

Register No.

Minute Sheet No.

D.B.

I have had endless correspondence with S.O.E. on the subject of letting me have details of their compromised equipment. The attached CX report, which you were good enough to send up to me, at last gives us something officially which we can clamp on to. The official way is via Senter, and a letter is submitted for approval. If, however, you feel that it would not cause trouble to go round the corner, a more profitable method might be direct to Louis Frank. Will you please decide.

B.1.C.
26.8.43.

D.B.

2.
I have asked S.O.E. Special Section for a commentary on the attached and will send it to you when I have it. We know, as did the L.P.C., that Gen. VIDAL had been arrested, but it was actually in Paris about June 9th - 14th that this happened.

(Discontinued.)

(19019) W124670/3400 300,000 S/41 A & E.W.L.L. Gp.498 J.5240

N/B. The S.O.E. is interested to see these papers. 26/8

[P.T. OVER.]

ix) Nothing is known of the fate of General VIDAL after his arrest.

I also attach a copy of report No.125 dated 27.8.43.

L. 3977/Brance/9.

D.G. (through D.F.B. and D.B.) ^{D.G. 3/9} *Cl*

Reference the attached papers, in which you were interested. I have now ascertained from S.O.E. that a great deal of the subject matter of report No.121 of 21.8.43 is accurate. The correct version of the paragraphs mentioned in that report would be as follows:

L. 3977/Brance/9.

- i) General VIDAL was in fact head of the Armée Secrète. He was arrested by the Germans near a Metro Station in Paris, not in Lyons. This arrest took place, not on June 24th., but between June 8th. and 15th.
- ii) It is difficult to tell who is referred to by the phrase "his successor, a Colonel." This might be identical with more than one individual who admittedly have been arrested.
- iii) It is unfortunately true that the Germans seized a great deal of material at the time of these arrests.
- iv, v, and vi) The "important British terrorist organisation" may well be identical with an S.O.E. organisation named PROSPER, though the facts as given are too vague for this to be ascertained for certain. The organisation PROSPER has suffered very severely in the last few weeks in France. A detailed report of its ramifications has been prepared by Mr. Cyril Harvey of S.O.E., and I have a copy of his report. The report at the moment is much in action, as it refers to different individuals whose cases are being considered from a security point of view by the S.O.E. Special Section and myself.
- vii) The reference to the Major in the British Army, born in France, etc., is probably a reference to PROSPER himself, the organiser of the organisation referred to above, whose real name is F.A. SUTTILL. This officer is known to have been imprisoned at Fresnes, and is now believed to have been shot. A member of the organisation was named Peter CHURCHILL. It is true that he has been arrested, but he is not a nephew of the Prime Minister.
- viii) It would appear that the information contained in paragraph viii of the attached report is likely to be accurate.
- ix) Nothing is known of the fate of General VIDAL after his arrest.

I also attach a copy of report No.125 dated 27.8.43. This also represents a resume of information which it is feared is accurate. S.O.E. have in their possession a large plan drawn up as a result of different interrogations, in which the sectors mentioned in Paragraph 2 are set out in detail, together with a number of names of the personalities concerned. They have also considerable detail about paragraph 3.

/It is

It is undoubtedly an unfortunate fact that during the last three months untold damage has been done in France, both to S.O.E. and indigenous organisations.

G.P. Wethered.

Major G.P. Wethered.

B.L.B.
3.9.43.

4.

*D/B. L.H.
43*

This makes melancholy reading, but there is nothing we can do about it.

You had better keep these papers along with the note that Mr. Curry prepared on "Penetration" of S.I.S. & S.O.E. organisations with contact.

D. White

4.9.43.

L. B. Wethered / 9.

MOST SECRET.

11a

Copy No. 45

N.B. Special attention is drawn to the MOST SECRET nature of this report.

French Department.

No.125, dated 27.6.43.

Large-scale Gestapo penetration of Resistance Movements.

We have very recently obtained access by sure means to a Gestapo document which shows that the de Gaullist resistance movements, which had been greatly centralised under the de Gaulle special delegate known as Rex, have been completely penetrated by the Gestapo, who know the names and identities of many of the leaders including the identities of some of those who are actually in England.

2. The following are the sections or bureaux named in this document, with personalities concerned:

- (a) Military affairs. ... Name of leader given.
- (b) Political affairs, including the Name of leader cor- former organisation "Liberation". rectly given.
- (c) "Service Général". ...
- (d) Centre of Operations; parachutage Names of leaders and landings. given, and two men shown as executed.
- (e) Committee of Experiments.... Names of leaders given, including that of one who is known to be in the U.K.
- (f) Secret Armies. ... Name of leader given and marked as executed.
- (g) "Groupes Francs". ... Name of leader given and marked as executed.

3. In addition, twenty different sections of administration, recruitment and information are named, and with their heads. Amongst these twenty is the section dealing with regional chiefs. The name of the leader is given and marked as executed. This leads to sixteen regional sections compromised.

Copies to: Mr. Loxley. Sir E. Bridges. Major Morton. War Office.

S.O.E. informed.

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D.G. through D.B.

The supplementary report at 5a is the result of the further enquiries I have made after you saw the main report at 1a. I have discussed this problem with Captain Liddell and Mr. White and other officers and am satisfied that we cannot carry the enquiry any further on the basis of the material available in this office and I have therefore suggested that if you think it desirable for it to be pursued the only means of doing so would be through a joint enquiry by officers representing the three services. It seems clear to me that Section V is primarily concerned. Captain Liddell asked me to send a copy of the first report, which is mainly concerned with material relating to S.O.E., to Commander Senter as he wanted to discuss certain aspects of it with Air-Commodore Boyle and S.O.E. have asked that at present, while they are engaged in certain negotiations, we should not show the material relating to S.O.E. to S.I.S. The second report is partly based on Isba material, which S.I.S. regard with peculiar secrecy and it has a very limited circulation and I feel that this part cannot be sent out of this office without the previous consent of C.S.S. In case you desire to propose a further enquiry by officers of the three services I attach a draft letter. Before the enquiry can be set on foot it will be necessary to consult Colonel Vivian as to how much of the supplementary report can be shown to S.O.E. and to consult Air-Commodore Boyle as to how much of the first report can be shown to S.I.S. One direction in which I think we could contribute to the solution of the problem is by utilising information obtained at the L.R.C.

Research.

The terms of reference which I would propose are (a) to set out in a convenient form ... relevant facts regarding the success of ... and (b) to note ... of the problems involved.

The question of a solution vitally affects the interests of all three services, but the functions of protecting war ... and operations on an operational basis fall primarily within the scope of Section V of ... It is ... possible that we may be able to contribute ...

- 3 -

Supplementary report on German penetration of S.O.E., S.I.S. and Allied Organisations.

The main report on this subject is based on information in the files of this office dealing with the interrogation of suspects, of agents who have been turned round and of well disposed persons passing through the L.R.C. who have willingly helped us with information. This supplementary report is based on material of an extremely secret and delicate kind and cannot be sent outside this office without the consent of C.S.S.

1. Further enquiries made since the main report was prepared show that while there is an immense amount of material in this office to examine, it is not likely even if set out to lead us any further. The general nature of the material is similar to that already dealt with and, as has been mentioned, our information is, generally speaking, incomplete both in regard to the evidence dealing with individuals and in regard to the over-riding questions of the system, technique and policies of S.O.E. and S.I.S. In the information at our disposal there are a number of gaps which can be filled in my them but not by us. In order to provide for a complete enquiry it would, therefore, be necessary for this to be authorized by the heads of these two services.

2. Two points may, however, be emphasised. The first is that, as mentioned in the main report in para. 82, two of the most important factors contributing to the success of Abteilung III F and the S.D. have been wireless interception and the use of agents for penetration purposes.

3. We know from Most Secret sources that the Germans have a highly developed system of short range D/Fing which enables them to detect illicit transmitters; and we know that this work is done by a special section of Abteilung III F which deals with wireless, acting in co-operation with a section of the Wehrmacht Nachrichten Verbindungen (vide Appendix J. on page 85 of our report on the German Secret Service, August, 1942). This branch of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, commonly known as W.N.V., deals with all wireless and other communications of the armed forces and also monitors, illicit wireless, in communication with the Abwehr on the subject and provides personnel to collaborate in the detection and location of such transmitters. There is good ground for believing that it is very unlikely that any transmitter can hope to exist for any length of time in Germany or German occupied territory without being detected, identified and located. If this is so it is, presumably, extremely dangerous for S.O.E. or S.I.S. to send an agent out equipped with a transmitter, but we do not know certain relevant facts. On the one hand we do not know how far they have been successful in maintaining transmitters for any length of time, or the proportion which comes to grief and on the other we do not know exactly how the co-operation between the W.N.V., the Abwehr and the Gestapo in these matters is effected. It is, however, a reasonable inference that somewhere in their organisations they must discharge the same functions as our voluntary interceptors, "general search" and, presumably, "discrimination"; that they must be in a position to locate the stations in the U.K. from which messages are sent to agents abroad; and that the results of this work must be communicated to the Abwehr through the W.N.V. and the above-mentioned wireless section of Abteilung III F. We also know that the O.K.W. employs specialists in cryptographical work (just as they know that our services do the same).

4. It is understood that S.O.E. are aware of the danger attached to the use of wireless transmitters, but that under present circumstances they feel compelled to continue to use them in spite of the losses they have incurred and that they are attempting to devise means of minimising these losses; it is not known, however, how far the real nature of the danger has been appreciated and it is not possible to arrive at a reliable estimate of the position on the basis of the material available in this office.

6. It will be obvious that we are here dealing with the point mentioned in para. 3. (ii) and (iii) of the main report and that this is a governing factor in the question of protecting the operations of S.I.S., S.O.E. and their agents.

7. The success in the use of agents is illustrated in the main report and in the case of Pierre BOURRIEZ. The attached summary of this case suggests that if they have not already done so Abteilung III F and the Sicherheitsdienst - especially with the increasing control by Himmler and the S.D. - will be in a position by the time we invade the continent to cut off the heads of all the tall poppies, leaving the rank and file more or less disorganised and helpless. Whether or not Hitler and Himmler will adopt a policy of waiting and pouncing, as they are known to have done in the past, may be in the nature of a hypothetical question, but it must be expected that they will act according to past form. It should be worthwhile to arrange for the action they now take to be carefully observed. If they have not, since the arrest of Pierre BOURRIEZ in January, 1943, and do not make a number of arrests of important people in Belgium, the inference that they intend to adopt this policy will be strengthened. The action which the Abwehr and the S.D. have recently taken to disrupt the ANDREE and Montpellier escape routes may have a sinister significance. If all the escape routes became closed it would become difficult to evacuate the leading personalities of the resistance movements, should that policy at any time appear desirable.

8. The second point to be emphasised and a serious aspect of the matter is that it cannot but be obvious to the Intelligence services of the Allied governments established in London that they have to deal with five different parts of the British Intelligence machine, i.e. S.I.S., Section V, S.O.E., the L.R.C. and E. Division of this office, and that the working of these parts is not only not co-ordinated, but in more directions than one is far from harmonious. The consequences of this are likely to extend to a high political level as well as to have a serious effect in matters of "Intelligence". In the first place, the Allied Intelligence services and their governments must inevitably attribute the loss of agents, that is to say very often the loss of the lives of their nationals, to this lack of harmony among the British organisations. If losses become more serious still, on the lines indicated above in the event of invasion, this cannot but have a serious effect on the political relations between this country and the Allies in the future and it must have a harmful effect on British prestige.

9. This is the apparent position as seen from this office, but it is possible that this view may be to some extent modified when seen from a different angle in S.I.S. and S.O.E. and we must obviously be careful about jumping to conclusions when our knowledge of the whole subject is admittedly incomplete.

10. As all the relevant information cannot be examined without the assistance of S.I.S. and S.O.E. officers, it is evident that if the matter is to be carried any further it will be necessary to arrange for a joint enquiry. It is suggested that the terms of reference should be (a) to set out in a convenient form, and if possible, on the basis of this report the relevant facts regarding the success of Abteilung III and the S.D. in effecting penetration, and (b) to make recommendations for a solution of the problems involved. The question of a solution vitally affects the interests of all three services but the functions of protecting our own communications and operational basis fall primarily within the scope of Section V of S.I.S.

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Brief summary of the case of Pierre BOURRIEZ © MURET © PIERRE

© LACANE © SABOT.

Lt. Pierre BOURRIEZ of the Belgian Army reported in September, 1941 at the depot at Montpellier of an organisation under Major BRANDERS. BOURRIEZ had been dropped in France by parachute with a man named Francois de WEEER, equipped with a radio transmitter and BRANDERS was in charge of what was known as the "E" (Evades") Division with the function of evacuating Belgians of military age. The "E" Division had been constituted by members of the Belgian Government residing in France in a formation of the staff of the Belgian Army in Montpellier dealing with Belgian war material abandoned or left in France after the departure of the Belgian troops. Officers on the active or reserve list and pilots, mechanics and petty officers of the regular Army were accepted in the "E" Division, subject to their signing an undertaking to engage themselves on their honour to join the Belgian forces wherever they might be. The "E" Division concerned itself with arrangements for the despatch of appropriate personnel, especially Belgian airmen, through France to the U.K. and in this connection Pierre BOURRIEZ, who was directly responsible to M. LEPAGE in London through whom he received his orders from Minister GUT, proved himself highly efficient. Early in 1942 the influx of airmen reached embarrassing proportions and the Division encountered a number of difficulties, some of its men being arrested by the French and others becoming brulé. In particular, difficulties arose in connection with what was described as lack of flexibility and lack of liaison at Barcelona, where their representative was a certain M. SCHUL, who had an important part to play as he was the terminal of the escape route under BRANDERS' control.

BRANDERS, who came over to this country in August, 1942, mentioned that the organisation commanded considerable funds, that nearly 400 men had signed the "E" Division undertaking and that in July about 100 airmen had been accepted. He said that Pierre BOURRIEZ was indispensable and that his best colleague was a certain Lt. LACOMBLEZ, who was excellent at gathering information and undertook practically all the risky part of the work. BRANDERS also mentioned that the Rexist Party in Brussels had been employed by the Germans to send several of their agents to France, with the obvious intention of penetrating this organisation. One of them had admitted that he belonged to a group of six and had been sent to unoccupied France with instructions to find out the number of Belgians, the means by which they travelled and the places where they were collected. The organisation also suffered from the activities of some disloyal Belgians who organised escape parties which were doomed to failure. Their victims were told that in case they were caught they should mention the names of Major BRANDERS and his personal assistants in order to compromise the Montpellier organisation.

As has been pointed out in the main report on penetration of S.I.S., S.O.E. and Allied organisations, the principal movements in Belgium have been associated more or less closely in their activities, especially in connection with arranging escape routes. In this way the Montpellier organisation, based as it is on Belgian Army cadres, naturally came into touch with the Legion Belge and with organisations like LUC and ZERO. It was also in touch with individuals like Pierre KOTTET, who was concerned in the evacuation of a number of Belgian airmen through Montpellier with the assistance of the BRANDERS group. The LUC Organisation has already been briefly described in the report and, according to Jean CURICEX, alias André GAUVIN, one of its founders, he was in contact with UGUEUX, known as "WALTER", the head of the ZERO Organisation, and these two organisations exchanged information. UGUEUX alias WALTER has told us that the ZERO Organisation was started in July, 1940 under the name of Service Jef, having been founded and led by KERKHOF, a director of the Banque de Bruxelles. KERKHOF is a man of standing not only on account of his position as a director of a bank but also because of his relations with the British Intelligence Service and even more so with unofficial military and political circles in Belgium. KERKHOF left Belgium in October, 1941 and at that time the organisation included sections dealing with the King and his entourage, political information, economic information, financial

information, military information, air information, propaganda ("La Libre Belgique"), propaganda (tracts and posters), escape organisations (Belgian and British), supply of false documents, liaison with paramilitary organisations, communications (couriers), communications (Radio), security, assistance to parachutists, operations and codes and cyphers. We have details of the personalities in the different sections, who included a number of former ministers of the Belgian Government, prominent editors, lawyers, industrialists and others. Walter UGUEUX was nominated by KERKHOFFS as his successor.

KERKHOFFS himself had maintained liaison with the Legion Belge, which he described as the only paramilitary organisation likely to have any real influence at the time of an attack on Belgium by the Allies. He stated that it had originally consisted of two groups and that he had helped to bring about a fusion between them in the late summer of 1941 with the assistance of Commandant de ROOVER, one of his personal friends. A brief note on the Legion Belge is in the Appendix to the report. According to GLAZER, one of the chief leaders of the Legion Belge, it, like LUC, suffered considerable damage as a result of the alleged treachery of JAMART in 1941. The fact that LUC and the Legion Belge were both thought to have been so seriously affected by JAMART's disclosures is some indication of the close relation between them.

In 1941 a Belgian named Pierre P.T. TOPPET was working in unoccupied France in connection with the evacuation of Belgians willing to serve as parachutists and saboteurs on behalf of the Allies. A friend of his, a Frenchman named KEREMAREC who was secretary to the Office Belge in Montauban, had installed a transmitter in his loft. About the middle of December, 1941 TOPPET went to Montpellier to explain to BRANDERS the difficult situation of Belgians interned in various camps and to try to find some way of evacuating them, and again in January, 1942 he met BRANDERS, LIEDEWIN, who went under the name of FIRMIN, and Pierre BOURRIEZ. From that time until the middle of April TOPPET worked in Montauban on behalf of BOURRIEZ, but on 17th April he was arrested by the French Police and in the course of his interrogation was covertly informed by one of the French police officers that he had been denounced by a man named DELPA, who had been associated with his work. In September, 1942 BOURRIEZ gave instructions to TOPPET that he was to leave the country and he left by the escape route of the Montpellier organisation via Barcelona, where he was taken to the British Consulate and put in touch with Pierre SCHUL. He was hidden for a fortnight and then left Barcelona with a group of Belgians and reached this country, where he was well known at the R.F.S. as having worked for a long time helping Belgians to leave unoccupied France for Spain and Portugal.

On 3rd January, 1943 an individual named ADOLPHE was arrested by the French Police in Toulouse, together with his assistant, Sous-Lt. d'AR, and five Belgians who were being sent to the U.K. by one of the escape routes. These five men told the Police that they had been sent by KEREMAREC of Montauban. Consequently KEREMAREC was interrogated and had to leave France immediately afterwards and BOURRIEZ had reason to fear that the organisation in Montauban had been given away. After ADOLPHE was arrested his wife telephoned to the German authorities at the Kommandatur in Toulouse and, in consequence of this, REICHNECH, described as "Chef de la Gestapo" in Toulouse, demanded his release in accordance with the terms of the Armistice agreement. Pierre BOURRIEZ regarded the circumstances as evidence of treachery on the part of ADOLPHE, who he learnt had made a statement to the French Police to the effect that he was working for the Belgian S.R., the French 2me Bureau and the Schutzpolizei and that he had passed escapees through in order to earn money. The details of his statement, of which BOURRIEZ obtained knowledge from associates in the French police, were in important respects incorrect. In addition to serving the needs of the various Belgian organisations, BOURRIEZ established organisations in Paris, Toulouse, Montpellier, Montauban and elsewhere. The DELPA organisation in Paris was one of his. It supplied information of military interest which was sent on by courier.

It is known that Abwehr Abteilung III developed a project to penetrate the LUC Organisation, as a result of which Pierre BOURRIEZ and Jules LAOUMIERE

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were arrested on 28th January, 1943 and the circumstances under which REICHNECH secured the release of ADOLPHE suggest the possibility that he may have been connected with this German attempt at penetration. Under the general supervision of Oberstlt. ROULEDER, head of Abteilung III F in Berlin, and Oberstlt. ROHRSCHEIDT of Abteilung III in Madrid, an officer of Abteilung III named Alfred GENSEROWSKI, acting in co-operation with the S.D. in Toulouse and the Abwehr officers in Pau and Toulouse and with the S.D. and Abteilung III in Barcelona, was concerned in the arrangements which led to these two arrests. At the same time a quantity of incriminating evidence was seized and it appears that the enquiry was taken over by the S.D. in Paris, where Oberstlt. REILLE of Abteilung III also co-operated. As a result important information was obtained about the LUC Organisation. The Germans were able to arrange for a number of further arrests and they are also known to have planted another agent on the organisation, with the object of getting in touch with the British Consulate in Barcelona. At the same time there is reason to fear that the evidence obtained at the time of these arrests will have furnished them with information regarding other organisations in France and Belgium with which BOURRIEZ was concerned. The Abteilung III organisation in Brussels was also concerned in the enquiry. We thus have a picture of a whole network of Abteilung III in Belgium, France and Spain collaborating actively with the S.D. to combat LUC and its associated organisations, and indications more or less definite of penetration by agents - including Belgian Raxists - in Montauban, Montpellier, Paris, Toulouse and Barcelona.

The whole affair leaves a very strong impression that the Germans have now penetrated deeply into the most important groups in Belgium and that the opinion formed by UCUEUX when he left that country in July 1942 cannot now hold good. He considered that the Germans had nowhere penetrated beyond the fringes.

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GERMAN PENETRATION OF S.O.E., S.I.S. AND ALLIED ORGANISATIONS.

I. Introductory Remarks.

1. It is proposed to attempt to set out the facts relevant to the problem of providing a "protective umbrella" for the operations of S.O.E. and S.I.S., as far as they can be studied from the material available at present in this office. It should be emphasised that this is written without any knowledge of the organisation and policy of S.O.E. S.I.S. presents a different problem and is not dealt with in any detail.
2. In the first place it is desirable to explain what is meant by a "protective umbrella". The idea underlying this convenient cliché is to provide for counter-espionage and security arrangements which will facilitate the successful operations of these organisations and their agents, and obstruct or prevent their detection by the enemy in so far as this is possible by preventive measures. The term preventive measures must here include such steps as may be necessary to counter the moves of the enemy counter-espionage organisation when they succeed in getting S.O.E. or S.I.S. agents under their control.
3. The facts relevant to this problem fall under five main heads:
 - i. those disclosed by actual cases of penetration by the enemy.
 - ii. those concerning the system and technique employed by S.O.E. and S.I.S. in training, controlling and directing the activities of their agents.
 - iii. the policies followed by S.O.E. and S.I.S. in this connection and the policies of the British and Allied Governments, which lie behind the departmental policies and are directed towards sustaining the national resistance movements in occupied territories.
 - iv. the problems presented by the relations between S.O.E., S.I.S. and M.I.5 among themselves and their relations with the Allied Intelligence services.
 - v. the facts, as far as they are known, regarding the methods and organisations of the enemy, i.e. the Abwehr, the Sicherheitsdienst, the Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police)* and the Gestapo.
4. In the present report it is not proposed to deal with any of these heads in any detail, except under (i), but it will be obvious that the question of C.E. arrangements is inseparable from that of the policies, methods and systems followed by S.O.E. and S.I.S. It will be sufficient for present purposes if the fact that the other heads have a bearing on the problem is kept in mind.
5. The following details which relate to Belgium, Norway and France are not intended to be comprehensive. They are merely to be regarded as an illustrative cross-section of some of our information and have not been selected to prove any particular point of view. All the cases are dealt with very briefly and as a rule long and complicated stories have necessarily been simplified. There is information on our records relating to other cases in these countries; and also regarding Abwehr III, Geheime Feldpolizei or "Gestapo"* and Sicherheitsdienst operations against S.O.E. or S.I.S. organisations and indigenous resistance movements in other countries, such as Holland, Greece and elsewhere, but our records are far from being exhaustive and often leave us in doubt as to whether an organisation is primarily British (S.O.E. or S.I.S.) or indigenous.

*The Geheime Feldpolizei in occupied Europe and the Gestapo in Germany are the executive of the Abwehr. They are staffed from the same source - the S.S. or Schutzstaffel of the Nazi Party. The G.F.P. is apparently confused with the Gestapo in the common parlance of the occupied territories.

N.B. The latest available information goes to show that since the spring of 1942 the Gestapo has to a great extent displaced the G.F.P. as the executive of the Abwehr in Western European countries.

II. Belgian Cases.

6. In view of the complicated nature of the problem it seems desirable to treat one particular aspect of it in some detail by way of making a fairly close examination of a small part of the field. As an illustration of the kind of problem which arises for consideration. For this purpose S.O.E. operations in Belgium have been selected. Belgium, however, is not a typical case, in the sense that the S.O.E. section dealing with Belgium has met with exceptionally serious setbacks and it is understood that the question has arisen of taking drastic action to curtail activities in that country, at any rate for a time, owing to the fact that nearly all the S.O.E. agents who have been sent there are known to be compromised or are regarded as doubtful. In consequence of these facts steps have been taken to examine the causes of failure and to avoid some of them by arranging for more complete records to be kept about each agent and of all the circumstances connected with him, with a view to making it possible to check all the relevant facts and also to impose workable identity checks whenever an agent is suspected to be under the control of the enemy.

7. Special difficulties which have arisen in the case of S.O.E. operations in Belgium are stated to arise from the fact that the Belgian Prime Minister, M. Pierlot, and the Belgian Sureté are inclined to give independent instructions to S.O.E. agents without keeping S.O.E. informed. Another outstanding cause of failure has been due to the marked tendency of Belgian agents to make contact with one another when in Belgium. This tendency is to be attributed to various causes, among them being the fact that they are trained as S.O.E. agents in groups; that they have sometimes been given instructions to make contact with one another; that they have at other times made unauthorised contacts - a tendency which is promoted by the special conditions in Belgium - and that whenever a man has been recruited from the Belgian Army for S.O.E. duties a notice is posted announcing that he has been seconded to the British for a special mission. An even more important source of difficulty is to be found in the fact that while S.O.E. have in some cases given their agents a sabotage mission, the Belgian authorities in this country are believed to have given contrary instructions and to have been anxious to discourage sabotage because they did not wish their factories to be damaged and they prefer to support a policy of "go slow". (If there is this cleavage in a fundamental question of policy, it would seem to be necessary that a compromise should be arrived at on a high level.)

Jean Prosper CASSART and the LUC organisation.

8. As an illustration of the extent of the material it may be mentioned that there are no less than 41 files, roughly representing some 40 persons who have passed through the L.R.C. and given information about the LUC organisation (and this is typical of many other cases). In spite of this, there is no complete picture of the LUC organisation, although very detailed information has been extracted from the 41 files and put on the Information Index (the principal object in view being to supply data useful to L.R.C. interrogators who examine people coming from Belgium). Many of these files deal with the penetration of the organisation connected with the case of Jean Prosper CASSART, an S.O.E. agent who was arrested in Belgium on 13.12.41, but there is no sufficient material on record in this office to show whether that case has been fully investigated, nor is it possible to arrive at the exact facts about the penetration at that time. It seems probable that fuller information is available in S.O.E. than we have in this office. Further information, again, is undoubtedly available in the Belgian Sureté, but if S.O.E. and the Sureté have conducted a full investigation into the cause of the breakdown the precise results do not appear to be available here.

9. The LUC organisation is closely connected with other S.O.E. and S.I.S. organisations, as shown in the Appendix, and with the extremely important and very large organisation based on the Belgian Army.

10. As mentioned in the Appendix, the LUC organisation shows signs of having

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been penetrated more than once, the most important instance being in connection with the case of Jean Prosper CASSART. CASSART was a Belgian officer who refused to surrender with the Belgian Army and eventually made his way to England, where he became an agent of S.O.E. He had already given evidence of his zeal by collecting military information about the German occupation of Belgium and France. He was dropped in Belgium by S.O.E. on 3.10.41 with Henri VERHAEGEN, who was to act as his W/T operator. CASSART was arrested by the Germans on 13.12.41 and VERHAEGEN eventually made his way back to England through France and Spain. According to one report some 200 people in Belgium, as well as the Societe Generale, were involved after CASSART's arrest, although it is also stated that CASSART, in spite of very brutal treatment, refused to make a statement to the Germans.

11. Among the events which preceded CASSART's arrest the following stand out. On or about 10.10.41 CASSART and one BERNARD, a leading member of the organisation, met another member named JAMART at Brussels. Shortly afterwards JAMART left for Paris, where he met a Luxembourger named RICHIR. JAMART very indiscreetly gave RICHIR a lot of information about the whole organisation and RICHIR then admitted that he was a German agent. JAMART returned to Belgium and warned various members, including BERNARD and LECLERCQ but, presumably because he did not tell the whole truth and they did not regard him as very reliable, they did not pay much attention. Early in October the German Secret Field Police (Geheime Feldpolizei) searched JAMART's house. On the next day JAMART told one of his colleagues named DESCHAMPS that one JACOBS was a traitor. GLAZER, describing himself as the founder of the Legion Belge (vide Appendix p. iv) has stated that a great deal of harm was done to the Legion by the personal treachery of JAMART. A suspicion of being concerned in treachery which led to CASSART's arrest also fell on one of the members named NESSU, in whose house VERHAEGEN's W/T set was at one time kept. VERHAEGEN, however, says that he enquired into the allegations and decided that NESSU was not guilty. According to one LIBOTTE, NESSU sold the W/T code to the Germans and he alleges that the Germans thus got to know VERHAEGEN's code and tried to send messages to the U.K., i.e. at some time shortly after the middle of October, 1941.

12. After VERHAEGEN's return to this country he made a long statement giving an account almost from day to day of the events which preceded and followed CASSART's arrest. Five days before the arrest, i.e. on 8th December, CASSART, VERHAEGEN and two others were attempting to arrange for a Lysander to land near Neufchateau when they were interrupted by some German soldiers, after which the Germans appear to have got on the track of both CASSART and VERHAEGEN. The whole incident has been the subject of discussion between officers of B.1, S.O.E. and the Belgian Surete, as well as Captain Brooke-Booth of E. Division who commented that it seems that the whole unfortunate affair was due not to treachery, but to the normal risks attached to such an enterprise. Presumably this is the result of a more or less formal enquiry, but precise details are not available on the files relating to CASSART or VERHAEGEN and there is no indication that the affair connected with RICHIR and JAMART has been fully probed. In the circumstances it is not possible to form a definite opinion on the cause of the penetration, or to discuss steps which could have been taken to prevent it, but presumably this information is available in S.O.E. (The E.R.C. files of the 40 odd people who have referred to the LUC organisation have not all been studied for this purpose.)

13. Some slight indication of the character of CASSART and the nature of the LUC organisation may be obtained from the fact that CASSART had arranged a body of released convicts, under the supervision of a Belgian Police officer, who were to kill Germans and bury them secretly in Belgian graveyards. Again, this Belgian officer when arrested showed presence of mind by giving a signal to two of his confederates, which prevented them from falling into German hands. When VERHAEGEN was arrested at the time when they were attempting to arrange for a Lysander to land, he escaped by wrenching his rifle from one of the German soldiers and, although wounded, ran for 5 or 6 kilometres through the snow until he became feverish from the wound. One of their associates named DEBROEU had VERHAEGEN's W/T set in his house at the time of CASSART's arrest. A German officer and three soldiers came to search DEBROEU's house. His wife, knowing that he was going to fire on the Germans, fainted and in spite of this fact he attacked them,

killing or wounding three of them and escaped into the road in his pyjamas, where he met VERHAGEN, and then the two went quietly to a friend's farm to obtain clothes and to make arrangements to warn other of his associates. In spite of the fact that the Germans were looking for him, VERHAGEN remained in Belgium and carried on the work of the organisation at great personal risk. On one occasion he and two Belgian Police officers, believing that the Germans were after VERHAGEN, walked through the streets of Liege fully prepared to shoot at any German who interfered with them.

ANDREE Escape Organization.

14. The LUC organisation, among others, made use of the ANDREE organisation, which was established immediately after the capitulation by ANDREE père and his daughter for the purpose of setting up an escape route. It ran from Brussels, through Paris and Bayonne, to the Spanish frontier where a British organisation took over from it. In May, 1942 the Brussels end was broken up by the Germans and ANDREE escaped to Paris. A Baron Jean GRUNDEL in Brussels then re-established the Belgian end. In consultation with ANDREE it was agreed that henceforward they would confine themselves to passing R.A.F. men or highly skilled air mechanics out of Belgium. The new arrangements functioned satisfactorily until the middle of November, 1942. About that time two individuals who are regarded as being undoubted German agents got into touch with the organisation in the guise of American airmen. Immediately afterwards a number of members of the organisation were arrested and the Brussels end collapsed again. This escape route was used by other organisations, such as the Dame Blanche.

15. In July, 1942 the extent of the German knowledge of the ANDREE organisation was proved by the way in which the Abwehr made plans to use it to send one of their agents, a Belgian named Gabriel Jules Emanuel FRY from Belgium via Spain to England and the Congo. For this purpose the Abwehr utilised Mme. Florina DINGS, an important double agent, whose chief function was to constitute the link between the Abwehr and patriot circles in Belgium which had been penetrated by the Germans and were being used for their own purposes. FRY obtained a number of letters from GILSON, a distinguished patriot and statesman in Belgium and General Secretary of the Association des Interets Coloniaux Belges. These letters were addressed to the Governor General of the Congo and the Colonial Minister of the Belgian Government in London. They were long and contained a quantity of information about the national morale in occupied territory and proposals for sustaining the spirit of resistance. The Abwehr evidently hoped to gain valuable intelligence about the Congo and no less valuable information about the activities of Belgian patriots in the Congo, in England and inside Belgium by a plot, according to which FRY was to use these letters from GILSON to enable him to travel between the three countries, having gained the confidence of the Belgian authorities concerned.

16. From all these circumstances it would appear to be possible that the penetration of the ANDREE organisation has given Abwehr Abteilung III in Belgium a very considerable amount of information about Belgian resistance movements and S.O.E. agents, and the extent of the penetration cannot easily be assessed.

17. (The information which reaches us often stops short at such points as the introduction of the two German agents in the guise of American airmen, but we do not know how the Germans obtained the information which enabled them to effect the penetration which made this introduction possible. The explanation may often lie in the use of agents, as in the case of Mme. Florina DINGS. If FRY had not been suspected by the Belgian Legation in Lisbon, and therefore sent to London for further enquiry, he would probably have been an extremely important agent for penetration by the Abwehr. The reason for suspicion falling on FRY at the Belgian Legation in Lisbon was that he had German documents in the shape of a passierchein and a durchlasschein.)

A. 18. As mentioned above, Mme. Florina DINGS was used by the Abwehr to make plans to send FRY via the ANDREE organisation in July. This information reached us at the L.R.C. in October and the full story was known after interrogation at Camp O.2.O. in December. There is nothing on FRY's file to show that we have

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communicated this information to S.O.E., although it seems possible that if they had possessed it in October they might have been able to prevent ANDRE's daughter from being arrested by the Germans in November (or later). We have no other information about Mrs. Florina BINGS, except that contained in PRY's statement, but we know that the Belgian Sureté know her as the mistress of one DEZUTTER, alias Captain COUL, alias Jack COLBY, a Belgian who has been naturalised as a German and is known to penetrate escape organisations by sending young Belgians through them. This information is stated to have been confirmed by OGUEUX, mentioned in the Appendixes connected with the HERO organisation.

A. 19. (It therefore seems that our information is incomplete on many points where more detailed information is available in S.O.E. or the Allied intelligence organisations, and the question suggests itself whether it is not desirable for more complete information on such matters to be recorded centrally and to be at the immediate disposal of L.R.G. interrogators, as well as for subsequent interrogation at Camp 0.2.0.)

Oscar KATHERINE. The story of one of the most important disasters in connection with Belgium has been told in a report by Mr. Harvey of B.I.A. dated 28.11.42, filed at 19K in S.F. 51/52/24(5). While the report shows that the conditions under which the S.O.E. agents were controlled from this country and the conditions under which they worked in Belgium have been such that no C.E. arrangements of a purely protective kind could have prevented the disasters, the first essential was great care and careful organisation in making the arrangements for the despatch and control of agents and, if that is possible, steps to ensure that they carried out instructions. It appears that in certain cases they have failed to carry out instructions, even when their own lives were in the balance. The story in the above mentioned report deals with the cases of a number of S.O.E. agents sent to Belgium, many of them having been recruited from the Belgian Army or through the Belgian Sureté in London. The details are extremely complicated and the report itself does not purport to be complete, but the following are some of the outstanding points. M. Pierlot, the Belgian Prime Minister, desired to arrange for a Belgian named Marc DELFORGE to leave Belgium and come to the United Kingdom and, without informing S.O.E., the Belgian Sureté gave instructions to Oscar KATHERINE of the Belgian Army, who was dropped by S.O.E. by parachute near Mons on the night of 28th-29th January, 1942 together with Maurice AARENS, also recruited from the Belgian Army, who was to act as his W/T operator. The B.I.A. report shows that they were furnished with admirable cover stories and suitable documents to match them. It appears, however, that at an early date AARENS fell into the hands of the Germans and his W/T set was operated under their control. This fact did not become known to S.O.E. until several months later, i.e. after Marc DELFORGE arrived in this country on 21.8.42. DELFORGE was interrogated at the R.V.P.S., which he left on 29.8.42, but it was not until nearly a month later that S.O.E. learnt of it, and they learnt it from P.I.D., who sent them a copy of a report in which he disclosed details not mentioned by him at the R.V.P.S. When interrogated at the R.V.P.S. he had, however, stated that he had met Oscar KATHERINE, who had come to inform him on or about 3.2.42 that Pierlot desired him to make his way to the U.K. and this fact was also mentioned in the P.I.D. version which gave more elaborate details. In the meanwhile, however, in April, 1942 a message had been received from the W/T operator AARENS to the effect that he - i.e. presumably Oscar KATHERINE - had not had time to get in touch with DELFORGE. That is to say, this message was sent under German control, but the fact was not appreciated at the time. In this connection, the B.I.A. report shows that in the light of after events it might be possible to pick holes in the traffic, but allowing for the circumstances of the case, it can hardly be said that there were any definite indications prior to the arrival of DELFORGE that AARENS was under control. The consequence of the fact that AARENS was under control not being realized was to bring disaster to a number of other agents, regarding whom instructions were sent to Oscar KATHERINE. Oscar KATHERINE's mission to Belgium is stated to have been largely a propaganda one and he was also to send political information and to make contact with existing organisations, in particular with the publishers of secret newspapers, and to engage in sabotage as a side-line when opportunity offered. In addition to all this he was to arrange "reception committees" for the arrival of supplies and to reconnoitre landing grounds for Lysander operations. Apart from this, as already

indicated, he received elaborate instructions from the Belgian Sureté, including the names of many useful contacts in Belgium. The function of the "reception committees" was to show lights to enable Lyssanders to land supplies or agents at a spot prearranged on the traffic and selected by the "reception committee" as suitable. It follows that various supplies, including arms which were dropped on 30.4.42, and three agents dropped in May, June and August fell into German hands after they had AARENS' W/T set under their control. On 10.5.42 AARENS - under German control as explained above - reported that various people with whom he had concealed the arms dropped on 30.4.42 were getting nervous and asked for somebody to whom they could be delivered. He was given the name of Major Gaston CHAIN. (This undoubtedly gave the Germans information of special importance, and if they have penetrated his organisation by keeping it under observation and obtaining statements about it from CHAIN or other members, the consequences may be very far-reaching, but the exact facts are not available here.) On 28.5.42 AARENS reported that CHAIN was too nervous to receive the arms and asked for another name: he was given that of a man named POTIER. The agents dropped in May and June were instructed to organise passive resistance and to carry out sabotage. The man dropped in August, Pierre Roald OSTERREITH, appears to have had a more important mission, evolved by the Belgian Sureté with the consent of P.I.D. He was to influence prominent Belgian industrialists to develop a "go-slow" movement and he was furnished with powerful letters from the Belgian Government in favour of their policy. His mission had been approved by the Foreign Office. He was actually dropped on 27.8.42 and had the significance of DELFORGE's statement at the R.V.P.S. on 25.8.42 been appreciated OSTERREITH's life could have been saved. It was not appreciated because there was no one at the R.V.P.S. who had any knowledge of the significance of the fact that DELFORGE had received his instructions from M. Pierlot through Oscar KATHERINE in February and that the AARENS W/T set had reported in April that KATHERINE had not yet got into touch. (Steps have been taken to remedy this kind of gap in the protective arrangements by the issue of instructions that copies of statements made at the L.R.C. are in future to be sent without delay to the country sections of S.O.E. A difficulty which apparently has not been got over is that S.I.S. insist that references to S.I.S. agents shall not be sent in this way to S.O.E. In this particular case DELFORGE did in fact mention an important S.I.S. agent and he does not appear to have made it clear - even if he knew - whether Oscar KATHERINE was an agent of the Belgian Sureté, S.O.E. or S.I.S. In view of the operational importance of S.O.E. activities, it would seem necessary that in such matters first priority should be given to the need for S.O.E. to have the fullest and promptest possible knowledge of information obtained at the L.R.C., (or from any other security source, in matters where the safety of their agents may be at stake.)

21. The B.I.A. report mentions that from the security point of view the general picture is extremely disquieting and suggests that any refugee who claims to have come from Belgium by any of the escape routes in recent months may at some time have been in touch with one of the S.O.E. agents or their contacts, and as these agents are in frequent if unauthorised touch with each other and since a considerable number of them are or have been in German hands, the suspicion arises that any refugee arriving in this way may be acting for the Germans.

22. In view of the connection between some of the important Belgian organisations mentioned in the Appendix, such as Luc, Les Mousquetaires, the Belgian Military Organisation (including the Legion Belge) and the Zero organisation, and the fact that some of the captured agents have contact with them, it seems possible that the Germans (whether Abteilung III or the Gestapo are principally concerned, or most probably both) have penetrated Belgian organisations to an extent which may have an important effect, not only on S.O.E. operations which may be timed to coincide with an invasion of the Continent, but also on the conduct of the military operations and on the future of our relations with Belgium, or even on the future of Belgium itself.

23. The reason for thinking that all this might have such serious consequences is to be found in the way in which the Nazi leaders and their instruments, such as the Gestapo, have acted in the past. For instance, these Belgian cases and others have shown that the Abwehr having once penetrated an organisation will hold on to it for a very long time without taking action to break it up. They

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will gradually penetrate further and further into the organisation by watching it and by making occasional arrests, or by turning an agent round to work for them. There can be little doubt that on the famous "Night of the Long Knives" they acted on information which had been accumulated over a period and then, under Hitler's orders, took drastic action by executing hundreds of Germans. Hitler himself has proclaimed that this is his method; that he watches for a long time and then pounces when the time is ripe. In view of the possibility that several Belgian organisations have been penetrated it may not be too far-fetched to suggest that there is the possibility that the Nazis may be preparing to act against the numerous Belgian organisations, including that based on the Belgian regiments, in a similarly drastic way and that the most probable occasion for such action would be at the time of an Allied invasion of the Continent. There is no direct evidence of this, but it would seem to be worthwhile to suggest that the possibility should be kept in mind.

III. Norwegian Cases.

Small boat cases.

24. Two cases occurred in 1941 and one in 1943 in which the Abwehr attempted to penetrate Norwegian or British organisations in this country by sending agents on small boats.

25. On 16.3.41 the m.v. Olaf arrived at Lerwick from Trondheim with three Norwegians on board. Two of them, named JOHANSEN and SOLEM, were subsequently employed by S.O.E. In November, 1941 reliable information showed that JOHANSEN had come here on an Abwehr mission. The exact circumstances have never been fully cleared up, but there can be little doubt that the Abwehr intention was to penetrate S.O.E., and the case is instructive as showing the difficulty in the way of the detection of such cases by interrogation at the L.R.C. in the absence of definite information.

26. On 8.7.41 the m.v. Hernie arrived at Lerwick from Bergen. In this case prior information had been received that one of the three Norwegians on board was an Abwehr agent and Helmik WALLEM, the man in question, confessed on being interrogated here. It was a straightforward attempt to penetrate S.O.E. and was planned by Abwehr Abteilung III F. Helmik WALLEM was a qualified wireless operator and the Abwehr apparently believed that this would result in his having no difficulty in obtaining employment as a British agent. The difficulty of detecting agents of the type of WALLEM is enhanced by the fact that it is not necessary for them to carry any incriminating material.

27. On 8.1.43 the m.v. Reider arrived at Lerwick from Aalesund with three Norwegians on board. One of them named Arnold EVENSEN confessed that he had been an agent of the Abwehr in Trondheim and that his mission was to proceed to England in the guise of a refugee with the other two who were unaware of his intentions. One of them, Lewis WESTRUM, wanted to obtain a wireless transmitter in England in order to establish contact with a resistance organisation in Norway. His intention had become known to the Abwehr and EVENSEN's instructions were to ingratiate himself with WESTRUM in order to get himself sent back to Norway by the British Intelligence to supply the required transmitter to the organisation with which WESTRUM was in contact. The above is a greatly simplified account of a very involved case.

The Bergen Organisation.

28. Early in 1941 a number of Norwegian groups were working in Bergen collecting information. They eventually came under the leadership of Johan REFSHAHL and were in contact with the Military group and escape organisation. An important part was played by Eystein Henrik MAGNUS, who among other activities managed a photographic department for the organisation. He employed one Rolf BONNEVIE in this photographic department and later removed BONNEVIE on account of his lack of discretion, but gave him some other work to do. In August, 1941 very reliable information was received that a German agent was in touch with BONNEVIE and

had his confidence. It appeared that this agent was Olaf PJEITURSEN, alias HENDRIK, who lived on the top floor of the same house as BONNEVIE. It is known that Olaf PJEITURSEN had been working for the Germans in 1940, '41 and '42. In the summer of 1941 he was responsible for the arrangements by which the s.v. Hernie was sent to this country, as mentioned in para. 26 above. WALLEN, the German agent on the Hernie, was, however, unaware that PJEITURSEN was also a German agent and believed that he was a genuine organiser of Norwegian escape parties.

29. REFSDAHL, who arrived in this country on 24.9.42, reported that on 24.6.42 he saw Rudolf NESS, BONNEVIE's successor in MAGNUS's photographic department, and that NESS told him that PJEITURSEN had made an offer through BONNEVIE to supply him with a military map of certain German fortifications in Norway. NESS had refused the offer and REFSDAHL told NESS to have nothing to do with PJEITURSEN as he had been warned against him by a member of the Oslo Police. On the following day BONNEVIE was arrested and this was followed by a series of arrests of people whose names were known to BONNEVIE. Further arrests also followed and, having done all they could to protect the remaining members of the organisation, MAGNUS and REFSDAHL both came over to this country. They are both regarded as being completely loyal Norwegians, and they believe BONNEVIE to have been an innocent dupe, not a traitor. BONNEVIE was reported to be an S.O.E. agent and presumably the facts about his connection with PJEITURSEN were communicated to S.O.E. by S.I.S. in 1941. As far as can be seen, it is not possible to say from the information on record whether PJEITURSEN penetrated the organisation only at the time of BONNEVIE's arrest in June, 1942 or had been watching BONNEVIE, or getting information from him, from about the time of the Hernie affair in June, 1941.

For GULDBRANSEN.

30. For GULDBRANSEN is a Norwegian officer who was trained by S.O.E. and sent on a mission to Norway. According to his own statement, he landed on 22.2.42 at Televaag near Bergen and went to Drammen, where his parents lived, on 23.2.42. There he got in touch with a number of local people and a local organisation. He gave instruction in guerrilla warfare to a number of Norwegians. He went to his parents house in Drammen early in May and the Gestapo learnt of his presence and arrested him. He attempted to escape but was shot and badly wounded, and suffered from temporary and partial paralysis. In a very weak state in hospital he was subjected to interrogation by the Gestapo and to what he described as mental torture, which consisted in part of being compelled to listen to what sounded like screams of people being tortured. (There is a suggestion that gramophone records were used for this purpose.) For a long time he tried to conceal the truth or mislead his interrogators, but eventually broke down. He states that his interrogators were in possession of a great deal of information about S.O.E., its training schools, methods and its officers, as well as about Norwegians who had been trained for despatch to Norway as agents. When he made any misleading statement it was invariably carefully checked and he was made to suffer for departures from the truth. They also knew a good deal about his associates in Norway and had obtained possession of a code and some addresses which were in his possession.

31. Finally, under great pressure, he consented to return to England to act as a German agent, with a view to obtaining further information about S.O.E. and sending the information back to the Germans in Norway and to find out what was known in England about the German agents in Great Britain. In the alternative he was to return to Norway as an S.O.E. agent if that were possible. In order to obtain a hold on him his parents, his fiancée and other relatives were put under arrest and he was also told that if he admitted on his return to England that he had agreed to work for the Germans he would be guilty of high treason.

32. The Germans staged a faked escape in a forest, in the course of which, in spite of not having fully recovered from his illness, he knocked down two Germans (who were playing their parts) and ran through the trees without being caught or hit by the shots they fired. He got back to England through Sweden, where he arrived on 19.10.42, having sent a message to the "Gestapo" as an earnest of his good intentions and in the hope that it would lead, as promised, to the release of his mother. In this message he gave some information about Norwegians

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33. Shortly afterwards his journey to Scotland was arranged through the British Legation in Stockholm. On his arrival here he made a statement in which he concealed the facts as to the extent of the information he had given to the "Gestapo" under pressure and pretended that the faked escape was a real one. S.O.E. officers acted in consultation with B.I.A. of this office in view of the fact that there was reason to believe that GULDBRANSEN was acting as a double agent. The story of his escape was regarded by B.I.A. officers as betraying traces of German technique which had come to notice in connection with other reports of faked escapes, and the general circumstances of his case made it appear extremely probable that Ter GULDBRANSEN was holding back a true account of what had happened to him. Enquiries continued for some time without any success in the attempt to induce GULDBRANSEN to tell the whole truth. Eventually information was received from another Norwegian named Ernst Kirkeby JACOBSEN, who had also been arrested by the "Gestapo" and had stated that FREMER of the "Gestapo" had told him that GULDBRANSEN had given them information and that arrangements were being made to send him back to England, his "escape" having been arranged.

34. Finally, on 29.1.43, a formal enquiry was arranged in which a Norwegian officer, S.O.E. officers and Major Robertson of B.I.A. took part. GULDBRANSEN, having been confronted with the fact that information (as given by JACOBSEN) had been received, made a statement in which he said in answer to questions that he had given more information to the Germans than he had previously admitted and that he had concealed the fact that his escape had been arranged. It appears that he was influenced not only by the fact that his relatives were held as hostages, but also by the German argument that if he admitted the real facts in England he would be treated as a traitor. The Germans had also attempted to influence him by arguing that in working for them he would be working in the interests of Norway as opposed to the interests of Great Britain.

35. The view was taken, and is understood to have been accepted by GULDBRANSEN himself, that his duty compelled him to act without reference to the safety of his relatives who were held as hostages, but that an attempt to arrange for him to communicate with the Germans as if he were still acting as a double agent should be made and that this might save their lives. It was held that GULDBRANSEN was a loyal officer and had eventually told the whole truth and had not at any time contemplated working genuinely for the Germans. One of the strongest motives on which the Germans had worked had been his sense of shame in admitting to his superiors that he had given away as much as he had about the organisation with which he was concerned in Norway.

36. It is probable that if JACOBSEN's information had not been received it would have been extremely difficult to obtain the full truth from GULDBRANSEN and this illustrates the extreme complexity and difficulty of investigating the cases of men who have been in the hands of the Abwehr or the "Gestapo" and returned to this country with stories of having escaped. It is not possible to go into all these complexities here, but they are obviously greater in the cases of men with weaker character than GULDBRANSEN.

37. The statements of individuals who have been in German hands, as in this case are not always clear regarding the functions of different parts of the German machine, such as Abwehr Abteilung III and the Gestapo, but the facts regarding FREMER, mentioned by GULDBRANSEN as the Gestapo chief who dealt with him, appear to show that he is in fact an official of the G.M.F. or Secret Field Police.

IV. French Cases.

Mrs. Stella LONEDALE.

38. Mrs. Stella LONEDALE, British, arrived in England by air from Lisbon on 6.11.41, having been abroad since 12.1.40. Early in 1940 she had been in France, where her husband was stationed, and she refused to leave when the Germans advanced

According to her own account, they did not molest her and she used her liberty to collect intelligence for the benefit of the Allies. She was caught in flagrante delicto and rigorously examined by the head of the Abwehr counter-espionage at Angers. When she arrived in England Stella LONSDALE told a long story about her relations with an Abwehr officer, who she alleged had obtained her release on condition that she worked for them. While in unoccupied France, to which she proceeded on an Abwehr mission, she worked for M.I.9, although her conduct aroused the suspicion of other British authorities. She was also induced to work for the Sme Bureau. She alleged that the Abwehr officer who had obtained her release was a traitor to Germany and had given her information to pass on to the British Intelligence. This information was found on reference to S.I.S. to be accurate and important, and it was regarded as having been supplied to her as part of a plan by the Abwehr to build her up as a double agent. The enquiry regarding her case presented difficulty as it was not possible to rely on any uncorroborated statement she made. She made repeated requests to be sent back to France as an agent of the British Intelligence, in order to obtain further information from the above mentioned Abwehr officer. There is therefore a strong probability that this is to be regarded as an attempt to penetrate the British Intelligence Service on the part of the Abwehr.

Notes on the VICTOIRE Case.

39. A brief summary of this case has been prepared by Mr. Harner of B.I.a. and it reads as follows:

40. "During the period November, 1940 to November, 1941 a very successful Polish organisation worked in France under the name of INTERALLIEE. It was run by a Polish officer, whose code name was WALENTY, and his second in command was a woman known to us now as VICTOIRE. In all he recruited over 100 special agents. They sent periodic reports on the military situation to the Polish Deuxieme Bureau in London, who passed them on to the British War Office. They in fact provided an almost complete Order of Battle of the German forces in France. At the beginning of November, 1941 the Gestapo at Cherbourg got on the track of one of the sub-agents working in that district, arrested him, due to the betrayal of one of his former mistresses, forced him to write a letter to WALENTY asking for an interview, arrested the man WALENTY sent to attend the interview, and eventually tortured the latter into giving away WALENTY's address. On November 18th, 1941 the principal members of the organisation were arrested. VICTOIRE immediately threw in her hand with the Germans and collaborated with them whole-heartedly. Her collaboration took the form of helping them to settle messages to be sent back to London via the W/T set and also acting as an agent provocateur to catch the remaining sub-agents. She was not allowed complete liberty, but instead BLEICHER, the German "Gestapo" official who was in charge of the round-up became her lover and accompanied her everywhere, posing as a friend. Many sub-agents were arrested as a result of her efforts, which consisted in her sitting in cafes where they were due to meet and identifying them.

41. "By Christmas, 1941 the whole of the INTERALLIEE Organisation was in German hands. Then, through a contact of the organisation (a Polish lawyer living in Paris) VICTOIRE got in touch with an important S.O.E. agent whose code name was LUCAS. The probability is that her contact with him was entirely fortuitous and that she reported it to the Germans to curry favour with them. From that time onwards she was allowed almost complete liberty, installed in a most expensive flat in Paris and used to penetrate the LUCAS Organisation. For a month LUCAS did not realise that she was controlled. His primary object in getting in touch with her was that he was without quick means of communication in London and was using her wireless link. He would, therefore, give her messages to be passed back to London and she would, of course, show these to the Germans who would also see the replies before they were handed back to him. Several operations took place during January and February, whose object was to bring LUCAS back to England. The Germans were prepared from the outset to let him go, which was obviously taking a very big risk, but which they no doubt felt to be justified on the grounds that the messages they were seeing revealed that he was going back to England to be made the titular head of all the British underground organisations working in France. It was obviously, therefore, to their advantage to let him go and watch him on his return. VICTOIRE, therefore, went

troops. This story aroused scepticism when he was examined here. He ultimately reported to his superior officers that he had been given a mission by the Germans who had attempted to persuade him that in working for them he would be helping his own country. They also held his relatives and his fiancée as hostages.

48. The following are the details available regarding BLEICHER, who is described in this case as a Gestapo officer:

Feldwebel Hugo BLEICHER (This rank if correctly given implies that he is in the Secret Field Police - Geheime Feldpolizei.)

November, 1941: Originally Commissaire de Gestapo in Cherbourg - now holding important position in Paris. Stated to have been European agent in Danstadt before the war. Spied in England during the last war. Arrested WALSLEY on 16.11.41.

It is known that Abteilung III F of the Abwehr was concerned with his work on the WALSLEY case.

Jean Charles PELLETIER.

49. On 15.4.42 PELLETIER, who was an accredited agent of the Fighting French forces, arrived at Liverpool from Vichy territory. He had previously arrived in this country as a refugee in August, 1940 and, after being trained as a W/T agent by S.I.S., was sent to unoccupied France by parachute, with instructions to get into touch with certain other agents in unoccupied France, in order to assist them in their W/T communications with London. In June, 1941 he received orders from London to go to Paris and in July he was arrested by the Germans and submitted to a rigorous examination by being severely handled whenever he made an incorrect statement. He has stated that the main reason for the German success in breaking down his resistance was that they possessed a great deal of information about de Gaulle agents in the occupied and unoccupied zones, and that an Air Force Captain, who was a wireless expert, disconcerted him by producing copies of practically every message which PELLETIER had sent ever since he commenced practice in this country before he left for France. He also stated that the expert was able to produce a large number of messages sent out by every British or Fighting French agent in France and a mass of other information about the movements of sets and operators. It appears that he had been given a list of most if not all of these agents, in order to enable him to help them with their wireless sets. After he had made a full confession to the Germans they proposed to him that he should work as a double agent in their interest. He accepted this proposal because the Germans informed him that his parents were in their power and would suffer if he did not comply with their wishes. On 25.10.42 the Germans arranged for his "escape". The plan was that he was taken from the prison by ambulance to the hospital, pretending to be suffering from appendicitis, and later escaped from the hospital. He was instructed to return to the unoccupied zone, rejoining his network, and transmit to the Germans in Paris full information, especially W/T and cryptographic, about the operations and identities of the other agents. He was then told that he would be sent to this country to get into the wireless section of the British Intelligence organisation running agents in the free zone. From this point of vantage he was to transmit to the Germans by one of the British sets information regarding traffic arrangements, the identities of new agents in training and identities in the controlling organisation in London. He stated that he proceeded to unoccupied France and it is significant that two Fighting French agents, his former colleagues, whom he happened to meet shortly after his release, were immediately arrested by the Germans. On 17.11.41 he decided to make his way back to England for a reason which is not on his own statement entirely clear.

50. There is hardly sufficient material in the above cases to admit of an exhaustive analysis of German methods, but the following facts stand out:

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with him when a plane was expected and later during two unsuccessful attempts to take him off by sea. On each occasion she was kept under observation by the Germans but allowed, on her own, complete liberty. The Germans thus ran the risk of her betraying her mission to LUCAS and losing him, and she did in fact do this very thing at the beginning of February when she became his mistress. Finally, however, a sea operation at the end of February was successful and he arrived in England accompanied to everybody's surprise by VICTOIRE herself. (The Germans had not announced her coming in their messages.)

42. "Parallel to the above but much less important, the Germans were using another ex-agent of the WALLEY organization to penetrate an S.O.E. organization working in Northern France, known as OVERCLOUD. Here again the agent was allowed complete liberty and the Germans took the risk of his double-crossing them. Again, however, they cultivated personal relations with him and stayed in his family and so on. They also allowed an operation to take place whereby the heads of OVERCLOUD, the LE TAG brothers, returned to England and came back again to France with fresh material and instructions. They did not close down this organization until the LE TAG brothers were back in France.

43. "The case provides a valuable insight into the methods employed by the Germans, in showing the risks and chances they are prepared to take in order to win substantial prizes. It will be seen from the above that they put their trust in two agents who had shortly before been working whole-heartedly against them - in the first case they might well have missed their prize but in fact got it due to outside circumstances; in the second case they achieved what they wanted. The second lesson seems to be that, when using agents for penetration purposes, they allow them a very large amount of liberty and treat them very decently, to the extent even of making them personal friends. The third, and perhaps most singular lesson of the case is that in its broad outlines it was handled with great imagination by the Germans, whereas in detail they were very slovenly and failed to take a great deal of care. Some of their messages, for instance, were very bad and they did not prepare VICTOIRE's cover story in this country with any care at all. One's general feeling on investigating the case is that the Germans are playing for results rather than for safety, and either by successful handling or by good luck they achieved them in this case."

44. A very long summary of the case has been prepared by the same officer. It comprises some 60 pages and voluminous appendices. It does not purport to be more than a summary of the information available to us and our information is obviously a small part of the story of this important and widespread organization in France. The facts are exceedingly difficult to assess, because we are in the main dependent on VICTOIRE's version of them and it is impossible to be certain whether she is telling the truth at any point where there is no independent corroboration. It follows that a large part of this longer summary consists of speculation, which necessarily involves considerable uncertainty, although the whole case has been set out with great care and ability.

45. The INTERMINE Organization as we know it owed its existence to a meeting between a Polish officer and a French woman who made eyes at one another in a café. Within a short time she became his mistress and they set to work together to found the organization. Their work has every appearance of being brilliantly done, but both of them and some of their colleagues were probably somewhat eccentric if not abnormal people. Personal jealousies between some of the women and their lovers possibly had some influence on the final catastrophe and it is obvious that no counter-espionage "umbrella" could provide against factors such as these.

46. When the Germans broke up the INTERMINE Organization they appear to have succeeded for some time in deceiving S.I.S. by the messages which they induced VICTOIRE to send to England on her transmitter, in spite of the fact that viewed in the light of after events these messages appear to have been badly prepared. The Germans were thus in possession of the facts regarding her M/T in November, 1941 and from this case alone would have obtained useful information about the wireless technique of S.I.S. agents.

47. WALLEY eventually arrived in England and told a story of escape as a result of a motor accident which enabled him to dive through a column of marching

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These cases in occupied territories are controlled by Abteilung III F of the Abwehr, assisted by the G.F.P. or Secret Field Police. The agents who come into contact with the various officials are not always able to distinguish between those of the Abwehr, the Gestapo and the G.F.P.

The Germans are especially interested in W/T operators and W/T technique.

The ultimate means of German penetration are difficult to ascertain, but are probably to be found in the use of agents inside indigenous or British inspired organisations and in wireless interception.

Importance is also attached to their methods of turning Allied nationals round to work against Britain, by attempting to suggest that it is in the real interest of their own country for them to do so. In such cases "escapes" are arranged and escape stories are therefore treated with suspicion when agents who have been in contact with the enemy arrive here.

Pressure is placed on captured agents by brutality combined with attempts at moral persuasion, including the holding of hostages.

After penetrating an organisation the Germans do not necessarily take precipitate action, but by watching and waiting effect further penetration and the extent to which this is done is not easy to gauge.

There is an inescapable security interest in cases in which an Abteilung III agent or an S.I.S. or S.O.E. agent who has been turned round is sent here by the Germans. The former includes cases like that of WALTER of the Herbie, mentioned in para. 28 above as an attempt to penetrate S.O.E. and also cases where an unaccredited agent recruited in occupied territory is a double agent working for Abteilung III F. (The machinery for the detection of such cases is at the L.R.C. and largely depends for its efficiency on having the most complete information possible regarding organisations and individuals working for the enemy or against them.)

51. There are other cases of penetration in Belgium, Norway and France, as well as in Holland, which have not been included in these summaries as they have not yet been fully examined.

V. Conclusions.

52. The facts which have been set out above are a very small fraction of those bearing directly or indirectly on the question of counter-espionage and security arrangements for the protection of S.O.E. or S.I.S. operations abroad. The case of Belgium has been dealt with most fully but, as the appendix shows, there are a few important and a number of less important organisations which are working against the enemy, either by sustaining national morale, by obtaining military information, by working on behalf of S.O.E. or S.I.S. or by providing means of escape from Belgium for British soldiers left there, of R.A.F. personnel who make forced landings, for secret agents of S.O.E., S.I.S. or indigenous Belgian organisations and for ordinary refugees. The exact facts about many of these organisations are not available in this office and it is clear that more precise facts must be known to S.O.E. and S.I.S. or to the Intelligence Service of the Belgian Government in London, especially in regard to organisations working directly for them, but the links between the various organisations appear to be numerous and this fact gives Abwehr Abteilung III and the Sicherheitsdienst as the Intelligence organisation under Himmler, with the G.F.P. and the Gestapo as executives, opportunities for penetration which cannot be fully assessed on our present material and may prove extremely dan-

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59. It is not proposed to suggest remedies here*. This is a matter which in most respects can best be dealt with - ultimately, if not directly - by the officers responsible for secret operations. The question of security measures in the field is one which is beyond the scope of M.I.5, but while various indigenous movements in occupied territory have their own counter-espionage arrangements in some cases, it seems clear that it is not feasible to direct such measures from this country.

60. So far as S.O.E. and M.I.5 are concerned, there are various ways in which M.I.5 machinery and the intelligence obtained by various branches of this office, especially the L.R.C., Camp O.2.O. and B.1a, can be of the greatest value for the purpose in view. In one sense it might be said that the texture of the "umbrella" is already woven into the existing fabric: that is to say, co-operation between the security section of S.O.E. and sections of this office such as B.1a and B.1b. already goes some way towards facilitating the counter-espionage protection which is required. This has been developed recently and is still being developed, but it is impossible to resist the feeling that something more comprehensive and closer in the way of co-ordination is required. This could be effected by the creation within S.O.E. of a section or staff with a good knowledge of all the relevant information about the German machine and its methods, and of our own C.E. machinery.

61. The problem of S.I.S. is more complex, if only because S.I.S. have, in the shape of Section V, their own counter-espionage organisation outside the three mile limit. This position involves a further complication after Allied landings in Africa or Europe, when the functional relations between Section V and M.I.5 seem to become more difficult to define and Section V, acting in co-operation with the provisional (or permanent) Allied government, presumably becomes responsible in British-occupied Africa or Europe for the security of S.O.E. organisations and agents in the same sense that M.I.5 are responsible within the three-mile limit, e.g. for assisting with information obtained by interrogating suspects, as at the L.R.C., or by advising in cases of double-agents.

62. The following are among the causes of enemy penetration:

- a) the unavoidable risks of such undertakings.
- b) the avoidable risks taken by agents or the controlling authorities.
- c) lack of sufficiently close collaboration between the three British services on the one hand and between them and the Allied Intelligence services on the other.
- d) the German success in reading agents' wireless messages (cf. in particular CASSART, VICTOIRE and PELLETIER mentioned above). It is not known whether an enquiry into the extent of this success and its duration has been undertaken, nor what counter measures have been adopted. It is obviously a matter of major importance, which deserves close and constant attention. There have been references to a belief among agents that the Germans have a very efficient system of DFing their sets.
- e) the German success in employing agents to penetrate resistance or escape organisations in occupied territory; their skill in watching organisations once penetrated over prolonged periods (cf. Mme. Florina DINGS in the ANDREE case); and their severe treatment of captured agents.

63. This report is based on information available in M.I.5. A full considera-

*Certain minor suggestions have been made, en passant, in the text and are marked "A" in the margin.

tion of the intricate problems involved would only be possible in the light of the knowledge and experience available in S.O.E. and S.I.S. The time at disposal for the preparation of this report has not been sufficient to allow of an examination of all the relevant files of M.I.5 and even less so for an extensive enquiry into the knowledge and experience of M.I.5 officers in this subject.

It is noted that the information available in S.O.E. and S.I.S. is not complete and that the knowledge and experience of M.I.5 officers is not fully available. It is suggested that a more extensive enquiry be made into the knowledge and experience of M.I.5 officers in this subject.

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APPENDIX.

Belgian Resistance and Escape Organisations.

The information in this appendix is mainly based on details available in the Information Index regarding resistance organisations in Belgium. It is not possible to say from our records whether some of these organisations are British, i.e. S.O.E. or S.I.S., or are indigenous. There are also a number of other resistance movements known to us (the information having in most cases been obtained from persons at the L.R.C.) which are scattered about the towns and villages of Belgium, and it is not always possible to be certain whether these small local organisations are affiliated to or connected with the larger organisations listed below. The most important of those in the list have been starred and in these cases a very brief outline of the nature and purpose of the organisation has been included. The unstarred cases are mentioned to show that our information, incomplete as it is, indicates the existence of a large field for the Germans to penetrate and shows one difficulty with which we are confronted, i.e. that many of the organisations have contacts with one another and that the penetration of one is therefore likely to lead to the penetration of others. Where we have received indications of penetration (or arrests) this has been noted.

It cannot always be said how far statements made by individuals passing through the L.R.C. are reliable or authentic and the facts available to us are not always up to date. Up to date and authentic information could, in many cases, be obtained from S.I.S., S.O.E. or the Belgian Sureté and if it were so obtained, the interrogators at the L.R.C. would have a more complete picture of the escape and other organisations than they have at present.

- Agence Noël** * Escape organisation, having connections with Service Guim, which was a subsidiary of Luc (q.v.)
- Aide Communale (A.R.F.)** Camouflaged military organisation.
- Les Ailes Brisées** * Escape organisation mainly for Allied airmen.
- Andree or Le Facteur** * Escape organisation, described in para. 14 of the report.
- Agence Beaver** * Escape organisation, having connections with the Belgian Sureté in London.
On 12.2.42 various members of the organisation were arrested. These arrests may have been caused by an indiscretion on the telephone by a man who wished to join the organisation, or he may have been given away by GILLET, a Nazi who worked in the same place.
- Parti Belge** * Organisation for collecting military information and helping in escapes by forging documents, etc.
In September, 1941 various members were arrested.
- Belgique avant Tout** * Organisation for propaganda, sabotage and later espionage.
- B.O.S. (Belgische Oud Stryders).** * Ex-Servicemen's organisation for propaganda, sabotage and help for the Allies in the event of a German withdrawal.
- Brave** * Espionage organisation, having connections with Dame Blanche (q.v.)
In March, 1942 STIMIER, an agent who had been sent from the U.K., was caught transmitting and was arrested. In July, 1942 a leakage was suspected in the courier service to the SAPOT organisation in the South of France.

Service des Carburants (Fuel Office) An organisation which obtains information through its inspectors who travel round the country.

*Cleveland or Clarence) -- Escape organisation, having connections with Brave and Dame Blanche) Les Mousquetaires (q.v.). Its communications run through the Belgian Military Organisation and many of its members are also members of the Legion Belge. It uses the Andree escape route.

Entente Nationale Belge Organisation for propaganda and anti-Nazi activities.

Groupment l'Etoile Organisation which is making preparations to help an Allied invasion.

Fraternelles Organisation for collecting information.

Front Independance Organisation for propaganda and preparing to help an Allied invasion.

Legion Nationale Military organisation, having connections with l'Etoile and Legion Noire (q.v.) There are some doubts as to its loyalty, and one member is said to have worked in Germany since the capitulation, although the leader, HOORNAERT, has been arrested.

Legion Noire Organisation for collecting information, which is believed to be passed to the U.K.

Ligues Patriotiques Luxembourgaises Organisation for propaganda, assistance to escapees and resistance to Germany when the Allies invade. It communicated with the U.K. through another secret organisation (not named), but this link was broken in May, 1942. It had its own C.E. organisation.

*Luc This organisation was founded in August, 1940 by George LECLERCQ, an employee of the Belgian Ministry of Justice. It had three main aims: 1) espionage and the collection of information. 2) sabotage of German war material, and aircraft in particular. 3) the evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and political refugees. It had connections with Zero, Les Mousquetaires and Andree (q.v.) and was in touch with the U.K. by wireless and courier and with British agents in Belgium. On 14.12.41 CASEART (see para. 8 of the report) was arrested. In January, 1942 LECLERCQ and CAUVIN, one of his principal assistants, escaped to England after the organisation had been penetrated. After they left Belgium the organisation was split up into several groups and there have been various indications of penetration. The organisation had S.O.E. connections until CASEART's arrest and now some groups have S.I.S. connections.

Service Cuen This organisation was a subsidiary of Luc and is now discontinued.

Organisation Militaire du Corps de Cavalerie Military organisation said to be in touch with London.

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- Les Mousquetaires. A para-military organisation, which also organises escapes and collects information. It has connections with Luc, Dame Blanche and with S.O.E. The para-military formation is based on the provinces of Belgium and sub-divisions are Zones, Sections, Groupes and Equipes, the maximum number of men in an Equipe being 10-12. The leaders are selected not on account of rank, but for keenness, leadership and patriotism. As provincial leaders they attempted to obtain officers of high rank and as many of them were connected with the Legion Belge it was decided to co-ordinate their activities with those of the Legion. A number of the leaders and couriers have been arrested. One member was a girl stenographer working at the German Marine Office, who produced a list of Belgians wanted by the Gestapo.
- Le Mouvement Rassemblement Morale. This organisation is permitted by the Germans and provides a cover for the Legion Belge.
- Entente Nationale Belge. Organisation for countering German, Rexist and Flamingant propaganda.
- Oeuvre de Secours aux Familles des Prisonniers en Allemagne. This organisation provides food, etc. for British forces hiding in Belgium.
- Société Generale. This bank collects information and finances escapees. They were involved when CASSART (see Luc) was arrested. They are said to withhold information if it is prejudicial to their own interests to pass it on.
- Sportif. One of the members of this organisation, OSSELAER, arrived in the U.K. in March, 1942 to contact S.O.E. as the delegate of the organisation.
- Un Toit A Toi. Organisation of workmen (not Communist) which helps escapees and has stores of arms and ammunition.
- V.E.V.A. (Vereeniging voor Economisch Werweer). Organisation composed partly of Jewish diamond dealers to fight against German intrusion on the Belgian market and to counter anti-Semitic propaganda.
- Blanche Brigade or Brigade Blanche. This organisation is reported to include a great number of Police and douanes in its ranks. Among its aims is that of seizing key points in the event of an Allied invasion. New members are tested for a period and are not informed of the names of their leaders or headquarters. The organisation publishes clandestine papers and has committed numerous acts of sabotage. The Germans have offered big rewards for the discovery of arms, of which they believe the organisation to have large quantities. It transmits information by wireless and helps British airmen to escape. The organisation was denounced by de HAIDE and several arrests were made. It has now probably been absorbed by the Legion Belge.
- Zero (Walter, Service Jef). This is the largest and probably the most important organisation in Belgium. It is used by S.I.S. and the Belgian Sureté and has connections with Luc and the Legion Belge. It has sections dealing with military, air, political economic and financial information, and others dealing with propaganda, communications and couriers, radio

Zero (cont.)

communications; false documents, security, assistance to parachutists and escapes.

The head of the security section was arrested in September, 1941, and in 1942 the organisation suffered a considerable number of casualties.

There are members of the organisation working in German offices, who warn the others of German intentions.

Legion Belge

This is a very large organisation based on the Belgian Army and the Belgian regiments, but not exclusively so, as the Legion Belge includes civilians. For the sake of security, arrangements were made for civilians to take the place of military leaders in the event of the latter being arrested in some of the smaller units.

The object of this organisation is to keep an underground army in being, with a view to joining the Allies when they invade the continent. For this reason it is quiescent but many of its members engage in other activities.

It maintains contact with Zero and the Air Force Personnel organisation and is reported to be in contact with the British Intelligence Service.

The organisation has been openly talked about in Belgium and it is said that the Germans must know of its existence. One of the members, FERREMAN, was arrested and has since reported that the Germans appeared to know a lot about the organisation. Wholesale arrests took place after a consultation of the leaders with leaders of the Communist movement, who are suspected of having given them away.

Military Personnel

Organisation for helping British soldiers in Belgium to escape. In March, 1941 MARTINY, one of the members, was arrested. A month later he was released and resumed his activities.

Air Force Personnel

Organisation for the escape of airmen. The route ran through unoccupied France and it is not known how the organisation has worked after the Germans occupied the whole of France.

Armée Belge (A.B.)

Organisation for anti-Nazi activities and sabotage. Members of the sabotage organisation have been arrested and other members were denounced by Mme. MOSEBEUX to save her own life.

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ATTEMPTED PENETRATION OF S.O.E. AND S.I.S.

1. The following five cases which have been handled by this section illustrate how the Abwehr has attempted to penetrate S.O.E. and S.I.S. by means of double agents for purposes of contrespionage and/or deception. These cases have been selected as offering the more striking and representative illustrations of this technique. They fall naturally into two categories: first, attempts to penetrate S.O.E. operations against Norway; second, attempts to penetrate S.I.S. operations against France.

2. Norwegian cases: S.O.E.

a. The case of the M/V OLAF (JOHANSEN, SOLEM, ALSETH)

On 16.3.41 the m/v OLAF arrived at Lerwick, Shetlands, having left Trondheim on 4.3.41. There were three persons aboard: Ingvald JOHANSEN, a Norwegian seaman; Thorlief SOLEM, a Norwegian seaman; and Sigurd ALSETH, Norwegian. The party were found satisfactory from the security standpoint and duly allowed their liberty. Two of the party then took service with S.O.E., namely JOHANSEN and SOLEM. JOHANSEN was recruited shortly after his arrival, and continued in this employment until 11.41, when he was captured together with a number of other agents whilst in Norway on a mission for S.O.E. His function over this period was to skipper the vessels plying between the Shetlands and Norway in the interests of S.O.E. SOLEM served only in a minor capacity from 16.4.41 to 2.6.41, when he was discharged as wholly unsuitable.

On 29.11.41 Special Source information was received which made it plain not only that the Abwehr had imprisoned JOHANSEN and his companions and were proposing to court-martial them, but also that on his original journey to this country JOHANSEN had been charged with a mission for the Abwehr. On the strength of this intelligence, the cases of JOHANSEN's companions on that journey, SOLEM and ALSETH, were reexamined and found profoundly unsatisfactory. They were arrested, closely interrogated, and duly broken.

In the absence of JOHANSEN, it has not been possible to elucidate with any distinctness the objectives of the German mission, since SOLEM and ALSETH maintain that this was known to JOHANSEN alone. The following facts were, however, established by the examination. SOLEM admitted that he was a German agent, having been engaged in contrespionage work for the Trondheim station against patriots in Norway from 7.40 down to his journey to this country. As for the purpose of that journey, SOLEM alleges that he and JOHANSEN were told by the Abwehr officer in charge to observe on the way over the route through the mine-barrier at Lerwick, the position of any naval units seen en route, and the recognition signals used by aircraft. They were to allege that the purpose of the journey was to purchase whiskey, and having done this with the money with which the Germans had provided them, they were to return in the OLAF to Norway. It was clearly hoped by the Abwehr that having broken the ice in this manner the OLAF would be in a position to ply regularly between Shetland and Norway.

Manifestly, this story is unsatisfactory, and it is felt that the real purpose of the journey was to enter the service of S.O.E. in order to ply, ostensibly on their behalf, between the two countries, whilst really putting the position to the advantage of the Germans. It should be emphasised, however, that in the absence of JOHANSEN, this conclusion has of necessity remained a speculation. S.O.E. have maintained that JOHANSEN, whilst in their service, was in fact loyal, witness the facts that none of his expeditions gave any grounds for belief that he had double-crossed S.O.E., and that he is known to

have been genuinely imprisoned by the Germans, not merely arrested for cover purposes.

But whilst these considerations may fairly be taken to have established that JOHANSEN did not in fact act as a d.a. in the German interest, they of course in no way invalidate the speculation above as to the nature of the original Abwehr intention. The case, therefore, is primarily of interest as shewing with what ease two accredited German agents were enlisted in S.O.E., in all probability on German instructions. For this the responsibility was found to lie with M.I.5., inasmuch as it was discovered, when the case was reopened on the basis of the Special Source information, that the security examination of the party on arrival had been quite inadequate.

b. The case of the M/V HERNIE (WALLEM).

On 8.7.41. the m/v HERNIE arrived at Lerwick, Shetland, having left Bergen on 5.7.41. There were aboard three persons: Helmik WALLEM, Norwegian, professional W/T operator; Ingard NILSEN, Norwegian; and Georg LUNDE, Norwegian.

The arrival of the vessel was preceded by information from Special Source shewing that she was carrying an unidentified German agent with a mission for this country. The party were closely examined, as a result of which WALLEM confessed to being the agent in question. His story is briefly this.

He was recruited in 3.41 by the Bergen station of the Abwehr, and had been employed down to 6.41 on contrespionage work against patriots and Allied agents inside Norway. In the middle of 6.41 he was instructed to proceed to England in the guise of a refugee together with two selected dupes, NILSEN and LUNDE. On arrival he was to get himself recruited by the British Intelligence and in this capacity return to Norway with a transmitter and code which he was to hand over to the Abwehr, who would play back the set to the British control.

The case is therefore a straightforward attempt to penetrate S.O.E. It is worth remarking that the Abwehr apparently held that, in view of his W/T qualifications, WALLEM would experience no difficulty in getting himself constituted a British agent.

c. The case of the M/V REIDAR (EVENSEN).

On 8.1.43 the m/v REIDAR arrived at Lerwick, Shetland, having left Aalesund on 6.1.43. There were aboard three persons: Arnold EVENSEN, Norwegian, baker; Louis WESTRUM, Norwegian, seaman; and Gunnar PEDERSEN, Norwegian, student.

The arrival of the vessel was preceded and followed by copious evidence from Special Source, shewing that the arrival of REIDAR was the realisation of a project the Abwehr had been entertaining since 5.42, and that she had aboard an unidentified German agent.

The party have therefore been closely examined, and although the investigation is far from complete, the main outlines of the story are sufficiently clear for present purposes.

In the course of a statement freely made at the beginning of the examination, EVENSEN admitted that he was the German agent in question. His story, as given on this and subsequent occasions to date, is briefly as follows.

In 7.42, EVENSEN became an accredited agent of the Abwehr in Trondheim, and in this capacity was entrusted, at the end of the year, with a mission to proceed to England in the guise of a refugee, together with the dupes WESTRUM and PEDERSEN. WESTRUM was known to

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...not have contact in Norway with a certain resistance organisation which stood in need of a transmitter in order to establish contact with this country. This intention of WESTRUM's, and the activities of the organisation were known to the Germans, who had, for this reason, arranged for him to be included in the REIDAR party. EVENSEN's instructions therefore were to ingratiate himself with WESTRUM in the course of the voyage and thus contrive to get himself sent back to Norway by the British Intelligence together with WESTRUM, in order to supply the necessary transmitter to the organisation with which WESTRUM was in contact. He was also given a subsidiary straight espionage mission to cover the period of his stay in this country. It was supposed that, having hitched his wagon in this manner to WESTRUM's star, he would find no difficulty in returning with a set, which would then of course be handed over to the Abwehr in order to be played back.

It is necessary to add that the foregoing is a considerable simplification of this involved case, which is complicated by the difficulty of establishing EVENSEN's good or bad faith. In brief, whilst he maintains that his whole long connexion with the Abwehr is to be explained by his intention to double-cross them on his eventual arrival in England, there are strong grounds for believing that this claim is not wholly true. Doubts thus being shed on his good faith, it is felt to be possible that, in telling the story outlined above, he has been acting on German instructions; and in thus readily revealing his double-cross mission he is only concealing some still undisclosed assignment.

Whilst no conclusion can yet be pronounced on the general question of EVENSEN's claim to have acted consistently in the Allied interests, it can safely be said that any hypothesis as to a triple-cross mission can be emphatically rejected as over-subtle. That is to say, it is felt that EVENSEN's account of his mission as summarized above is substantially true, and this being so, the case is clearly an attempted penetration by means of a d.a., exactly similar in type to that of WOLFE WALLEK.

3. French cases: S.I.S.

a. The case of Stella LONSDALE.

Mrs. Stella LONSDALE, British, arrived at Whitchurch on 5.11.41 by air from Lisbon, having escaped by stages to Lisbon from Occupied France via the Unoccupied Zone. She had not been in England since 12.1.40. She was treated on arrival as a suspect agent of M.I.9, for reasons which will appear in the sequel. M.I.9, M.I.5, and S.I.S. quickly formed an impression that their suspicions were well-founded, and a careful joint examination of LONSDALE was undertaken, as a result of which the following story was obtained.

On 13.1.40 she landed in France for the purpose of proceeding to Nantes to join her husband, John LONSDALE, who was stationed there. There is independent evidence of her presence there till immediately prior to the German occupation of Nantes. This, and her own story, convey a highly confused picture of what she was actually doing in these four months, inasmuch as it seems highly probable that LONSDALE and her husband were engaged in secret intelligence work of some kind, though on whose behalf is not clear.

LONSDALE refused to leave France as the Germans advanced, with the result that the story of her doings from the occupation of Nantes down to her arrival in Vichy territory rests exclusively on her own words. That story is as follows. The Germans, on their arrival in Nantes, did not molest LONSDALE, and she soon began to take advantage of her continued liberty to engage on her own account in

collecting intelligence for the benefit of the Allies. On 15.11.41 she was caught by the Germans flagrante delicto, arrested, rigorously examined by the head of the Abwehr counterespionage department for North West France located at Angers, and thrown into prison. From this predicament she was rescued by the efforts of one 'Rene', described as personal assistant to the head of the Angers station and a pre-war acquaintance of LONSDALE's. 'Rene' obtained her release on condition that she worked for the Abwehr; this condition she duly accepted to save her life. Curiously, 'Rene' at this point revealed himself as an opponent of Germany, and implied that his real reason in engaging LONSDALE as an Abwehr agent was that she should collaborate with him in passing on to the British Intelligence the valuable information 'Rene' possessed. Accordingly, on 5.4.41, she left for Marseilles, ostensibly on an Abwehr mission, actually to contact, on 'Rene's' instructions, the British Intelligence, and to give certain information of which 'Rene' had already apprised her. In Marseilles she attempted to obtain a quick passage to England, but failed. She aroused the suspicions of certain British authorities in that city by her conduct, but this did not prevent her putting her story across GARROW of M.I.9, who, as a result, recruited her as an agent to act as go-between to 'Rene'. On GARROW's instructions she returned in 6.41 to the Occupied Zone in order to recontact 'Rene' and bring back any further information he might have accumulated, and in the course of the next month she plied regularly between the two zones as GARROW's liaison agent with 'Rene'. In 7.41 a further complication was introduced in that the Vichy authorities tumbled to the activities of GARROW, LONSDALE and other M.I.9. representatives. This was regulated by a compromise, the Ile Bureau chief agreeing to leave LONSDALE at liberty on condition that she supplied him with any intelligence from 'Rene' bearing on German secret intelligence activities in Vichy territory.

About 10.9.41 LONSDALE learned through a secret ink letter from 'Rene' that she was blown, since the Abwehr had learnt that she was working for the French. This was closely followed by information from the Ile Bureau chief that the Germans had applied for her arrest and extradition, and by the arrest of GARROW on 2.10.41. LONSDALE therefore found her position untenable, and left France on GARROW's instructions, in order to convey an account of the whole affair to London and to distract attention from such of GARROW's subordinates as had escaped the round-up. She accordingly flew to Lisbon and arrived in this country on 5.11.41. In view of the fact that her own part in the arrest of GARROW was not clear, she was treated as suspect.

LONSDALE followed up this story with repeated requests to be enlisted as an agent of the British Intelligence, to be sent back in this capacity to France in order to transmit direct the valuable intelligence she would obtain from 'Rene'.

A close observation of LONSDALE's character and activities after her arrival, combined with the utter improbability of there existing a traitor in the Abwehr in the form of 'Rene', led to an unhesitating rejection of both LONSDALE's story and her offer of services. Although the true story has never been obtained, there is little doubt that LONSDALE arrived here for the purpose of penetrating S.I.S. in the German interest and establishing a deception mechanism in the guise of reports purporting to emanate from the traitor 'Rene'. In qualification of this view of the case, however, it is necessary to add that the information LONSDALE alleged 'Rene' had supplied to her for passing to the British Intelligence was found, on reference to S.I.S., to be quite accurate and indeed important. Although of course it is possible to interpret this as signifying that the 'Rene' story is true, it seems more probable that this represented the Abwehr's attempt to build up LONSDALE as a d.a., and the comparative importance and accuracy of the information sacrificed in building her up is a valuable indication of the importance the Abwehr attached to LONSDALE's own potentialities as a double cross agent.

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b. PELLETIER.

On 15.4.42 PELLETIER, French and accredited agent of the Fighting French Forces, arrived at Liverpool from Vichy territory via Gibraltar. He was treated on arrival as suspect, for reasons which will appear in the sequel, and duly arrested, examined and broken by the French in the same day. At this point the case was handed over to M.I.5.

His story of his doings in France subsequent to his arrival as revealed by his confession is as follows. For the first three months he occupied himself in contacting a number of agents in the Free Zone as instructed. On 28.6.42 instructions were received from London that he was to proceed to Paris for the purpose of making a contact there. For some reason with which he is unacquainted, the contact never materialised, and in consequence he decided to return to the Unoccupied Zone. On 29.7.42 he was caught whilst crossing the demarcation line in the neighbourhood of Bourges. Although on PELLETIER's story there is no reason for believing that the Germans at this stage possessed any information about him other than that he was a mere transgressor of the demarcation line, he was at once removed to Fresnes Prison at Paris. Here he was submitted to a rigorous examination, as a result of which he broke and confessed. He states that the principal reason for the German success in thus breaking down his resistance was that they possessed so much information about the activities of de Gaullist agents in the Occupied and Unoccupied Zones that to continue in his denials appeared to him pointless. Having confessed, the Germans put to him the proposition that he should work as an agent in their interest, for the purpose of double crossing the British Intelligence. He accepted this proposition, largely because of the pressure the Germans put on him in informing him that his parents, who were still living in Paris, were in their power and would suffer if PELLETIER did not meet their wishes.

On 25.10.42 an escape was arranged for PELLETIER by the Germans, the outline of which was that he was taken away from the prison by ambulance to hospital, pretending to suffer from appendicitis, later 'escaping' from the hospital. His instructions, as given to him by the Germans were as follows. In the first place he was to return to the Unoccupied Zone and rejoin his network, and transmit to the Germans in Paris full information, especially W/T and cryptographic, about the operations and identities of these other agents. He was also equipped with secret writing materials and post boxes for this purpose. In the second place he was told that if he performed this first function satisfactorily he would be contacted in the Free Zone by a German agent who would give him detailed instructions for a mission to England. Although this contact was never made PELLETIER knows that the general nature of his assignment in this country was to have been to get himself introduced into the wireless section of the British Intelligence organisation running agents in the Free Zone, and, from this position of advantage, transmit to the Germans by one of the British sets information respecting the traffic arrangements, identities of new agents in training, and identities of the controlling organisation in London.

After his release he proceeded as instructed to the Unoccupied Zone, and it is significant that two Free French agents, his former colleagues, whom he happened to contact shortly after his release,

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were immediately arrested by the Germans. On 17.11.41 he decided to make his way back to England for a reason which is not, on his own statement, entirely clear. It is at least known that during his residence in the Free Zone he aroused the suspicions of his fighting French colleagues, and was in periodic communication by secret writing with the Abwehr, Paris. He successfully reached Gibraltar, after a stay of 3 months in Miranda Concentration Camp, and returned to this country in the manner already stated. Meantime, the information of the suspicions entertained against PELLETIER by his former colleagues had reached London, and it was for this reason that PELLETIER was treated on arrival as suspect.

4. The following general conclusions may be drawn from this survey.

It is clear that in their attempts to penetrate S.O.E. and S.I.S. the Germans use two different types of agent. First is the accredited agent of either of these two organisations, who has been caught by the Germans and turned round.

Mr. Harmer's note, which is concerned exclusively with this type of penetration agent, emphasises that there is a common element in all of them in the "escape" story they are told to tell, which is supposed by the Germans to account for the agents having been in touch with the Germans. It will be seen that the case of PELLETIER and, to some extent, that of LONSDALE too, fully support Mr. Harmer's conclusion on this point.

A second type is the agent who is not already ^{an} accredited member of either of the two organisations in question, and of these WALLEM and EVENSEN afford examples. Since agents of this type do not fall within the category of accredited agents of S.O.E. or S.I.S. it of course follows that the responsibility for their examination on arrival in this country lies with the L.R.C. in just the same way as does the case of any other normal arrival. It is therefore clear that in this matter M.I.5. has a responsibility to S.O.E. and S.I.S. in order that agents of this class shall not be allowed to succeed in their penetration intentions, the case of the "OLAF" being a striking illustration of how matters can go wrong in this respect. From the foregoing survey it seems that the following inferences can fairly be made, which may be of assistance to the L.R.C. in detecting this type of penetration agent. In the case of WALLEM the Germans appear to have relied simply and solely on his excellent W/T qualifications, and his professed willingness to return to Norway in the British service. In the case of EVENSEN a rather subtler technique is apparent, inasmuch as he was told to ingratiate himself with WESTRUM, who was, in turn, associated with a resistance organisation in Norway. It was clearly the German view that his connection with WESTRUM would constitute in the eyes of the British Intelligence an additional reason why EVENSEN should return to Norway. It therefore appears that the L.R.C. should treat with strong suspicion any arrivals who profess willingness to return to occupied territory as British agents, especially when they attempt to emphasise their qualifications for this work by pointing to a period of service or some other connection with a resistance organisation in Norway prior to their arrival here.

Whether it is within the capacity of the L.R.C. to examine these cases with the care they require in the absence of full and up to date information from S.O.E. and S.I.S. as to the fate of such parts of their organisations as may at times come to the attention of the Abwehr is an open question. On the face of it, however, it would certainly seem that if S.O.E. and S.I.S. wish to ensure that M.I.5. does not clear agents of this type as sound from a security point of view, it is necessary that they should contribute to the common security machine, by making this information available to M.I.5. as and when they procure it.

There is, of course, one category which lies in between the accredited agent who has been turned round and the intended penetrator who does not enjoy accredited status, and that is the agent recruited by S.O.E. or S.I.S. in the field. It will be seen, however, that the cases which have so far come to our attention do not include any example of an agent recruited

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in the field being used as a penetrator. It is none the less true that this category is a continual potential menace, and here again it seems very questionable whether the L.R.C. can be in a position to deal with these individuals in the absence of regular and up to date information as to the security of the organisation abroad by which the agent professes himself to have been recruited.

J.P. de C. Day

J.P. de C. Day.

B.1.B.
13.3.43.

for H.P. Milmo.

immediate target of British counter-espionage is therefore ^{penetration} Abteilung I and Abteilung II of the Abwehr. The protection of our own offensive organisations working abroad is primarily a matter of combatting Abteilung III of the Abwehr - the C.E. department.

INTERNAL MEMORANDUM.

SF-521010B³

From..... Mr. Milmo. B.I.B.

To..... Mr. Curry. Research.

~~Mr. Fokler.~~

As requested herewith a typed copy of some preliminary notes which I made on the subject which we discussed on the morning of 3.3.43., together with the initial paragraphs of the paper upon which I embarked but never completed. I trust that some of the ideas expressed may be of assistance to you.

Bib Mr Milmo

Many thanks

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

Date..... 8.3.43.

Signature.....

H.P. Milmo

Form 161/B.P./15000/9.42.

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organisation appears to interest itself in keeping a day to day on the security of operations, a function which one would have thought would have been the principal concern of their security department.

I am not in a position to know the precise extent to which the losses suffered are due to the penetration but I have seen sufficient papers to realise that these losses have been serious and the penetration extensive. But to what extent a counter-espionage umbrella operating in occupied territory could have prevented these disasters or, acting in a salvage capacity, mitigate

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Major Robertson.

I attach my note on the escape cases. I hope th
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POINTS.

1. Working of agents in specified areas with function to identify and penetrate German C.E. organisation.
2. Organisation charged with detection of espionage and sabotage cells which enemy will leave behind.
3. Cashing in on our information derived from Ham and other sources.
4. If ISOS lost where would we be.
5. Long term nature of German penetration.
6. Personal attacks of individuals - Drawing off the opposition.
7. Centralised study of causes of losses.
8. Constant expert study of cases of agents in the field.
9. Menace to domestic security of penetration in the field.
10. Number of agents sent over here to penetrate.

Major Robertson.

I attach my note on the escape cases. I hope that it is what you want and I have not gone outside my province.

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OBJECTIVES.

1. Immediate protection of agents in the field.
2. Meeting threat to domestic security constituted by penetration of organisations in the field.
3. Turning to proper advantage the vast wealth of intelligence collected from Ham and other sources relating to the personnel, addresses, methods etc. of the Abwehr in occupied territory.
4. Long term work to detect the espionage and sabotage cells which the retreating enemy will leave behind him.

- (a) Dumping off dangerous people.
- (b) Cashing in on G.S. intelligence collected at H.Q.

2. Central study of failures in the field and their causes. This may be done, but no evidence that it is. Must tie up both S.I.S. and S.O.S.
3. Constant review of security of operations. This must be done centrally and from day to day. Files must be properly kept.

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Major Robertson.

I attach my note on the escape cases. I hope that it is what you want and I have not gone outside my province in making recommendations. Might I also suggest that either Day or Stamp of B.L.B. gets out short summaries of cases such as PELLETIER and BOYD as I have, with regard to ERUTUS and ANCHOR, as I feel certain that a very definite chain of similarity will be discernible in all cases. It might then be possible for somebody on behalf of B.L.A. and B.L.B. to put up a joint paper on this subject.

The ERUTUS facts have been disguised as much as possible, so that if the memorandum is submitted to S.O.E. we will not be violating the undertaking I gave to not to disclose the true facts about WALBENNY to that organisation.

B.L.A.
15.2.43.

G. Harner
G.H. Harner.

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ESCAPE CASES.

1. GENERAL.

There are an increasing number of cases of British or allied agents returning to this country after having been captured by the Germans and imprisoned, and subsequently having escaped. In two such cases which have been dealt with by B.I.A., the agent, on returning, has confessed that his escape was arranged by the German authorities on condition that he accepted a mission for them to be performed in this country. Two further cases are under review by B.I.A., but no such admission has yet been obtained, although a strong probability exists in one case that the escape was similarly arranged. As it appears that a great number of enemy agents who come to this country, start their intelligence life as agents working against the Germans, the following memorandum is put forward setting out various principles which can be derived from our investigation of the two cases and the difficulties of dealing with them, and suggested methods of approach to similar cases in the future.

2. The BRUTUS and ANCHOR Cases.

The two cases to which reference has been made above are shortly as follows.

(a) BRUTUS. This man was an allied officer who ran a very large espionage organisation in Paris from the end of 1940 to the end of 1941. He was then arrested and imprisoned. He received no harsh treatment from the Germans, nor was he interrogated in any detail, but this fact is not very surprising in view of other developments within his organisation. About a week after his arrest he was allowed to see in prison his mistress, who urged on him, on behalf of the Germans, the advisability of collaborating with them in working against the allies. She was accompanied by a German officer who then left them alone for half an hour. The reply of BRUTUS was that no collaboration would be possible, as it would react solely to the detriment of his compatriots. After three months of imprisonment, during the latter part of which the Germans arranged considerable improvements in his living conditions, the matter was brought up again, probably on BRUTUS' initiative. Discussions then took place for about three months and ultimately BRUTUS accepted a mission on behalf of the Germans on condition that his escape from prison was arranged. The basic factors of his mission were the following:

- (i) The Germans admitted that his main loyalty should be to his own country, but persuaded him that in working for them he was helping his country.
- (ii) The Germans made him sign a declaration agreeing to work for them and acknowledging their right to hold relatives and his fiancée as hostages.
- (iii) The Germans prepared his escape story, but it was not put into effect, i.e. he did not go through the motions of escaping as in the case of ANCHOR.
- (iv) He was given W/T. crystals to bring to this country to enable him to construct a W/T set. His mission was to give military information and also to try and persuade leading circles in his own government in London to collaborate with the Germans in the new order in Europe.
- (v) From and after his release from prison his movements were practically unsupervised and he was allowed to make his own arrangements for escaping from occupied territory.

BRUTUS "escaped" from the Fresnes prison on July 29th 1942. His story was that he was being taken to an interrogation at the Gestapo Headquarters. He was travelling in a civilian motor car with a driver and an escort. The escort arrived late and the driver was in a hurry so that he should not be late for his appointment. He therefore drove recklessly and finally had an accident, when he became involved in a column of marching soldiers, it being the day of a great military parade in Paris. Finally, in order to prevent a collision the driver was forced to swerve violently and crash on all his brakes, which threw both the occupants in the back of the car on to the floor and enabled BRUTUS to escape. BRUTUS dived through the ranks of the soldiers, thereby placing the marching column between himself and the escort. He then escaped and ultimately found his way to unoccupied France, Spain and Gibraltar. BRUTUS continually emphasized his extreme weakness at the moment of his escape and therefore told the story of having proceeded initially in short stages, first of all resting in a waiting motor car, then in a public convenience and then on a seat in the park.

On arrival in England, BRUTUS, who as an agent had worked under the direct orders of his own Intelligence Service, was examined by them for over a month. On arrival, he told his chief that he would have important information to impart in a month's time. He was treated, naturally, as an honoured guest and no search was carried out, and his crystals were therefore not found. His story was taken down in very great detail by his own government service, who formed the conclusion that the escape had been arranged by the Germans, but that he, in view of his previous record of faithful service, did not know about it. They suspected some subtle and indirect gesture on the part of the Germans. About a month after his arrival, however, he wrote out the correct story of his escape and offered to work for the British. It can be said that although his story left a vague feeling of uneasiness in the minds of everybody, he would probably have got away with it if he had not confessed.

(b) ANCHOR. ANCHOR is a young Norwegian who escaped from Norway and came to this country, and was recruited to go back as a secret agent to organise an underground movement there. He returned to Norway by sea, operating in the spring of 1942. He set up his headquarters in his home town and carried out valuable service in training local teams in guerrilla tactics. At the beginning of May, 1942, he was arrested in his home by the Gestapo, tried to escape and was badly shot up. For many weeks he lay in a perilous condition, but ultimately recovered sufficiently to be interrogated. He was seen by FIMMER, the chief of the Gestapo in Oslo, who impressed on him the advantages of collaboration with the Germans and finally allowed him to see in prison and alone an elderly Swede who had also been caught in Norway and whose life had been spared as a result of his collaborating fully with the Germans. ANCHOR stated that after this he pretended to break down and told the story which was accepted by the Germans, with the result that his treatment improved and their confidence in him was built up. Finally, at the end of September, he told them that he would show them an arms dump in the woods near Oslo and was taken out there by two Gestapo men. All this time he had pretended to be very weak in the legs and was supported by one man on each side. At an appropriate moment he knocked down the two guards and disappeared in the woods, finally finding his way back to Oslo where he hid and then escaped. In actual fact FIMMER's tactics broke him down completely and he told everything. He was then allowed to escape on condition that he accepted a mission in England. The basic factors about his mission are the following:

- (i) It was emphasized that he was accepting the mission not for Germany but in order to help the cause of Norway, which was only being damaged by agents sent from England.
- (ii) He was told that if he confessed his mission on arrival in England we would shoot him as a traitor and also the Germans would shoot his relatives and fiancée.

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- (iii) The Germans not only prepared this escape story, but he also carried it out in every detail, including knocking down the two Gestapo agents who were escorting him.
- (iv) He was given the mission to come to this country where he was to report on the organization of the underground movement in Norway and the names of agents going back, and also the names of agents provocateurs known to the British as working for the Germans. He was to give this information in code in letters which he could give to agents going back and ask them to post. If possible he was to receive training in W/T and communicate with Oslo in code.
- (v) Having escaped he was left entirely to his own devices in organizing his journey to Sweden, and no real supervision appears to have been exercised by the Germans over his movements from that time.

On arrival in this country, ANCHOR was treated as BRUTUS, and told the false story of his escape. Once again the interrogators were left with a strong feeling of uneasiness, but the character of ANCHOR was such that it appeared impossible that he should be a German agent. After many weeks of investigation therefore, the case was about to be closed down when reliable information was received from Norway which enabled ANCHOR to be broken when he confessed his true story.

It is unnecessary to draw attention to the similarity between this case and the case of BRUTUS, but it should be observed that it was, if anything, better prepared in that the actual events of the "escape" took place.

3. The Advantages to the Germans of this Method of Recruiting Agents.

The evidence of these two cases and the extreme similarity of approach, starting off with the visit to the prison of an independent person urging him to collaborate, justifies one in drawing a conclusion that the Germans are working on a pre-arranged plan. Psychologically this appears to be absolutely right. They get hold of an agent who is in a very queer emotional state, having had instilled in to him an enormous amount of propaganda about Gestapo frightfulness. They then set about showing a mixture of harshness and friendliness and set about persuading him that he is not a traitor to his own country by collaborating with them. In this way they satisfy his conscience at the prospect of making terms with them. They then force him to accept a mission on condition that he is released at the same time, ensuring that they hold hostages against when they will not if he betrays his mission. They then, as in the ANCHOR case, give him a story which he can tell and which so far as the escape is concerned, is the literal truth. They reason out, quite rightly, that on arrival in England he will not be searched and therefore can bring in with him all the impediments of a spy, - that he will be treated in an informal and friendly manner and that any sort of hostile interrogation of an agent, who has risked and almost lost his life in our service, is extremely distasteful and improbable, - that in telling his story there will be no point on which he will have to lie and therefore no possibility of ever catching him out and that the agent will be debarred from telling the truth to the British, not only by his feeling of shame at having betrayed them but also for fear of reprisals against himself and against the hostages who remain in German hands. It may be that they also think that the effects of their propaganda will remain after he arrives in this country and he will genuinely feel that he is serving his own country's good. In the Brutus case the Germans have communicated with him on a few occasions and go out of their way whenever possible to stress that he is serving his own country by carrying out his mission. It cannot be overstated that the above sort of escape story is an extremely difficult one to break. One may be left with all sorts of vague suspicions, but they are practically impossible to prove and over and above everything will remain the feeling that it is inequitable to imprison a man who has rendered faithful service in the past as an agent.

It is considered therefore that the Germans are acting very cleverly in their approach to these cases though whether any of these sorts of agents would actually work for them is another matter. The problem, however, is to us as a security service a very grave one in that it relates to returned agents who are not strictly within our province. This note will therefore set out various suggestions for dealing with these cases.

4. Suggested Methods For Dealing With These Cases.

In the BRUNUS case, after he had confessed his true mission, ~~he~~^{his own Government} set up a military court of enquiry in pursuance of a rule of military law that any man taken prisoner by the enemy has got to have his conduct examined by a court of enquiry. This court of enquiry then set out to answer the question whether an agent was justified in accepting a mission in order to escape, and answered the question in the affirmative subject to three conditions which were the following:

- (i) That no other means of escape was open to the agent.
- (ii) That he did not save his life at the expense of betraying other people, particularly subordinates.
- (iii) That he told the whole truth immediately he was out of enemy hands.

Both the setting up of a court of enquiry and the above statement of principle appear to be sound; although it is difficult for a person who recruited an agent to be tough with him, it is always possible for a military court under the guise of extreme formality to do so. The first principle therefore, which I feel should be accepted by both the two intelligence services concerned is that any man who has ever been in the hands of the enemy should have an investigation of this nature.

The second point is that I feel fairly confident that the main reason for withholding the true story in other cases will not be so much the fear of reprisals against the subjects family in occupied territory, but the feeling of shame and the fear of the consequences over here. This can, I am certain, be overcome if the matter is presented properly to the escaped agent on arrival. It is obviously rather a tricky business, because one cannot make promises to him, but if it could be put somewhat along the lines of an enunciation of the principles set out by the court in the BRUNUS case, coupled with a suggestion that in order to save the relatives over there the mission might still be carried out under the orders of the British, ~~it~~ it might well be possible to induce the right state of mind for a full confession.

5. Proposals.

I was not asked to make any specific proposals but for what they are worth I suggest the following:

- (i) That both S.I.S. and S.O.E. should be asked for particulars with regard to all returned agents who have escaped from the enemy.
- (ii) That the possibilities of a complete search of all returning agents should be investigated.
- (iii) That all agents who have escaped from the enemy should be made in the first instance, before being allowed complete liberty, to write out a full account of their escape.
- (iv) That if this discloses any possibility of having been an arranged escape by the Germans, they should then be dealt with in an extremely formal way in interrogation. In this

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(iv) (cont.) connection I feel that the approach that they are only being interrogated in order to obtain useful information which will be of vital use to agents going into the field, etc. is the wrong one. It must be impressed on them that their conduct is upon enquiry and they must in all cases at some stage be bluffed.

6. Appendix.

In the appendix I am setting out various particulars on the CROW and LARK cases which do not yet come within the category of escape cases dealt with above, though in my view LARK will ultimately be broken and confess to having had his escape arranged.

E R T Y U
APPENDIX.

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Short Particulars of the CROW and LARK Cases.

A. CROW.

This man is a Norwegian who came to this country from America after the capitulation of Norway. He was recruited and trained as a wireless operator to go back as part of an organisation working in Norway. He was given away by ANCHOR and caught by D/Ping from the air on 25th July, 1942. In prison he was broken by the Gestapo (the case being under the control of PEEPER) and agreed to operate his set under the orders of the Germans which he did for several months. Meanwhile we had independent knowledge that he was working under control and played him along with stories of assumed contacts who were coming. This enabled him to persuade the Germans to release him, so that he could appear to be at liberty if the contacts checked up before approaching him. He was allowed his liberty on condition that he worked for the Germans in Norway. He was told that his relatives would be victimized if he double-crossed the Germans. He worked and lived in close relations with the Gestapo. At Christmas time 1942 hearing that a very large number of the Gestapo were going back to Germany for Christmas leave he escaped into Sweden with his mother, wife and family. He has been very closely examined, but so far it has not become apparent that his escape to Sweden was arranged. It would certainly be out of keeping with the other cases for the Germans to allow him to bring with him the only people they could hold as hostages. This is more important in the particular case of CROW who is obviously an unreliable character and not the same type as ANCHOR.

B. LARK. *~ Noyant*

W/T
This man is a Norwegian who was recruited in the field in the spring of 1942, brought over to England and after a short training of a month or so, sent back to his own town in Norway under his proper name. He was captured by the Gestapo in Trondheim on December 16th, 1942 at the home of a W/T operator. He states that he was held in prison for three days, during which time he was beaten up severely and finally confessed to having had some dealings with an underground organisation. He states that he told a false story and that the Germans had no idea that he had been sent from England. They accepted his story subject to checking and decided to move him from the cells in the Gestapo headquarters to the local prison. He was marched through the streets on the evening of Saturday, December 19th, loosely chained to another prisoner with an armed German guard following him. On arrival at the steps of the prison he allowed the guard to draw level and then slipped his chain and disappeared, ultimately finding his way to Sweden.

R. Sealey

PP. C.H. Harter.

B.I.A.
15.2.43.