustecken brauchen? Es muß schon gesagt werden: Nein! Bingham hatte damals eine Chance in seiner Hand und das Spiel hätte in der Erkenntnis, welchen Gegner er vor sich hatte, zu einem ungeheuren Erfolg und würdig der Tradition des englischen Geheimdienstes umgestaltet werden können. Die deutsche Abwehr konnte mit der Zeit nur noch eine Absicht haben, eine klare Erkenntnis zu erlangen, wann der Tag X fällig würde. Hier hätte Bingham sogar unter dem Einsatz von Agenten die England-Spieler völlig irreleiten können. Den Alliierten wären manche Opfer und Mühen erspart geblieben.

Noch läuft das Spiel. Aber schon hat das Interesse bei den Deutschen nachgelassen. Sie funken, sie empfangen. Keine allzugroße Beratung entsteht, als am 23. November der erneute Ausbruch von drei Insassen aus Haaren gemeldet wird. Man sucht zwar intensiv, aber auch diesmal vergebens. Man findet sie nicht. Wie es diesmal geschehen konnte, ist kein großes Rätsel. Die Agenten van Rietschoten und van der Giessen haben mit ihrem Kameraden Wegner es fertig gebracht, ein Loch in die Decke der Zelle zu sägen, unbemerkt mit einer kleinen Feile, in mühevoller wochenlanger Arbeit. In einer

stürmischen regenschweren Novembernacht gelingt es ihnen, in ähnlicher Weise wie ihren Vorgängern, an selbstgeflochtenem Tau zu entkommen. Nichts vermag diese Tatsache zu ändern.

Das Spiel ist aus!

Die Entkommenen haben längst mit der Widerstandsbewegung Verbindung aufgenommen. England erhält Berichte über Berichte, Warnung über Warnung. Es läßt sich nicht mehr verheimlichen. Man ist phantastisch getäuscht worden. Man muß umstecken. Ein paar Worte fielen, aber der Krieg kennt keine Reminiszenzen. Die Realität des täglichen Geschehens drängt das schon Vergangene in den Hintergrund. Den Tag X hat der Gegner nicht erfahren. Man weiß zwar nicht, wieviel Linien die Deutschen in ihrer Hand halten. Nun tastet man den Gegner ab. Man verspürt, wie er überall ist. Überall die nichtssagenden Antworten, die verraten, daß er formal die Linien im Funk noch aufrecht erhält. So wechseln noch Anrufe und Abmeldung. Dann schlafen die Sendungen langsam ein.

Der letzte Aprilscherz

Am 1. April 1944 geht in London auf einer der letzten Linien folgender verschlüsselter Funkspruch ein, der ordnungsgemäß bestätigt wird:

„Wir haben festgestellt, daß Sie schon seit längerem ohne uns in Holland Geschäfte tätigen stop / Da wir für lange Zeit Ihre einzigen Vertreter waren, glauben wir, daß dies sehr unfair von Ihnen ist stop / Das ändert aber nichts daran, daß, sollten Sie sich vornehmen, in größerem Ausmaße uns zu besuchen, Sie mit derselben Gastlichkeit von uns bedacht werden wie Ihre Agenten stop /.“

Ironie, Drohung, Resignation, Stolz auf eine einmalige Leistung, — alles dies liegt in diesem merkwürdigen Text, mit dem die größte Spionageaffäre dieser Zeit ihren Abschluß fand.

Eine stolze Bilanz

Zwanzig Monate lang stand während des letzten Weltkrieges der englische Secret Service mit den Deutschen auf achtzehn verschiedenen Wellenlängen in Funkverkehr, ohne zu ahnen, daß der Feind im Besitz dieser wertvollsten Stützpunkte auf dem Festland war.

Zwanzig Monate lang, vom März 1942 bis zum Ende des Jahres 1943, lieferten die Alliierten über den Luftweg tonnenweise Waffen, Sprengstoffe, Sabotagematerial an den Gegner. Ungeheure Geldsummen, ausgebildete Sabotageagenten und vaterlandsliebende Kämpfer gegen den Landesfeind wurden von der deutschen Sicherungspolizei angefordert und von der Royal Air Force ahnungslos abgeworfen.

Erst nach großen Verlusten und schwersten Opfern gelang es, in diesem fast aussichtslosen Kampf der holländischen Widerstandsbewegung, England zu warnen. Mit dem letzten Funkspruch der Deutschen an die Gegenspieler in London, am 1. April 1944, fiel der Vorhang über eine Tragödie. Damit schlossen sich die Akten über der Geheimen Reichssache Az. IV E — 17 471,42 —, dem „England-Spiel“.

Die letzten Geheimnisse darin sind noch lange nicht geklärt. Sie werden erst geklärt werden, wenn die Köpfe des Spieles selbst eines Tages das Wort ergreifen werden. Werden sie es tun?

Was sagen die offiziellen Berichterstatter?

Wo lag auf alliierter Seite der Fehler? Wie kamen die Deutschen zu ihrem Erfolg?

Immer werden diese Fragen gestellt werden, wie sie bisher gestellt wurden. In den Zeitungen, in Rundfunkkommentaren des Auslandes, im offiziellen Werk der Untersuchungskommission, in den zahlreichen Verhören der Kriegsgerichte versuchte man sie zu beantworten. Holland und England vor allem legten Wert darauf, Klarheit zu schaffen, um jene Verstimmung zu überbrücken, die unter den Bundesgenossen wegen jener Vorgänge eingetreten war.

Ein hoher Beamter der holländischen Regierung stellte fest: „Es dürften unglaubliche Fehler in London gemacht worden sein.“

Ein alliierter Nachrichtenoffizier vertritt in einem zweibändigen Werk die Auffassung, daß an der Schlüsselstelle des englischen Geheimdienstes, eine der wichtigsten Zentralen für das „England-Spiel“, ein deutscher Abwehrmann saß, so daß jeder Schlag vom englischen Raum aus ins Leere geführt wurde.

Ein Advokat und holländischer Verteidiger während der Kriegsverbrecherprozesse behauptete mit Nachdruck, daß der Chef der deutschen Gegenspionage im Auftrage Englands und mit Kenntnis

hoher englischer Stellen gearbeitet habe. England habe sein eigenes Spiel gespielt. Warum? Wer die Hintergründe kennt, weiß, daß dies Phantasien sind.

Ein deutscher Nachrichtenoffizier erklärte, das England-Spiel sei das „phantastischste und gelungenste Wagnis, das Trojanische Pferd der anderen heimlich zu vertauschen“.

Und Schreieder? Was wird die Welt erfahren, wenn er selbst das Wort ergreift?

Und die andere Seite?

Opfer wurden gebracht, Leben und Tod galten nichts bei den freiheitsliebenden Kämpfern, die absprangen. Die große Tragik, die durch alle Akte des England-Spiels geht, ist nicht zu beschreiben. Dieses Spionagedrama beweist besonders kraß den Widersinn des heroischen Opfers in einem modernen Kriege. Es waren die wertvollsten Europäer, die in diesem Kriege vernichtet wurden. Man sollte ihnen dadurch ein Denkmal setzen, daß man die letzten Reste des Kontinents, in dessen Namen sie stritten und fielen, vereinigt. Der Wahnsinn eines europäischen Krieges dürfte dann für alle Zeiten vorbei sein.

Ausklang

Die großen Spieler aber sind einsam geworden. Sie, die sich nicht kannten und doch bekämpften, die allein im Hintergrund blieben, während auf dem Schachbrett ihre Partie begann, remis stand und dann sich entschied. Sie erinnern sich wohl zuweilen und werden zuweilen erinnert.

Ihre Figuren sind zum großen Teil in das dunkle Land gewandert. Man schreibt das fünfte Jahr nach dem größten der Kriege. Die Lebenden und die Toten, die Spieler und die, mit denen das Spiel ausgetragen wurde, sie gehören schon der Geschichte an, die sich seit kurzem schneller in das Buch der Menschheit schreibt.

Wer erkennt den englischen Privatmann Bingham, wenn er sein Haus verläßt, seinen Tabak einkauft und einen seiner Spaziergänge unternimmt, wie die vielen pensionierten Militärs. Man hat

es ihm sogar einmal übel vermerkt, daß er, da er blind spielen mußte, kein Glück hatte. Sein ehemaliger Vorgesetzter aber brachte es zum General.

In Deutschland, nicht weit von der holländischen Grenze, lebt der ehemalige Oberstleutnant Giskes, ein entlassener Soldat. Wer weiß, wenn er durch die Straßen des kleinen Städtchens schreitet, was er einmal der deutschen Abwehr für Dienste leistete?

Der Kriminaldirektor ist nach Süddeutschland heimgekehrt, unbemerkt und fast unbekannt lebt er in einer der großen Städte, die die Wunden des Krieges noch allzu sichtbar tragen. Wer erkennt in ihm jenen „Doktor Mabuse“, wenn er mit seinen Söhnen zum Sportplatz geht?

Über den Akten der Kriegsarchive gebeugt, sitzen die Sachbearbeiter und erstellen die Berichte. Es ist nicht leicht, durch das Gewirr der vielen Fäden, des Geheimen und Geheimsten, einen Weg zu finden. Vieles bleibt ein Rätsel. Selbst denen, die im großen Spiel führten!

Eine merkwürdige und tröstliche Lehre nur ist geblieben: sogar in dieser finsternen Welt des erbarmungslosen Kampfes im Dunkeln siegt über alle Technik, siegt über alle Organisation die überlegene menschliche Persönlichkeit, der Geist, der plant und das Herz, das keiner Gewalt bedarf, um im Gespräch von Mensch zu Mensch auch dem Feind ein gefährliches Geheimnis zu entreißen.

DAS „ENGLAND-SPIEL“

jenes Unternehmen der deutschen Contra-Spionage, von dem diese Broschüre einen kurzgefaßten Abriß gibt, gehört zu den unglaublichen Tatsachen des letzten Krieges. In oft leidenschaftlichen Diskussionen hat sich die Öffentlichkeit in den Ländern der westlichen Allianz dieses Stoffes bemächtigt und zwischen Anklage und Verteidigung versuchten neutrale Beobachter, die Wahrheit um den wohl umfassendsten Fall der erfolgreichen Gegenspionage zu finden. In über zweitausend Vernehmungen hat Kriminaldirektor Joseph Schreieder, einer der Initiatoren des Unternehmens, selbst den Gerichten und Untersuchungsbehörden der Westmächte Rede und Antwort gestanden. Das dieser Broschüre folgende umfangreiche Buch Schreieders

Wir funkten mit London

DAS „ENGLAND-SPIEL“

DER DEUTSCHEN GEGENSPIONAGE

1942/43

wird die lückenlose Aufklärung über jene Geheimnisse bringen, welche die holländischen Nächte in den Jahren 1942/43 den Augen der Nichteingeweihten entzogen. Wie ein spannender Film rollt das Geschehen vor uns ab, reibt sich Bild an Bild zu einem Spiel, das in

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MÜNCHEN

allen seinen Einzelheiten bestimmt wird durch die Persönlichkeit dieses großen Regisseurs, dessen menschliche Anständigkeit auch unter den kalten Gesetzen des unsichtbaren Krieges erhalten blieb.

Das Buch Schreieders geht über die authentische Berichterstattung hinaus, indem es Fragen aufwirft, die für die Völker unserer Zeit ungewöhnliche Bedeutung haben und die zu bannen sich noch keine internationale Konferenz bereitgefunden hat. Da ist das tragische Problem der Kollaboration, die Zusammenarbeit von Einwohnern besetzter Länder mit dem siegreichen Feind als eine Frage, die solange die Menschen bedrückt und belastet, solange der Zwiespalt in unserer Welt nicht überwunden ist. Feigheit oder Vernunft, Idealismus oder Verrat — was gestern Franzosen, Belgier, Holländer und Russen anging, interessiert heute und morgen andere, die durch die Anwesenheit eines Siegers zur Kollaboration kommen könnten!

So erleben wir mit dem ungewöhnlichen Buch Schreieders nicht nur einen überaus spannenden Abriß jüngster Geschichte, sondern wir werden durch diese auch unausbleiblich in die Problematik hineinversetzt, die nach den Prozessen der Nachkriegszeit erst recht zur bangen Frage der Menschheit geworden ist.

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PROFESSOR WOLFGANG FOERSTER

Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg

Ein historisch-wissenschaftliches Werk, das die Bemühungen des deutschen Generalstabes — vor allem seines Chefs, Generaloberst Ludwig Beck — schildert, Hitler von seinen Kriegsplänen abzubringen. Dieses Werk, dessen Richtigkeit niemand bestreiten kann, räumt ein für allemal mit dem Märchen von der Kriegslüsterheit der deutschen Generalität auf. Es zeigt aber auch, wo die Gefahren in Zukunft liegen, und was ein Volk wissen und tun muß, um vor Kriegsabenteuern seiner Politiker sich schützen zu können (kt., DM 4,—).


WILHELM VON SCHRAMM

Rommel — Schicksal eines Deutschen

Spannend wie ein Kriminalfilm und dennoch tief erschütternd liest sich dieses flüssig geschriebene Büchlein, das den jurchbaren Leidensweg schildert, den der volkstümlichste Soldatenführer des zweiten Weltkrieges gehen mußte, der Mann, der bei dem Feinde ebenso populär und beliebt war wie bei seinen Afrika-Kämpfern und der auf der Landstraße wenige Minuten von seinem Heim entfernt, sterben mußte, weil er zu denen gehörte, die noch in letzter Stunde das Verhängnis ihres Volkes wenden wollten (brosch., DM 1,—).

SCHREIEDER

UND DIE SPIONE



**Kriminaldirektor Schreieder
steht im Mittelpunkt des
Geheimunternehmens**

»ENGLAND-SPIEL«

**das seit Kriegsende in den
alliierten Ländern leiden-
schaftlich diskutiert wird.**

**Dies ist der erste deutsche
Bericht über Ablauf und
Erfolg dieses Unternehmens**

SCHREIEDER UND DIE SPIONE

Der erste deutsche Bericht über das „England-Spiel“

von L. D. GERSON

MÜNCHENER DOM-VERLAG · MÜNCHEN 2

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SECRET

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17a

4th July, 1951.

OL. 500,951/D.4./1117.

Dear

Our attention has been drawn by D. S. O. Gibraltar to some articles appearing in the Spanish daily newspaper, Patria, published in Granada, which are serialising a book about German counter-espionage activities in the last war. The series is called 'Técnicas y Enigma del Espionaje', and authorship is ascribed to L. D. GERSON. Reproduction rights have been granted by the Münchener-Dom-Verlag publishing company.

We would be grateful if you could let us know whether the book is in any way authentic, and if it is likely to be of value I wonder whether you would obtain a copy for us from Germany or Spain.

Yours sincerely,

Lt. Colonel T. H. Winterborn.

M. L. G.

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Ref: L.B.

Q. 20 JUN 1951

11th June, 1951.

TO 023/SLB

Director General.

REF Gen.

14a

Please refer to your SLB/GEN of 30th May, 1951.

2. I am drawing the attention of M.I.6. to the articles mentioned in my L.B. of 17th May, 1951.

3. I agree that they are of interest to M.I.6., but I would have thought that from the technical point of view, as they contained a great deal of extremely revealing information about the way the German counter-espionage service had been able to operate against M.I.6., that information might have been of interest to our own Service.

4. It has often occurred to me that there would be an advantage to the Service in making one officer, perhaps on a part-time basis, responsible for a certain amount of research in counter-espionage techniques as revealed in the operations of foreign counter espionage services.

in the
Part?

5. Perhaps this work is already being done somewhere in Head Office?

D. J. Schen

Defence Security Officer.

SECRET

DJS/MW.

1/22-6-51

SECRET

~~120~~
14a

SLB/GEN

30th May 1951.

D.S.O. Gibraltar.

~~120~~
13a
Your reference L.B. of 17.5.51.

The English version of "Tecnica y Enigma del Espionaje" is not known to S.I.B. From the text of your opening paragraph, it would seem that this manuscript would be more of interest to M.I.6., rather than to us.

B. A. Hill

for Director-General.

DPK/DM.

SECRET

W. J. Wecher

13a 48/2/53 589/11

**DEFENCE SECURITY OFFICE,
13, COLLEGE LANE,
GIBRALTAR.**

Ref: L.B.

17th May, 1951.

ENCLOSURE

24 MAY 1951

TO ~~OSB~~ ^B / ~~B2c~~ (J.R.K.) - Any instant?

Director General.

REF

The Spanish daily newspaper "Patria", published in Granada, is serialising a book about German counter-espionage activities during the last war, with particular reference to their alleged penetration of the British Intelligence Service's use of underground groups in Holland.

2. The title given to the series is "Tecnica y Enigma del Espionaje", and authorship is ascribed to L. D. GERSON. Right of reproduction has been granted by the Munchener-Dom-Verlag publishing company.

3. I am drawing your attention to this series because of the wealth of detail about counter espionage methods, which is revealed in the two or three articles in the series which I have happened to see. If the English version is not already known to you, you may wish to look at a copy from that point of view.

D. J. Schen

Defence Security Officer.

DJS/MW.

organisation should have no
and stores to the sabotage organisation and should pass bodie
Supplies by Air

SECRET

Minute Sheet No. *477*

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM.

From *B.1 Reg*

To *B.1 Lt. Thanks you*

Is the attached of any interest to you, please?
Will you please P.A. to me?

DMG/...

PA 52/805/815

Date.....

Signature.....

U.S. Form 161/B.P./10000//1.43.

of

Enc

26.1.44

161.

would kindly return these papers
seen them.

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM

*BIB Paper 477
written
[Signature]
[Signature]*

From..... B.1.d/L.R.C.

To..... D.D.B. Mr. White.

Seen thank you. I have shown these notes to those of my officers who are interested.

Enc: S.O.E. letter of 17.1.44.

H. J. Baxter

Date..... 26.1.44.

Signature.....

H. J. Baxter.

Form 161.

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INTER-SERVICES RESEARCH BUREAU.

64, BAKER STREET.

LONDON, W. 1.

28

B (Major Wethered)

Register No.

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

Minute Sheet No.

477

B.1.D/LRC Colonel Baxter

Reference the attached papers, my only comment is that I am glad to find that the agent who was responsible for these notes has, in paras. 2 (d) and 4 (a) and (b), made reference to the necessity for cut-outs for secret organisations in the field. I think probably the country referred to is Belgium, where apparently a very much better system of security exists in security work than in France. Judging by the extent of penetration which has continued in France during the last year and more, and where various agents meet and are known to one another in spite of instructions to the contrary, it has seemed to me for some time that the only possible method of handling the problem is to make it impossible for one agent to contact members of other organisations, or even of his own, with whom he has not got the necessity to deal. I am told by Fl/Lt. Miller of S.O.E. that in Belgium this security principle is recognised and in Miller's view fairly well observed. In France and other countries it has certainly been overlooked, and this often accounts for the failure of S.O.E. and other organisations.

Perhaps you would kindly return these papers to D.D.B. when you have seen them.

Plastic

B.1.B
20.1.1944

of

where the sympathies of the police are proved beyond question. In 9 cases out of 10 the friendly policeman is a dangerous agent provocateur).

(d) Groups must be organised in strictly separate compartments;

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426

BIB (Maj. Wethered)

Show to d.R.C.
relevant parts.
A₇ Comments?

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19/11



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INTER-SERVICES RESEARCH BUREAU.

64, BAKER STREET,

LONDON, W. 1.

ARB/108/4564

17th January 1944

My dear *Sarker*

I send you herewith a copy of some notes extracted from the report of a chief organiser of a sabotage group.

There may be one or two points which will interest you or on which you may be able to comment to our advantage.

I have sent copies to A.C.S.S. and Section V.

Yours *men*

ARB/L

Brigadier O.A. Harker, C.B.E.
M.I.5.

2g B

Any remarks?

800 H

18/c

where the sympathies of the police are proved beyond question
In 9 cases out of 10 the friendly policeman is a dangerous
agent provocateur!


The following notes are extracted from a full report by the chief organiser of a sabotage group which has achieved outstanding results; they are circulated as being of interest to Country

12a

APPENDIX A.

SET UP.

(Cut-outs used as in Para 4a.)



(c) Friendly elements in the police can supply information of great value. (Comment: only to be permitted in rare cases, where the sympathies of the police are ...)

MOST SECRET

12a^{u17}

PLANNING AND ORGANISATION IN THE FIELD.

The following notes are extracted from a full report by the chief organiser of a sabotage group which has achieved outstanding results; they are circulated as being of interest to Country Sections in England and overseas for purposes of planning and organisation. Some of the subject matter is only relevant to conditions in an occupied Allied Country in Western Europe, but many of the principles described are of general application.

1. TRAINING.

(a) At Home. The chief organiser said that even the full 9 months training which he had spent at the various schools was not excessive and that agents cannot, in fact, be trained enough.

(b) In the Field. 6 lectures of one hour each were estimated as necessary to teach recruits in his country on demolitions. Lectures should never be held in the same place twice. Cellars are amongst the places chosen for lecturing. Agents should be brought out of the field after 6 months, wherever possible, to render a report and receive further training; if left in the field longer than 6 months, they run a grave risk of being compromised and in any event they need a refresher course if they are to maintain their standards.

2. SECURITY - Some general principles.

(a) Illegal work should be done by legal people. The employment of people living an underground existence because of their political or criminal activities is dangerous and financially expensive. (Comment. This of course does not apply to countries which have reached the stage of guerilla warfare. It is, however, a sound principle when organising clandestine sabotage in a highly developed country, where the population are not openly resisting the occupier. There have been many cases where the arrest of a man for some technical irregularity or previous political activity has led to the discovery of his sabotage connections and to the exposure of his organisation.)

(b) Indiscretion must be treated at once and with severity. One member was indiscreet; the Germans did not arrest him but tried to bribe him to disclose the names of his leaders. He had to be shot by his own group.

(c) Friendly elements in the police can supply information of great value. (Comment: only to be permitted in rare cases, where the sympathies of the police are proved beyond question. In 9 cases out of 10 the friendly policeman is a dangerous agent provocateur).

(d) Groups must be organised in strictly separate compartments; see appendix A. The reception organisation should have no knowledge of the sabotage organisation and should pass bodies and stores to the sabotage organisation through cut-outs.

Supplies by Air.

(a) On arrival of the aircraft prearranged signals were exchanged and whenever possible S-phones used to exchange information with the aircraft. (Comment. It is particularly important for the reception committee to know how many bodies,

containers and packages are to be dropped; in the absence of this information they may spend time searching for non-existent containers or may leave one or more containers uncollected, thus not only losing valuable stores but also compromising the reception ground.)

(b) Personnel dropped should be suitably clothed and escorted away from the ground independently and housed and fed immediately, if possible.

(c) Supplies when dropped to one organisation are put into suitcases and taken away either by car or by a farm-cart driven by an old farmer. The latter method has usually proved the more successful.

3. TRANSPORT OF STORES.

Suitcases containing explosives belonging to this organisation are put in a compartment at railway stations, preferably at termini when the train is empty. The person responsible for the cases occupies another compartment and in case of search disclaims all knowledge. At his destination he takes the cases away. Cars, buses and trams are also used.

4. COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) Internal. Cut-outs are extensively used, including telephone cut-outs. Letters from the Head of one group to the Chief Organiser, for instance, are passed firstly to cut-out "A" on whom cut-out "B" calls daily to collect mail which he passes to cut-out "C" who in turn passes them to the Chief Organiser. The same procedure is used for messages from the Chief Organiser to the Head of a Group. Messages are always sent by Courier; never by post. Once monthly, but on different days, the Head of a Group and the Chief Organiser meet, always at a different place and time, arrangements being made by a cut-out.

(b) H/T. Messages are encoded by the Chief Organiser who passes them through cut-outs to his operator. The Operator has many transmitting sites, and through a contact has the set taken to the site chosen. 10 minutes before schedule time, 2 men take up positions in the street (in 'phone boxes if possible) to give warning of any approach of danger. 2 minutes before schedule time the Operator arrives, goes on the air for not more than 8 minutes, and leaves immediately. Messages are received independently by another operator and passed to the Chief Organiser through cut-outs; incoming messages are acknowledged ONLY when there is an outgoing message to be transmitted. Messages are received on an innocent looking but specially wired receiving set, which would not arouse suspicion if the house were searched unless examined critically by a technician. All messages from Heads of Groups are sent direct to London, who repeats them to the Chief Organiser.

(c) Courier. Small undeveloped films of all correspondence are smuggled out to a neutral country and can easily be destroyed if a search takes place.

ACCOMMODATION.

Flats are rented for housing personnel; never more than one person stays in any one flat, at any one time. For security reasons it has been found inadvisable to stay with friends. They are too prone to ask questions and the agent is too prone to talk.

120

6. COVER.

One Organiser successfully adopted the identity of a man in whose name a flat was rented. He had the man's identity card, but with his own photo; received the man's mail and ration cards; had his name in the telephone directory; got himself appointed Air Raid Warden and applied to take a Warden's course under German supervision.

7. SABOTAGE.

Groups should not consist of more than 5 men. The target is kept under observation for some time in advance and when the attack is made the sentries or watchmen tied and gagged or locked up. Sabotage should always be effected by as few persons as possible. The use of petrol in incendiarism is recommended.

8. PROPAGANDA.

A Non-Political Council of Liberation was formed by this particular Organisation, communists working in harmony with Conservatives, and the Organisation's activities reported in a Underground Paper which had a large circulation.

9. GENERAL.

(a) At dinner parties collections are made of ration cards for those persons unable to obtain them legally.

(b) Each agent receives equivalent of £5 at a time, for which he has to account; thrift is encouraged.

10. ESCAPE LINES.

Once a man is known to be compromised he should be evacuated. A special safe house should be kept in reserve exclusively for evacuation purposes. One Organisation gives a number to its members who are leaving and tells them to whom they should report on their arrival in the neutral country. By this number the person, to whom he reports on arrival, knows what he has been doing, whether his work was successful, whether he should be sent on to England. A separate evacuation line is used for members or potential recruits rescued from prisons.

13th January, 1944.

months to ... A very much greater number of ...
in France. ... than in any other European country.
... there

MOST SECRET

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

116

B.1.D/L.R.C. Major Baxter

I thought it might be helpful if I were to prepare some sort of monthly report on S.O.E. cases and matters of interest with which I come in contact. The attached is the first of such reports. Where any organisation, such as the BISHOP organisation referred to in paragraph 5, is concerned, or where a returned agent gives information of particular interest, I will circulate a separate report rather than try to incorporate so much detail in a monthly report.

B.1.B
12.7.1943

G.P. Wethered
G.P. Wethered

Copies to: D.D.B.
B.1.A Col. Robertson
B.1.B Mr. Hart, Mr. Milmo, Mr. Stamp, Capt. Day

RECEIVED
20 JUL 1943
10.43.43

(19019) Wt.24376/3460 200,000 8/41 A.&E.W.L.L. Gp.698 J3340

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above and a ... (Para. 5) ... It is ...
referred to below, ... time to time at S.O.E.
that from information available from ... organisations in

General Report on S.O.E. Cases

Up to the end of June 1945.

1. General

A great deal of damage has been done in recent months to S.O.E. interests on the Continent and particularly in France. A very much greater number of S.O.E. agents are operating in France than in any other European country. The degree of penetration of S.O.E. organisations there seems to be partly accounted for by the number of agents used exceeding the powers of the London officers available. It is not possible on the information available to tell how far penetration has gone; in view of recent arrests as well as the batch of arrests which occurred last April it would appear that penetration has gone fairly deep.

In other countries the situation is not so serious. A great deal of illegal activity continues apparently undetected in Norway, and in that country various S.O.E. organisations have functioned without disaster for some time, while the chain of arrests which took place in the LARK Organisation and later in connection with Pastor NOR has not been repeated in recent weeks. In Denmark in spite of the serious leakages which on two occasions in the last half of 1942 suggested that information was passing from this country to the Germans in Denmark, S.O.E. organisations have apparently functioned recently without further unfortunate results. This is to some extent capable of a double check as S.O.E. do not have to rely only upon their agents in the field for reports but receive fairly regular information from an indigenous Danish organisation which has a courier service through Stockholm. In Holland there have been recently several arrests and a report on S.O.E. activities in that country is now being prepared. The scene in Belgium has already become a tragedy in the spring of this year and activity in that country is still slight, though S.O.E. contend that one or two recent operations have been successful. I have little detailed information about Poland where, of course, hardly any activity is possible from this country during the summer months. S.O.E., however, apparently co-operate with some success with native organisations and a recent report from a returned Polish agent suggests that underground activity in Poland is still on a large scale. In Germany itself nothing has been accomplished except propaganda work in collaboration with P.W.E. France has been mentioned above and a typical S.O.E. French organisation will be referred to below, (Para. 5). It is worth noting, however, that from information available from time to time at S.O.E. the disasters which have applied to S.O.E. organisations in the field have not greatly involved indigenous French organisations. It appears that operations of the Organisation LIBERATION continue to function, and a recent organiser of a separate Organisation, CEUX DE LIBERATION, who has been interviewed in the last few days has made a report which is encouraging in its statement of the effective potentialities of the Organisation he represented. This will also be referred to below.

It is easy to criticise S.O.E. for concentrating on quantity rather than quality in respect of the agents they send to the field. There is considerable truth in this, particularly in the case of France. It should,

however, perhaps be remembered that M.I. 5 is apt to hear only of cases where penetration has been effected or is suspected. A great many successful operations are being performed of which we receive no notice. Whether or no the Germans are content to watch a certain number of such organisations and to take no action until the eve of invasion must remain to be seen. Apart from the operational side French O.E. has been successful in obtaining a good deal of information from occupied territory which is useful to the Services and other Ministries in this country, and of course they do a great deal of work in collaboration with the P.W.E. Organisation. N.O. 8 is not intended to suggest that the O.E. is not doing its best to assist the Services in their operations against the enemy.

12. CEUX DE LIBERATION

The Organisation CEUX DE LIBERATION is referred to in some detail on pages 2 and 3 of the L.R.C. Monthly Summary for June 1943. The story there set out can be taken a little further from S.O.E. sources. MEDERIC, an organiser of CEUX DE LIBERATION, and one GUERIN & GAUTIER, another S.O.E. agent in touch with MEDERIC and the French Rex Organisation, have both been interviewed. MEDERIC gave a good deal of rather striking information about the scope of CEUX DE LIBERATION. He reported that this Organisation comprises approximately 50,000 men, of whom about 27,000 lived in the Paris region.

The Organisation has a good deal of arms but needs more, and in the opinion of MEDERIC if these were provided operations against the enemy on a very considerable scale would be possible. The Organisation has also got a number of lorries and transport of its effectives to a target at some distance from Paris would be possible. It would seem that the penetration which has affected so many S.O.E. organisations in this part of France does not apply to any great extent to CEUX DE LIBERATION. MEDERIC also mentioned that a very strong resistance group in North France was constituted by the Communist Party. This group keeps its activities so secret that not even indigenous or Gaullist organisations have much information about it. In many ways they appear to be the most efficient organisation operating in that part of France. The chief dangers to the Organisation of this sort seem to be the demands of the Bureau Relève.

In the month of June the number of men demanded for the Relève was 250,000. The number will not be too far from this but the demand has meant that a large number of men has had to go into hiding in the maquis in the south of France and in farms in the north.

GUERIN & GAUTIER referred to on page 3 of the L.R.C. Summary, gave an account at his interrogation by the Special Section of S.O.E. and to me of his arrest in company with VIVIER and subsequent escape. GUERIN was not himself strongly suspected of being an accomplice of VIVIER and was therefore able to swallow all the incriminating papers in his possession. Both these men were taken to the Hotel de Bayre, Boulevard Raspail, a known Abwehr address, where they found three members of CEUX DE LIBERATION also awaiting search and interrogation. GUERIN was able to effect his escape by choosing an appropriate moment and felling the German guard to the ground. This enabled VIVIER and the other three men to get away from the hotel also. The story has been confirmed from other sources and is thought to be accurate. GUERIN was able to give some useful information

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about the activities of his Organisation which was an S.O.E. one and has also ceased to function.

3. A Danish Organisation which supplies S.O.E. with information from Stockholm recently sent to this country a copy of a German cypher and certain facts, many of which could be checked, which suggested that the German cypher might have been used for wireless transmission to the U.K. The name of the German operator was supplied and it was found that this name was noted as a wireless operator in Jutland before the war. Although it seemed rather unlikely that the Germans would operate an espionage service of this sort independently of the Abwehr the above facts seem to link up with the serious Danish leakage referred to above. Suspicions had already turned upon a former S.O.E. agent trained as a W/T operator who had been reported as making unauthorised use of his W/T set during 1942, and who would have been in possession of a set at the time of both leakages. It still seems conceivable that this man, who was a first-class operator in Denmark before the war, may have been known to the German operator and might have thus established contact with him by pre-arrangement or by chance. The fullest enquiries are being made about the former S.O.E. student.

4. A Polish woman who has been working for an indigenous Polish organisation since early 1941 was recently sent by this organisation through Germany, France and Spain to the U.K. She travelled under the name of ELIZABETH WATSON from the time she reached Spain, and was entrusted with the mission of contacting the Poles in London and exchanging information with them. This lady has given information about conditions in Poland and in Paris which was not previously known. She had an extremely eventful journey through France under the suspicions of the Polish Organisation, which appears to have been extremely efficient. She was issued with several sets of identity papers, first as a Volksdeutsch living in Poland, and then as an Alsacienne, since she spoke fluent German but no French. She had two brushes with the German Police in France and two with the Spanish Police after crossing the frontier. She appears, however, to have had both luck and a great deal of self-possession, and apart from the rigours of the journey and brief periods spent in hiding she made the whole enormous journey without being arrested or detained. Her account naturally needed a certain amount of checking, but it was impossible to find any grounds for suspicion in it, although the whole affair lasted only from February 9th when she left Warsaw until March 29th when she reported to the British Consulate at Barcelona. This lady is to return shortly to Poland with the information which she has gained from the Poles in London, and it has been strongly recommended that she should travel by some different route, in view of the fact that her description, or notes about her different brushes with the Police, may be compared and circulated.

Successfully

The case was chiefly of interest in showing how it is still possible for an individual with a good knowledge of German (and in this case a rather German appearance) to make such a long and complicated journey in safety.

to see

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Secret & Personal.

Original in SF 8/32 Nisc (H) R7L

SF 5/30/81

JS/KV/3082

11/02

Copies to D/CE.SS, D/CE.G, D/CE.GA, D/CE/SJ, D/CE.SS.1 for information.

9th May, 1943.

Dear Dick,

I understand from Geoffrey Wethered that you have been giving further consideration to the question of penetration and that you had a meeting on the 29th ultimo.

Cyril Harvey gave me Geoffrey Wethered's letter of the 30th April and Wethered has since spoken to me about it.

We are all agreed that the best way of dealing with such a case is for any request for information from our Country Sections to go to Warden in the first place, in his capacity as our Security Directorate's contact with our Country Sections in such cases.

It is very important, in connection with our work here, that Warden should deal with any such cases in the first place, especially on account of his knowledge of the Country Sections and the difficulties in which they work for a large part of every month on account of their active operational commitments. Warden is always in a position to judge, after discussing the matter with the Country Section Head, whether or not there is a case for arranging for a special investigation to be done (say, by Cyril Harvey) or for direct contact with Geoffrey Wethered.

The other aspect which I discussed with Geoffrey Wethered is that there is a long-standing arrangement whereby Haylor - and now Baxter - is able to put up requests for information, so as to ensure the completeness of the L.R.C. records on any matters where we are able to help. In point of fact, the action taken in the present case has been twofold: in the first place, Warden has seen all the Country Sections concerned on the organisations mentioned by name and, in the second place, Margaret Sample, in her capacity as our link with the L.R.C. Information Index, has been informed at the L.R.C. of the points on which additional information is required and is in process of obtaining this from the Country Sections.

For the reasons mentioned above, we have dealt with the matter in that way and I did not feel able to accede to the suggestion that Mrs. Chenhalls should visit our Country Sections in that connection.

I set out below the information at present available as to the following organisations:-

- Group Bravery or Brave (which I understand functions in Belgium only).
- Sabot (Delbos) Organisation, near Toulouse, Montpellier, etc.
- Marc.
- Bayard.
- Reins.
- Zerofrance.
- Luctor (may be the Luc Organisation).
- Emergo or Emerel or Euebgo.
- Combat.

As to these, Warden has interviewed our French, Fighting French and Belgian Section Heads, as well as the Head of our Section dealing with clandestine routes.

179 1/22/42 27 of 25 1/22/42 R.L.P.

Copies of D.O.C. 23/1/42
D.O.C. 23/1/42
D.O.C. 23/1/42
for information

The result is as follows:-

Buckmaster, of the French Section, knows by name Sabot and Combat. He does not use any of these organisations. He has an agent called Marc imprisoned in Lyons, but does not think this can be the Marc referred to, as our one was more or less a lone agent.

Humphreys, of our Clandestine Communications Section, does not know these organisations, but suggests that Captain Langley, of S.I.S., might be able to help.

Hutchison, of our Fighting French Section, also knows of Sabot and Combat. He knows of the ramifications of the latter and in his ordinary liaison work with the Fighting French meets people connected with it.

Knight, of our Belgian Section, also knows Sabot and Combat by name. He says that Sabot is in touch with S.I.S. and that we occasionally (against our will) get courier through it.

As to the other organisations mentioned in Curry's letter to me of the 5th ultimo, I am given the following information:-

Les Ailes Brises. It is suggested this is an M.I.9 organisation.

Agence Beaver, Parti Belge, Brave, Luc, Detache Sportif, Zero.

It is suggested that S.I.S. may be able to help in these. In the case of Luc, an agent named Cassart was sent to contact this body with a view to expanding their sabotage activities, but was arrested and nothing further has since been heard.

Front Independance. It is intended to use this in future.

Legion Belge, including the Hagerman Group and probably the Witte Brigade.

An agent named Bull was sent to try and contact this organisation, but nothing has been heard of him.

Generally speaking, I think, as a result of our renewed enquiries, it would be fair to say that we do not use the organisations mentioned above and are alive to the risk of their being penetrated. We do not bring out agents by these means, but by direct pick-up. If any of the people we bring out are L.R.C. cases under the established procedure, then, under the arrangement made with you and with Haylor last year, we make a kind of request that means of escape should be a forbidden subject of interrogation. As regards those agents who are, by agreement, not L.R.C. cases, under the arrangements we have for the interrogation of returned agents any such information would be sure to emerge and is, of course, completely at your disposal and would reach you through Geoffrey Wethered and, as regards the L.R.C., probably also through Margaret Sample.

Yours sincerely,

D.G. White, Esq., O.B.E.,
S.I.S.,
London.

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Copy in L.397/Belgium/3. SABOT.

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

106

B.I.B. Major Wethered.

I have spoken to D.B. about this matter and we are proposing to have a talk with Archie Boyle when D.B. gets back and it may be that we shall then jointly approach S.I.S. on the whole subject of counter measures against penetration of our services. Would you keep this note by you as it may be wanted again.

D.D.B. D. Gilmore
6.5.43.

97/519

Pa in SF.52/SOE/SIS.

naturally came into touch with the Legion Belge and with organisations like LUC and ZERO. It was also in touch with individuals like Pierre MOYSE...

constituted by members of the Belgian Government residing in France in
a formation of the staff of the Belgian Army in Montpellier dealing with
Belgian war material abandoned or left in France after the departure

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

102

D.B. *you can*
13/7/43

I understood you to say in discussion the other evening, that whereas you were not necessarily opposed to the despatch of the letter to Vivian suggested by Research for your signature, you wanted to await the further discussions you propose to have with Boyle of S.O.E.

D.D.B.
6.5.43.

D.G. White

Montpellier organisation, based as it is on Belgian Army cadres naturally came into touch with

Belgian war material abandoned or left in France after the departure of the Belgian Army in Montpellier dealing with

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

B.D.B.

I have discussed the attached rough draft with D.B. and he wants to discuss it further with you. It appears to me to be a matter which concerns the director of B. Division and is not, strictly speaking, a matter on which I - as Research - can appropriately address Colonel Vivian. At the same time you may like to have my opinion as a result of my examination of the penetration question.

To enable B. Division to discharge their responsibility, they must claim that they should receive all relevant information, both from S.I.S. and S.O.E, and it is clear from the present condition of affairs in Belgium, France, Norway and other countries that all intelligence about organisations which have been penetrated is not only relevant, but essential for B. Division purposes, with special reference to interrogation at the L.R.C. As the L.R.C. necessarily receives a great deal of information about organisations, whether they are penetrated or not, it is for similar reasons highly desirable that they should receive accurate information from S.I.S. and S.O.E. about organisations, including escape routes which are not known to have been penetrated. This is a very different matter from asking for information about highly placed individual agents in S.I.S., whose identity should be known only to the officers directly concerned with them.

St. 5130/81
(y. 440 671)

5.5.1945.

J. J. Giffy
J. J. Giffy.

Research.

(1933) WL24370/2460 300,000 5/41 A.A.E.W Ltd. Gp.495
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[P.T. OVER

Montpellier organisation, based as it is on Belgian Army cadres, naturally came into touch with

184
Brief summary of the case of Pierre BOURRIEZ

@ MURET @ PIERRE @ LACANE @ SABOT. *Ja*

Lt. Pierre BOURRIEZ of the Belgian Army reported in September 1941 at the depot at Montpellier of an organisation under Major BRANDERS. BOURRIEZ had been dropped in France by parachute with a man named Francois de WEER, equipped with a radio transmitter and BRANDERS was in charge of what was known as the "E" ("Evades") Division with the function of evacuating Belgians of military age. The "E" Division had been constituted by members of the Belgian Government residing in France in a formation of the staff of the Belgian Army in Montpellier dealing with Belgian war material abandoned or left in France after the departure of the Belgian troops. Officers on the active or reserve list and pilots, mechanics and petty officers of the regular Army were accepted in the "E" Division, subject to their signing an undertaking to engage themselves on their honour to join the Belgian forces wherever they might be. The "E" Division concerned itself with arrangements for the despatch of the appropriate personnel, especially Belgian airmen, through France to the U.K. and in this connection Pierre BOURRIEZ, who was directly responsible to M. LEPAGE in London through whom he received his orders from Minister GUT, proved himself highly efficient. Early in 1942 the influx of airmen reached embarrassing proportions and the Division encountered a number of difficulties, some of its men being arrested by the French and others becoming *brulé*. In particular, difficulties arose in connection with what was described as lack of flexibility and lack of liaison at Barcelona, where their representative was a certain M. SCHUL, who had an important part to play as he was the terminal of the escape route under BRANDERS' control.

BRANDERS, who came over to this country in August 1942, mentioned that the organisation commanded considerable funds, that nearly 400 men had signed the "E" Division undertaking and that in July about 100 airmen had been accepted. He said that Pierre BOURRIEZ was indispensable and that his best colleague was a certain Lt. LACOMBEZ, who was excellent at gathering information and undertook practically all the risky part of the work. BRANDERS also mentioned that the Rexist Party in Brussels had been employed by the Germans to send several of their agents to France, with the obvious intention of penetrating this organisation. One of them had admitted that he belonged to a group of six and had been sent to unoccupied France with instructions to find out the number of Belgians, and the means by which they travelled, and the places where they were collected. The organisation also suffered from the activities of some disloyal Belgians who organised escape parties which were doomed to failure. Their victims were told that in case they were caught they should mention the names of Major BRANDERS and his personal assistants in order to compromise the Montpellier organisation.

As has been pointed out in the main report on penetration of S.I.S., S.O.E. and Allied organisation, the principal movements in Belgium have been associated more or less closely in their activities, especially in connection with arranging escape routes. In this way the Montpellier organisation, based as it is on Belgian Army cadres, naturally came into touch with the Legion Belge and with organisations like LUC and ZERO. It was also in touch with individuals like Pierre NOTTET, who was concerned in the evacuation of a number of Belgian airmen through Montpellier with the assistance of the BRANDERS group. The LUC Organisation has already been briefly described in the report and, according to Jean GURICKX, alias Andre CAUVIN, one of its founders, he was in contact with UGUEUX, known as "WALTER", the head of the ZERO Organisation, and these two organisations exchanged information. UGUEUX alias WALTER has told us that the Zero Organisation was started in July, 1940 under the name of Service Jef, having been founded and led by KERKHOFS, a director of the Banque de Bruxelles. KERKHOFS is a man of standing not only on account of his position as a director of a bank but also because of his relations with the British Intelligence Service

and even more so with unofficial military and political circles in Belgium. KERKHOF left Belgium in October 1941 and at that time the organisation included sections dealing with the King and his entourage, political information economic information, financial information, military information, air information, propaganda ("La Libre Belgique"), propaganda (tracts and posters); escape organisations (Belgian and British), supply of false documents, liaison with paramilitary organisations, communications (couriers), communications (Radio), security, assistance to parachutists, operations and codes and cyphers. We have details of the personalities in the different sections, who included a number of former ministers of the Belgian Government, prominent editors, lawyers, industrialists and others. Walter UGUEUX was nominated by KERKHOF as his successor.

KERKHOF himself had maintained liaison with the Legion Belge, which he described as the only paramilitary organisation likely to have any real influence at the time of an attack on Belgium by the Allies. He stated that it had originally consisted of two groups and that he had helped to bring about a fusion between them in the late summer of 1941 with the assistance of Commandant de ROOVER, one of his personal friends. A brief note on the Legion Belge is in the Appendix to the report. According to GLAZER, one of the chief leaders of the Legion Belge, it, like LUC, suffered considerable damage as a result of the alleged treachery of JAMART in 1941. The fact that LUC and the Legion Belge were both thought to have been so seriously affected by JAMART's disclosures is some indication of the close relations between them.

In 1941 a Belgian named Pierre P.T. TOPPET was working in unoccupied France in connection with the evacuation of Belgians willing to serve as parachutists and saboteurs on behalf of the Allies. A friend of his, a Frenchman named KERMAREC who was secretary to the Office Belge in Montauban, had installed a transmitter in his loft. About the middle of December, 1941 TOPPET went to Montpellier to explain to BRANDERS the difficult situation of Belgians interned in various camps and to try to find some way of evacuating them, and again in January 1942 he met BRANDERS, LEDEWYN, who went under the name of FIRMIN, and Pierre BOURRIEZ. From that time until the middle of April TOPPET worked in Montauban on behalf of BOURRIEZ, but on 17th April he was arrested by the French Police and in the course of his interrogation was covertly informed by one of the French Police officers that he had been denounced by a man named DETAL who had been associated with his work. In September 1942, BOURRIEZ gave instructions to TOPPET that he was to leave the country and he left by the escape route of the Montpellier organisation via Barcelona, where he was taken to the British Consulate and put in touch with Pierre SCHUL. He was hidden for a fortnight and then left Barcelona with a group of Belgians and reached this country, where he was well known at the R.P.S. as having worked for a long time helping Belgians to leave unoccupied France for Spain and Portugal.

On 3rd January 1943 an individual named ADOLPHE was arrested by the French Police in Toulouse, together with his assistant, Sous-Lt. d'AE, and five Belgians who were being sent to the U.K. by one of the escape routes. These five men told the Police that they had been sent by KERMAREC of Montauban. Consequently KERMAREC was interrogated and had to leave France immediately afterwards and BOURRIEZ had reason to fear that the organisation in Montauban had been given away. After ADOLPHE was arrested his wife telephoned to the German authorities at the Kommandatur in Toulouse and, in consequence of this, REICHNECH, described as "Chef de la Gestapo" in Toulouse, demanded his release in accordance with the terms of the Armistice agreement. Pierre BOURRIEZ regarded the circumstances as evidence of treachery on the part of ADOLPHE, who he learnt had made a statement to the French Police to the effect that he was

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18/8 Jan

working for the Belgian S.R., the French 2me Bureau and the Schutzpolizei and that he had passed escapees through in order to earn money. The details of his statement, of which BOURRIEZ obtained knowledge from associates in the French police, were in important respects incorrect. In addition to serving the needs of the various Belgian organisations, BOURRIEZ established organisations in Paris, Toulouse, Montpellier, Montauban and elsewhere. The DELPA organisation in Paris was one of his. It supplied information of military interest which was sent on by courier.

It is known that Abwehr Abteilung III developed a project to penetrate the LUC organisation, as a result of which Pierre BOURRIEZ and Jules LACOMBLEZ were arrested on 28th January 1943 and the circumstances under which REICHNECH secured the release of ADOLPHE suggest the possibility that he may have been connected with this German attempt at penetration. Under the general supervision of Oberstlt. ROHLEDER, head of Abteilung III F in Berlin, and Oberstlt. ROHRSCHIEDT of Abteilung III in Madrid, an officer of Abteilung III named Alfred GENSEROWSKI, acting in co-operation with the S.D. in Toulouse and the Abwehr officers in Pau and Toulouse and with the S.D. and Abteilung III in Barcelona, was concerned in the arrangements which led to these two arrests. At the same time a quantity of incriminating evidence was seized and it appears that the enquiry was taken over by the S.D. in Paris, where Oberstlt. REILE of Abteilung III also co-operated. As a result important information was obtained about the LUC organisation. The Germans were able to arrange for a number of further arrests and they are also known to have planted another agent on the organisation, with the object of getting in touch with the British Consulate in Barcelona. At the same time there is reason to fear that the evidence obtained at the time of these arrests will have furnished them with information regarding other organisations in France and Belgium with which BOURRIEZ was concerned. The Abteilung III organisation in Brussels was also concerned in the enquiry. We thus have a picture of a whole network of Abteilung III in Belgium, France and Spain collaborating actively with the S.D. to combat LUC and its associated organisations, and indications more or less definite of penetration by agents - including Belgian Rexist - in Montauban, Montpellier, Paris, Toulouse and Barcelona.

The whole affair leaves a very strong impression that the Germans have now penetrated deeply into the most important groups in Belgium and that the opinion formed by UGUEUX when he left that country in July 1942 cannot now hold good. He considered that the Germans had nowhere penetrated beyond the fringes.

Draft.

Colonel Vivian.

I attach a copy of a summary of the case of Pierre ROUBRIEZ with various aliases, but best known as SABOT. This summary is based mainly on information obtained at the L.R.C., but it only brings out the salient features and is far from representing the very voluminous information in our possession regarding the SABOT organisation at Montpellier, the Luc organisation in Belgium and various other associate organisations.

At the same time our information about both the Montpellier and the Luc organisations is in certain important respects incomplete; and it is insufficient for the purposes for which it has been prepared, i.e. to render as efficient as possible our machinery at the L.R.C. for detecting enemy agents entering this country. It is clear that fuller information could be obtained if certain lines of enquiry were followed up, and no doubt, you have followed up the indications referred to below.

Isba 115 dated 8.3.42 refers to ZARATHUSTRA as a matter of interest to Abw.III.D. which, as you know, is the organisation concerned with deception, and to III.F. in Dijon and Paris. From the text it appears that ZARATHUSTRA is a German agent or a German organisation in touch with "the English Intelligence Service in Grenoble", and is using the latter as a vehicle to pass over misleading information on military matters. Alternatively it may be a British or Belgian agent who has been turned round. Presumably this message, which received the approval of Heeresgruppe D, was received in this country by the Belgians or by your P. Section; and you are therefore in a position to say by whom the attempt was made to put over this misleading information, i.e. you must know the identity of the agent or organisation concealed under the name of ZARATHUSTRA. In any case you will know whether the organisation at Grenoble is purely Belgian or whether your P. Section is directly interested. Whoever is, or was, running whatever existed at Grenoble will presumably know how the deception material was "put across", and therefore know something about ZARATHUSTRA. If there are any gaps in this part of the story it is possible that we may be able to assist through our indexed information. We should be interested, for instance, to learn whether Georges van der VELDE whom we know as doing important work for the Belgians at Grenoble was in any way concerned, or SABOT's W/T man Francois de WEIK.

There have been previous references to ZARATHUSTRA on 12.3.1943 which showed that Oberstleutnant BEILE and Oberstleutnant BERNBACH were concerned in putting over misleading information on a naval matter, as desired by the German Admiral commanding in France. On 12.11.1942 the material indicates that Alfred GIESEROWSKI asked Abteilung III to arrest ZARATHUSTRA, and the presumption from this is that it is an individual double agent rather than an organisation or any large group. Again, on 27.11.42 GIESEROWSKI wanted MURRSCHIEDT in Madrid to get from Berlin a short summary of their information about the Luc organisation for the purposes of ZARATHUSTRA. The details regarding the arrest of SABOT and his assistant, and the obtaining of information about the Luc organisation on 30.1.1943 and 7.2.1943 are referred to in the attached note on SABOT's case, and the evidence for 18.2.1943 would seem to show that they have succeeded in intercepting couriers' material; and that this interception is in some way connected with the British Consulate at Barcelona. Since then there has been a number of other seizures of couriers' material with serious results to the organisations in Belgium and France.

/continued...

All this has no doubt formed the subject of suitable enquiry in the appropriate quarters; and the events of which we obtain an indistinct picture from the above material must have been to a great extent uncovered.

I should be grateful for a full account of the result of these enquiries, so that, in agreement with you, we may put an appropriately Rowdlerized form of it on record for the guidance of those parts of our organisation, on whom falls the responsibility for understanding what is happening in the way of penetration of British and Allied organisations in occupied territory, as material assistance to them in detecting penetrative agents of the enemy when they come to this country.

Research.
7.5.1943.

NOTES FROM INFORMATION INDEX, L.R.C., RE SPECIFIC
PENETRATED ORGANISATIONS IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM. 156

1. MARC.

No trace, except for one reference to "MARC ET LUC" organisation, to whom one ROEYERS (R.P.S. 10,073) was introduced by a certain Joseph CLAEYS of Brussels in July 1942. ROEYERS kept CLAEYS informed of German troop movements etc. in Antwerp.

?Possible connection with Marc VIGNERON, who in July 1942 was link at Issoire in an escape route on behalf of BRAVE organisation. His father, Major VIGNERON, and his sister were both members of BRAVE. There is however nothing to identify this Marc, beyond his christian name.

2. BAYARD.

* Identical with Group Bravay.

No trace.

3. REIMS.

No specific trace of a definite or sponsored organisation here. The following three traces of assistance rendered to escapees might be worth noting:

- a) Hotel Sportif, Reims, can arrange for false identity documents. (HYSMANS - RPS 8322). Information dated May 1942.
- b) Owner of Cafe La Boule d'Or willing to help escapees.
- c) Polish priest called KOZICKI aided an escape from prison in Reims, in March 1941. (R.P.S. 12088), He passed a Pole called MARIANKOWSKI, through help of French railwayman, to Polish Hostel in Paris, thence to factory at Guerigny.

4. ZEROFRANCE.

This must be identical with the ZERO organisation, which is a large one, with many ramifications. It is possible that for convenience the French part of it was called ZEROFRANCE.

/Early information

it an appropriately Bowdlerized form of it on record for
Early information about the organisation is given in
Y Box 2063 for KERKHOF'S.

ZERO's alternative names are BANQUE DE BRUZELLES,
SERVICE JEFF and SERVICE WALTER.

In March 1942, head of organisation was a lawyer
named UGEUX @ WALTER., who was also a member of the DONNY
organisation.

Information was passed between this organisation and
LUC organisation.

In February 1943 (after arrests in ANDREE organisation)
a man called Ghislain NYBERG @ HENRI was working for ZERO.
His immediate superior in ZERO was Ivan MICHELIS @ Jean SARMON.
NYBERG, who worked in Brussels, was probably arrested
6.2.43.

5. LUCTOR.

There is no trace of an organisation of this name,
nor is there trace of anyone called TOR who might be a
member of the LUC organisation.

The LUC organisation is again a very big one. It is
stated to be primarily concerned with the collection of
military information and with sabotage. Its original
leaders, LECLERC and CAUVIN came to the United Kingdom in
1942. They were succeeded by Pierre DEPRETER @ LE CINQ,
whose wireless operator (? in Brussels) was HENRY @ VICTOR
A VERHAEGEN, the latter being his true name. Previous to
this, in December 1941, a wireless operator in Louvain
named NESSU is believed to have sold the organisation's
code to the Germans.

In October 1941 there is evidence to suggest that
the LUC organisation was in touch with the WALTER
organisation (ZERO). Also, late in 1941, LUC was in
touch with another organisation LES MOUSQUETAIRES.

The name LUC appears to have been given to several
members of the organisation.. In February 1942 a prominent
member was a man called de ROUBAIX @ LUC V. (See RPS 7520).

/He seems to

UNREGISTERED

3.

He seems to have specialised in escape routes. The following were used in the early months of 1942:-

- 5b
- a) From Brussels, to Tournai, to Blandin. Part of this journey accomplished on foot, escorted by a guide called Jean. At Blandin escapees were turned over to SABOT organisation. (See RPS 7520 for de BORCHGRAVE).
 - b) In March, 1942, another party was escorted by LUC V. himself across the Belgian frontier, crossed the demarcation line near Perigeux, and thence to Lyons. The party was then helped by M. GEORGES of the Belgian Legation, M. TOPPET at Montaubun, M. BRITTE at Carcasonne, M. GOMEZ at Perpignan. (RPS 8003 GIGOT) This route was also used by HOYOUX (RPS 8308), who said it was organised by ZERO organisation.
 - c) Paris-Chalon sur Saone, Bourg, Lyon, Montaubun.
 - d) Brussels-Paris-Bordeaux-Dax-Pujoo (Basses Pyrennees) by train, on foot across demarcation line, to Pau by motor coach, by train to Limoges, were people were put in touch with Mme. WEENTJENS at Hotel de l'Europe.

In March 1942 GROEVE, the subject of RPS 8309, at the request of LUC V. applied for membership of the S.S. He accordingly received a certificate of membership and handed it over to LUC V.

There is no information about LUC organisation subsequent to September 1942.

Presumably a purely Belgian organisation.

6. EMERGO, EMEREI, EMERGO.

No trace.

7. GROUP BRAVE.

The BRAVE organisation, as well as sheltering British airmen and organising escapes, distributed illegal newspapers and collected information. Orders came from London. The organisation was formed in December 1941 by M. STEINER @ VILLIER, who had been sent from England.

/He was

I should be grateful for a full account of the result of these enquiries, so that, in agreement with you, we may put an appropriately Bowdlerized form of it on record for the
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He was assisted by FIERENS (Y. Box 2485). The aims of the organisation at that date were the collection of material, which was then passed to a central organisation.

FIERENS worked with a man called van GELUWE in the Hainault-Brabant area.

Omer DROUSSIN @ SANGLIER was chef du Cellule and operated in Sambre et Meuse area.

In March 1942, STENIER was caught transmitting, and was arrested. Mlle. LAMBERT, a member of the CLEVELAND organisation, transmitted this news to London, who sent out Edouard CLEREN @ BRAVERY, who managed to contact STENIER before he was shot. CLEREN took over the organisation in April 1942.

Reports from Group BRAVE were sent to ZERO organisation in Roubaix.

In July 1942, when for some reason BRAVERY was unable to transmit, they sent their messages through SABOT organisation in the South of France. (All this information comes from Y. Box 2485 for FIERENS, in which is also mentioned his suspicions about serious leakage re courier service to the South of France. (SABOT (?))

BRAVE escape route, used 5.8.42, was as follows:
Namur-Givet-Nancy (Major VIGNERON's married daughter)
-Besancon-Arbois-Poligny-Issiore (Major VIGNERON's son, Marc)
-Bessages (M. SOLEVE) - Marseilles (M. FRANCOIS.)
Major VIGNERON himself was active on behalf of the organisation in Belgium.

There is a trace in the L.R.C. Information Index to the effect that the Germans are aware of Section LEJEUNE-LE-MAIN in Belgium, and their connection with SABOT's courier service. Date of this information February 1943. There is also another trace to the effect that the Germans have a courier planted on Belgian courier route ending in Barcelona, and are securing despatches in this way. These two traces are from B.1.Reg., probably ~~SECRET~~ material.

from ISBA.

56

8. COMBAT.*in which both are interested*

This ~~group~~ organisation seems to have been formed in September 1940 by Henri FRENAY @ MOLIN @ HENRI @ JEAN @ CHARVET. It was at that date known as LIBERATION NATIONAL. In December 1941, when LIBERATION NATIONAL and another organisation called LIBERTE were fused, the organisation came to be known as COMBAT. (Henri FRENAY is the subject of Y. Box 2416.) At that time, COMBAT was mainly concerned with propaganda, and was responsible for at least two papers, "LIBERATION" and "LES PETITS AILES."

In February 1941 Robert GUEDON was recruited to form a propaganda service and force paramilitaire in the Occupied Zone. The organisation, which seems to be entirely a French one, was then roughly divided into two parts, one for Occupied Territory and the other for Unoccupied. The former continued to be in charge of Henri FRENAY.

In December 1941, COMBAT's courier between Paris and Lyons, a man named DEVILLIERS, was an agent of the Gestapo. Arrests by the Vichy Police followed on the 14th. January 1942, when a large part of the Lyons section and H.Q. were arrested. Some, however, were given provisional liberty, and they then disappeared to renew their activities elsewhere.

There is evidence, dated May 1942, that COMBAT in all its sections and ramifications, does not officially encourage escapes, as there was, they considered, more important work to be done on the spot.

In June 1942, COMBAT was constituted into five branches, as follows:

- 1) Recruitment, Organisation, Propaganda.
- 2) Corps France.
- 3) Armee Secrete.
- 4) Renseignements.
- 5) Noyautage Administrations Publiques (recruiting from Government Offices, etc.)

/Headquarters

Headquarters were situated at Lyons, Marseilles, Montpellier, Toulouse, Brive and Clermont Ferrand. In addition to this, their secret army in Toulouse Region was run by JONAS (Y. Box 2976)

JONAS, on his return to this country, gave the following information as to the membership of COMBAT:

AVRICOT, BARRIOZ, BERTRAND (all cover names), members of Central Committee of COMBAT.

AURICOU @ ANDRIEU, Chief of Toulouse Region.

Jacques DHONT @ DUBARD, assistant to AURICOU.

KEPPELIN @ BENOIT, chief of intelligence branch, Toulouse.

JUVENAL @ OVIDE, Chef for Aix ville, and perhaps for whole department of Bouches du Rhone except Marseilles.

Marquis d'ARAGON @ MARSAC, chief of all branches for Departement Tarn.

SAUVANET @ SICART, Chief of secret army in Toulouse ville.

GERARD, Chief in Toulouse of British Intelligence organisation, in contact with COMBAT.

LEBLANC @ LEROUX, a new member of organisation, who made lone attempt to blow up radio jamming station near Toulouse (?October 1942). His attempt failed, and he was arrested. SAUVANET (see above) was also arrested, but was released after a few days. LEBLANC was still in prison 4.12.42, when source left the country, but source suspects that he may be an agent provocateur.

(All the above information is contained in Y. Box 2976 for JONAS.)

In January 1943, an offshoot of COMBAT was known as CEUX de la RESISTANCE.

Register No. L. 397/France/1.

Minute Sheet No.

GROUP II/L
MADRID TO BERLIN.
RSS 221/25/4/43.
VFS on 7975 Kcs.

1737 GMT.

25/4/43,

731. To JUNTA. Another enemy courier baggage consignment has been seized with espionage material from HOLLAND, BELGIUM, NORTHERN and SOUTHERN FRANCE of the organisations MARC, BAYARD, REIMS, ZEROFRANCE, LUCTOR et EMERGO+, COMBAT. Evaluation report follows with D 858.

DON I no. 155.

KO.SP.

(+Forms in text were: EMEREI and EMEBGO.)

SABOT. —————
GROUP BRAUERY

I have file for Van de Vliet.

- Boyer
- Totpat
- Brandus.
- 2 Des Onays.
- Lambert
- Ledoyen.

entirely blown.

Please look upon the attached notes as very rough and provisional only.

B.1.B.

29.4.43.

H.P.T.
for Major G.P. Wether

Research Mr. Curry

Copy in L.397/Belgium/3. SABOT.

Register No. L.397/France/1.

Minute Sheet No.

56

A.D.B.I.

I attach the rough notes which I have so far made in the case of the SABOT organisation and the French organisations referred to in a recent trace in secret sources. I am afraid that, as I have only had one day in which to do this, the notes are rather inadequate.

My summary on the SABOT organisation is drawn from a few R.P.S. files which I have read. The notes on the French organisations have been prepared by my secretary, who was only able to spend an hour or two in the Information Index yesterday. They are, I think, sufficient to indicate that someone should undertake considerable investigation. I imagine that the French and Belgians might be able to supply us with information, as might S.I.S. and S.O.E. I could easily get Harvey to prepare a note on the information available to the latter.

As regards the message from most secret sources dated 18.2.43 which referred to material seized from the SABOT organisation and GROUP BRAVERY, I gather that the set up is briefly as follows:

GROUP BRAVERY or BRAVE, referred to in Paragraph 7 of the attached notes, operated in Belgium and joined up with the SABOT organisation in the South of France. The channel for escapes and information then crossed the Spanish frontier and reached the British Consulate at Barcelona. It seems most likely that this route is now almost if not entirely blown.

Please look upon the attached notes as very rough and provisional only.

25/9.

B.1.B.
29.4.43.

H.P.T.
for Major G.P. Wethered.

(19019)	WC24370/3460	300,000	8/41	A. & E.W.Ltd.	Gp.698
(20277)	WC40727/3960	300,000	12/41	"	" J.5340

[P.T. OVER.

4a

Research Mr. Curry*1a in buff folder*

I have read this note with very great interest and I must say that when all the evidence is collected together like this, the picture presented is not a reassuring one.

There is one point to which I think it is worth drawing your attention: that is, when you are discussing the question of S.O.E.'s operations in the field in connection with military operations, it seems to me that it is of paramount importance to be certain that the S.O.E. agents and S.I.S. agents in the area which is going to be affected by the operations are not controlled by the enemy. DERNBACH, who is in charge of counter-espionage work at Angers, told Stella LONSDALE that it was his practice whenever an agent operating a wireless transmitter was captured by him, to try and turn it round in order to make use of it in misleading us by giving false operational information. It therefore follows that irreparable damage might be done if during military operations too much weight is attached to information which is received from agents operating in the field and which has a bearing on military operations in progress, unless, of course, one can be absolutely certain that the agents reporting are working not under control.

B. I. A
26.4.43

T.A.
T. A. Robertson,
(Lt. Colonel)